THE PRINCE

CHAPTER XX

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH

PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. SOME princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed

their subjects; others have kept their subject towns by factions;

others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid

themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the

beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some

have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a

final judgment on all one of these things unless one possesses the

particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made,

nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself

will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects;

rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them,

because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were

distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so,

and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects

cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the

others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their

treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your

dependants, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that

those who have the most danger and service should have the most

reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend

them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for

want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against

you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn

to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they

should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against

powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a

new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms.

Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new

state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is

necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have

been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and

opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters

should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state

shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were

accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions

and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in

some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the

more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when

Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be

accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that

factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the

enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because

the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the

other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I

believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline

factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed

them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst

them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should

not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn

out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once

took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore,

weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted

in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more

easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if

war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the

difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore

fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who

has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one,

causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he

may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount

higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this

reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the

opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against

himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and

assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were

distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted.

Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those

who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one

cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I

will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a

princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need

assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the

greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince

with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for

them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of

them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than

from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his

affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a

prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state,

that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour

him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him,

but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them

friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be

impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this

in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern

affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make

friends of those men who were contented under the former government,

and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented

with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their

states more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle

and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place

of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has

been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli

in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di

Castello so that he might keep that state; Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino,

on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare

Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that

province, and considered that without them it would be more

difficult to lose it; the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a

similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according

to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in

another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has

more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build

fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from

the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by

Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the

house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this

reason the best possible fortress is- not to be hated by the people,

because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not

save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting

foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It

has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use

to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count

Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to

withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and

thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that

time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses

were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked

her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.

Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before,

not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses.

All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds

fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,

trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.

CHAPTER XXI

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF

SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

NOTHING makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and

setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the

present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because

he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to

be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his

deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary.

In the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise

was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first

and without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons

of Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any

innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was

acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of

the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long

war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since

distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as

to undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with a pious

cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor

could there be a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this

same cloak he assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally

attacked France; and thus his achievements and designs have always

been great, and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and

admiration and occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have

arisen in such a way, one out of the other, that men have never been

given time to work steadily against him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in

internal affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo

da Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil

life doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take

some method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much

spoken about. And a prince ought, above all things, always to

endeavour in every action to gain for himself the reputation of

being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a

downright enemy, that to say, when, without any reservation, he

declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which

course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because

if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a

character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him

or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you

to declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first

case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a

prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has

been conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything toor to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want

doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who

loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in

hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive

out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of

the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand

the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be

discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of

Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate

answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more

advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can

be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left,

without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus

it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand

your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to

declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present

dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are generally

ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of

one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers,

although the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet

he is indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and

men are never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by

oppressing you. Victories after all are never so complete that the

victor must not show some regard, especially to justice. But if he

with whom you ally yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and

whilst he is able he may aid you, and you become companions in a

fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character

that you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it

greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction

of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have

saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not with

your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be

noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance

with one more powerful than himself for the purpose of attacking

others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if

he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as

much as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians

joined with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which

caused their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be

avoided, as happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent

armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons,

the prince ought to favour one of the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe

courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,

because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to

avoid one trouble without running into another; but prudence

consists in knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles,

and for choice to take the lesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to

honour the proficient in every art. At the same time he should

encourage his citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in

commerce and agriculture, and in every other following, so that the

one should not be deterred from improving his possessions for fear

lest they be taken away from him or another from opening up trade

for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever

wishes to do these things and designs in any way to honour his city or

state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and

spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is

divided into guilds or into societies, he ought to hold such bodies in

esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example

of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the

majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in

anything.

CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

THE choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and

they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince.

And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his

understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when

they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise,

because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them

faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion

of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of

Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to

be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because

there are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by

itself; another which appreciates what others comprehend; and a

third which neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of

others; the first is the most excellent, the second is good, the third

is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was

not in the first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has

judgment to know good or bad when it is said and done, although he

himself may not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and

the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise and the other

correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept

honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is

one test which never falls; when you see the servant thinking more

of his own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own

profit in everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor

will you ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of

another in his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of

his prince, and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince

is not concerned.

On the other to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study

him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing

with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see

that he cannot stand alone, so that many honours not make him desire

more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make

him dread changes. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards

servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is

otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the

other.

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I DO NOT wish to leave out an important branch of this subject,

for it is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved,

unless they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of

flatterers, of whom courts arc full, because men are so

self-complacent in their own affairs, and in a way so deceived in

them, that they are preserved with difficulty from this pest, and if

they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of falling into

contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself from

flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth

does not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth,

respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the

wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking

the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he

inquires, and of none others; but he ought to question them upon

everything, and listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his

own conclusions. With these councillors, separately and

collectively, he ought to carry himself in such a way that each of

them should know that, the more freely he shall speak, the more he

shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen to no one,

pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his resolutions.

He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or is so

often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man

of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, speaking of his

majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way

in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the

opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man- he does not

communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on

them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and

known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around

him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows

that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one

ever understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can

rely on his resolutions.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when

he wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage

every one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he

ought to be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener

concerning the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any

one, on any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let

his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an

impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but

through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they

are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a

prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless

by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who

happens to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well

governed, but it would not be for long, because such a governor

would in a short time take away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not experienced should take counsel from more

than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to

unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,

and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through

them. And they are not to be found otherwise, because men will

always prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by

constraint. Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels,

whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and

not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

THE previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new

prince to appear well established, and render him at once more

secure and fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there.

For the actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than

those of an hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they

gain more men and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are

attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the

present good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make

the utmost defence for a prince if he fails them not in other

things. Thus it will be a double glory to him to have established a

new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good

arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a double

disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of

wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states

in Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of

Milan, and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common

defect in regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed

at length; in the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to

have had the people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly,

he has not known how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these

defects states that have power enough to keep an army in the field

cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who

was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to

the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet

being a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure

the nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years,

and if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he

retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of

their principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their

own sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be

a change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in

the calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times

came they thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and

they hoped that the people, disgusted with the insolence of the

conquerors, would recall them. This course, when others fail, may be

good, but it is very bad to have neglected all other expedients for

that, since you would never wish to fall because you trusted to be

able to find someone later on to restore you. This again either does

not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for your security,

because that deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon

yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on

yourself and your valour.

CHAPTER XXV

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS,

AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

IT is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the

opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by

fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and

that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us

believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let

chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times

because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and

may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes

pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.

Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true

that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she

still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood

overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing

away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all

yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand

it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore

that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision,

both with defences and barriers, in such a manner that, rising

again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their force be neither

so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who

shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her, and

thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and

defences have not been raised to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these

changes, and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to

be an open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it

had been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France,

either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made

or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say

concerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may

be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any

change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly

from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that

the prince who relies entirely upon fortune is lost when it changes. I

believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions

according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not

accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in

affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,

glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,

another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,

another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by

a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one

attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different

observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the

other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not

they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows

from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about

the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his

object and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs

himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in

such a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made;

but if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change

his course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently

circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both

because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to, and also

because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be

persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious

man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do

it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the

times fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius II went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and

found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of

action that he always met with success. Consider his first

enterprise against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still

alive. The Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of

Spain, and he had the enterprise still under discussion with the

King of France; nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition

with his accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and

the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear,

the former from desire to recover all the kingdom of Naples; on the

other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king,

having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend

so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him

soldiers without manifestly offending him. Therefore Julius with his

impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple

human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome until he

could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any

other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.

Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the

others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and

they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him

experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which

required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because

he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature

inclined him.

I conclude therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind

steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are

successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I

consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because

fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is

necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows

herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who

go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover

of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with

more audacity command her.

CHAPTER XXVI

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

HAVING carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and

wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a

new prince, and whether there were the elements that would give an

opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of

things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this

country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new

prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should

be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the

Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the

greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be

dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the

present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it

was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity she is now

in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more

oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians;

without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and

to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us

think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was

afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected

him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall

yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of

Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,

and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how

she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these

wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready

and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more

hope than in your illustrious house, with its valour and fortune,

favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and

which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be

difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of

the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful

men, yet they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity

than the present offers, for their enterprises were neither more

just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is

yours.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is

necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in

them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the

willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only

follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further

than this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested

beyond example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the

rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has

contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not

willing to do everything, and thus take away our free will and that

share of glory which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named

Italians have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your

illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so

many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were

exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not

good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing

honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances

when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well

founded and dignified will make him revered and admired, and in

Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in

every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.

Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how

superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But

when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this

springs entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those

who are capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to

know, there having never been any one so distinguished above the rest,

either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence

it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past

twenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has

always given a poor account of itself; as witness Taro, Alessandria,

Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestre.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow those

remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before

all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be

provided with your own forces, because there can be no more

faithful, truer, or better soldiers. And although singly they are

good, altogether they will be much better when they find themselves

commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his

expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so

that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very

formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which

a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be

relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist

cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they

encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may

again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry,

and the Switzers are overthrown by infantry. And although a complete

proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was some

evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry

were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same tactics as

the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid

of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood

out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless,

and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with

them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these

infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not

be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a

variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which

confer reputation and power upon a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for

letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express

the love with which he would be received in all those provinces

which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what

thirst for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with

what tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse

obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would

refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let,

therefore, your illustrious house take up this charge with that

courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, so

that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, and

under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:

Virtu contro al Furore

Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:

Che l'antico valore

Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.*

* Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,

And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight;

For the old Roman, valour is not dead,

Nor in th' Italians' breasts extinguished.