GROUND UNITS, WARSAW PACT AND NATO, CENTRAL FRONT, 1980s
Unit Database for Boots, Tracks, and Rotors and Emcon C

Changes: August 2004: Introduced new fire support and air defense values.
September 18, 2003: increased Soviet Category I division Armor and AT Highest ratings to VI; modified British Infantry Division, Airborne Brigade, and Commando Brigade; reduced Troop Quality of the Danish Jutland Division.

NATO

Belgium

Canada
Canada's chief contribution to the Initiative of the Central Front was the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.

Denmark
Due to the short service terms of its draftees and heavy reliance on reservists, Denmark's Jutland division was perhaps NATO's weakest frontline division.

France
France's policy of independent nuclear deterrence and maintaining out-of-area force projection capability left it with a two-tiered ground force. The top tier was represented by the professional Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) of airborne, airmobile, and light armored/mechanized divisions. The concentration of professional soldiers in the FAR was due to the French laws preventing draftees from serving overseas without parliamentary approval. Although FAR units would no doubt have seen action on the Central Front, the brunt of the fighting would have been by regular army formations, the draftee-manned (stiffened by a strong backbone of professional NCOs) armored, light armored, and motorized infantry divisions.  Doctrine-wise, the traumatic experience of 1940 has led the French army to adopt a doctrine of maneuver which would have served the French forces well in the event of any clash with the ponderous Soviet forces. French forces would have likely performed well in the first several weeks of high-intensity combat. However, the French army lacked the depth to sustain a lengthy campaign vs. the Soviet Army. Due to France's inability to match USSR's masses of divisions, French army divisions intended mainly as a nuclear tripwire force. Moreover, the financial requirements of the nuclear deterrent and force projection capability have left the regular army units underfunded, and as a result modern equipment was concentrated mainly in the forward-deployed forces in Germany. Second-line and reserve forces suffered from considerably lower levels of readiness.

Germany
Bundeswehr's 12 Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions would have represented a serious battlefield challenge to Soviet forces. Thanks to the combination of doctrine emphasizing bold battlefield maneuver, a highly competent officer and NCO cadre, and modern equipment, German divisions were formidable units that were individually superior to their Soviet counterparts. In addition, the Bundeswehr could rely on a large number of well trained and equipped Heimatschutz (Homeland Defense) brigades and a larger number of territorial regiments, battalions, and companies. These forces, trained to fight in urban and close terrain prevalent in large parts of Germany, were capable of significantly slowing down the AFV-heavy Soviet units and thus freeing Panzer and Panzergrenadier units for offensive counterstrokes. The large pool of trained reservists meant the Bundeswehr was reasonably well prepared for an extended conventional campaign.
 

Great Britain
The highly professional British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) constituted one of the key components of NATO's land defenses. During the 1980s British forces began to receive Challenger MBTs and Warrior IFVs, which significantly improved the combat power of their formations and increased their margin of qualitative superiority over Soviet forces.
 

Netherlands

 

United States
The US Army of the 1980s has definitively overcome the post-Vietnam malaise and fielded formidable, well-equipped and modern units animated by the new Air-Land Battle doctrine that offered a promise of effectively countering the superior numbers of men and materiel at the disposal of the Warsaw Pact. The highly effective performance of US divisions against the Iraqi army in the Operation Desert Storm suggests the USAREUR would have been an extremely dangerous foe for the Soviet Army.

 

WARSAW PACT

Czechoslovakia
The actual combat usefulness of the Czechoslovak military to the Soviets in the event of a war against NATO would have likely been limited by lingering animosities after the 1968 invasion to suppress the "Prague Spring," budding pro-democracy movements, and insufficient provision of modern equipment.

E. Germany
The Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) probably was the most reliable satellite army, although its reliability was by no means absolutely guaranteed. The rapid collapse of the GDR and overwhelming pro-reunification sentiment suggest its population (and, by extension, its army) might have shown limited support for any war against NATO.
 

Poland
The largest non-Soviet army of the Warsaw Pact was all but crippled in the 1980s due to the severe economic crisis that befell the Polish economy in the late 1970s and lasted through the decade, and the use of the military to suppress the Solidarity-centered pro-independence and democracy movement. As a result of economic hardships and the complete loss of legitimacy by the Polish communist government, the Polish military was no longer a credible component of the Warsaw Pact offensive strength, with possible exception of its elite units.

USSR
The Soviet military machine in the 1980s reflected the systemic problems of the Soviet state that was rapidly nearing its extinction. Soviet divisions, although individually outwardly impressive and collectively seemingly overwhelming, suffered from a number of problems that severely limited their combat power in comparison with their NATO equivalents. Small unit tactics were unsophisticated, with battalions expected to advance deployed in WW2-style highly vulnerable skirmish lines into the teeth of NATO firepower. Even though forward-deployed divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) were highly drilled, they were merely very good at executing fundamentally flawed tactics. Compounding the problem of troop quality was the pervasive corruption present at all levels of the Soviet military which did not spare even the high-readiness forward-deployed forces. Postings to the GSFG and other Groups of Forces were highly sought after due to the vastly better living conditions than in most Soviet garrisons, and means used to obtain such postings included employing political connections and outright bribery. Moreover, Soviet units lacked competent and experienced leadership at lower levels, particularly at the level of company and below. With no career NCOs to speak with and with many junior officers and sergeants, being little more than conscripts themselves, Soviet tactical units could not be relied upon to operate with skill on the battlefield. Although the Soviet military sought to reduce the vulnerability of its forces by increasing available artillery support, this effort did not result in fire support commensurate with the number of artillery tubes available to Soviet maneuver commanders due to command and control limitations and the "vertical" nature of Soviet artillery support which made it difficult to mass artillery fires in fluid tactical situations. The "elite" branches of the Soviet military were not immune from these problems, and their undoubted elan and high esprit de corps of these forces could not compensate for their tactical shortcomings. Furthermore, Soviet divisions have not evolved organizationally for several decades, apart from acquiring more and greater numbers of weapon systems and subunits. As a result, they have become unwieldy and lacking in combat agility. This problem was recognized by the Soviet military, which launched a reform effort replace the old "regiment-division-army" structure with a more flexible and agile "brigade-corps" one. However, this effort did not progress beyond the creation of up to two experimental corps (sometimes referred to as Operational Maneuver Groups). Therefore any war vs. NATO would have seen the Soviet Army still using its unwieldy and obsolescent organizational structure.
 

Mike J.
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The J-8 Shop
Wargame Rules, Variants, and Orders of Battle
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