Article Review - Hypnosis, Memory and the Ethics of Uncertainty

'Navigating Uncharted Waters'

An Article Review

The article 'Hypnosis, Memory, and the Ethics of Uncertainty' by Kevin M. McConkey, published in the March 1995 Australian Psychologist (Vol 30, No. 1), is a prime example of effective communication concerning the ethical behaviour of psychologists in situations in which progress is hindered by ambiguity. The article is in fact the publication of his presidential address to the Australian Psychological Society at their 29th Annual Conference in September 1994. The presentation deals exclusively with the difficulties being faced by psychologists using hypnosis as an aide to reconstructing memory. McConkey (1995) has had a great deal of experience within this field, something which is effectively demonstrated in the introduction to his article. He makes the point in his conclusion that while addressing a larger issue, he deals specifically with hypnosis and memory because this is the material with which he is most familiar. This, while fulfilling one of the requirements of a presidential address in summarizing the interests of the speaker, ensures that his article, and the issues contained within it, are within his area of competence. Due to the fact that McConkey (1995) deals with hypnosis exclusively, there may be the temptation for anyone reading his article to assume that hypnosis itself is the issue under investigation, when instead it is the professional behaviour of psychologists that is being addressed and the ethical repercussions of such behaviour.

McConkey's (1995) article is clear and coherent, providing clear definitions of the terms which he is addressing, empirical evidence in the form of studies and reviews detailing research in that particular area, as well as case studies which serve to further illustrate and clarify the topic. While this is all well and good, it may be said that McConkey (1995) draws almost exclusively from past research and documented evidence rather than giving any particular personal commentary outside his involvement in the case studies. Under the circumstances, this is the best approach. In an article which attempts to suggest that psychologists need to keep themselves informed and act in a professional manner rather than get wrapped up in the often highly emotional and confusing domain of hypnosis, minimizing ambiguous statements and maximizing on scientific research is not only advantageous but cautious. The goal is to inform rather than to further confuse therapists involved in the ethics of uncertainty.

It would seem that this article would be best read alongside McConkey & Sheehan (in press) which contributed to the formulation of the guidelines found in the appendix. Whereas this article is a tight summation intended as a presidential address to the Australian Psychological Society, the earlier publication is a more scientific investigation of hypnosis and memory. More specifically, McConkey and Sheehan (in press) developed test guidelines and a program of research from their experience conducting and evaluating a number of cases of hypnosis being used within criminal investigation. This earlier article coupled with the one currently under review, when read in conjunction with the guidelines formulated, give a clearer understanding of the situation under investigation. However, his presidential address serves to effectively highlight the ethical dilemma being faced within this field of research.

A great deal of what McConkey (1995) addresses within his article can be seen as an example of common sense, unfortunately, the disappointment is that this sense may not be so common after all. Amongst a community of scientific, educated, caring psychologists, the consequences of such a thought are catastrophic to say the least. Any erosion of trust, judgment, truth or professional conduct can only damage psychology as an ethical profession. As McConkey (1995) states, reiterating Hess (1987), "(c)ircumstances of ambiguity almost always lead to ethical vulnerability". Kevin McConkey's (1995) principle argument is that well-meaning therapists, acting in ignorance of what is known about memory, emotion and the human condition, are putting psychology as a science and profession in jeopardy. The danger is that false or ambiguous memories are going to be accepted as veridical due to zealousness and excess. That is, cases of genuine trauma may be overlooked as psychology becomes a soft target for ridicule due to the seemingly justified links in the public mind between reports of abuse given in therapy and bizarre claims of alien abduction, past lives and satanic rituals. In fact, I would suggest that McConkey (1995), other than making a passing reference, doesn't seem to give any indication of exaclty what the public perception of the use of hypnosis in the therapeutic setting are. Most likely this is through no fault of his own, not only because it detracts from the crux of his argument, but research into this area may be lacking.

The two principal difficulties seem to be that while (a) therapists are accepting as true either distorted or false memories, and (b) clients are jumping to conclusions about the truth or falsity of their memories. While therapists are required to be empathic towards their clients, they are moving towards excess in accepting accounts only on grounds that a high level of emotionality was exhibited during their reports. Similarly, as McConkey (1995) acknowledges both here and in McConkey and Sheehan (in press), the apparent simplicity of the situation masks the complexity of human needs and emotions that lie behind material reported as memory. Clients, not only in danger being in a state of high suggestibility, are more prone to believing false claims obtained via hypnosis as true and important to them. This can also be demonstrated by the laboratory phenomenon of 'confident errors', as reported by McConkey (1995) in the section on Hypnosis and Memory in the Laboratory, dealing specifically with hypnotic hypermnesia and hypnotic pseudomemory. Imagine the difficulty in dismissing reports when such powerful emotions are invested in the final results of continued therapy. Not only is the psychologist in danger of being seen as confrontational and/or upsetting to the client, but the client may begin to doubt themselves if it is suddenly suggested that the memories they have retrieved are false or distorted in some way. McConkey's (1995) guidelines acknowledge that scientific evidence cannot address the issue of repressed memories, and he himself proposes that therapists need to work with clients to explore ways of ensuring the authenticity of their memories. Unfortunately, this puts a great deal of responsibility on individual psychologists.

Therapists and clients using hypnosis as an aide in the recall of past memories of childhood abuse or similar trauma are operating in an area which as scientists and practitioners we can only call 'uncertain'. McConkey's (1995) article, and more so the recommendations included in the appendix, provide guidelines for navigating this uncertain terrain. The 'Guidelines Relating to the Reporting of Recovered Memories' are quite expansive, covering Scientific, Clinical, Ethical, Legal and Research Issues. While this provides an excellent starting point for the formulation of professional standards, the buck stops with the psychologists themselves. As psychologists it is important that it there is an acknowledge that memory is not a reliable human faculty - it's malleable and distorts itself according to what is sometimes the slightest (if unintended) suggestion or outside influence. Before the intervention of the APS, responsibility needs to be taken by the individual psychologist in recognizing that they may have made an error. While McConkey (1995) acknowledges that the psychologist will no doubt experience difficulties in recognizing and managing ambiguity, his best suggestion is that we become overnight clairvoyants in our ability to foresee the consequences of our actions. He draws from Goldman (1986) in this respect, both men implying that the involvement of a psychologist in legal proceedings (for example, to procure possible testimony) will most likely end up doing more harm than good. More often than not, a large amount of time is spent interviewing witnesses or victims of past abuse only to find that their reports cannot be confidently verified. McConkey (1995) includes three case studies which serve to verify this. This is no doubt an issue which also has particular repercussions in legal proceedings, hence the additional pressure to formulate policy due to the forensic applications of the work.

Overall, Kevin McConkey's (1995) article is an extremely interesting, succinct and poignant indicator of the current ethical pitfalls which endanger the progress of those dealing within the ethics of uncertainty. It's clarity, a result of the logical and coherent format McConkey (1995) has adopted of dividing the topic into easy to digest subheadings, is matched only by it's science - McConkey (1995) has more than sufficiently supported all his assertions with empirical evidence. This article accomplishes a very important goal in providing both a credible summary of the situation as well as suggestions for further progress in research which may help the lone therapist feel more confident in proceeding.

References

Goldman, A. H. (1986). Cognitive psychologists as expert witness. Law and Human Behavior, 10, 29-46.
Hess, A. K. (1987). The ethics of forensic psychology. In I. B. Weiner & A. K. Hess (Eds.), Handbook of forensic psychology (pp. 653-680). New York: Wiley.
McConkey, K. (1995). Hypnosis, memory and the ethics of uncertainty. Australian Psychologist, 30, 1-10.
McConkey, K. M., & Sheehan, P. W. (in press). Hypnosis, memory, and behavior in the forensic setting. New York: Guilford.

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