CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE,

AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

ALL STATES, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have

been and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been

long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza,

or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of

the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that

of the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a

prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms

of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another

place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only

to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated

above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and

preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary

states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince,

than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs

of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they

arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his

state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive

force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything

sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not

have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of

Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his

dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity

to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless

extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to

expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards

him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and

motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves

the toothing for another.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it

be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which,

taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly

from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new

principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to

better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms

against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they

afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This

follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always

causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his

soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon

his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in

seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those

friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy

them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures

against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very

strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need

of the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan,

and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only

needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates

to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future

benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is

very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,

they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with

little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish

the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen

himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan

the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise

insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second

time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that

his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which

followed from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the

second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it

remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he

had, and what any one in his situation would have had for

maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King

of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an

ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country

and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold

them, especially when they have not been accustomed to

self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have

destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the

two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not

being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen

in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to

France for so long a time: and, although there may be some

difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the

people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has

annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind

two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is

extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are

altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one

body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,

customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great

energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most

real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside

there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has

made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other

measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled

there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on

the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly

remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they heard of only when they

are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not

pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt

recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause

to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would

attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as

long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him

with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two

places, which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to

do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and

infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or

no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends

a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to

give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining

poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest

being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are

anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to

those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these

colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and

the injured, as has been said, I being poor and scattered, cannot

hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well

treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter

injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury

that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does

not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends

much more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the

state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are

exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the

shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with

hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst

beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason,

therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above

respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful

neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking

care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any

accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a

one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through

excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The

Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other

country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the

inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a

powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are

drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling

power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take

any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them

quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to

take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much

authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he

can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain

entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage

this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he

does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely

these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations

with the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept

down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to

gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The

Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of

Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the

Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase

their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the

Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the

influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any

lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances

what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only

present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare

with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy

them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer

in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in

this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the

beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect,

but in the course of time, not having been either detected or

treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to

cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that

arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to

see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been

foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can

see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans,

foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a

war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is

not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others;

moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so

as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but

this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for

ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:- Let us enjoy the

benefits of the time- but rather the benefits of their own valour

and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to

bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of

the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis [XII] (and not of

Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed,

he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you

will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought

to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the

Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his

intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king,

because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends

there- seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the

conduct of Charles- he was forced to accept those friendships which he

could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if

in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however,

having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles

had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the

Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, my lady of

Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of

Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese- everybody made

advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize

the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they

might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of

two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king

could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the

rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and

protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and

timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they

would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means

he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained

powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by

assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to

him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of

friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he

aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual,

thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error,

he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to

the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of

Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and

deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,

divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime

arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of

that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to

shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own

pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able

to drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men

always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not

blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,

then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have

attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if

she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the

partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was

justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this

other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that

necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor

powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in

Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the

country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were

not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away

their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized

the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very

reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken

these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they,

being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on

Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except

to become masters themselves there; also because the others would

not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the

Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the

courage.

And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to

Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the

reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid

war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your

disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king

had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in

exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen,

to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of

princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the

conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries

and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but

much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I

spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino,* as Cesare Borgia, the son

of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on

Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand

war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft,

meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach

such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the

Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin

may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which

never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming

powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about

either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by

him who has been raised to power.

* So called- in Italian- from the duchy of Valentinois, conferred on

him by Louis XII.

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER,

DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties which men have had to hold a newly

acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great

became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was yet

scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole

empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained

themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which

arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found

to be governed in two different ways: either by a prince, with a

body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by

his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that

dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such

barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords

and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed

by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more

consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is

recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to

another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear

him any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and

the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one

lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into

sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and

changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the

midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,

and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the

king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who

considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in

seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease

in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom

of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of

the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the

revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the

reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and

bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can

expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as

they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned.

Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him

united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on

the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and

routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies,

there is nothing to fear but the family of the prince, and, this being

exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no

credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them

before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France,

because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the

kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change.

Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and

render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you

meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you

and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have

exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain

make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you

are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost

whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of

Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and

therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow

him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which

victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to

Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been

united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for

there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked

themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states

constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions

against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many

principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the

memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession;

but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of

them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And

when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to

attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the

authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord

being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with

which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties

which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many

more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability

in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH

LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

WHENEVER those states which have been acquired as stated have been

accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are

three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin

them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit

them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing

within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because

such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot

stand without his friendship and interest, and does its utmost to

support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to

freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than

in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans

held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy,

nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua,

Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They

wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and

permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were

compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth

there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them.

And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not

destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it

has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a

rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it

to forget. And what ever you may do or provide against, they never

forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or

dispersed but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as

Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the

Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a

prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand

accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince,

cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not

know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to

take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them

much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater

hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to

allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest

way is to destroy them or to reside there.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED

BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

LET no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new

principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of

prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths

beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet

unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power

of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths

beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so

that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour

of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the

mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to

which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the

mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height,

but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they

wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there

is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,

accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired

the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private

station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or

other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many

difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is

established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the

prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through

fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,

Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although

one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the

will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which

made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others

who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable;

and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they

will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great

a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see

that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought

them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them.

Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been

extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come

in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people

of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order

that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out

of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,

and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he

should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was

necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the

government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through

their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he

not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore,

made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to

recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and

made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a

principality with difficulty, but they it with ease. The

difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new

rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish

their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered

that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to

conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in

the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has

for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and

lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This

coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws

on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not

readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of

them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the

opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others

defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along

with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter

thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves

or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate

their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In

the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass

anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then

they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have

conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the

reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it

is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that

persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that,

when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe

by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could

not have enforced their constitutions for long- as happened in our

time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order

of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and

he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making

the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great

difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers

are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but

when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are

exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will

continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears

some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a

like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan. This man rose from a private

station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything

to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose

him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made

their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen,

that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to

be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new,

gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers

and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice:

thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but

little in keeping.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED

EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

THOSE who solely by good fortune become princes from being private

citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they

have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they

have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some

state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows

it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the

Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they

might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also

were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being

citizens came to empire. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the

fortune of him who has elevated them- two most inconstant and unstable

things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the position;

because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it is not

reasonable to expect that they should know how to command, having

always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold it

because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and

faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature

which are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and

relations with other states fixed in such a way that the first storm

will not overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly

become princes are men of so much ability that they know they have

to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into

their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid

before they became princes, they must lay afterwards.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability

or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,

and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper

means and with great ability, from being a private person rose to be

Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand

anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare

Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during

the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,

notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that

ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the

states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his

foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but

they will be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the

building. If, therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be

considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his

future power, and I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them,

because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than

the example of his actions; and if his dispositions were of no

avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme

malignity of fortune.

Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many

immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his

way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the

Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the

Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza

and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides

this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might

have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the

Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonna and their following. It

behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the

powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states.

This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved

by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he

would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by

dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king

came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent

of Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers

from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the

reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the

Romagna and beaten the Colonna, while wishing to hold that and to

advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did

not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to

say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which was using, would

not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from winning

more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the King

might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when, after

taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly

to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind when he

himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and the

king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided

to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in

Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,

making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to

their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way

that in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed

and turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an

opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the

Colonna. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini,

perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the

Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione, in the territory

of Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults

in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he

overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his authority,

not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other

outside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well

how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo

[Orsini]- whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of

attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses- the Orsini were

reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at

Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their

partisans into his friends, the duke had laid sufficiently good

foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the duchy of

Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,

he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of

notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it

out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of

weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and

gave them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the

country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and

so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he

considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he

promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco [de Lorqua], a swift and cruel man, to

whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short time restored

peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke

considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive

authority, for he had no doubt but that he would become odious, so

he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent

president, wherein all cities had their advocates. And because he knew

that the past severity had caused some hatred against himself, so,

to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to

himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practised,

it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the

minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused

him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and

a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the

people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding

himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate

dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a

great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure

him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider

France, for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his

mistake, would not support him. And from this time he began to seek

new alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she

was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who

were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against

them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the

future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the

Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him

that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways.

Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had

despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by

winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb

the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by

converting the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much

power before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures

resist the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of

Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the

dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he

had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party

in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become

master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino,

and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study

France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of

Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy

his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and

Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear

of the Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had

he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that

Alexander died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation

that he would have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on

the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and

ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He

left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the

rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick

unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability,

and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were

the foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had

not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he

would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his

foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a

month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and

whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,

they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have

made Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish

would not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the

death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day

that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of

everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had

provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated

that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to

die.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how

to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I

ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or

the arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a

lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his

conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and

his own sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers

it necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win

friends, to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved

and feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the

soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him,

to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and

gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery

and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in

such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with

caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this

man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius II, in whom he made

a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to

his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected

Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of any

cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they

became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom

he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,

San Giorgio, and Ascanio.* Any one of the others, on becoming Pope,

would have had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the

latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his

influence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore,

above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,

failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad

Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages

to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his

choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

* Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; San

Giorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio Sforza.