CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A PRINCE ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select

anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline;

for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of

such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it

often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on

the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease

than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of

your losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire

a state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being

martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons,

through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became

private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,

it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies

against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on.

Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the

unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield

obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man

should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one

disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to

work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the

art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned,

cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought

never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and

in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war;

this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well

organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he

accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of

localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the

valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature

of rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care.

Which knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know

his country, and is better able to undertake its defence;

afterwards, by means of the knowledge and observation of that

locality, he understands with ease any other which it may be necessary

for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains,

and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a

certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a

knowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a

knowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the

essential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for

it teaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead

armies, to array the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which

writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he

never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was

in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with

them: "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find

ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How

should one best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should

wish to retreat, how ought we to set about it? If they should retreat,

how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as he went,

all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their

opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these

continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any

unexpected circumstances that he could deal with.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories,

and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have

borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories

and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and

above all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one

who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and

deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great

imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads

the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in

the life of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in

chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to

those things which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise

prince ought to observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times

stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in such a way

that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if fortune

changes it may find him prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,

ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

IT REMAINS now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a

prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have

written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous

in mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall

depart from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to

write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it

appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter

than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and

principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because

how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he

who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects

his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely

up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him

among so much that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know

how to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to

necessity. Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things

concerning a prince, and discussing those which are real, I say that

all men when they are spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more

highly placed, are remarkable for some of those qualities which

bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is that one is

reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an

avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess

by robbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much

of the use of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one

cruel, one compassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one

effeminate and cowardly, another bold and brave; one affable,

another haughty; one lascivious, another chaste; one sincere,

another cunning; one hard, another easy; one grave, another frivolous;

one religious, another unbelieving, and the like. And I know that

every one will confess that it would be most praiseworthy in a

prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are considered good;

but because they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed, for

human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be

sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the reproach of

those vices which would lose him his state; and also to keep

himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;

but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon

himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at

incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can

only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered

carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if

followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like

vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

COMMENCING then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I

say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,

liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation

for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should

be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the

reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among

men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of

magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts

all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to

maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax

them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him

odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued

by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and

rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and

imperilled by whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this

himself, and wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the

reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of

liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if

he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in

time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that

with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself

against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without

burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises

liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,

and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who

have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the

Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for

liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he

made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing

any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his

additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of

Spain would not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if

he had been reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has

not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does

not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious,

ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is

one of those vices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and

many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,

and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,

or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is

dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered

liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become

pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had

not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government.

And if any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done

great things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I

reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects'

or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in

the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And

to the price who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage,

sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this

liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by

soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you

can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it

does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but

adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even

whilst you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become

either poor or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and

hated. And a prince should guard himself, above all things, against

being despised and hated; and liberality leads you to both.

Therefore it is wiser to have a reputation for meanness which brings

reproach without hatred, than to be compelled through seeking a

reputation for liberality to incur a name for rapacity which begets

reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND

WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

COMING now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that

every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.

Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare

Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled

the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And

if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much

more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation

for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. Therefore a prince, so

long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind

the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more

merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to

arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to

injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate

with a prince offend the individual only.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the

imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers.

Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her

reign owing to its being new, saying:

Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt

Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.*

* ...against my will, my fate,

A throne unsettled, and an infant state,

Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,

And guard with these severities my shores.

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should

he himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with

prudence and humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him

incautious and too much distrust render him intolerable.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than

feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish

to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one

person, is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two,

either must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in

general of men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly,

covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they

will offer you their blood, property, life and children, as is said

above, when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they

turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on their

promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because

friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or

nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured,

and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple

in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is

preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of

men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear

preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if

he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very

well being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long

as he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from

their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the

life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for

manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the

property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their

father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for

taking away the property are never wanting; for he who has once

begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what

belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are

more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his

army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is

quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for

without it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its

duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that

having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to

fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or

against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This

arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his

boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his

soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not

sufficient to produce this effect. And shortsighted writers admire his

deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the principal

cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not have been

sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that most

excellent man, not of his own times but within the memory of man,

against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this arose

from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his soldiers

more licence than is consistent with military discipline. For this

he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the

corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a

legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the

insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature.

Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there

were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct

the errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in

the command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of

Scipio; but, he being under the control of the Senate, this

injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to

his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the

conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing

according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish

himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others;

he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

EVERY one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith,

and to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our

experience has been that those princes who have done great things have

held good faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent

the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those

who have relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of

contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method

is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is

frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the

second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to

avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively

taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and

many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse,

who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as

they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is

necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and

that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore,

being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the

fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against

snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it

is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to

terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not

understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor

ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against

him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no

longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but

because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are

not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a

prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this

endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties

and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the

faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ

the fox has succeeded best.

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this

characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men

are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who

seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be

deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in silence.

Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought of

doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a

man who had greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths

would affirm a thing, yet would observe it less; nevertheless his

deceits always succeeded according to his wishes, because he well

understood this side of mankind.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good

qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to

have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and

always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them

is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright,

and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to

be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new

one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being

often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to

faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary

for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds

and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said above, not

to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if

compelled, then to know how to set about it.

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets

anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named

five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him

altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There

is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality,

inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand,

because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch

with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what

you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of

the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the

actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent

to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and

holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and

he will be praised by everybody because the vulgar are always taken by

what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world

there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when

the many have no ground to rest on.

One prince* of the present time, whom it is not well to name,

never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both

he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived

him of reputation and kingdom many a time.

* Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made

above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish

to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must

consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things

which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall

have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear

any danger in other reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be

rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his

subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their

property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content,

and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can

curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,

effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince

should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show

in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in

his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments

are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one

can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of

himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired

against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man

and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty.

For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within,

on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of

external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed

and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good

friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are

quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by

conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has

carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long

as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis

the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he

has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince

can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by

keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary

for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the

most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against

conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who

conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his

removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending

them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the

difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as

experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been

successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take

a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents,

and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have

given him the material with which to content himself, for by

denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the

gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be

doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a

thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the

side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect

of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is

the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends

and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the

popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as

to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before

the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel

to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy,

and thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be

content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers.

Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of

the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who

had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer

Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination

the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the

popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those

days in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there

after the death of Annibale who were able to rule the state, the

Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivoglio

family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of

a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government

of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in

due course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon

conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but

when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to

fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise

princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to

desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for

this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,

and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty

and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its

authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of

the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths

would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing

the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he

wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the

particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach

which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the

people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an

arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour

the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a

better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of

security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another

important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of

reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their

own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish

the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and

deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example

contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and

showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their

empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against

them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall

the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the

causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the

same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are

noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded

to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were

Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son

Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the

ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be

contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to

put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so

beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a

hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because

the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the

unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who

was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite

willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get

double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose

that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or

training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those

who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of

these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to

the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course

was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone,

they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and

when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost

diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those

emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered

more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned

out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to

maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, [Aurelius], Pertinax, and

Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to

cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he

alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the

throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or

the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made

him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he

lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,

who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not

endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them;

thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added

contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of

his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is

acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said

before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to

do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of

to maintain yourself- it may be either the people or the soldiers or

the nobles- you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and

then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great

goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this,

that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to

death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a

man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became

despised, the army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus,

Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and

rapacious- men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to

commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except

Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour

that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were

oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him

so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the

latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former

respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a

new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how

to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above,

it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in

Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to

Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the

praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to

aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy

before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the

Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After

this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master

of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger,

head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor;

the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the

throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile

to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the

latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was

willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of

Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague;

which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had

conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he

returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little

recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by

treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was

compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and

took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore,

carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant

lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected

by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered

at that he, the new man, well, because his supreme renown always

protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived

against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent

qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and

acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of

fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which

caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and

cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single

murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all

those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also

feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was

murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must

be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted

with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes,

because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a

prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has

only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs

or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken

this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that

centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his

bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved

the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy

to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,

and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his

people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave

himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he

might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not

maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete

with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the

imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being

hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against

and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very

warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of

Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected

Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two

things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep

in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to

all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other,

his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome

and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a

reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects

in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that

the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to

fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all

the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which

may be added his own army: this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting

with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and

fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who,

being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will

bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our

times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to

their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one

has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these

princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and

administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire;

and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the

soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all

princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people

rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round

him twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the

security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,

putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep

them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely

in the hands of soldiers, follows again that, without regard to the

people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the

state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason

that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called

either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the

sons of the old prince not the heirs, but he who is elected to that

position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only

noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a

new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it

that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the

constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive

him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever

will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has

been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also

how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a

number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the

rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous

for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus,

who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been

utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have

imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them

to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the

principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is

it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from

Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from

Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may

already be stable and firm.