NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Inviolability vs. Self-Determination

Erik Growen

The bitter fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijan that began in 1989, has been held in check by a cease-fire since late 1994, however the roots of the conflict have never even come close to being resolved despite years of mediation and talks. The conflict remains over who should have the right to control and govern the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan puts forth their claim citing the inviolability of internationally recognized borders while the Armenian majority in the region base their claim upon the internationally recognized right to self-determination. Neither side appears willing to compromise on this fundamental issue.

The basic question of inviolability of borders versus self-determination is one of primary importance to the future of the post-Soviet successor states. The answer to the question could have an immediate impact, by setting precedence, upon such other conflict areas as Chechnya, Georgia, Moldova, and others.

Many outside actors have attempted to mediate or intervene in the region including Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Turkey, Iran, the United States and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), later changed to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The geopolitical reasons for their particular interests will be examined along with an analysis of their efforts to achieve a settlement beneficial to themselves. These various nations and organizations have been selectively using the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords (the Charter of the OSCE), particularly espousing the right to territorial integrity, while ignoring the right to self-determination in order to further their own political and economic agendas.

This paper will therefore examine the historical roots of the conflict in order to present the context from which Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) are working within, followed by a detailed look at the various diplomatic conflict resolution attempts that have been made by themselves and by outside actors to see their motivations and where they stand on the inviolability of borders versus self-determination question.

The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords Decalogue are the important international legal documents being used by all sides in the conflict to justify their various positions. As Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of the CSCE in 1991, and members of the UN in 1992, the Charters have particular relevance for to join either organization is to accept the rules laid down to govern them.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Article 21 (3) states " The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. "⁽¹⁾

The UN Charter Article 1 (2) states : " To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination"⁽²⁾

The Helsinki Accords, drawn up in 1975 by the CSCE, lay down ten basic principles of conduct member nations are to follow including: the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of states, non-intervention in internal affairs, as well as the belief in equal rights and self-determination of peoples.⁽³⁾

There exists an obvious and recognized fundamental tension between self-determination and the maintenance of territorial integrity in both Charters as well as a basic controversy between collective and individual rights vis a vis the state.⁽⁴⁾

Basically stated, in the Nagorno-Karabakh the Karabakh Armenians argue that they are entitled to an independent state by right of self-determination and free-vote while Azerbaijan maintains that the Nagorno-Karabakh must remain part of Azeri territory by right of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

The first Armenian and Azeri republics came into being in 1918 in the wake of the collapse of Csarist control. By 1920 however they had been incorporated into the Transcuacasian Federation along with Georgia under the communists. On the 30^th of November 1920 the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee recognized Nakichevan as part of Soviet Armenia and gave the Nagorno-Karabakh the right to self-determination. There was also a discussion of ceding the Nagorno-Karabakh directly to Armenia. In July 1921 the decision was made to attach the Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan while " granting it broad regional autonomy." ⁽⁵⁾

This was due to pressure from Stalin who was trying to placate the restive Moslem population being subdued by Soviet Russia. Azerbaijan with its larger population and oil became more important than Armenia.⁽⁶⁾

The final border changes were made in 1923 by Stalin who gave the Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan as an Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (AzSSR).

In 1987 the NKAO conducted a petition campaign for reunification with Armenia. They managed to collect over 80 000 signatures out of a population of 162 000. The Azeris responded with repression so the NKAO sent out appeals to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan asking for the right of succession and attachment to Armenia. This resulted in the 1988 pogroms in Azerbaijan (especially in Baku) against the Armenian Christian segment of the population.

A massive earthquake struck Armenia in December 1988 and in the ensuing chaos the Soviets, in an effort to diffuse the situation, jailed the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee, ousted the NKAO leader and dissolved the elected bodies in the region to quell the calls for succession. Direct rule from Moscow was set up, however the individuals sent promptly began to set up links (political, economic, et cetera) between the NKAO and Armenia. The USSR Supreme Soviet opted for even more direct intervention in January 1990 by declaring a state of emergency in the NKAO following more pogroms against Armenians in the region and in the rest of Azerbaijan. This effectively meant military occupation.

In the fall 1990 elections in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan only the Azeris kept the communists in power and Azerbaijan even voted in March 1991 to preserve the USSR. These two actions won them support from Moscow.

A deportation operation began in the Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991 which lasted four months, moved ~10 000 people, depopulated 26 villages and led to 140-170 civilians killed. It was only halted by the August 1991 putsch in Moscow and the subsequent chaos it created. On September 2^nd 1991 the Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed their independence from Moscow naming themselves the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Within two months Azerbaijan passed a law abolishing the autonomy of the NKAO which was followed by the NKR proclaiming separation from Azerbaijan on the basis of a referendum which had an 82% voter turnout and resulted in a 99% vote for separation. In November 1991 Soviet troops withdrew from the NKAO/NKR. Due to the perceived threat from Azerbaijan the NKR actually appealed to Yeltsin as to if it was possible to be incorporated into Russia but they received no reply.

On January 6^th 1992 the NKR officially declared independence and the war for control began with Azerbaijan. By the end of spring the NKR forces had taken all of the Nagorno-Karabakh territory plus a corridor leading through the city of Lachin to Armenia. The next year saw further military success as the NKR captured ~20% of Azerbaijan. Major counter-attacks were attempted by Azeri forces in 1994 but they failed despite Turkish and US mercenary trainers, an influx of ~1 500 Mujaheddin fighters and the use of numerous ex-Soviet mercenaries. After the failure of the operations a cease-fire was brokered by Russia which has held since. The war, in spite of being a low-intensity conflict involving relatively little manpower, has caused the deaths of ~25 000 people and created over 1 million refugees.

Russia has been very active in trying to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ever since they lost control of the situation in 1991. They have several reasons for wishing this particular conflict to come to a final conclusion based on geopolitical as well as economic concerns. The Russians wish to limit Iranian and Turkish intervention/expansion into the Transcaucasus, a region they feel they can restore military and political control over thereby re-securing the border of the former Soviet-Union.⁽⁷⁾

To achieve success would be a demonstration of Russian influence in the so-called 'near-abroad' and a show of strength for the CIS as sole peace-keeping arbiters and security guarantors in the former Soviet Union. There is also the fact that a full-blown domino-theory has taken hold in Moscow. "the Soviet leaders were concerned at the possibility of an uncontrollable chain reaction of border claims and population transfers across the whole of the Soviet Union."⁽⁸⁾

The change in power from the communists to the reformers has not changed this fundamental belief. To allow the NKR the right to self-determination would mean, by precedence, that areas like Chechnya ought to have the same right.

The economic factor cannot be ignored especially since the discovery of ~40 billion barrels of oil and natural gas deposits off the coast of Azerbaijan in the Caspian Sea. The Russian energy industry is in crisis with falling production and the fact that many customers have reneged on or cannot afford to pay their energy debts.⁽⁹⁾

Due to this there is a need to preserve access to the Azeri strategic oil reserves. The transportation of the new oil reserves is also a factor with pipeline proposals either going through Chechnya, or within artillery range of the Nagorno-Karabakh or going through Turkey (which would be an economic disaster for Russia). It is due to these factors, and the fact that Azerbaijan produces most of the Russian oil-drilling equipment, that the Russians have been leery of antagonizing the Azeris and are quite willing to back their call for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Russia's first mediation attempt was made in September 1991 and resulted in the Zheleznovodsk Communique regarding the first steps towards shaping of a peace-making process. In 1993 they approached the CSCE to get financial backing for a proposed CIS peace-keeping operation involving only Russian troops but were turned down. Since then Moscow has tried to minimize the European security agenda and manipulate the CSCE/OSCE on its own behalf to legitimize CIS operations and plans.⁽¹⁰⁾

Between 1992-94 Russia attempted a number of bilateral initiatives which on the whole failed except for an agreement with Armenia guaranteeing the safeguarding of Armenia's borders from outside (Turkish or Iranian) aggression, which although not ratified by Russia's Supreme Soviet has led to the continued stationing of the Russian 7^th Army in Armenia.

Russia has played a dangerous diplomatic game by backing, at different times, both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the conflict. For example they helped an Azeri offensive in 1992 and the next year supported the Armenian capture of Kelbajar. At the same time they have condemned the NKR occupation of Azeri territory, supplied arms to both sides and instigated two coup attempts in Azerbaijan to install more pro-Russian leadership.⁽¹¹⁾

In December 1995 Russia sent special envoy Vladimir Kazimirov to the region with a new set of initiatives and some advances were made in military-technical issues such as the deployment of OSCE peace-keepers, the establishment of a 'no-fly zone', the de-militarization of certain territories, safe transport through the Lachin corridor for Karabakh Armenians, no restrictions on the size or quality of the Nagorno-Karabakh defense force and Armenia was named guarantor of the NKR's security.⁽¹²⁾

In the face of failed OSCE talks Russia and the United States developed a new peace plan in the spring of 1996. Both presidents were up for re-election and both wanted a foreign policy victory prior to people going to the polls. They attempted to link a deal with the lifting of the energy embargo on Armenia as well as lifting US aid restrictions on Azerbaijan.⁽¹³⁾

The deal hinged upon the recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, a transport link through the Lachin corridor and "fundamental autonomy status"⁽¹⁴⁾

for Nagorno-Karabakh.⁽¹⁵⁾

The package has yet to gain the approval of the various parties involved.

Turkey has, since 1991, been trying to play a role as an economic and political model for the region by checking Muscovite hegemony in the area. They have been staunch supporters of Azerbaijan and hope that the pay-off will be an oil pipeline through Turkey from the Caspian Sea.⁽¹⁶⁾

They have also attempted to use "initiatives in Transcaucasia to divert public opinion at home from dissatisfaction with the social situation and international protests against repression in Kurdistan."⁽¹⁷⁾

Turkey's most direct intervention came in May 1992 when they threatened Armenia during a crisis over Nakhichenvan. The US cautioned Turkey and Russia warned Armenia not to attack the Nakhichevan region thereby averting a possible military confrontation.⁽¹⁸⁾

In September 1993 in talks between Prime Minister Ciller (Turkey), President Yeltsin (Russia) and President Aliyev (Azerbaijan), Turkey accepted Russia's role as main mediator however as a check to Moscow's direct intervention they would not accept the deployment of a unilateral Russian peace-keeping force nor a solely joint Russo-Turkish operation.⁽¹⁹⁾

Turkey has proposed a swap of the Nagorno-Karabakh for the Zangezur region of southern Armenia that would thereby connect Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan but this was seen by most as a thinly veiled attempt to create a safe corridor for a proposed Turkish oil pipeline and the idea was rejected outright by the Armenians.⁽²⁰⁾

Their latest call has been for the preservation of territorial integrity (mainly due to the precedence a self-determination stance would have on Turkey's internal situation vis a vis Kurdistan), 'wide autonomy' for the NKR and with-drawl of NKR forces from Azeri territory.⁽²¹⁾

Iran is motivated by a desire to limit Turkish influence in the region and to this end has supported both Armenia and Azerbaijan. An independent Armenia is seen as in Iran's interests as they are traditionally hostile to Turkey (due to the 1916 genocide of Armenians by the Turks) however Armenia is Christian so Iran is not in favour of a particularly powerful Armenia nor a powerful Azerbaijan which might, in the future, make territorial claims on Iranian Azeri regions.⁽²²⁾

This is important as Azeris form the second largest ethnic community in Iran.

The region is seen as an important target for the new export-oriented Iranian economy and to this end the Iranians initiated the creation of the Group of Caspian Sea States including Russia, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan Azerbaijan and Iran for regional cooperation in trade and shipping. This is an important link as Iran is also competing for access to the Azeri oil reserves.

In March 1992 Iran's mediation efforts resulted in a one week long cease-fire but they became far more active in September 1993. In that month Armenian troops attacked Nakhichevan and Iranian troops crossed the frontier in reaction to secure the 'jointly-managed' dams over the Aras River and to establish refugee camps for fleeing Azeris.⁽²³⁾

This led directly to an increased Russian presence in the region which prompted both the Armenians and Iranians to withdraw. One month later they successfully brokered another short-lived cease-fire.

The mediation initiatives are helping to break Iranian isolation and bring it back onto the world scene but it has not been able to come up with a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as they are firm supporters of territorial integrity due to its Azeri and Kurdish minorities.

US interests in the region are probably the easiest to discern. They are almost purely motivated by economic concerns. In spite of the rhetoric of a "perceived risk of a strategic reinforcement of Russia and/or Iran, which are still regardedas potential threats to Western interests"⁽²⁴⁾

one has to ask what exactly are these 'Western interests'? The answer is simply oil. US oil companies have huge interests in the mega-exploration and exploitation deal signed with Azerbaijan. The US "is seeking to ensure maximally favourable conditions for the earliest possible implementation of the project for the transportation of Azeri oil (extracted from offshore fields in the Caspian by an international consortium including US companies)."⁽²⁵⁾

The US supports Turkey in its attempts to win the pipeline route as it would offset Russian influence in the region.⁽²⁶⁾

President Clinton has actually personally voiced US support for Azerbaijan and opposition to either an Iranian role or an exclusive Russian role in extracting Azeri oil.⁽²⁷⁾

Early attempts at mediation (1992 for example) were a complete failure as the US obviously took sides however in spring 1996 they came up with a joint initiative with Russia partially due to pressures from the then upcoming elections as well as the US oil industry. Due to the obvious advantages of being perceived as pro-Azeri the US has come down firmly on the side of territorial integrity (a philosophy they themselves have violated numerous times in countries such as Panama and Grenada to name a few).

The United Nations did not get involved until March 1992 when it sent its first fact finding team to the region under the request of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali. The Security Council have since come up with a number of resolutions, the first of which was stated April 30^th 1993. It re-affirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and all other states in the region which meant that the NKR could not be recognized as an independent state without the consent of the Azeri government. It also called for the immediate with-drawl of all occupying forces in Azerbaijan but placed no sanctions on Armenia and did not even call for Armenia specifically to withdraw its troops. There was not even a ban on arms transfers into the region. No embargoes that were called for were even coupled with any enforcement measures bringing into question their effectiveness.⁽²⁸⁾

When the CSCE petitioned the Security Council to assume the leadership role in the region under Chapter VIII provisions the UN accepted and thereby abdicated all responsibility for the negotiations that followed. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states in principle that regional organizations are empowered to deal with disputes of local interest and to resolve them by peaceful means (UN Charter, Article 52) but cannot undertake coercive measures (Chapter VII) without Security Council approval.⁽²⁹⁾

The CSCE thereby took primary responsibility for solving the crisis and since then only CSCE peace initiatives have had UN support until the latest US/Russian initiative. With the exception of the Security Council's first resolution (822) all subsequent resolutions have been based on reports by the chairman of the CSCE's Peace Conference and not by the UN Secretary-General.⁽³⁰⁾

The CSCE (OSCE since December 1994) is in a unique position within the post-Soviet successor states. They are the only pan-European organization which has been allowed access to the CIS nations and in fact all of the CIS nations were admitted into the CSCE on January 30-31^st 1991. There is a basic belief in the CSCE/OSCE that security in the Caucasus is ultimately inseparable from Europe's security now that the CIS nations have joined the organization.

The CSCE used the 7^th basic principle of conduct from the Helsinki Decalogue (respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief)⁽³¹⁾

as the context for entering into talks with Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In February 1992 they made their first call for a cease-fire as well as for an immediate embargo on the delivery of weapons, humanitarian aid to be sent, for all sides to respect their international obligations, the guarantee of rights of ethnic and national communities and for all sides to abandon territorial claims versus neighboring countries.⁽³²⁾

Later in 1992 a peace conference was held in Minsk which created the so-called 'Minsk Group'. It consisted of eleven countries representatives: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Belarus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey and the United States. This group reconvened in 1993 and came up with an agreement for the deployment of a CSCE 'observer mission' to monitor a cease-fire, a separation of forces, with-drawl of foreign military advisors and heavy weapons and a call for the return of refugees.⁽³³⁾

It was Azerbaijan's refusal to accept a Russian only peace-keeping operation that opened the door for a CSCE presence.

In December 1994 Russia became co-chair of the Minsk Group in recognition by the OSCE that they could not broker any agreement without Russia and by themselves they had failed to achieve any significant results.⁽³⁴⁾

In 1995 the Minsk Group met eight times but failed to achieve any results beyond a May 1995 exchange of prisoners-of-war and in March 1996 the Group ended talks indefinitely this in spite of the fact that the OSCE believes that it must achieve a breakthrough in this, its first foray into peace-making, as they are also very active now in Estonia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine and Tajikistan.

The Groups attempts to stop Russian unilateral peace-making efforts which enforced Russian interests and expansion⁽³⁵⁾

were successful however their own efforts have failed to achieve any results as well. They still believe they can be a factor in the talks however their position is clearly opposed to that of the NKR. The current chairman of the OSCE, Swiss foreign minister Flavio Cotti, has stated that any resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue would have to recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.⁽³⁶⁾

Armenia has backed the NKR both politically and militarily. On June 15^th 1988 the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ArmSSR) Supreme Soviet passed a resolution granting the request of the NKAO Oblast Soviet to reunite the NKAO with Armenia however two days later the AzSSR refused the request.⁽³⁷⁾

The December 1^st decision by the ArmSSR Supreme Soviet to incorporate the NKAO into Armenia was apparently the last straw which led directly to unrest in Nakhichevan (700 km of border installations were destroyed) and Azerbaijan. In spite of the potential for conflict with its larger neighbor, Armenia continued its stand for Nagorno-Karabakh even after the NKR declared itself independent and was no longer seeking to reunite with Armenia.

"The Armenian gamble in the war has apparently been to use their military victories to compel Azerbaijan to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, and then to return most of the captured Azeri-populated regions (probably excepting Shusha and the Lachin corridor) in return for peace."⁽³⁸⁾

What is interesting is the fact that not even Armenia has recognized the NKR as an independent state as per their declaration. This can be viewed as keeping the option of reunification open.

Azerbaijan, for its part, is "unlikely to budge in its demand that Nagorno-Karabakh remain part of the country because most states support the principle of territorial integrity over self-determination. Azerbaijan has even tried to buy Armenia with a suggestion of a pipeline for 'later' oil to run through Armenian territory."⁽³⁹⁾

It has been able to internationalize the conflict in order to obtain international condemnation of the "violation of the integrity of the territory involved, to prevent direct Russian involvement, to restrain military gains by the opposite side [and] to secure humanitarian aid"⁽⁴⁰⁾

Azerbaijan has been able to resist Russian pressure as they do not rely, as Armenia does, on Russian energy supplies.

After face-to-face talks with Armenia on May 17 1996, Azerbaijan stated they were prepared to give Nagorno-Karabakh the "highest autonomy status that exists in the world today. However, [they] did not clarify what that status was."⁽⁴¹⁾

In spite of rhetoric such as this it is apparent that for the Azeris Nagorno-Karabakh must continue to be part of Azerbaijan which is a position diametrically opposed to the position of the NKR.

The NKR believes that it has as much right to an independent existence as does Azerbaijan which seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991 thus providing a precedence and as long as they control the military situation they have no real reason to accommodate the Azeris or the international community. "The Karabakh Armenians while in possession of all of the territory they wanted believed they could trade some of the occupied territories for independence."⁽⁴²⁾

In mid-February 1996 the NKR put forth a set of non-negotiable conditions on any future talks: "firstly, there is no subordinating of Karabakh to Azerbaijan, secondly, the Karabakh Republic should not exist as an enclave within Azerbaijan, thirdly, the Karabakh Republic must determine for itself the degree of its safety and guarantees needed to ensure it. Without all these conditions progress in the negotiations is impossible."⁽⁴³⁾

As President Robert Kocharian stated "Nagorno-Karabakh is an established republic with its own economy, military [and] stable internal environment."⁽⁴⁴⁾

Thus they have little reason to negotiate any of their sovereignty away and are counting on eventual de facto recognition of the NKR by the international community.

As has been illustrated there are very limited prospects for any settlement of the conflict. In Azerbaijan "the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh also determines the ups and downs of the politicians fortunes. Until mid-1993, defeats in battle or political crisis accompanying the struggle for Karabakh spelt the downfall for four successive CP general-secretaries and presidents."⁽⁴⁵⁾

"Any departure from the principle of territorial integrity leads inevitably to a severe loss of prestige and legitimacy by any Azeri government"⁽⁴⁶⁾

The banner of territorial integrity is held up by all of the other international actors involved primarily to placate Azerbaijan to gain access to its oil reserves. "Oil is at the core of the internationalization of the struggle for the Caucasus."⁽⁴⁷⁾

The power of sheer economics over politics cannot be overstated.

International precedences such as the recognition of Eritrea as an independent nation after years of civil war in Ethiopia or the lack of respect for the inviolability of borders shown by many, if not all the other actors is conveniently ignored (for example: the US in Panama, the Turks in Iraq, the Iranians in Bosnia-Herzigovina, the UN in Somalia or Haiti et cetera). These conflicting ideals of territorial integrity and self-determination are used by nations to legitimize their particular position of the day with little or no regard to actions of the past. If, in the final analysis, the rule of law is subordinated to the rules of power and the rule of supply and demand then Azerbaijan will continue to receive international backing which may lead to it one day possessing the military capability to take back the Nagorno-Karabakh by using its oil revenues to reconstitute its army. The NKR is hoping to achieve de facto recognition before that point gets reached.

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2.

² www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter1.html p.2.

3.

³ Max van der Stoel "The Heart of the Matter: The Human Dimension of the OSCE", Helsinki Monitor, vol.3, 1995, p.4.

4.

⁴ Micheal Mihalka "A Marriage of Convenience: The OSCE and Russia in Nagorny-Karabakh and Chechnya", Helsinki Monitor, vol.7, 1996, p.3. &

Elisa Niemtzow "The OSCE's Security Model: Conceptual Confusion and Competing Visions", Helsinki Monitor, vol.7, 1996, p.1.

5.

⁵ V.B. Arutiunian Sobytiya v Nagornom Karabakhe, Yerevan, 1988, p.14.

6.

⁶ " Armenia will doubtless have to let itself be guided by the Leninist principle of the greatest national sacrifices. It will have to renounce not only the imperialistdesigns for a 'Greater Armenia', but possibly also a more modest desire to unify those lands which had always been considered Armenian."-A. Skadko in the press organ of Stalin's Narkomnats on March 21st 1921, "Zhizn' natsional'nostey", Pro-Armenia, no.6, 1992, p.44.

7.

⁷ Micheal Mihalka, ibid., p.1.

8.

⁸ gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/zver2.txt p.4.

9.

⁹ Fred Hiatt "Amid the Change, Too Much Remains the Same", Washington Post Weekly, 26 December 1994 and 1 January 1995, p.1819.

10.

¹⁰ Stephen Blank "Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus(1)", Helsinki Monitor, vol.3, 1995, p.1.

11.

¹¹ Stephen Blank, ibid., p.5.

12.

¹² Micheal Mihalka, ibid., from Interfax 15 Jan. 1996, p.7.

13.

¹³ Roland Eggleston "Moscow Summit Might Witness Karabakh Declaration" Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 15 March 1996.

14.

¹⁴ Ara Tatevosian "Dayton Scenario for Karabakh" Moscow News, 18 April 1996.

15.

¹⁵ Micheal Mihalka, ibid., from Interfax 17 March 1996, p.6.

16.

¹⁶ Barry Newman "Oil, Water and Politics Make a Volatile Mix in Crowded Bosporus" Wall Street Journal, 24 Aug. 1994, p.1.

17.

¹⁷ Olivier Paye and Eric Remacle "UN and CSCE Policies in Transcaucasia" in Bruno Coppieter (ed) Contested Borders in the Caucasus, 1995, p.18.

18.

¹⁸ gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/zver3.txt p.5.

19.

¹⁹ Elizabeth Fuller "Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Karabakh Mediation Process" Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Report, vol.3, no.8, 25 Feb. 1994, p.32.

20.

²⁰ Stephen Blank, ibid., p.4.

21.

²¹ Ara Tatevosian, ibid., p.1.

22.

²² gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/ramezan.txt p.7.

23.

²³ gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/remezan.txt p.10.

24.

²⁴ Olivier Paye and Eric Remacle, ibid., p.18.

25.

²⁵ Micheal Mihilka, ibid., p.6.

26.

²⁶ Fred Hiatt "Moscow Warns West on Criticism Over Chechnya", Washington Post, 15 Jan. 1995, p.A26.

27.

²⁷ Daniel Southerland and Steve LeVine "Azeri Seeks Clinton's Help in Ending War", Washington Post, 28 Sep. 1994, p.A14.

28.

²⁸ Olivier Paye and Eric Remacle, ibid., p.5 & p.8.

29.

²⁹ Ibid., p.20.

30.

³⁰ Ibid., p.14.

31.

³¹ www.revue.ch/English/04/Forum/principle/principes.htm p.1.

32.

³² Olivier Paye and Eric Remacle, Ibid., p.11.

33.

³³ Covcas Bulletin, 11 March 1993, p.1. & 1 April 1993, p.4-6.

34.

³⁴ Micheal Mihalka, ibid., p.4.

35.

³⁵ Lally Weymouth "NATO and the Next Crisis", Washington Post, 6 Dec. 1994, p.A17.

36.

³⁶ Micheal Mihalka, ibid., p.8.

37.

³⁷ gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/zver2.txt p.5.

38.

³⁸ Kitty McKinsey "Armenia: Solution to Nagorno-Karabakh Still Distant", Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 16 July 1996.

39.

³⁹ Micheal Mihalka, ibid., p.11.

40.

⁴⁰ Olivier Paye and Eric Remacle, ibid., p.19.

41.

⁴¹ www.arminco.com/Armenpress/issues/May/20may.txt p.1.

42.

⁴² Micheal Mihalka, ibid., p.3.

43.

⁴³ Ibid., p.8.

44.

⁴⁴ www.arminco.com/Armenpress/issues/Sep/19sep.txt p.4.

45.

⁴⁵ goher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/zver3.txt p.2.

46.

⁴⁶ Abdollah Ramezanzadeh "Iran's Role as Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis" at gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int70/00/secdet/cipdd/COP/ramezan.txt p.11.

47.

⁴⁷ Stephen Blank, ibid., p.2.