GOD'S DIPLOMAT:
Eugenio Pacelli / Pope Pius XII
Erik Growen
Eugenio Pacelli, the man who would become in 1939 Pope Pius XII, has been characterized, as many other diplomats of the inter-war period, by two conflicting perceptions. By some he has been seen as a highly moral man thoroughly dedicated to peace, who did all he could to prevent a war from occurring, but by others as an essentially immoral compromiser willing to 'deal with the devil' to save the position of the Catholic Church. These two views correspond to his duel roles of spiritual leader of the Catholic faith and leader and head diplomat of an independent European nation. While there may be elements of truth to these views they are not necessarily mutually incompatible. One cannot see the character of Pacelli in such terms. As with all human beings the many facets of his personality cannot be reduced to a single sentence or idea. What can be examined are his decisions which he made during his career to see which of the two paths he most often followed: staunch defender of the faith or compromising diplomat.
Pacelli was a highly gifted diplomat in the Vatican diplomatic service ( by age 25 he already had acquired three doctorates ) who held rather strict ideas on the world. He was opposed to laissez-faire capitalism, was vehemently anti-Bolshevik, called constantly for social reforms and preached for world peace through the application of balance-of-power principles.(1) The latter was not exclusive to Pacelli as it was a view held by both Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI. Benedict XV had kept the Church from having to choose sides during World War One by maintaining a strictly neutral stance and supporting/encouraging humanitarian work while the war was in progress. The Entente powers codified this position in the Treaty of London in 1915 excluding the Vatican from any of the peace negotiations.(2) This did not sit well with the Holy See and raised the question of what the Church's, and more specifically the Pope's, duties were in wartime, beyond merely preaching on the immorality of the act in general, if not ordained a Just War by Saint Augustine's standards.(3) Pacelli had fairly set ideas on how this question was to be answered. The Church should seek to help avoid conflict by assuming the role of impartial mediator and peacemaker; if war still broke out she should ensure the moral conduct of the belligerents as well as clarifying responsibility; and the final act would be to help negotiate a just peace.(4)
During the turbulent time between the wars Pacelli worked hard within the constraints of his position as a diplomat, without the clout of a nation or an army behind him, for peace in Europe. To see what led him to the decisions he made in the inter-war period his life will be traced up to June 1940 and the fall of France.
Eugenio Pacelli was born on March 2nd 1876 in Rome to Filipo Pacelli who was a Dean of the College of Vatican Lawyers and a minor noble. He was ordained a priest in 1899 and became a professor of Canon Law at the Pontifical Institute of the Apollinaire and of ecclesiastical diplomacy at the Academy of Noble Ecclesiastics in Rome. After only two years he entered the Papal Secretariat of State and assisted Italian Archbishop ( later Cardinal ) Pietro Gasparri in a new codification of Canon law. In 1912 he was named Undersecretary of State and two years later Pacelli succeeded Gasparri as Secretary of the Papal Department of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. He was one of the Vatican's fastest rising young stars. Pacelli was noted as being very industrious, knowledgeable and precise. Although not adverse to compromise, he had a reputation for being very austere ( to the point of cold detachment ) and was very sensitive to personal criticism. At age thirty-eight he was a " tall, gaunt man with the look of an acetic"(5), the manner of a gentleman and the ability to speak fluently in English, German, Italian, and of course Latin.(6) On meeting with Pacelli in 1916 Prussian Minister Muhlberg's impression was of:
...a gifted Prelate, well versed in history and Canon
law , skilled with words, and quick at repartee in dis-
cusions. Zealous and inspired by the powers and importance
of the Church, he will accordingly seek to strengthen and
increase its influence.(7)
1917 proved to be a pivotal year in Pacelli's life. He was consecrated a titular Archbishop and appointed as Nuncio to Bavaria. He was hand-picked for this position by Pope Benedict XV as he was " the most gifted young diplomat in the Curia."(8) Upon arriving in Germany he traveled directly to Munich and then to Berlin to introduce himself to the Kaiser, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, and members of the Foreign Office. Pacelli immediately sought to promote a negotiated peace, but the attempt failed as the Entente saw the proposals as enemy-inspired whilst the Germans were unsure of the West's links to the Vatican.(9) There was a second reason for the Berlin visit and that was to pave the way towards appointing a Papal Nuncio in Berlin thereby gaining diplomatic status throughout all of Germany and not just in a few lander ( state ). By the end of the war the Holy See's peace efforts, however futile, and its charitable actions throughout had gained it prestige and respect and served to strengthen its previously weak diplomatic position.(10)
The Vatican took was very critical of the Versailles Treaty imposed upon Germany as a weak Germany was a poor counterweight to the ' Godless ' Bolsheviks in Russia and the anti-clericalists French. This anti-Versailles stance ( morally labeled as an ' un-just ' peace by the Vatican and others ) led to a natural conjunction of interest between Germany and the Vatican. The Germans were diplomatically isolated and needed international leverage against the Allies which the Vatican afforded them whilst the Vatican found a player with which it hoped to work the European diplomatic balance with. It also helped that the a player in Weimar politics was the Catholic Centre Party.
An incident happened while Pacelli was at the Nunciature in Munich which was to have a profound impact upon him for the rest of his life. During the Bolshevik uprisings in Munich in 1919 Eugenio's residence was riddled with bullets and at one point gunmen entered the Nunciature. Pacelli informed them that they were violating international law and one of the Bolsheviks threatened him with his revolver before the group of them left the building. The anti-Bolshevism of the Vatican thus took on an even more personal aspect for Pacelli.(11)
The Vatican showed the opposition of the Weimar government to the Versailles territorial concessions as the Vatican needed the maximum number of Catholics in Germany to have a larger political say ( they only accounted for around one-third of the total population ) and most of the territories lost to Germany were predominantly Catholic.
Pacelli believed the Germans were right in their condemnation of Versailles, and their goal of reuniting all Germans within the Reich. At the same time, however, Pacelli used the Weimar constitution to play off the lander against the Reich for Church ends. Pacelli began negotiations with the separate lander to establish Concordats with each in order to gain, in small steps, his goals of freedom for religious education and diplomatic representation within the Reich. A Concordat is an international agreement recognizing the sovereignty of the Holy See and " the supra-national character of the local churches as part of a universal institution whose laws, hierarchy and absolute government are entrusted to the Pope."(12) "A Concordat represents the compromise, outside of matters of principle, which the Church enters into with a Government which does not, fully or freely, recognize her entire claims to independence and autonomy."(13) Prussia was initially against changing the status quo so Pacelli changed tact and pursued an over-all agreement with the Weimar government in order to achieve his goals in Prussia indirectly. He succeeded in setting up Concordats with Bavaria in 1924, Prussia in 1929 and Baden in 1932. Another way of expanding the influence of the Church was through Pacelli's negotiations for a Berlin Nuncio, which was created in 1920, which sought to consolidate and expand the Vatican's influence in two power centres as he refused the Weimar government's suggestion to close down the Nunciature in Munich.
By 1920, the year Pacelli became the new Nuncio for Berlin, the Catholic Church's position inside the Russia was deteriorating badly. In Germany Bolshevik uprisings in Munich and Berlin were used by both the Weimar government and the Vatican ti argue for a stronger Republic able to defend itself, and the rest of Europe, from a Soviet threat. The Holy See lacked confidence in the durability of Versailles and was convinced that reparations were preventing the German economy from stabilizing. Without a stable economy Germany would not be able to increase her military strength to become the bulwark versus Bolshevism Pacelli envisioned.
Germany's diplomatic isolation was a continual problem. With the establishment of relations with the Vatican, through Pacelli's efforts, a message could now be sent to the Allies through Pacelli's lines of communication with the Vatican Foreign Office. Although the Vatican guaranteed secrecy in diplomatic dealings ( ie. no possible press leaks ) it was for the Germans an unsatisfactory arrangement and far too slow.(14)
As the Germans were slowly working their way out of isolation the Vatican was gaining diplomatic and ecclesiastical links at a break-neck pace. From their relative isolation at the outbreak of World War One when there were only two embassies and 12 legations in Rome, by 1920 this had risen to 10 embassies and 18 legations. Whilst the Vatican similarly expanded its overseas representation from six Nuncios and seven diplomatic missions, to 22 Nuncios and six Internuncios.(15)
In 1929 Pacelli was recalled to Rome for a promotion to Cardinal and to be given a new post as Secretary of State to the Holy See, a position he would hold until his coronation as Pope in 1939. 1929 was a key year for the Vatican for it brought with it the signing of the Lateran Accords with Italy, establishing the absolute sovereignty of the Vatican as an independent state. There was a very important clause in the Accords upon which Italy insisted:
...the Holy See declares that it wishes to remain and
will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between
nations, and to international congresses convoked for the
settlement of such disputes, unless the contending parties
make a joint appeal to its mission of peace.(16)
This clause kept the Vatican out of the League of Nations. On top of this the Italian clergy had to take an oath to the state to refrain from all political activities and the state was allowed to make political objections to episcopal appointments. In return the Fascists would continue their financial support of the clergy, unorthodox writings were banned and Protestant propaganda was suppressed throughout Italy.
There were serious misgivings when the Nazi Fascists took power in Germany due to their racist and anti-Catholic propaganda and in fact German Bishops initially forbad Catholics to join the Nazi Party due to its anti-Christian doctrine but they were later swayed by Adolf Hitler that there was to be no persecution of their faith so the ban was lifted on March 28 1933. [ Appendix A ]
From Pacelli's point of view the introduction of Hitler's new dictatorial regime on March 23rd heralded a new round of diplomatic opportunity. His ongoing Concordat diplomacy had always come to naught thanks to never passing the Reichstag votes. Now that the Reichstag was powerless it would not be able to stop a Concordat from passing.
The most controversial act of Pacelli's during the inter-war years is arguably the signing of the July 20th 1933 Reich Concordat. Pope Pius XI managed to secure Concordats with Latvia, Bavaria, Poland, Lithuania, Italy, Rumania, Prussia, Baden, Austria, Yugoslavia and the German Reich as well as lesser agreements with France, Czechoslovakia and Portugal. Under the provisions of the Concordats the States must support the clergy and the churches and gave the Church the right to supervise public schools or at least give Catholic religious education in them. They represent the ages old alliance of Church and State.(17) The biggest problem was that historically Concordats had a relatively short life span. The Concordats with Bavaria, Baden and Prussia were nullified when the Nazi constitution made them into mere provinces and no longer independent states. Austria did not survive the 1938 Anschluss, Poland's was irrelevant by late 1939, Czechoslovakia's died at Munich and Latvia and Lithuania's went down to Soviet annexation to name a few examples.
Generally the Church favoured Concordats with dictators as it viewed these as more durable and binding on the dictators, and since they were not open to the swings in public opinion found in liberal democracies.(18) As well secret provisions tend to stay secret. There were a number of reasons for making the deal with Hitler not the least of which was the hope of using Germany to save Europe from Communism and, of course, preserving the position of the Church within Germany. It was a case of compromise with the lesser of two evils.
Disturbing events within Germany led the Vatican, and especially Pacelli, towards the signing. By the end of June 1933 all of the leaders of the Catholic backed Bavarian People's Party ( BPP ) had been thrown in jail. On the 28th Dr. Goebbels advised the Centre Party to dissolve itself. On July 4th the BPP were tricked into self-dissolution and the next day the Centre Party took Goebbels advice and did the same. They were the last of the Weimar political parties. By mid-July many of the Catholic organizations in the Reich had ' voluntarily ' disbanded following weeks of a massive anti-Catholic terror campaign by the Nazis throughout the Reich.(19)
Initially Hitler had wanted the Concordat so he could use it as a pretext for the elimination of the two Catholic political parties by inserting a clause banning the clergy from taking part in political affairs. The Concordat was nevertheless also useful to Hitler's new Nazi government in that it afforded the regime some international recognition and prestige.(20)
Now that Hitler could suspend the old Weimar constitution with its guarantees of freedom of religion, Pacelli had to act to save the Church's position within Germany. What had initially appeared to be an opportunity had quickly become a necessity.
As if these were not reasons enough to sign a Concordat with Hitler the first German offer contained all of what the Holy See had tried to get from the Weimar Republic and also included better concessions concerning Catholic schools and organizations. It was a deal too good to refuse and to do so would have cost them dearly with their own constituents. There was the fear of a possible schism developing between those priests and bishops who supported Hitler and those that did not.(21) Pacelli fully realized the reality of the situation and he said as much to the British Minister Ivone Kirkpatrick in August 1933:
A pistol had been pointed at his head and he had no
alternative. The German government had offered him
concessions, concessions, it must be admitted, wider
than any previous German government would agree to,
and he had to choose between an agreement on their
lines and the virtual elimination of the Catholic
Church in the Reich.(22)
Article 32 ' depoliticizing ' the clergy was refused by Pacelli until the end of June ( negotiations had been going on for a month ) and only finally conceded in the final round of negotiations on July 1st when it became readily apparent that the BPP and the Centre Party were finished politically. In the end Pacelli saw how even this apparent defeat was in fact a victory as old law and custom in many of the lander gave the State the power to nominate up to one-third of the pastors of parishes in various dioceses. The Nazis would have made membership in the Nazi Party a prerequisite for priests wishing to be so nominated. The ' depoliticizing ' Article would ensure the separation of the Church from this kind of State interference.(23)
The Concordat was formally signed on July 20th 1933 in Rome between Papal Secretary of State Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli, Monsignor Ludwig Kaas ( expert on Canon law and leader of the Centre Party ) and Archbishop Conrad Grober of Freiburg ( representing the German episcopate ) for the Vatican and Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, Diego von Bergen ( German Ambassador to the Holy See ) and Rudolf Buttmann ( Ministry of the Interior and Nazi Party member ). [ Appendix B ]
Pacelli was under no illusions as to the long term viability of the Concordat. It was for him not a capitulation or a compromise so much as an attempt to build up some sort of defense against an anti-Catholic terror campaign within the Reich.(24) Violation of the tenants was anticipated but " the Germans would probably not violate all the articles of the Concordat at the same time."(25) "If the German government violated the Concordat...the Vatican would have a treaty on which to base a protest."(26) Hitler's reward to the Church was a lull in the persecutions. Hitler also allowed the attachment of a secret annex exempting clergy and seminarians from military conscription. French officials, once they found out about the provision, were outraged. To them it seemed to give " tacit consent to German rearmament."(27) There was " little rejoicing over the Concordat in the Vatican"(28) and within a month of the signing L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican newspaper, was commenting upon the false interpretation of clauses in the Concordat by the German government.
Pacelli had relatively little choice but to sign the Concordat with Germany. As spiritual leader to the Catholic population it seemed the only way to put a halt to the persecutions going on in Germany against his flack. As a diplomat it was hard to turn down an offer of everything he had been trying to achieve for years.
Almost directly on the heals of the signing Hitler proclaimed " national conviction must overcome religious conviction."(29) On December 20th, only five months after the signing the Evangelical Youth Movement was absorbed into the Hitler Youth. Religion was removed from the schools and in its place was the teaching of the spirit of National Socialism ( no prayer just ' Heil Hitler 's ). Bishops denounced the Sterilization law, radical anti-Semitism and extreme nationalism. Within the Reich the Church was fighting a losing battle trying to separate National Socialism as a political ideal, from National Socialism as a religion. The Nazis subverted Catholic holy days by the reversion of ' Christian ' festivals to their supposed ' pagan ' roots.(30) Initially Pacelli prevented Pope Pius XI from protesting violations publicly in order to protect the Catholic population of Germany from reprisals.
The years following the Reich Concordat and up to Pacelli's coronation were a time of seemingly never ending crisis in Europe. There was the Austrian Anschluss of 1938, Ethiopia in 1935-36, Spanish Civil War 1936-39 and the Czech crisis and Munich conference in 1938. During this time Pacelli traveled to France ( 1934 ) and the United States ( 1936 ) where he met President Roosevelt and struck up an instant friendship with one whom he considered a fellow man of peace.
In an attempt to placate Mussolini and to keep him away from the arms of Hitler, the clergy in Italy backed Mussolini's foreign adventures. There was also " a fear that Italy might be taken over by the communists if Mussolini failed in his foreign [escapades]."(31) Ethiopia was defined as not just an invasion but a crusade to convert the heathens to the true faith. Pius XI publicly praised the Italian ' volunteers ' who went to fight against the Godless Bolsheviks in Spain.(32) Pope Pius XI in fact condemned the Republicans for their " truly satanic hatred of God "(33) as priests and bishops were being executed by them for being Franco supporters. Those who were killed were officially declared martyrs. Pacelli, however, remained largely silent on these issues as he was concentrating his efforts in Germany. On March t 1935 he gave his first speech against the persecution of the Church in Germany and in Autumn 1936 he gave another against the suppression of the Catholic press in Germany. Monasteries, convents, religious houses and ecclesiastical colleges were forbidden to fly the swastika.(34)
The culmination of anti-German rhetoric was the March 1937 Encyclical Mit brennender Sorge by Pius XI which railed against Nazi faithlessness and neo-pagan theories and included a long series of protests over violations in the Concordat. This represented the only time a sovereign power made a public statement about Hitler's duplicity prior to September 1939. The Encyclical was published in Germany, printed and distributed on Saturday night ( 13th ) and read at Sunday morning Mass. For their trouble 12 printing houses were suppressed and all copies were confiscated by the police. Pacelli, for his part, did some damage control with the German Ambassador von Bergen in order to prevent a severing of diplomatic relations which would lead to further persecutions within the Reich.(35) Pacelli was still trying to walk a fine line between protesting and offending and silence which would appear to indicate acquiescence.
The Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938 had little impact on the Church due to the twelve million Catholics living within the region which were balanced against around 30 million living in Germany.(36) Pacelli invoked the Lateran Accords when he spoke of the crisis while visiting Budapest, Hungary. " It is not the business of the Church to take sides in purely temporal matters and concerns between the various systems and methods that may be considered for mastering the problems of the day."(37)
This rather callous attitude towards Czechoslovakia is an absolute failure to live up to the title of spiritual leader for these people. The decision was a cold diplomatic calculation made by stacking the numbers up against one another. Although he had avoided taking a direct hand in the matter Pacelli was impressed with the British efforts to achieve peace at any cost.
Everything changed for Eugenio Pacelli on March 2nd 1939 when on the third ballot he was elected Pope by the College of Cardinals. The man who had been groomed for the post by Pius XI took the new name Pius XII in his honour and was coroneted on the t. He was the first Roman Pope since 1730. Hitler was the first Head of State to be informed of Pacelli's rise and not just in the customary Latin but in German as well, signed by his own hand.
The deteriorating diplomatic situation with Germany was the first thing on Pius XII's agenda. To this end the first Ambassador he received was von Bergen. He appointed Luigi Cardinal Maglione as his Secretary of State, a man who was a former Nuncio to Poland, a known Germanophile and a career diplomat. Despite these credentials Pius XII explicitly reserved the handling of German questions himself.
Pius XII immediately instructed L'Osservatore Romano to desist from attacks against the German government and in return the German press was ordered by Hitler to stop its attacks against the Vatican and the Pope. He wanted to achieve through conciliation what his predecessor had been unable to achieve through belligerence; a true binding, lasting agreement with Germany. This initial move by Pacelli is very reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain's appeasement-style diplomacy. The Germans were pleased with his election as:
Pacelli was regarded at the outset as very Germanophile.
He [was] well known for his excellent knowledge of the
German language. His advocacy of an orthodox Church
policy repeatedly brought him into conflict with National
Socialism on matters of principle. Nevertheless, it is
denied that he had any part in the forceful policies
of Pius XI, particularly the markedly hostile speeches
of that Pope. On the contrary, he made repeated efforts
to achieve compromises and gave expression to his wish
for friendly relations with our Embassy.(38)
Pius XII felt a tremendous spiritual responsibility to the world and peace. " It is clear that he believes, not that war is the worst of all evils, but that it will bring social and moral chaos in its train, disastrous to all he is commissioned to defend."(39) The keynote of Pius XI's Pontificate, the " crusade against Communism"(40) was to be carried on by the new Pope. This was tempered with certain political realities such as the fact that the Vatican's financial resources were dependent upon the stability of Mussolini's Fascist regime as part of the Lateran Accords handed over to the Vatican Italian State bonds in lieu of straight cash payments.(41) This, of course, constrained the amount of maneuvering room that Pius XII had. The Vatican was not a self-sufficient independent entity, it was reliant upon Italy politically, to ensure its sovereignty, and financially. This led to the idea of rapprochement between Italy and Germany being a good idea in order to have Mussolini rein in Hitler and have him influence Hitler's ecclesiastical policies ( a plan doomed to failure ).
On March 15 1939 the Germans occupied the rump Czech state and the French tried to prevail upon the newly elected Pope to protest the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich but he firmly declined. " He [saw] no reason to interfere in historic processes in which, from the political point of view, the Church is not interested."(42) By the end of the month the Germans had also seized Memel from Lithuania.
April of 1939 saw the European powers racing towards war and seemingly unable or unwilling to prevent the inevitable. Italy invaded Albania and Britain and France made guarantees to defend Poland, Greece and Rumania. On the 14th US President Roosevelt sent an appeal to Hitler and Mussolini to abstain from aggression for 10 years against a list of 31 specified countries. Pius XII was against such an appeal because it was announced in public so little negotiation was possible, it was one-sided and only addressed two of the European leaders and the time limit looked too much like a build up period for the US military and besides he had his own plan in the works.(43) Pacelli preferred secret negotiations as they allowed the Vatican to stay publicly neutral and they were also not under the sway of public opinion.
On May 1st Pius XII's plan for a five power conference ( Italy, Germany, Great Britain, France and Poland ) was taken to Mussolini who wanted to know the German reaction before committing himself. France wanted a delay, the British wanted no part of it due to the failure and fall out of Munich; Poland, Germany and then Italy all said no to the idea but all vaguely agreed the Holy See could play some part in the future of the crisis. This role remained undefined.(44) In order not to isolate the US, Roosevelt was later told that had the conference materialized then he would have been called in to help. At the time the British and French were attempting negotiations with Russia and excluding them from the conference was a very deliberate attempt by Pius XII to cut the Russians out of European affairs. The Vatican had made several " earnest enquiries concerning British motives [in their discussions with the Soviets] but had been most careful to avoid any comment which might be construed as interference."(45) Osborne told Maglione that the talks would not lead to any sort of ideological union or alliance.
Pius rightly turned down the US plan for it amounted to little more than an ultimatum which the Pope could not support against Italy. The Five Power Conference was a valiant attempt to keep the peace but Pius XII lacked the political clout to get the players to the table in the first place so a discussion could even take place. The exclusion of the Soviet Union may at first seem a little unwise but it was totally understandable given the situation in Russia for the Church. There was also the question of wether the Soviets would even attend a Vatican sponsored peace conference given Stalin's well known views on the Vatican.
By the end of May Ciano and Ribbentrop had signed the Pact of Steel in Berlin linking Italy and Germany together in a formal military alliance. In the face of this Pius XII tried to work towards a Franco-Italian rapprochement, as well as attempting to use Mussolini to moderate Hitler over the issue of Danzig. Mussolini was not receptive but Ciano was, and he acted as a conduit for Pius XII's ideas for Mussolini keeping out of the war. The pursuit of Franco-Italian rapprochement was, by this point, not a very realistic policy but there was still the hope of using Mussolini to hold back Hitler's belligerence or at the very least keep Italy neutral if war broke out. This seemed an attainable goal thanks to the assurances of Ciano.
Papal intermediary talks were encouraged by the British and French using the Vatican as a neutral middle-man in secret negotiations with Germany and Italy but the signs in Germany were not hopeful and the idea was never fully realized.(46) Goebbels declared that Danzig would be in German hands by the Fall but Ciano reassured Pius XII that " Germany will not make a move without our consent, and neither I nor Mussolini want war."(47)
Pius XII tried secret diplomacy:
the authority of his public word; begging the peoples and the governments to measure the
horror of the ruins which would heap up; he was to appeal to the influence which
Mussolini could have over Hitler; he was to address himself to the parties in dispute to
convince them to keep calm and to take up immediately the negotiations which had
been stopped. It was all to be in vain.(48)
He knew that Danzig was merely a pretext for war with Poland and he also discovered that the Russians had cut a deal with the Germans over the partition of Poland.(49)
The British, in desperation, turned to the Holy See as a last grasp for peace. Lord Halifax informed the Pope that he should facilitate new negotiations but not to offer up any solutions of his own.(50) On the 24th of August a line of Ambassadors and Ministers went to see the Pope from France, Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia. Pius XII made a final appeal by radio in Italian followed by translations in several languages. By a fluke of timing Hitler choose that moment to have an attack of the nerves and he called off the offensive that was set to go the next day in favour of one last attempt to detach Poland from the British and the French. Hitler telegramed Pius XII and informed him that the only recourse was to tell Poland to give in immediately on the Danzig question.(51)
A flurry of communication began between the Vatican and Warsaw but Colonel Beck of the Polish Foreign Office was not prepared to back down. Pius XII called for Beck to show more moderation and flexibility and even for him to give up Pomerania ( the Corridor ) and Danzig in order to preserve the peace.(52) To the Poles this sounded too much like Munich. The French Ambassador Charles-Roux was so resigned that he wished Pius XII to give a pro-Polish speech for moral consolation. Pius XII declined saying that such a speech for Polish Catholics would be paid for dearly by the German Catholics.(53)
The Pope made one last appeal to Mussolini to intervene as he did at Munich to prevent a war and at the very least keep Italy out of it. Mussolini said he would try and that he " had already considered the means of avoiding entering the battlefield without failing the Axis."(54) He of course failed to convince Hitler.
Pius XII considered that the intransigence of the Polish government, and especially of
the Foreign Minister Colonel Beck, concerning the ' corridor ' and the free city
of Danzig, was disproportionate, even downright absurd and morally blame-worthy, in
the face of the prospect of a second world war.(55)
All attempts to get Warsaw to back down failed. The last
attempt was made on August 31st, an appeal for Germany, Poland,
Italy, France, Great Britain, Spain and the US to come together for
negotiations:
His Holiness, therefore, in the name of God, implores the Governments of Germany and
Poland to do all that is in their power to avoid any incident and not to take any
measure likely to aggravate the present tension. He begs the Governments of Great Britain,
France and Italy to back his request.(56)
It was of course too late. On September 1st 1939 the German Wehrmacht crossed the Polish frontier and two days later Great Britain and France declared War on Germany.
The British Minister to the Holy See declared in September 1939 "that the Holy See had done everything possible for the sake of peace."(57) Pius XII himself said:
We are in a position to state that his Holiness, up to the last moment, has unceasingly
tried to prevent hostilities, not only through the initiatives already known to the public, but
also through confidential and practical steps. He has exhausted all possibilities which still
gave some hope of maintaining peace or, at least, to exclude the immediate danger of
war.(58)
Both the French and the British demanded the Pope immediately condemn the Germans for the invasion publicly but he declined, refusing public intervention in an international affair. There was also a fear of a schism developing with the German Bishops who openly backed the Nazis.(59) So Pius XII sacrificed the Polish Catholics as he had already sacrificed the Czech Catholics in order to save in some way the position of the Church in Germany.
It took until October of 1939 for Pius XII to finally speak out against Germany but even then it was somewhat indirectly. In his first Encyclical, Summi Pontificatus , he condemned the Godless State, spoke against the separation of Church and State and the tyranny of the State over individuals and families as well as naming God and Church as the " supreme criterion of the moral and judicial order."(60) One area he did not directly address was the Jewish situation beyond mentioning generally the universal law of charity uniting all races under God. He also denounced all States that violated or discarded their Concordats with the Holy See as well as those that also showed unfaithfulness towards any agreements and unilaterally broke treaties. Pius XII also stressed his religious program by saying he approached politics from a moral/spiritual view without any particular political bias. He concluded that peace only came with the return of States and individual to God.(61)
Yet in spite of the rhetoric Pius XII continued to try to make Concordats because the alternative was to accept the separation of Church and State. He also planned to keep up good relations with Italy to keep Mussolini out of the upcoming war. The preferred course of events for the Pope would have been the survival of a dictatorial Germany but without the Nazis, a Fascist Italy without racism and hyper-nationalism, for the liberal democracies to cut back on the liberties that allowed Communist propaganda to spread and of course Concordats with all the states in Europe to secure the Church's position within the political structure. Keeping Italy free from racism at least seemed an attainable goal. For in a speech made in 1932 Mussolini had declared " We too have our Jews. There are many in the Fascist Party and they are good Fascists and good Italians...A country with a sound system of government has no Jewish problem."(62)
The Germans grafted Poznania, Polish Pomerania and Silesia onto the Reich and used Kracow, Warsaw, Lubin and Radom to form the General Governorship rump state. The occupation had severe effects for the Church such as the cutting of diocesan borders due to the Catholic Church's previous support for Polish nationalism. The Germans systematically destroyed the ecclesiastical administration, attacked churches, and deported and executed members of the clergy. Pius XII tried to get Vatican observers into Poland to confirm the horrific rumours coming from the occupied territory but he was repeatedly denied by Ribbentrop.(63)
As he had failed to prevent the war the Pope saw his next task as limiting the war as much as possible and to bring about a just peace settlement based upon justice and security. He therefore made it known to all parties that he was willing to mediate when an opportunity to do so presented itself.(64) Obviously you cannot condemn any of the sides if you intend to be an impartial mediator. How realistic was this hope of Pius XIIs to be mediator? Not very, according to Osborne. In his words World War I " was not shortened for one day by all the efforts of the Papacy."(65) " The most important role of the Vatican may, however, be reserved for the end of the war and the problems of the peace."(66) In an interesting contrast to this sentiment Pope Pius XII did not hesitate to condemn Russia for their November 1939 invasion of Finland.(67) In December Pius XII gave a Christmas radio address in which he outlined five principles for world peace and ended off with the announcement of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the US. [ Appendix C ] Pius XII saw in Roosevelt a possible powerful ally in his quest for peace and wrote him directly saying that as Vicar on earth of the Prince of Peace he had not given up and he intended to " follow the path dictated by his Apostolic mission."(68) The US and the Vatican agreed mediation at this point was meaningless therefore the new track to take was to keep Italy neutral. Further meetings with Ciano in September had seemed to confirm Italy's neutrality and in December Ciano was decorated with the Papal Order of the Golden Spur for his peace efforts following peace talks with Pius XII and the King and Queen of Italy.(69)
Ribbentrop paid an unexpected visit to the Vatican in early March 1940 and during his audience with Pius XII he explained that the war would be over by the end of the year. There was no real subtlety here; everyone knew Hitler planned to invade France, Belgium and Holland it was only a matter of when. It was not until a week later that the real reason for Ribbentrop's visit to Italy became apparent with the meeting at the Brenner Pass of Mussolini and Hitler. Ribbentrop was also there to remind Pius XII that Germany contributed over 1 billion Reichsmark annually to the Catholic Church and he told the Pope that an all-encompassing agreement would follow when the crisis period had ended.(70) The promise carried little weight thanks to the numerous violations of the Reich Concordat since its signing in 1933.
At the same time the Pope had clandestine meetings with members of the German opposition to Hitler and the Nazis and he acted as a go-between with the British who unfortunately dismissed the opposition as irrelevant or a Gestapo ploy to entrap British agents.(71)
In one last attempt to keep Italy neutral Roosevelt called for himself, Pius XII and the King of Italy to all personally write Mussolini urging him against joining Germany in war. Pius XII sent his letter congratulating him on keeping the peace [ Appendix D ]. His reply came a week later attacking Britain and France's positions. [Appendix E ]. Roosevelt's letter met a similar response.
On May 3rd 1940 the Pope sent a warning to Belgium and Holland of an imminent German offensive. Two days later Pius XII went to Minerva Church in the centre of Rome and delivered a sermon in honour of the patron saints of Italy ( St. Francis and St. Catherine de Siera ) again calling for peace as publicly as he could. [ Appendix F ]
Even previously dormant diplomatic areas cropped up to become problems in 1940. From Spain came the claim of Franco to the right to ' make ' and ' un-make ' Bishops at will.
On May 10th 1940 the much anticipated/dreaded war on the western front began with the simultaneous invasions of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Pius XII immediately sent conciliatory messages to King Leopold of Belgium, Queen Wilhelmina of Holland and the Grand Dutchess of Luxembourg which were printed in L'Osservatore Romano [ Appendices G, H, I ]. The language used was not forceful enough for the French:
It is equally essential that the protest should be
expressed in sufficiently vehement and explicit
terms to influence Italian public opinion on the
course to be taken for maintaining a moral and
political equilibrium(72)
The Allies in general thought that Pius XII had been too moderate and the Axis felt he had openly attacked them. Mussolini in particular protested against the wording of the telegrams and had his Ambassador hint to the Pope about the severe consequences his actions could bring to which Pius XII calmly replied that he was not afraid of going to a concentration camp.(73) The Germans for their part also condemned the telegrams and astutely pointed out the fact that there were those 30 million Catholics living in the Reich.(74) Cardinal Hinsley of Britain astutely " asked the faithful to pray especially for Pius XII whose political position, locked in a small enclave within a country at war [was] 'agonizing'."(75)
Interestingly enough there was little reaction from the Pope upon the invasions of Norway and Denmark but of course there were only around 2 000 Catholics in those countries compared to the 30 million. By request of the Italian government L'Osservatore Romanoceased publishing political commentaries. This once again showed how closely linked the Vatican was to the Italian government.
One last rather desperate bid was made to keep Mussolini out of the war. The US asked Pius XII to threaten him with excommunication which the Pope felt would have had little effect.(76) The French offered concessions but it was a case of too little, too late. Ciano spurned the Holy See's final bid for peace so on June 2nd at the Feast of St. Eugene Pius XII told the College of Cardinals that he must now direct his attention to the countries at war and those already occupied including Czechoslovakia and Poland. The time for preventative diplomacy had irrevocably passed. Eight days later Italy declared war.
In spite of what he told the College of Cardinals, at the fall of France Pius XII again tried to negotiate between Great Britain, Germany and Italy only three weeks later. The only interested party was Hitler who wished for the UK to just opt out of the war so that he could go after his true enemy, Russia. One month later Pius XII again tried to sound out the British, feeling that they had no chance against the Germans. This time not only did they refuse they also warned the Pope that he was starting to look like he was working with Hitler to get them to surrender. The Pope backed off. The US withdrew their representative to the Holy See " until fighting created a new situation."(77)
The situation became completely untenable as the clergy in all the nations began to appeal to Pius XII in the name of God to bless all their various armies so they could defeat their enemies. It was not long before all sides began using the terminology of a religious and ideological crusade which had but two possible outcomes: victory or annihilation.
From an outsider's point of view Pius XII's policy seemed to some to be " a policy of convenience to itself and little else."(78) A French diplomat expressed his disgust by commenting: " One cannot help thinking that it is not by generalizations and reticence that the moral leadership of the world, which is, after all, the function of the Papacy, can be rendered effective."(79) The French diplomat, however, had the convenience of having his population concentrated in one state whereas the Catholic population was spread all over Europe on both sides of the conflict. This fact was used by Hitler and Ribbentrop quite effectively. To Pius XII the threat of Communism outweighed the threat of the neo-pagan Nazis and this, and his Germanophile outlook, allowed him to attempt to deal with the Nazi government.
The Church is the longest lasting political institution that western civilization has ever created. It has not survived for nearly 2 000 years by being imprudent. It has always put its " survival as a channel in the salvation of individuals souls before the moral demands of its own gospel."(80) Diplomacy over spiritual leadership whenever push came to shove.
Pope Pius XII was indeed a moral man of peace but he was also a pragmatic diplomat who was
willing to compromise in order to preserve the peace and the position of the Catholic Church. In
the final analysis the position of the Church was, and always will be, paramount. He had to
weigh things in the balance that no other diplomat had the misfortune to, primarily having
sizable portions of his ' population ' in hostile territory and held as hostages. Pius XII did go
against one part of his philosophy that he had set out when he was Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli and
that was if war broke out the Pope was to make it clear who was responsible in clear terms.
With 30 million Catholics in Germany and his only sovereign territory in Rome, Italy one can
see why outright condemnation would have been a bad idea with possible dire consequences as
it would have been a breaking of the Lateran Accords giving Mussolini cart-blanche for
counter-action against the Holy See. As British Minister Osborne remarked in a 1963 letter to
The Times "...what could he effectively do?"(81) It is somewhat ironic that despite all of Pius XII's
pleas and attempts for peace that he is widely and popularity ' known ' as a Nazi sympathizer for
his refusal to condemn Hitler and Mussolini. When in fact his positions were not due to any
pro-Fascist views but instead to a pragmatic, realistic appraisal of his precarious diplomatic
position which allowed him precious little room to manoeuver. As a spiritual leader he most
obviously failed as was shown by his attitude towards the Czech, Polish, Norwegian and Danish
Catholics. As a diplomat he succeeded in preserving the Church throughout Europe through this
time of political upheaval.
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