CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY

BY WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH a prince may rise from a private station in two ways,

neither of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius,

yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although

one could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These

methods are when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends

to the principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a

private person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of

the first method, it will be illustrated by two examples- one ancient,

the other modern- and without entering further into the subject, I

consider these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to

follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a

private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a

potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous

life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability

of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military

profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being

established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make

himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others,

that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an

understanding for this purpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who,

with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the

people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them

things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers

killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead,

he seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil

commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians,

and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his

city, but leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others

he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of

Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were

compelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to

him, had to be content with the possession of Africa.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man

will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune,

inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the

favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession,

which steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and

were afterwards boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers.

Yet it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive

friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such

methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of

Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers be

considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring overcoming

hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the

most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and

inhumanity with infinite wickednesses do not permit him to be

celebrated among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be

attributed either to fortune or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da

Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by

his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his

youth sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his

discipline, he might attain some high position in the military

profession. After Paolo died, he fought under his brother

Vitellozzo, and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a

vigorous body and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But

it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved,

with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their

country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelli,

to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been

away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city,

and in some measure to look into his patrimony; and although he had

not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the

citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to

come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen,

his friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that

he should be received honourably by the citizens of Fermo, all of

which would be not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni

himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his

nephew, and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermans,

and he lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days,

and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs,

Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani

and the chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other

entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished,

Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses, speaking of the

greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their

enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he

rose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more

private place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni

and the rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they

seated than soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered

Giovanni and the rest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on

horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate

in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and

to form a government, of which he made himself the prince. He killed

all the malcontents who were able to injure him, and strengthened

himself with new civil and military ordinances, in such a way that, in

the year during which he held the principality, not only was he secure

in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his

neighbours. And his destruction would have been as difficult as that

of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by

Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia,

as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed this

parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had

made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like,

after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long

secure in his country, and defend himself from external enemies, and

never be conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many

others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful

times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I

believe that this follows from severities being badly or properly

used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to

speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's

security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can

be turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are

those which, notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement,

multiply with time rather than decrease. Those who practise the

first system are able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some

degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who

follow the other to maintain themselves.

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper

ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary

for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have

to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able

to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does

otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to

keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor

can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and

repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so

that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be

given little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in

such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or

evil, shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes

in troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild

ones will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from

you, and no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

BUT coming to the other point- where a leading citizen becomes the

prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable

violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens- this may be called

a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to

attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a

principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by

the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct

parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish

to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule

and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there

arises in cities one of three results, either a principality,

self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,

accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the

nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the

reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that

under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,

finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of

one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his

authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the

nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to

it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with

many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of

this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who

reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has

none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to

others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for

their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter

wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed.

It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself

against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from

the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst

that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by

them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but

also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs

more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save

themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to

prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same

people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make

and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it

pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought

to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either

shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your

fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not

rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind

themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this

through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you

ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good

counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in

adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own

ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they

are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince

ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open

enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people

ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they

only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the

people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above

everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may

easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when

they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound

more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become

more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality

by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many

ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give

fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a

prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in

adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,

and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his

country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it

was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but

this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile.

And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb

that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,' for this is

true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades

himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his

enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very

often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer

Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established

himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed

in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by

his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged- such a

one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown

that he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from

the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either

rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their

government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on

the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and

who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with

great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has

not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because

the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from

magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions,

and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he

can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in

quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then every

one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant

they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state

has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the

more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried

once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his

citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have

need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them

faithful.

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH

OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character

of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power

that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own

resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of

others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are

able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by

abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle

against any one who comes to attack them; and I consider those

always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the

enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by

sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we

will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can say

nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify

their towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever

shall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns

of his subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated,

will never be attacked without great caution, for men are always

adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will

be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well

fortified, and is not hated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little

country around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it

suits them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have

near them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one

thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult,

seeing they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient

artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's

eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people

quiet and without loss to the state, they always have the means of

giving work to the community in those labours that are the life and

strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are

supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover

have many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made

himself odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he

will only be driven off with disgrace; again, because that affairs

of this world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an

army a whole year in the field without being interfered with. And

whoever should reply: If the people have property outside the city,

and see it burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and

self-interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer

that a powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such

difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects that the

evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of

the enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who

seem to him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and

ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are

still hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the

less ought the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when

spirits have cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are

incurred, and there is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so

much the more ready to unite with their prince, he appearing to be

under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and

their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men

to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those they

receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it wilt not be

difficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens

steadfast from first to last, when he does not fail to support and

defend them.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities,

touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession,

because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they

can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances

of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that

the principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave

and live. These princes alone have states and do not defend them, they

have subjects and do not rule them; and the states, although

unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects, although not

ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor the ability

to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are secure and happy.

But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind cannot reach, I

shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted and maintained

by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash man to

discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the

Church has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from

Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have

been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)

have valued the temporal power very slightly- yet now a king of France

trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy,

and to ruin the Venetians- although this may be very manifest, it does

not appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy, this country

was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples,

the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two

principal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy

under arms; the other, that none of themselves should seize more

territory. Those about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope

and the Venetians. To restrain the Venetians the union of all the

others was necessary, as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to

keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of Rome, who, being

divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna, had always a pretext

for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of

the Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although

there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV],

yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances.

And the short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness; for in the

ten years, which is the average life of a pope, he can with difficulty

lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one pope should almost

destroy the Colonna, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who

would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the

Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were

little esteemed in Italy.

Alexander VI arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have

ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to

prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by

reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things

which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And

although his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,

nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the

Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the

heir to all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong,

possessing all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence,

and, through the chastisements Alexander, the factions wiped out; he

also found the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had

never been practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not

only followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna,

to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of

these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his

credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not

any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonna factions

within the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among

them some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things

firm: the one, the greatness of the church, with which he terrified

them; and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals,

who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions

have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because

cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons

are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates

arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his

Holiness Pope Leo found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be

hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still

greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE,

AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

HAVING discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such

principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having

considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and

having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and

to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means

of offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his

foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to

ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or

composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good

laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are

well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the

discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his

state are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or

mixed. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if

one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm

nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline,

unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have

neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is

deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed

by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other

attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend,

which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They

are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but

if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I

should have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been

caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on

mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared

valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed

what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was

allowed to seize Italy with chalk in hand;* and he who told us that

our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the

sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the

sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.

* With which to chalk up the billets for his soldiers.

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The

mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they

are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own

greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others

contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you

are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,

whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted

to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in

person and perform the duty of captain; the republic has to send its

citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily,

it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the

laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown

princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress,

and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more

difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway

of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign

arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers

are completely armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians,

who were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war

with the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for

captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made

captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took

away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza

against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at

Caravaggio, allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his

masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna of

Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw

herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her

kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended

their dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make

themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the

Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able

captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not

conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their

ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,*

and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but

every one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines

would have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always

against him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition

to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But

let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The

Florentines appointed as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most prudent

man, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown.

If this man had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been

proper for the Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the

soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they

held to him they must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements

are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so

long as they sent to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen

and plebeians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to

enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook

this virtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning

of their expansion on land, through not having much territory, and

because of their great reputation, they had not much to fear from

their captains; but when they expanded, as under Carmignola, they

had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant

man (they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the

other hand, knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they

would no longer conquer under him, and for this reason they were not

willing, nor were they able, to let him go; and so, not to lose

again that which they had acquired, they were compelled, in order to

secure themselves, to murder him. They had afterwards for their

captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the Count

of Pitigliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not

gain, as happened afterwards at Vaila, where in one battle they lost

that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much

trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but slowly, long

delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

* As Sir John Hawkwood, the English leader of mercenaries, was

called by the Italians.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been

ruled for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more

seriously, in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may

be better prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the

empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope

has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up

into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up

arms against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were

oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain

authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became

princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the

hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of

priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both

commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,

a native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among

others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of

Italy. After these came all the other captains who till now have

directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has

been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged

by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has

guided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that

they might increase their own. They did this because, subsisting on

their pay and without territory, they were unable to support many

soldiers, and a few infantry did not give them any authority; so

they were led to employ cavalry, with a moderate force of which they

were maintained and honoured; and affairs were brought to such a

pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to

be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used

every art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their

soldiers, not killing in the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating

without ransom. They did not attack towns at night, nor did the

garrisons of the towns attack encampments at night; they did not

surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did they campaign

in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military

rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue

and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

AUXILIARIES, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a

prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done

by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the

enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries,

turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,

for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and

good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always

disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is

their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not

wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius II, the peril of which

cannot fall to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw

himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune

brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of

his rash choice; because, having auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and

the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all

expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did

not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his

auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand

Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other

time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten

thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece

to the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these

arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because

with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield

obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered,

more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they

are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a

third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once

to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in

mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The

wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to

his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer

with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with

the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This

duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French

soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,

such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,

discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;

whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and

dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the

difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be

seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation

of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and

Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity

he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never

esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete

master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but

I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of

those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the

army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery,

constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it

appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he

had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own

forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament

applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight

with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage,

Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as

he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that

he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In

conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they

weigh you down, or they bind you fast.

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and

valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity

of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his

kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his

son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the

Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a

source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation

of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms,

for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he

has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to

fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now

conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand

against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off

well against others. The armies of the French have thus become

mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms

together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries

alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example

proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the

ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks

well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I

have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a

principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not

truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first

disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to

have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that

time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that

valour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having

its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good

fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And

it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing

can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its

own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed

either of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all others are

mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces

will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected

upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the

Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized

themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.