Chapter 2: The US - partner in peace or nemesis

Two days after the coup the OAS held an emergency session denouncing the actions of Cedras and his followers. One of the speakers was US Secretary of State James Baker who declared: "This junta is illegal...Until President Aristide's government is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah, without friends, without support, and without a future. This coup must not and will not succeed."⁽¹⁾ On the 4^th the President, George Bush, said: "We want to see President Aristide returned to power."⁽²⁾ A curious thing happened during the weekend as by October 6^th the focus of the US government shifted from the coup to the human rights record of Aristide and the smearing of Aristide in the popular press began. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater remarked, for example: "We don't know [if Aristide will return to power] in the sense that the government of his country is changing and considering any number of different possibilities."⁽³⁾ He also stressed that Aristide had relied upon 'mob rule' while he was in power. This was to become a common theme. The US had pressed hard for the free elections in Haiti, fully expecting for their man Bazin to win and were alarmed by Aristide's victory. Washington remained very wary of his populism and his refusal to compromise.

The OAS did however adopt a resolution to embargo and diplomatically isolate Cedras which Bush finally agreed to comply with on November 5^th. The embargo was never enforced however and the porous nature of it was somewhat embarrassing. The Treasury Department (prompted by the State Department) exempted US light manufacturers (who comprised the bulk of Haitian exports). This move had a lot of support within the government including the Pentagon and Vice President Dan Quayle. Bush then began the trend of repatriating Haitian refugees who were fleeing in terror trying to make their way to Florida. Tens of thousands began making their way through the Gulf and hundreds were dying on the way. This illiterate and impoverished mob was the last thing the state of Florida wanted to take care of and Bush was not about to lose Florida in the upcoming Presidential elections by making the unpopular decision to actually help these people in any way.

The US was in a new position for itself. Haiti, unlike Kuwait, had no strategic value and produced no valuable exports. "US national security [was] not at stake"⁽⁴⁾ but the US had championed the elections and even though "a radical slum priest who had long preached against American imperialism"⁽⁵⁾ had won over their man Bazin, they had to act to restore him to power. Not to support Aristide "would give a green light to generals throughout Latin America to start a new era of coup d'etats against civilian regimes which were still serving US interests."⁽⁶⁾ This coupled with the tens of thousands of refugees attempting to make it into the US and dying by the hundreds trying was not the kind of crisis Bush wanted going into the Presidential election season. In fact under 1% of legitimate refugee petitions were accepted under Bush.⁽⁷⁾

What was interesting to see was the sudden interest the US took in the human rights area concerning Haiti. This newly found concern only came with the rise of Aristide to the Presidency even though for the past four regimes "international human rights advocates and democratic observers had begged the State Department to consider helping the democratic opposition in Haiti [but] no steps were taken by the United States to strengthen anything but the executive and the military until Aristide won the Presidency."⁽⁸⁾

The Bush administration began to pressure Aristide to compromise with the coup and he initially refused. The US strategy at this point was to strike a deal with the coup leaders who would then 'invite' foreign intervention in the way of some kind of an observer force to monitor human rights and guarantee the continuance of the government. Aristide was supposed to broaden his government to place 'moderates', that is pro-US and anti-revolutionary individuals, into positions of power in his government. This entailed the Ambassador to Haiti, Robert Adams, to work closely with Cedras and the coup leaders. Aristide, however, would not compromise and in fact would not even begin to negotiate with the coup leaders.

In November of 1991, the Haitian parliamentarians, backed by the first post-coup Prime Minister, Jean-Jacques Honorat (a recipient of $40 000 a year from the NED⁽⁹⁾), presented a US backed agreement to Aristide. The agreement called for an end to the embargo in exchange for further negotiations. Aristide abjectly refused this blatant attempt to merely lift the embargo.

However, under US government and media pressure Aristide was forced to get rid of his popular prime-minister Rene Preval in favour of either Rene Theodore, a fierce opponent of Aristides and the head of Haiti's Communist Party or Marc Bazin. Aristide chose Theodore, for although he was an opponent, at least he was not as beholden to the US as Bazin obviously was. Aristide could expect no support from Theodore, whom the US thought was a more reasonable negotiator. In fact in February 1992 he was quoted as saying that he agreed with a political return of Aristide but his "physical return, that is something else."⁽¹⁰⁾

A meeting in Washington was set up between the two sides and the result was the February 23^rd 'Protocol of Accord'. The main points were 1)an amnesty for the instigators of the coup 2)respect of legislation brought into law since the coup including Cedras' appointment as head of the army through 1994 3)lifting the embargo upon the ratification of the prime-minister and the inauguration of the government of national consensus.⁽¹¹⁾ The deal was defunct within days as Aristide intended on charging Cedras as a common criminal (not expressly excluded from the amnesty) and in Haiti the parliament would not ratify the agreement.

In early June the Haitian parliament, the coup-Prime Minister Honorat, the coup-President Joseph Nerette, and representatives of the FAdH got together in what they called the Tripartite Meeting. The result of this was the 'Villa d'Accueil' accord which called for a power-sharing arrangement between the Lavalas and Duvalierists headed by Marc Bazin who was named the new Prime-Minister on June 10^th. The offer was rejected by Lavalas. To counter the offer the merchant-bourgeois split with the revolutionaries and at their Miami Meeting came up with their own document calling for the establishment of a government of 'national concord'. They also created a non-official (i.e., not endorsed by Aristide) negotiating team headed by Father Antoine Adrien to travel to Haiti and negotiate face-to-face with the coup leaders for an agreement on the return to Haiti of democracy.

The independent initiative under Father Adrien met with Bazin on September 1^st and as a display of good faith Bazin allowed the deployment of OAS observers to Port-au-Prince to observe for possible human rights abuses. There were never more then twenty of them and they were entirely ineffective.

Lavalas were hoping for a better situation to develop with the US government following Bill Clinton's election as President as they saw most of the pressure against Aristide coming from the Republicans. After all, prior to his election, Clinton had called the forced repatriation of refugees an "immoral and illegal policy."⁽¹²⁾ Even before his inauguration however, Clinton called for the strengthening of the naval blockade of Haiti and continued Bush's policy of forced repatriation of Haitian refugees (something that is expressly against international humanitarian law). The official story was that these people were merely 'economic' refugees and not victims of political persecution, therefore they were not eligible for asylum. Of the more than 24 000 Haitians intercepted by the US Navy and Coast Guard from 1981 to Arisitide's takeover in 1991, only 11 were granted asylum (in comparison to 75 000 of 75 000 Cubans).⁽¹³⁾ The New Secretary of State, Warren Christopher began working for Aristide's return to stop the refugee flow and save Clinton the embarrassment of being even harder on the Haitians than his predecessor had been. Christopher was looking to interject UN monitors so that after the initial possible military phase, the US could quickly withdraw its forces. Aristide, in return, was forced to accept amnesty for the coup members.

In March, 1993 a 250 member UN Civilian Mission arrived in Haiti and were constantly threatened. On April 23^rd Clinton announced a plan to send a 'multi-national police force' of up to 600 men to 'professionalize' the army. Aristide had asked them to disarm the army or at the very least reduce it down from 7 000 to 1 000 men. This was an attempt to kick start the negotiations which had stagnated by early in the year. Clinton had vowed during the election that he would promote democracy abroad so he had to come up with a new initiative. To do this he actively enlisted the help of the UN who, up to this point, had largely left the matter in the hands of the OAS. Bazin's government collapsed on June 8^th with his resignation, a move possibly organized by Washington, allowing Lavalas and Aristide to supposedly fill the openings created. Eight days later the Security Council passed Resolution #841 calling for a mandatory global embargo of oil and arms going to Haiti.

The independent Haiti Commission of Inquiry into the September 30^th Coup d'etat, on June 26^th, made a statement that the US and the UN were using coercion on Aristide and specifically that the UN was legitimizing Cedras by forcing Aristide to deal with him. New negotiations were begun the next day on Governor's Island in New York. The go-between was UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo, an Argentine diplomat.

The Governor's Island Accord called for: 1) Cedras to step down and Aristide to resume power by October 30 in exchange for amnesty for all coup participants 2)the appointment by Aristide of a transitional cabinet accepted by the junta parliament 3)an international training mission to separate the police and army and to 'professionalize' both 4)large amounts of foreign aid and technical assistance.⁽¹⁴⁾ This plan was put together without even consulting Aristide. He and his advisors put together a counter-proposal which was immediately rejected and the pressure to sign came down including a call from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali who said "Don't think, Mr. President, just sign it."⁽¹⁵⁾ Aristide was forced to agree to the lifting of the embargo and to name another new prime-minister before Cedras left and he returned.

Lifting the embargo ensured the deal's failure as the junta refused to leave once goods started to flow in again. It had the effect of legitimizing Cedras, which is why Aristide was opposed to direct negotiations with him in the first place, as well as making the return of Aristide quite improbable. On top of that his supporters in Haiti were targeted for a new surge of arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture and murders. The concessions made by the Accord were far too broad according to Aristide's aides. "The army and its rightist allies have no right to make political demands after violently defying the will of Haitian voters and the international community."⁽¹⁶⁾ As part of the deal Rene Malval was named by Aristide as his new Prime Minister in August and he was sent to Haiti to work with the coup leaders towards Aristide's return on October 30^th. Malval conferred with Cedras, right wing leaders and members of parliament in order to come up with a viable power sharing arrangement.

Aristide rightfully felt that he was being manipulated by US officials who "sought to dilute his power as President and force him to return as a figurehead."⁽¹⁷⁾ Unfortunately Aristide saw the grim reality that if he wanted international financial support after his return, he was going to have to make concessions to the US. Even after signing the Accord Aristide had little faith that the provisions would ever really be acted upon. He doubted both the Haitian military and the international communities backing for the agreement. As for the merchant-bourgeois, they were at a dangerous political crossroads. They were torn between allying with what seemed to be a rather self-interested international community or an increasingly militant popular movement. They chose the former. The US's true level of concern can be shown by the Haitian-US export figures which actually rose during the coup period from 80% in 1990 to 83% by 1993.⁽¹⁸⁾ Aristide was being forced to chose between possible international military intervention or popular revolution. Neither was a particularly attractive option.

As the October 30^th deadline approached the political attacks on Aristide's supporters grew and amazingly Clinton announced that the proposed UN mission would rely on the Haitian military and police to maintain order. These would be the very same individuals who were killing their countrymen in large numbers. On October 14^th Haitian Justice Minister (and supporter of Aristide) Guy Malary was assassinated in broad daylight. All told there had been approximately 3 000 people killed in Haiti since the coup⁽¹⁹⁾ and the popular movements were being systematically decimated. An incident completely across the globe also impacted the negotiations. On October 3^rd the US forces in Somalia botched a raid which cost them 18 killed troops and precipitated the withdrawal of all US forces in that country. This was to have a major impact on the decision to send any forces into Haiti.

In response to the assassination of Malary, Clinton attempted to put more pressure on Cedras but was resisted by a now 'gun-shy' Pentagon and Congress. He did however reimpose sanctions when it became more clear that Cedras had no intention of allowing Aristide back into Haiti. As well the US froze the assets of forty-one military officers, police officials and civilians who had backed the coup and annulled their visas. This, of course, had been anticipated by the wealthy Haitian families who had more than enough warning to disperse their money into other foreign banks.

On October 11^th 1993, the USS Harlan County (an amphibious troop ship) approached the dock at Port-au-Prince carrying 218 American and Canadian military engineers, the vanguard of the envisioned 1 300 man UN mission overseeing Aristide's return to power and the retraining of the army and police forces. They were greeted by a "motley flotilla of small boats, and a gang of about 100 pro-government thugs [standing] on the dock, shouting and waving machetes."⁽²⁰⁾

Within 24 hours the ship was ordered back to Guantanamo Bay naval base. The ship's departure was "instantly perceived in Haiti and abroad as a humiliating retreat...an unmistakable sign of international disengagement from the Haitian crisis after nearly two years of intermittent efforts to reverse the army coup."⁽²¹⁾ Just six months later the US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence, Walter Slocombe, who was behind the decision to turn back the Harlan County, was quoted by the Times as vowing that: "the Pentagon would not risk American soldiers' lives to put 'that psychopath' [Aristide] back in power."⁽²²⁾ It was a very clear message. A French military advisor pointed out: "Do you know what the real problem is? The Americans don't want Aristide back, and they want the rest of us out."⁽²³⁾ The rest being Canada, France and Venezuela specifically, for backing the return of Aristide. The incident showed the "deep ambivalence among US officials about risking harm or criticism to prop up an impoverished third world democracy."⁽²⁴⁾ Warren Christopher made it clear in December that reinstating Aristide had ceased to be a priority.⁽²⁵⁾ Clinton successfully de-linked human rights from trade issues, at least for a short amount of time, but the problem did not go away.

Up until the "Harlan County" incident US officials had praised Cedras as a professional solider and the State Department predicted that the army would comply with the Accords because of this perceived professionalism. This, of course, was a complete misreading of the man and the situation. The US failed to understand just how little Haiti's elite cared about international opinion. The US diplomats and negotiating teams kept speaking of finding Haiti's political centre while utterly ignoring the fact that there existed an armed minority that was quite willing to kill to stay in power. The incident soured relations between the US and the UN officials who were questioning how a hand full of thugs on the wharf had turned back the strongest military nation in the world. US officials had just plainly underestimated the "cynicism, greed, ruthlessness and deep hostility to Aristide among military leaders and their civilian confederates, who also included conservative businessmen and criminal gangs."⁽²⁶⁾ The incident showed Cedras just how little he had to fear international intervention.

In Haiti the sanctions were having relatively little effect on the coup supporters who paved a new road to the Dominican Republic and smuggled in oil and gas. Former Duvalier aides also came in from exile in the Dominican Republic and they began to hold rallies threatening Aristide and any US or UN forces which could possibly arrive.

In April, 1994, civil rights activist Randall Robinson began a hunger strike to protest Clinton's inhumane repatriation of refugees policy, and in May, in response to this and other bad press he was receiving on his handling of the crisis, Clinton finally announced a new initiative. He introduced a new refugee policy which meant the "forcible return of 95% of boat people instead of 100%."⁽²⁷⁾ The President pleaded with the rest of the world to help absorb the flow of refugees, or at least provide them with temporary safe-havens. This was somewhat ironic considering the wealth of the US and the wealth and capabilities of the Caribbean nations he was specifically asking to undertake this task.

It was not until July 31^st, 1994, that the UN Security Council approved the use of force to restore Aristide to power. The US had hoped that "if enough pressure was brought to bear through a mixture of economic sanctions and military threats, divisions within the army ranks could [have] provoke[d] a coup"⁽²⁸⁾. This tactic failed (as it subsequently failed in Iraq) to materialize. This of course was a complete mis-reading of the political reality in Haiti. Now the only recourse left to Clinton was invasion but the US did not want to go alone, they wanted a "coalition of other states- preferably including a few Latin American ones- alongside it. So the countdown to [the] possible invasion proceed[ed] alongside the attempt to sign up allies."⁽²⁹⁾

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Haiti situation has been the media manipulation by the CIA and the Pentagon in order to paint Aristide as an unstable, violent leader. While the US government demanded more and more concessions by Aristide and none by the military coup, they were systematically undermining Aristide's credibility.

A document leaked in October 1993 by a Haitian US-Embassy security guard (who was assassinated days later) outlined a strategy for undermining Aristide's return. The US was to agree to recognize a new prime-minister, unfreeze assets and it goes on to say: "What is needed presently is a broad, sustained, and very discrete approach from the US policy-makers and the media which will counteract and nullify the propaganda of the Lavalas organization."⁽³⁰⁾ This was adopted by the Bush administration as well as the subsequent Clinton administration. The confusion at the US embassy was quite obvious in a confidential cable sent to Secretary of State Warren Christopher on April 12^th, 1994: "The Haitian left, including President Aristide and his supporters in Washington and here, consistently manipulate or even fabricate human rights abuses as a propaganda tool." However, later in the same cable: "The army and right wing elements are unquestionably committing numerous, serious human rights abuses, including murders of suspected Aristide partisans."⁽³¹⁾

The credibility attacks against Aristide appear to come from a number of areas including the State Department, the Republican Party and the CIA. The State Department went after Aristide's human rights record but was unable to come up with a single case of Aristide-government endorsed or encouraged violence or retaliations despite a lot of rhetoric and lies in the media. Clinton's former special envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, was only slightly more gracious: "What I saw was not a psychopathic maniac but a rigid, narrow person who does not have the courage to make decisions and is incapable of compromise."⁽³²⁾ The right-wing campaigns were led by Republican Senators Dole, Nunn and Helms attacking Aristide's psychological health, human rights and political affiliations. On October 20^th Senator Jesse Helms branded Aristide a "psychopath and grave human rights abuser"⁽³³⁾ and four days later Senator Bob Dole said: "The return of Aristide to Haiti is not worth even one American life."⁽³⁴⁾ Dole also tried to pass an amendment to the constitution that would have imposed new limits on the Presidential power to order the military abroad in order to stave off any attempt by Clinton to intervene in Haiti militarily. His amendment was defeated. There were references as well to Aristide being treated in Canada for psychological problems but this story was revealed later to be false. The media jumped on these statements. Some examples of how Aristide was being portrayed:

"Creating democratic institutions and practice will be hard enough; add the unpredictable Mr. Aristide, and it may become a lot harder."⁽³⁵⁾

"...some Americans may conclude that Aristide isn't much better than the generals. Though loved by the poor, the volatile Roman-Catholic priest is an anti-American Marxist demagogue whose commitment to democracy and human rights is far from rock-solid."⁽³⁶⁾

"...the flaky Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide."⁽³⁷⁾

"The Americans cannot turn the country over to Aristide until he is capable of governing coherently."⁽³⁸⁾

"...America needs to keep a politic distance from Father Aristide, an unconvincing democrat with a capacity to whip up mayhem."⁽³⁹⁾

"Returning President Aristide to Haiti is going to be difficult for reasons to which he himself has greatly contributed."⁽⁴⁰⁾

The CIA in 1991 circulated (with the State Department) a 'psychological profile' that suggested Aristide was emotionally unstable, promoted mob violence and was potentially psychotic.⁽⁴¹⁾ These though were the same people who visited Haiti at the height of the military repression and reported no evidence⁽⁴²⁾ of such problems.

There are long standing ties between the Pentagon, the CIA and the Haitian officers involved in the coup. Several of them were on the CIA payroll as informants up until the time of the coup and some continued their training in the US after the coup undermining the condemnation being espoused by the White House. In 1986 the CIA had setup and funded SIN (National Intelligence Service)in Haiti to fight narcotic smuggling. SIN, however, "never produced drug intelligence"⁽⁴³⁾ despite receiving between $500 000 to $1 million per year from the CIA. This may be seen by the fact that the coup leaders set up a lucrative drug transshipment point in Haiti which ran up to 10 000 pounds of cocaine a month.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Considering how effective the US Navy and Coast Guard were in finding every small fishing boat full of refugees coming out of Haiti it was odd that they could not detect this activity especially with a friendly intelligence agency in country.

The CIA used data collected by SIN to discredit Aristide after the coup, whose supporters were the real targets of SIN intelligence collecting. A Haitian official confirmed SIN's activities: They were "Heavily involved in spying on so-called subversive groups...They were doing nothing but political repression...They targeted people who were for a change."⁽⁴⁵⁾ Although there is no direct evidence of US involvement in the coup the list of junta members who were receiving US funding was impressive. The CIA funnelled millions into the FAdH and SIN as well as political parties and sympathetic NGOs in order to destabilize the popular organizations and build up conservative alternatives.

The Pentagon and the CIA used the backlash of public opinion against US overseas intervention, due to the disastrous engagement in Somalia, to try to stop Aristide's return. "One shot and we're out of there"⁽⁴⁶⁾ a Pentagon official said before the USS Harlan County got to Port-au-Prince giving the junta a real hint on how little trouble it would be to scuttle the Governor's Island Accord. There is also the story by New York Daily News columnist Juan Gonzalaz who "was told about the October 11^th port demonstration the day beforehand at a Duvalierist meeting at which US embassy personnel were present. How can two Daily News reporters who have only visited Haiti on a few occasions learn beforehand of secret plans to sabotage the landing of our troops, while our vaunted officialdom claims it was caught flatfooted?"⁽⁴⁷⁾ Pentagon officials resisted joining any Haitian mission and they dragged their heals with endless discussions on the rules of engagement with the State Department until the "Harlan County" incident when it withdrew its support altogether, thus scuttling the operation entirely. An officer in the Pentagon said "I don't want one American kid stubbing his toe restoring democracy in Haiti."⁽⁴⁸⁾ The Pentagon and the CIA completely distrusted Aristide and the reason is fairly clear. They had very close ties with all of the people involved in the coup and had trained most of them as well. The Haitian high command sought US assurances that the FAdH would not be dismantled, and as they did not trust Aristide or the UN they turned to the Pentagon and the CIA who happily supported their cause through an elaborate dis-information campaign which struck all the right cords in the State Department and the Republican Party.

The President was able to resist the temptation to join the chorus of voices calling to stay out of Haiti and looked towards the international community for assistance. Intervention is easier to sell domestically and internationally if it is undertaken multilaterally, and more specifically with the blessing of the UN Security Council or a regional organization such as the OAS.

Chapter 3: UN & OAS - independent organizations or US lackeys

October 11^th, 1991, saw the first act by the UN as the 166 members unanimously voted for a resolution backing the OAS embargo and branding the junta 'illegal' as well as refusing to deal with the coup leaders, as the OAS had done nine days earlier. The call by the OAS was only made due to the unprecedented decision taken in 1990 in favour of defending democracy in the Americas. It took almost a month (November 5^th) for the US to comply with the embargo and even then it was not enforced. On February 4^th the US virtually ended their embargo and began to allow shipping by assembly industries with plants in Haiti.

By late 1992 the US Ambassador to the UN, Fritz Longchamps, began to press for direct intervention by the Security Council to stop the Tonton Macoutes from killing the Aristide supporters. "If the General Assembly judges that the violations of human rights are continuing despite the different initiatives of the UN and that the only way to guarantee and preserve these rights is a peacekeeping force...to stop [the putschists] from assassinating the Haitian people"⁽⁴⁹⁾ then the course of action was clear. Aristide and Lavalas were against intervention however and they rightly pointed out that the UN Charter specifically forbids the Security Council from interfering with the internal affairs of the member states. The reason for their reluctance has a lot to do with the actions of the US the last time they went to Haiti to restore order in 1915 and did not leave until 1934 and, of course, one cannot forget the legacy they left behind. Despite this a September meeting between Bazin's coup-Foreign Minister Francois Benoit, Father Adrien and the OAS in Washington resulted in an OAS observer force being sent to Haiti. It was initially supposed to consist of hundreds of international observers but in the end there were only twenty sent and they "essentially remained ensconced in the luxurious Hotel Montana."⁽⁵⁰⁾ Months of fruitless negotiations followed under the auspices of the OAS. By 1993 the UN had virtually taken over the role the OAS had played as international negotiators. This was shown when the UN appointed Argentine Ambassador Dante Caputo as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy in December 1992. Caputo was named the OAS Special Envoy as well the next month and it was he who 'negotiated' the Governor's Island Accord.

The UN did have a small contingent of human rights monitors in Haiti which were sent in March 1993. The UN Civilian Mission of 250 persons was forced to pull out in early November following a rapid deterioration of the situation in Haiti leading to fears for their safety. When the Security Council decided to intervene in the situation in Haiti through UN Resolution 841 (April 16^th, 1993), it represented the first time since the Congo that the Council had openly intervened in the internal affairs of a member state. El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, Namibia and Bosnia were all considered 'regional conflicts'. Cuba opposed the move saying it represented a "dangerous precedent...to give this body powers and a mandate which are larger than those granted in the Charter."⁽⁵¹⁾

On June 16^th Resolution 841 was passed calling for an oil and arms embargo to take effect by June 23^rd. By June 27^th the negotiations of the Governor's Island Accord began. The UN forced Aristide to accept Cedras as a negotiating partner even though both the OAS and the UN had branded him and his followers as 'outlaws'. Cedras could not help but be pleased to be recognized internationally. There were, of course, no real negotiations. The UN, US and the IMF had worked out the agreement ahead of time and all that remained to be done was to get Cedras and Aristide to sign it. There was no input whatsoever from the legitimate government of Haiti and the Accord was even shared with the press before Aristide got to see it.⁽⁵²⁾ Aristide withheld his signature for almost a full day sending the US and UN diplomats into a 'frenzy'. The ill-fated "Harlan County" incident followed. It was to be an operation requiring 700 US and 500 UN troops for a six month long mission.

In response to the "Harlan County" incident in October 1993, the UN Security Council voted to re-impose oil and arms sanctions and to enforce the embargo with the deployment of warships. This represented the first enforcement action the UN undertook in the Haitian crisis. Throughout the next year the UN would continue to align its policies with the US and begin to press for an armed intervention.

1994 saw a flurry of activity by the Security Council. Resolution 917, which praised the defunct Governor's Island Accord,

called on the international community to isolate Haiti through the restriction of air traffic, especially in the case of the coup instigators, a freezing of foreign assets and the reinstatement of the embargo. This came into effect May 6^th. On July 31^st Resolution 940 was passed authorizing the formation of a Multinational Force (MNF) and its right to use "all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership." ⁽⁵³⁾ This was the Chapter VII authorization to use force and it extended the use of the MNF for a period of six months.

Once given the green light the US managed to sign up Argentina for the possible combat stage and a host of nations for the UN policing stage including Canada, France, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago, Holland, as well as Israel for medical and humanitarian relief only. Dominica, Grenada, Antigua and Surinam agreed to take in refugees.

A last minute deal was brokered by former US President Jimmy Carter that avoided an invasion 'under fire' and instead saw the US troops land unopposed and with the approval of Cedras in September 1994. This led to a bad perception of the US by Haitians "...the American forces that were to save ordinary Haitians from the regime arrived instead almost as partners."⁽⁵⁴⁾ Bringing in the UN to Haiti was a problem for some Haitians as they felt, somewhat justly, that the UN's commitment to human rights was based on self-interest and the organization was perceived to be controlled by the very nation (the US) that may have had a hand in the coup.⁽⁵⁵⁾

The initial invasion troops were largely replaced by 1 000 Military Police (MP) who were told not to meddle in internal affairs and that security would stay in the hand of the Haitian police. This was later changed to allow the MPs to protect the civilians from the police but neither the police nor the army were disarmed. Cedras promised to step down by October 15^th, 1994, but was allowed to stay in Haiti. On October 7^th, 1994, over three years since he had been ousted, Aristide addressed the General Assembly in New York to thank the world for its assistance and support, and he outlined a 10 year national reconstruction plan that had been written up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB).

The United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) took over from the MNF on March 31^st, 1995, with a mandate to keep it in place until the end of June 1996. At its peak it numbered 6 000 military personnel and 850 civilian police but by the end of its mandate these numbers dropped to 1 900 total.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The mission mandate was to: a) maintain security and stability in Haiti b) return to constitutional rule c) train a new national police force and d) assist in holding elections. As well the UNMIH undertook a number of projects aimed at restoring basic services and infrastructure. The UNMIH was contributed to by Algeria, Bangladesh, Canada, Djibouti, France, Mali, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago and the US and cost a total of $ 315 794 700 net from beginning to end.⁽⁵⁷⁾ This was followed by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) which was created by Resolution 1063 of June 28^th, 1996. Its mandate has been extended until May 31^st, 1997. At its peak the UNSMIH consisted of 500 military personnel and 300 civilian police. These two missions have been supported by the joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) created by the OAS Resolution 7/95 of June 5^th, 1995 and had its mandate extended by UN Resolution 49/27B to February 7^th,1996.

MICIVIH had a mandate to a) monitor and document human rights and make recommendations to Haitian authorities b) run a public information campaign on human rights c) assist the Truth Commission and the Human Rights Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior d) contribute to the communal governance Solidarity Plan and e) observe elections. The mission consisted of 32 OAS and 32 UN observers. These missions have been supported by other UN projects such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and many others.

Since the return of Aristide human rights abuses have become the exception rather than the norm. The system of rural section chiefs was dismantled as was the FAdH. In November 1994 a new law was written creating the Haitian National Police (HNP) which began its training in February 1995. There has been a substantial program of penal reform along with the inauguration of the Ecole de la Magistrature (July 1995) and the creation of an investigative capacity within the justice system. Despite these gains the police , judges and lawyers still have inadequate training, there is a chronic lack of resources and the ethical behaviour of some of the police and judges has been called into question. A potential destabilizing factor is the disbanded FAdH and FRAPH which make up a total of around 6 900 individuals. The FAdH members are still owed back pay which they have yet to receive.

The prison population is 1 703 of whom 1 504 (88%) were still awaiting trial, only 199 were convicted and some of the others had been in jail for months.⁽⁵⁸⁾ The criminal investigation of violent deaths stills fails to satisfy either international standards or the requirements of Haitian law. Unfortunately only 28% of the population feels that the justice system is fair.⁽⁵⁹⁾ This can be partially attributed to the fact that the police used to represent the oppressive regime of the Duvalierists. Although the HNP is still years from becoming a totally professional force "it is clear that the human rights situation has improved dramatically as a result of reforms initiated, including the replacement of the Armed Forces by new institutions such as the new police force and the civilian penal administration, as well as the efforts of the authorities, limited though they may be, to uphold accountability."⁽⁶⁰⁾ MICIVIH's recommendations for continued reform in 1997 include: a)improve the supervisory structure of the HNP b) continue the training of HNP agents on the ground c)limit the use of force and the use of firearms and ammunition d) improve the protection of detainees held in police stations e) regularly monitor the application of police regulations f) improve coordination between the police and judicial authorities g) define the status of and clearly identify those responsible for law enforcement and the maintenance of order h)investigate and sanction abuses and publish the results of inquires and sanctions imposed i) implement a national program of information and civic education and j) better defend the interests of police agents.⁽⁶¹⁾ This new HNP force is seen as the key to a civil society forming based on the rule of law.

The UNMIH ,UNSMIH and the MICIVIH successfully monitored the past five elections in Haiti. The June 25^th ,1995, elections were relatively free of violence. The August 13^th elections were peaceful although those on September 17^th had some incidents of violence and coercion. The most successful to date were the December 17^th Presidential elections which were virtually incident-free and resulted in the election to the Presidency of Aristide's hand picked successor Rene Preval who won with 87.9% of the votes and assumed office on February 1996.⁽⁶²⁾ Election victory did not mean that Preval was free to act in a manner of his choosing. The entire monetary policy and budget were pre-decided for him by the IMF and WB. These and other international lenders have influenced the course of events before, during and now after the coup.

1. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, Jan/Feb (1994)., p.16.

2. Ibid., p.16.

3. Ibid., p.16.

4. David H. Hackworth 'A Soldier's-Eye View' Newsweek. (Aug 22 1994).,p.33.

5. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994).,p.112.

6. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.20.

7. Noam Chomsky 'Democracy Enhancement Part II: The Case of Haiti' Znet @ www.lbbs.org/zmag/articles/chom3.htm, p.9.

8. Noam Chomsky 'Democracy Enhancement Part II: The Case of Haiti' Znet @ www.lbbs.org/zmag/articles/chom3.htm, p.7.

9. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President, NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.20.

10. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.22.

11. Kim Ives, Ibid., p.22.

12. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.24.

13. Noam Chomsky, "Democracy Enhancement Part II: The Case of Haiti" Znet, www.lbbs.org/zmag/articles/chom3.htm, p.9.

14. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994).,p.109.

15. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.26.

16. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994)., p.114.

17. Ibid., p.114.

18. 'Haiti Intra-Regional Trade' @ www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/aid/aid94/Intraregional/HAT.html, p.1.

19. Barry Came 'Sweet Mickey's Flight' Macleans. (Oct 17 1994)., p.25.

20. Russell Watson 'Is This Invasion Necessary?' Newsweek. (Sep 19 1994).,p.37.

21. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994).,p.108.

22. Noam Chomsky 'Democracy Enhancement Part II: The Case of Haiti' Znet @ www.lbbs.org/zmag/articles/chom3.htm ,p.12.

23. Ibid.,p.17.

24. Pamela Constable, Ibid., p.108.

25. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.29. "The reestablishment of democracy in Haiti is not one of the US government's priorities."

26. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994)., p.110.

27. Noam Chomsky 'Democracy Enhancement Part II: The Case of Haiti' Znet @ www.lbbs.org/zmag/articles/chom3.htm, p.11.

28. 'Tightening the Stranglehold' The Economist. vol. 332, (Aug 6-12 1994).,p.36.

29. 'Ready, Steady, Steady, Oh' The Economist. vol. 332, (Aug 6-12 1994).,p.23.

30. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.21.

31. Wesley Bocxe 'Mixing the Signals' Newsweek. (May 16 1994).,p.41.

32. Russell Watson 'Is This Invasion Necessary?' Newsweek. (Sep 19 1994)., p.37.

33. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994).,p.114.

34. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.29.

35. 'Haiti: The Morning After' The Economist. vol. 332, (Sep 24-30 1994).,p.41.

36. Russell Watson 'Is This Invasion Necessary?' Newsweek. (Sep 19 1994).,p.37.

37. Ibid.,p.36.

38. Wesley Boxce 'Mixing the Signals' Newsweek. (May 16 1994).,p.41.

39. 'To Haiti's Rescue?' The Economist vol. 332, (Sep 17-23 1994).,p.13.

40. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.16. Reported in the Washington Post.

41. Russell Watson 'Is This Invasion Necessary?' Newsweek. (Sep 19 1994)., p.37.

42. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. (Mar 1994).,p.114.

43. Marx V. Aristide and Laurie Richardson 'Democracy Enhancements- US Style' NACLA Report on the Americas vol XVII no 4 Jan/Feb(1994).,p.35.

44. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift' Current History. Mar (1994)., p.110.

45. Marx V. Aristide, Ibid., p.35.

46. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.28.

47. Ibid.,p.28.

48. Pamela Constable 'Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A policy Adrift' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.113.

49. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.23.

50. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.23.

51. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994).,p.25.

52. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.25.

53. 'Resolution 940 (1994)' United Nations @ www.un.org.plweb-cgi/idco.pl?48+u...www.un.org...80+un+un+scres+scres++haiti, p.2.

54. 'Haiti: The Morning After' The Economist. vol. 332, (Sep 24-30 1994).,p.41.

55. Kim Ives 'The Unmaking of a President' NACLA Report on the Americas. vol. XVII, no.4, (Jan/Feb 1994)., p.25.

56. 'Haiti-UNMIH' United Nations @ www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmih_p.htm, p.1. and Tetsuo Itani & Marc Whittingham 'Security and Defence Forum Visit' July 26^th 1996, p.C-1.

57. 'Haiti- UNMIH End of Mission Summary' United Nations @ www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmih_b.htm, p.2.

58. 'The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States @ www.oas.org/EN/PROG/UPD/micivihe.htm, p.6.

59. 'USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1997' USAID @ www.info.gov/pubs/cp97/countries/ht.htm, p.9.

60. 'The Situation of Democracy and human rights in Haiti' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States @ www.oas.org/EN/PROG/micivihe.htm, p.15.

61. 'The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti' Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, Organization of American States @ www.oas.org/EN/PROG/UPD/micivihe.htm, p.2.

62. 'Haiti- UNMIH End of Mission Summary' United Nations @ www.un/org/Depts/Missions/unmih_b.htm, p.12.