Synopsis: The Society for Philosophy and Psychology (The SPP) is calling for papers to be read at its next annual meeting. "The Society consists of psychologists and philosophers with common interests in the study of behavior, cognition, language, the nervous system, artificial intelligence, emotion, conscious experience, evolution and questions at the foundations of psychology and philosophy." Papers are for oral presentation and will be selected on the basis of quality and possible interest to both philosophers and psychologists.
Remark: Sent to me by a local professor, the SPP's call for papers made quite an impression. Not only was its executive committee comprised of some major heavy weights (see call for papers), but the SPP's self-characterization of its "common interests" couldn't help but get my attention. That's because I had been kicking around a theory of emotional disorder (Rational Negativism) which seemed to fit this characterization to a tee. I was about to make the SPP an offer they couldn't refuse ( ha! ).
Remark: Included with Rational Negativism to safeguard its modest introspective foundation (feelings of worthlessness, etc.) from any residual behaviorism which might still be in evidence at the SPP.
Synopsis: Facilitated by the structural and kinematic isomorphism customarily apparent within classifications of natural objects (e.g., atoms of oxygen), verification in science is not so much a matter of public demonstration as a manifestation of our collective faith in inter-subjective reproducibility (e.g., replicating an observation, experiment, etc.). As such, there would seem little reason in principle for treating a scientist's introspective observations of the private events within his own mind as epistemically inferior to so-called empirical observations of physical events, so long as they can pass the muster of reproducibility. Ah! But there's the rub.
Unlike oxygen, honey bees and Mustang convertibles, in humans there is a considerable amount of individualization, no doubt resulting from nature's increased reliance on imagination and judgement (reasoning). But since this is an order problem rather than a privacy problem, the solution is, not to banish introspection, but to differentiate (stratify) between the more evolved individualized features (specific reasoning, specific higher emotional behavior, etc.) and the more mechanical, isomorphic processes lower in the evolutionary scheme of things (perception, fear, anger, etc.). Once accomplished (e.g., Diagram I), the individualization can then be dealt with by applying corresponding amounts of abstraction and generalization to those features (both thought and behavior) where individualization can be presumed to be most rampant (Diagram II). For example, individualized conclusions for why one selected product A over product B could not serve as a data base, whereas feelings of anger, worthlessness, etc. (enduring structures) could.
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| physical events | | | psychical events |
| (behavior) | | | (thought) |
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| credible | | | non-credible |
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I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by an uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward demeanor. Experience [with intra-taxonomic order throughout the rest of nature], therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in myself, or a different one; By supposing the link to be of the same nature (see my diagrams) ....I conform to the legitimate rules of experimental enquiry (John Stuart Mill).
Objective: To account for self-worth related emotion (i.e., needs for love, acceptance, moral integrity, recognition, achievement, purpose, meaning, etc.) and emotional disorder (e.g., depression, suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario; i.e., to synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e., to answer the question: 'Why is there a species of naturally selected organism expending huge quantities of effort and energy on the survivalistically bizarre non-physical objective of maximizing self-worth?'
Observation: The species in which rationality is most developed is also the one in which individuals have the greatest difficulty in maintaining an adequate sense of self- worth, often going to extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel Knievel, celibate monks, self-endangering Greenpeacers, etc.).
Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric stability (i.e., maintaining an adequate sense of self-worth).
Synopsis: In much the manner reasoning allows for the subordination of lower emotional concerns and values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.) to more global concerns (concern for the self as a whole), so too, these more global concerns and values can themselves become reevaluated and subordinated to other more global, more objective considerations. And if this is so, and assuming that emotional disorder emanates from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from precisely this sort of experiencially based reevaluation, then it can reasonably be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from one's rational faculties functioning a tad too well.
Normalcy and Disorder: Assuming this is correct, then some explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most individuals would seem necessary. This can be accomplished simply by postulating different levels or degrees of consciousness. From this perspective, emotional disorder would then be construed as a valuative affliction resulting from an increase in semantic content in the engram indexed by the linguistic expression, "I am insignificant", which all persons of common sense "know" to be true, but which the "emotionally disturbed" have come to "realize", through abstract thought, devaluing experience, etc.
Implications: So-called "free will" and the incessant activity presumed to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite we all have for self-significating experience which, in turn, is simply nature's way of attempting to counter the objectifying influences of our rational faculties. This also implies that the engine in the first "free-thinking" artifact is probably going to be a diesel.
Another simile would be an atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, the disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for minds? (A. M. Turing).
Additional Implications: Since the explanation I have proposed amounts to the contention that nature's most rational species (presumably) is beginning to exhibit signs of transcending the formalism of nature's fixed objective (accomplished in man via intentional self-concern, i.e., the prudence program) it can reasonably be construed as providing evidence and argumentation in support of Lucas (1961) and Penrose (1989, 1994). Not only does this imply that the aforementioned artifact probably won't be a computer, but it would also explain why a question such as "Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?" (Cohen, 1981) has led to controversy, in that it presupposes the possibility of a discrete answer to a question which can only be addressed in comparative terms (e.g. X is more rational than Y, the norm, etc.). Along these same lines (the inability to constrain rationality within that which is formal, discrete, etc.), the theory can also be construed as an endorsement or metajustification for comparative approaches in epistemology (explanationism, plausiblism, etc.)
So even if mathematicians are superb cognizers of mathematical truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical or otherwise, for cognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the power of mathematicians to cognize mathematical truth is not entirely explicable in terms of their brain's executing an algorithm. Not an algorhithm for intuiting mathematical truth -- we can suppose that Penrose has proved that there could be no such thing. What would the algorithm be for, then? Most plausibly it would be an algorithm -- one of very many -- for trying to stay alive ... (D. C. Dennett, Murmers in the Cathedral).
Oops! Sorry! Wrong again, old bean. (Me again, in response
to Dennett's knee-jerk assumption that Homo Sapiens is
running the same program as other species)
I have often felt as though I had inherited all the defiance
and all the passions with which our ancestors defended their Temple
and could gladly sacrifice my life for one great moment in history
(Sigmund Freud).
He, too [Ludwig Wittgenstein], suffered from depressions
and for long periods
considered killing himself because he considered his life worthless, but the
stubbornness inherited from his father may have helped him to survive
(Hans Sluga).
The inquest [Alan Turing's] established that it was suicide.
The evidence was perfunctory, not for any irregular reason, but because
it was so transparently clear a case (Andrew Hodges).
Give me liberty or give me death (Nathan Hale).
Its not about the mountain. Its about what the mountain tells you
about yourself.[Everest mountain climber]
Is a Science of the Mind Possible: "This
is out of date (the latest citation -- aside from Bronowski --- is
1967) and shows it. It is apparently written by someone largely
unfamiliar with the literature of both philosophy (of science,
of psychology) and of recent psychology. Very naive treatments
of the concept of causation, intersubjectivity, behaviorism, 'Psychici'..."
Rational Negativism: "Potentially provocative
thesis gets lost in vague oracular pronouncements. Also, fails
to consider kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and other alternatives
to evolutionary egoism."
Remark: Upon receipt of the SPP's review, I was somewhat
perplexed, particularly with regard to the Is A Science....
paper, the logic of which seemed to me to be unassailable.
And so, once the smoke began to
clear, I attempted to obtain a more detailed explanation of just
exactly where I had gone wrong. This inquiry led off in two directions,
one in the form of a letter to Steve Harnad, the SPP's program
chairman, the second in the form of a number of phone calls to
various members of the SPP's executive committee (listed on its
letterhead). Most of the latter turned out to be dead ends, but
one of the calls culminated in a fairly extensive correspondence
with William Lycan. However, at Bill's behest, and aside from
a few brief references to his remarks on SPP refereeing practices
(second year), I have opted to omit the Roberts/Lycan dialogue.
Remark: In addition to my inquiries to the SPP,
I also did a considerable amount of research on my own. After
scouring the shelves of local libraries, I eventually managed
to stumble on a paper which had a direct bearing on the issue
addressed by my first paper.
Synopsis: "Discussions of scientific method
have tended to stress problems of testability, while neglecting
...those
aspects of the universe which in some sense are most central
and significant for the area of reality with which the
science deals." "It has been frequently assumed that
only those events which in principle can be simultaneously observed
by multiple observers ... are to be accepted as constituting a
legitimate observational basis for science." "I am suggesting
that the more general and, to me, acceptable, objective intended
by the criterion of interobserver agreement would be...the criterion
of repeatability....a more general trust in
one's own experience" ...and the abandonment
of "a corresponding uncritical acceptance of the
significance of verbal reports."
Note: Not only was it reassuring to discover
that I wasn't alone in my convictions, but I couldn't help but
notice that, unlike my own treatment, Zener had made no attempt
to explain why introspective psychology had remained such a basket case, let
alone offer a solution. I began to suspect that I might not
be "very naive" after all.
Remarks: Several months after receiving the first review,
I attended the SPP's seventh annual meeting where I had
the opportunity to converse with Pete Manicas and Paul Secord, coauthors
of a paper being presented on recent trends in the philosophy
of science. We agreed to correspond.
As to the meeting's general orientation, everything was cognitive
science to the max and my impression was that admitting you were
anything other than a mechanistic materialist was likely to get
you lynched.
Synopsis: Psychology is unique in that "its
institutionalization preceded its content and its methods preceded
its problems..." "From its earliest days, man's stipulation
that psychology be adequate to science has outweighed his commitment
that it be adequate to man". "By the late 50's voices
expressing deep dissatisfaction with the discipline appeared"
in which "one eminent psychologist after another admitted to having
strong doubts about what had been achieved". "Moreover, the 'busy
research' of the past several decades has seen the fragmentation
of psychology into "dozens of highly specialized, and largely
non-interacting subdisciplines". "Toulmin attributes this, rightly
on our view, to the still dominating neo-positivist
theory of the behavioral sciences that succeeded the
old positivism of the 30's and 40's. "But if as many writers
have argued, the root issue remains the very conception of science,
its methods, tasks and limits, then the time may be ripe for a
resolution."
According to an emerging literature (Bhaskar, Scriven, Hanson,
Harre, Madden, etc.), science is not so much about how test subjects
performed in selecting product A over product B (Humean constant
conjunctions) as about enduring
structures operating in a world which is radically open,
and therefore dependent upon such techniques as stratification,
abstraction, generalization, etc. "In the new heuristic,
scientific knowledge is much closer to that knowledge which is
more familiarly accessible, through common
sense, literature, and other modes of experience."
Remark: Stratification? Abstraction? Generalization?
Had these guys been reading my paper (Is A Science.....)?
Even so, the Manicas and
Secord paper was itself a bit vague and general and its full significance
really didn't register initially. Little did I know that many
of the same notions they identified as "twenty years or more
out of date" were about to be unleashed on me with a vengeance and,
strangely enough, by someone directly involved with the Manicas and
Secord presentation.
Synopsis: Let me say right off, I liked your
Is A Science... paper a lot and plan to send it to
several of my colleagues who
I am sure will find it of interest. "You have remarkably
good perceptions, intuitions and what is most amazing to me, an
extremely sophisticated knowledge of some abstruse philosophical
issues." "You are absolutely correct about the issues
of verification, objectivity, etc..."
With respect to Rational Negativism, "I think --
with Lycan -- that something like what you say must
be correct". "It may be that you have discovered America",
although I can't be sure because your development is insufficiently
exact. "You have something here, I am sure. Keep at it."
Remark: Since this was the opinion of a fellow
contributor publicly acknowledged by the SPP as a leading authority in the
field of my first paper (by accepting his paper for presentation), I assumed
it would carry some weight.
Who knows? Maybe the SPP might even acknowledge that the first
reviewer had gone a little overboard.
Note: A copy of this communication was included
in the material reviewed by Rey, Matthews, Lycan, Dretske and
Dennett (second year).
My ruling passion is the love of literary fame (David Hume).
