Index
1. Estimates
2. Waging War
3. Offensive Strategy
4. Dispositions
5. Energy
6. Weaknesses and Strengths
7. Manuevering
8. Variations in Tactics
9. The Army on the March
10. Terrain
11. The Nine Situations
12. The Attack by Fire
13. The Use of Spies
War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly.
Therefore, appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors and make comparisons of the various conditions of the antagonistic sides in order to ascertain the results of a war. The first of these factors is politics; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, the commander; and the fifth, doctrine. Politics means the thing which causes he people to be in harmony with their ruler so that they will follow him in disregard of their lives and without fear of any danger. Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat, fine days and rain, and change of seasons. Terrain means distances, and refers to whether the ground is traversed with ease or difficulty and to whether it is open or constricted, and influences your chances of life or death. The commander stands for the general's qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Doctrine is to be understood as the organization of the army, the gradations of rank among the officers, the regulations of supply routes, and the provision of military materials to the army.
These five fundamental factors are familiar to every general. Those who master them win; those who do not are defeated. Therefore, in laying plans, compare the following seven elements, appraising them with the utmost care.
1.Which ruler is wise and more able?
2.Which commander is more talented?
3.Which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain?
4.In which army are regulations and instructions better carried out?
5.Which troops are stronger?
6.Which army has the better-trained officers and men?
7.Which army administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened and correct way?
By means of these seven elements, I shall be able to forecast which side will be victorious and which will be defeated.
The general who heeds my counsel is sure to win. Such a general should be retained in command. One who ignores my counsel is certain to be defeated. Such a one should be dismissed.
Having paid attention to my counsel and plans, the general must create a situation which will contribute to their accomplishment. By "situation" I mean he should take the field situation into consideration and act in accordance with what is advantageous.
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable of attacking, feign incapacity; when active in moving troops, feign inactivity. When near the enemy, make it seem that you are far away; when far away, make it seem that you are near. Hold out baits to lure the enemy. Strike the enemy when he is in disorder. Prepare against the enemy when he is secure at all points. Avoid the enemy for the time being when he is stronger. If your opponent is of choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant, try to encourage his egotism. If the enemy troops are well prepared after reorganization, try to wear them down. If they are united, try to sow dissension among them. Attack the enemy where he is unprepared, and appear where you are not expected. These are the keys to victory for a strategist. It is not possible to formulate them in detail beforehand.
Now, if the estimates made before a battle indicate victory, it is because careful calculations show that your conditions are more favorable than those of your enemy; if they indicate defeat, it is because careful calculations show that favorable conditions for a battle are fewer. With more careful calculations, one can win; with less, one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes no calculations at all! By this means, one can foresee the outcome of a battle.
In operations of war-when one thousand fast four-horse chariots onethousand heavy chariots, and one thousand mail-clad soldiers are required; when provisions are transported for a thousand li; when thereare expenditures at home and at the front, and stipends for entertainment of envoys and advisers-the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer, and of chariots and armor, will amount to one thousand pieces of gold a day. One hundred thousand troops may be dispatched only when this money is in hand.
A speedy victory is the main object in war. If this is long in coming, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. If troops are attacking cities, their strength will be exhausted. When the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will fall short. When your weapons are dulled and ardor dampened, your strength exhausted and treasure spent, the chieftains of the neighboring states will take advantage of your crisis to act. In that case, no man, however wise, will be able to avert the disastrous consequences that ensue. Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. for there has never been a protracted war which benefited a country. Therefore, those unable to understand the evils inherent in employing troops are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing so.
Those adept in waging war do not require a second levy of conscripts or more that two provisionings. They carry military equipment from the homeland, but rely on the enemy for provisions. Thus, the army is plentifully provided with food.
When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is due to distant transportation; carrying supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. Where troops are gathered, prices go up. When prices rise, the wealth of the people is drained away. When wealth is drained away, the people will be afflicted with urgent and heavy exactions. With this loss of wealth and exhaustion of strength, the households in the country will be extremely poor and seven-tenths of their wealth dissipated. As to government expenditures, those due to broken-down chariots, worn-out horses, armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draft oxen, and wagons will amount to 60 percent of the total.
Hence, a wise general sees to it that his troops feed on the enemy, for one zhong of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own and one shi of the enemy's fodder to twenty shi of one's own.
In order to make the soldiers courageous in overcoming the enemy, they must be roused to anger. In order to capture more booty from the enemy, soldiers must have their rewards.
Therefore, in chariot fighting when more than ten chariots are captured, reward those who take the first. Replace the enemy's flags and banners with you own, mix the captured chariots with yours, and mount them. Treat the prisoners of war well, and care for them. This is called "winning a battle and becoming stronger."
Hence, what is valued in war is victory, not prolonged operations. And the general who understands how to employ troops is the minister of the people's fate and arbiter of the nation's destiny.
Chapter 3 : Offensive Strategy
Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy's entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.Attack cities only when there is no alternative because to prepare big shields and wagons and make ready the necessary arms and equipment require at least three months, and to pile up earthen ramps against the walls requires an additional three months. The general, unable to control his impatience, will order his troops to swarm up the wall like ants, with the result that one-third of them will be killed without taking the city. Such is the calamity of attacking cities.
Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture the enemy's cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Their aim is to take all under heaven intact by strategic considerations. Thus, their troops are not worn out and their gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive strategy.
Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him with some good plan. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing. And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him, for a small force is but booty for one more powerful if it fights recklessly.
Now, the general is the assistant to the sovereign of the state. If this assistance is all-embracing, the state will surely be strong; if defective, the state will certainly be weak.
Now, there are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army:
1.When ignorant that the army should not advance, to order anadvance; or when ignorant that it should not retire, to order a retirement. This is described as "hobbling the army." 2.When ignorant of military affairs, to interfere in their administration. This causes the officers to be perplexed. 3.When ignorant of command problems, to interfere with the direction of the fighting. This engenders doubts in the minds of the officers.
If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will take advantage of this and cause trouble. This is what is meant by: "A confused army leads to another's victory." Thus, there are five points in which victory may be predicted:
1.He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious.
2.He who understands how to fight in accordance with the strength of antagonistic forces
will be victorious.
3.He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious.
4.He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is not well prepared will be
victorious.
5.He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will be victorious.
It is in these five matters that the way to victory is known.
Therefore, I say: Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle.
The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the enemy's moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on oneself, but the enemy' vulnerability on himself. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable. Therefore, it can be said that, one may know how to win, but cannot necessarily do so.
Defend yourself when you cannot defeat the enemy, and attack the enemy when you can. One defends when his strangth is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant. Those who are skilled in defense hide themselves as under the nine-fold earth; those in attack flash forth as from above the ninefold heavens. Thus, they are capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a complete victory.
To foresee a victory which the ordinary man can foresee is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it if you triumph in battle and are universally acclaimed "expert," for to lift an autumn down requires no great strength, to distinguish between the sun and moon is no test of vision, to hear the thunderclap is no indication of acute hearing. In ancient times, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. And, therefore, the victories won by a master of war gain him neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for courage. For he wins his victories without erring. Without erring he establishes the certainty of his victory; he conquers an enemy already defeated. Therefore, the skillful commander takes up a position in which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to overcome him enemy. Thus, a victorious army always seeks battle after his plans indicate that victory is possible under them, whereas an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning but without any planning. Those skilled in war cultivate their policies and strictly adhere to the laws and regulations. Thus, it is in their power to control success.
Now, the elements of the art of war are first, the measurement of space; second, the estimation of quantities; third, calculations; fourth, comparisons; and fifth, chances of victory. Measurements of space are derived from the ground. Quantities, comparisons from figures, and victory from comparisons. Thus, a victorious army is as one yi balanced against a grain, and a defeated army is as a grain balanced against one yi.
It is because of disposition that a victorious general is able to make his soldiers fight with the effect of pent-up waters which, suddenly released, plunge into a bottomless abyss.
Generally, management of a large force is the same as management of a few men. It is a matter of organization. And to direct a large force is the same as to direct a few men. This is a matter of formations and signals. That the army is certain to sustain the enemy's attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of the extraordinary and the normal forces. Troops thrown against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of a solid acting upon a void.
Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage and use the extraordinary forces to win. Now, the resources of those skilled in the use of extraordinary forces are as infinite as the heavens and earth, as inexhaustible as the flow of the great rivers, for they end and recommence - cyclical, as are the movements of the sun and moon. They die away and are reborn - recurrent, as are the passing seasons. The musical notes are the passing seasons. The musical notes are only five in number, but their combinations are so infinite that one cannot visualize them all. The flavors are only five in number, but their blends are so various that one cannot taste them all. In battle, there are only the normal and extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all. For these two forces are mutually reproductive. It is like moving in an endless circle. Who can exhaust the possibility of their combination?
When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momentum; when the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus, the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming, and his attack precisely timed. His potential is that of a fully drawn crossbow; his timing, that of the release of the trigger.
In tumult and uproar, the battle seems chaotic, but there must be no disorder in one's own troops. The battlefield may seem in confusion and chaos, but one's array must be in good order. That will be proof against defeat. Apparent confusion is a product of good order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength. Order of disorder depends on organization and direction; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on tactical dispositions. Thus, one who is skilled at making the enemy move does so by creating a situation, according to which the enemy will act. He entices the enemy with something he is certain to want. He keeps the enemy on the move by holding out bait and then attacks him with picked troops.
Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. He selects suitable men and exploits the situation. He who utilizes the situation uses his men in fighting as one rolls logs or stones. Now, the nature of logs and stones is that on stable ground they are static; on a slope, they move. If square, they stop; if round, they roll. Thus, the energy of troops skillfully commanded in battle may be compared to the momentum of round boulders which roll down from a mountain thousands of feet in height.
Chapter 6 : Weaknesses and Strengths
Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease, and he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary. And, therefore, those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him. One able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to stop him from coming does so by preventing him. Thus, when the enemy is at ease, be able to tire him, when well fed, to starve him, when at rest to make him move.
Appear at places which he is unable to rescue; move swiftly in a direction where you are least expected.
That you may march a thousand li without tiring yourself is because you travel where there is no enemy. To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not or cannot protect. To be certain to hold what you defend is to defend a place the enemy dares not or is not able to attack. Therefore, against those skilled in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend, and against the experts in defense, the enemy does not know where to attack.
How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no trace. How divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible. Thus, he is master of his enemy's fate. His offensive will be irresistible if he makes for his enemy's weak positions; he cannot be overtaken when he withdraws if he moves swiftly. When I wish o give battle, my enemy, even though protected by high walls and deep moats, cannot help but engage me, for I attack a position he must relieve. When I wish to avoid battle, I may defend myself simply be drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes.
If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while, at the same time, I conceal my own, then I can concentrate my forces and his must be divided. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. Therefore, I will be numerically superior. Then, if I am able to use many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal with will fall into hopeless straits. The enemy must not know where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know where I intend to give battle, he must prepare in a great many places. And when he prepares in a great many places, those I have to fight in will be few. For if he prepares to the front, his rear will be weak, and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable, and if his right, there will be few troops on his left. And when he sends troops everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. Numerical weakness comes from having to guard against possible attacks; numerical strength from forcing the enemy to make these preparations against us.
If one knows where and when a battle will be fought, his troops can march a thousand li and meet on the field. But if one knows neither the battleground nor the day of battle, the left will be unable to aid the right and the right will be unable to aid the left, and the van will be unable to support the rear and the rear, the van. How much more is this so when separated by several tens of li or, indeed, be even a few! Although I estimate the troops of Yue as many, of what benefit is this superiority with respect to the outcome of war? Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the enemy is numerically stronger, I can prevent him from engaging.
Therefore, analyze the enemy's plans so that you will know his shortcomings as strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient. The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to conceal them without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is according to the situations that plans are laid for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands how the victory is achieved. Therefore, when a victory is won, one's tactics are not repeated. One should always respond to circumstances in an infinite variety of ways.
Now, an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army should avoid strength and strike weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. And as water has no constant form, there are in warfare no constant conditions. Thus, one able to win the victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Of the five elements [water, fire, metal, wood, and earth], none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are long and some short, and the moon waxes and wanes. That is also the law of employing troops.
Normally, in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. During the process from assembling his troops and mobilizing the people to blending the army into a harmonious entity and encamping it, nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuvering for advantageous positions. What is difficult about it is to make the devious route the most direct routeand divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive at the battlefield before him. One able to do this shows the knowledge of the artifice of diversion.
Therefore, both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuvering for an advantageous position. One who sets the entire army in moriton with impediments to pursue an advantageous position will not attain it. If he abandons the camp and all the impediments to contend for advantage, the stores will be lost. Thus, if one orders his men to make forced marches without armor, stopping neithe day nor night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, and doing a hundred li to wrest an advantage, it is probable that the commanders will be captured. The stronger men will arrive first and the feeble ones will struggle along behind; so, if this method is used, only one-tenth of the army will reach its destination. In a forced march of fifty li, the commander of the van will probably fall, but half the army will arrive. Ina forced march of thirty li, just two-thirds will arrive. It follows that an army which lacks heavy equipment, fodder, food, and stores will be lost.
One who is not acquainted with the designs of his neighbors should not enter into aliances with them. Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground. Now, war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces,. When campainging, be swift as the wind; in leisurely marching, majestic as the forest; in raiding and plundering, be fierce as fire; in standing, firm as the mountains. When hiding, be as unfathomable as things behind the clouds; when moving, fall like a thunderbolt. When you plunder the countryside, divide your forces. When you conquer territory, defend strategic points. Weigh the situation before you move. He who knows the artifice of diversion will be victorious. Such is the art of manuevering.
Chapter 8: Variations in Tactics
1.Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
2.When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
3.There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
4.The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
5.The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
6.So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
7.Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
8.If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
9.If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
10.Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; [Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind: "Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord."] and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
11.The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.
12.There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
1.Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
2.cowardice, which leads to capture;
3.a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
4.a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
5.over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
13.These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
14.When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.
Chapter 9: The Army on the March
1.Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.
2.Camp in high places, facing the sun.
Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3.After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
4.When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it
in mid-stream.
It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.
5.If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.
6.Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.
Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
So much for river warfare.
7.In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.
8.If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get
your back to a
clump of trees.
So much for operations in salt-marches.
9.In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to
your right and on your
rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.
So much for campaigning in flat country.
10.These are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.
11.All armies prefer high ground to low, and sunny places to dark.
12.If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory.
13.When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.
14.When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
15.Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
16.While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear.
17.If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.
18.When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.
19.When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance.
20.If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.
21.Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing.
The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
22.The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade.
23.When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.
When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.
24.Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance.
Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat.
25.When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
26.Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
27.When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.
28.When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
29.When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.
30.If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.
31.If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
32.If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokensn nervousness.
33.If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.
34.When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the
men do not
hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their
tents, you may
know that they are determined to fight to the death.
35.The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
36.Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
37.To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
38.When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.
39.If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
40.If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it
only means that no
direct attack can be made.
What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
41.He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.
42.If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be unless.
43.Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.
44.If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45.If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.
1.Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:
1.Accessible ground;
2.entangling ground;
3.temporizing ground;
4.narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the
enemy.
2.Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called ACCESSIBLE.
3.With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies.
Then you will be able to fight with advantage.
4.Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called ENTANGLING.
5.From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
6.When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.
7.In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
8.With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
9.Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10.With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.
11.If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.
12.If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13.These six are the principles connected with Earth.
The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
14.Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) rout.
15.Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT of the former.
16.When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION.
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is COLLAPSE.
17.When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.
18.When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter DISORGANIZATION.
19.When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.
20.These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
21.The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
22.He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.
23.If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
24.The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
25.Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.
26.If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
27.If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
28.If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.
29.If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
30.Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
31.Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.
Chapter 11: The Nine Situations
1.Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2.When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.
3.When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.
4.Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.
5.Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
6.Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.
7.When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
8.Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens-all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
9.Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.
10.Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is
desperate
ground.
11.On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.
12.On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.
13.On serious ground, gather in plunder.
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
14.On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
On desperate ground, fight.
15.Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men.
16.When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.
17.When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
18.If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
19.Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20.The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.
21.Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.
22.Carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.
Keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans.
23.Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
24.Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25.Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted.
26.Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
27.If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
28.On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
29.The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang mountains.
Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
30.Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN, I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
31.Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.
32.The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.
33.How to make the best of both strong and weak-that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
34.Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.
35.It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
36.He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance.
37.By altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
38.At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
39.He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
40.To muster his host and bring it into danger: this may be termed the business of the general.
41.The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied.
42.When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
43.When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
When there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44.When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
45.When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46.Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
47.On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
48.On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
49.On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.
50.On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.
On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
51.For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
52.We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country-its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
53.To be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
54.When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
55.Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
56.Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man.
57.Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58.Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.
59.For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.
60.Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
61.By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.
62.This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
63.On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries.
64.Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation.
65.If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
66.Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.
67.Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
68.At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an
opening; afterwards
emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose
you.
Chapter 12: The Attack by Fire
1.Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.
2.In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available, the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.
3.There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.
4.The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.
5.In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
6.(1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
7.(2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
8.(3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.
9.(4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.
10.(5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
11.A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
12.In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.
13.Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.
14.By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
15.Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.
16.Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
17.Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.
18.No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.
19.If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.
20.Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
21.But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.
22.Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.
1.Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.
2.Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity.
3.One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
4.Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.
5.Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained
inductively from
experience, nor by any deductive calculation.
6.Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
7.Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
8.When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.
9.Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
10.Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the enemy.
11.Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
12.Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy.
13.SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.
14.Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
15.Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.
16.They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.
17.Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
18.Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.
19.If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
20.Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
21.The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service.
22.It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies.
23.It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.
24.Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.
25.The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.
26.Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served under the Yin.
27.Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.
Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.
Inscribed by The Old Sage from the works of the Great Sage of Cathay, Sun Tzu.