Through the UKUSA agreement Australia's Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) is a party to Echelon, a world wide network monitoring the phone calls of ordinary citizens. Below Green Senator Bob Brown attempts to get the Australian Government to acknowledge what they are up to.

Senator BROWN  (Tasmania) (6.47 p.m.) --I congratulate Senator Cooney for that speech and particularly for his concern that there is a tendency for legislative creep in this act and his concern that we have to be very vigilant about legislation like this, which is the reason I do not support it. The first parts of it which are to do with being able to more effectively tap in on criminals does not concern me, but the proposal from the second reading speech of the minister does concern me. He said:

The foreign communications warrant will enable the interception of particular communications which cannot be identified by reference to specific services or named individuals--

   and he goes on to say:

This is a characteristic of the sophisticated digital technologies which are increasingly dominant in modern telecommunication systems.

The bill limits the powers to issue this category of warrants to interception for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. To reduce the possibility of inadvertently intercepting communications between Australians, these warrants may be issued only in relation to foreign communications.

   What it does not say is that this opens up the whole arena of spying for commercial purposes and to the spying on all Australian telecommunications going overseas. We know from the remarkable Sunday program on Channel 9 called Big Brother is Listening on 23 May last year that there is enormous facility these days, particularly through the installations at Geraldton and Waihopai in New Zealand with massive computers and dictionaries to pick out calls from amongst the millions of faxes, emails and phone calls and to scan these so that every conversation going out of this country is being listened into--and, moreover, the information and the scanning of those calls can go direct to Washington without any Australian intervention.

   I will be asking the minister tomorrow to give more information about this process, this tearaway modern communication which is not dealt with under this legislation. In fact, I am very concerned that this legislation gives some legitimacy to this process of comprehensive spying which is not confined to Australia or the United States--it is carried on around the world. I believe that citizens should know about it and be aware of the enormous potential damage that can accrue from it, and tomorrow I will give the Senate some specific cases where this form of intelligence has been abused in the political arena, in the economic arena and used against the interests of ordinary citizens speaking on mobile phones in the street. (Time expired)

Debate interrupted

Senator BROWN  (Tasmania) (9.31 a.m.) --I was saying before the debate on the Telecommunications (Interception) Legislation Amendment Bill 2000 was adjourned yesterday that there is more to this legislation than meets the eye, or at least there is more to the change to modern communications than this legislation can deal with. At the outset I might just say that if there are some senators missing from the chamber this morning it may well be due to the traffic jams which have been caused by the V8 car racing being imposed on Canberra at the moment. I believe the delay is up to 40 minutes for some people making the approach outside Parliament House at the moment. That aside, I refer to Channel 9's Sunday program in May last year when reporter Ross Coulthart interviewed New Zealand author and researcher Nicky Hager. Mr Hager talked about the giant computer systems which use dictionary systems to track down selected phone calls, faxes and Internet communications coming in and out of Australia and indeed going between other countries. One of these facilities is at Geraldton in Western Australia, and most Australians know very little about it. Mr Hager said:

One of the defining features of the Echelon system--

   that is, this giant computer tracking system on everybody's phone calls--

is that it is a move away from what is the most effective way to spy on our enemies to a system which is the most effective way of spying on everyone.

   That is the reality of the modern world. While this bill points us towards intervention in phone calls for criminals, drug handlers and spies, in effect what it is not doing is saying that our whole spying system is being moved to an international system which spies on everybody's phone calls. Most Australians are not aware of that.

   The bill does refer to intervention in foreign phone calls--phone calls going out of this country--but what it does not say is that everybody's phone calls are being listened to, that everybody's phone calls are being scanned and, moreover, that the check on this system is not within our national boundaries. Australia has an arrangement with the UK, the United States, Canada and New Zealand whereby the downloading of selected phone calls--the intercepted calls which the Americans, in particular, want to listen to--go straight to Washington. I will be asking the government during the committee stages of this debate what control Australia has over this spy system based here in Australia. I think we will find that it is close to zero; that in fact this information is being relayed straight to Washington and to other countries without proper intervention by the Australian authorities. When this bill says, `Let's intervene in certain phone calls made by criminals and people with an intent that is not in Australia's interests,' it is really missing the point--that is, that everybody's phone calls are being listened in to and, as far as I know, this parliament has no control over that. This parliament is not informed about it. This parliament is not a watchdog on behalf of citizens. This parliament does not know what our spy systems are doing and, more particularly, it does not know what the foreign spy systems are doing which are getting the information out of the Australian infrastructure.

   We are not in an age where this is simply spying--or even primarily spying--in the defence interests of this country; we are in an age where commercial interests are at the forefront in spying. Indeed, President Clinton has made it very clear that, as far as the United States is concerned, the intelligence agencies are there in the interests of America's economic supremacy, its corporate interests. Information being taken from these spy facilities, including here in Australia, is passed on to the corporate system--the Forbes 500 and the big multinational corporations--because it is in the interests of those big systems to get the drop on their competitors around the world. The Sunday program pointed to a number of cases where an advantage had been given to either US or Canadian countries--in one case, a wheat deal in favour of Canada, because the Canadians had picked up a phone call coming out of a car in the United States--a call to do with a United States bid for a world market. There was another extraordinary case cited in the Channel 9 Sunday program of 23 May last year. Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom was presumably able to get information on two of her ministers through the Canadian connection of this spying system--that is, the UK arm of it was kept clean while the Canadians picked up information on two UK ministers about whom the Prime Minister of the UK of the day was not sure. Is that the intent of a spy system in which Australia is involved? What halt does this legislation put on that sort of activity occurring in the international arena against the interests of Australian people in general, let alone elected Australians? Maybe the government will be able to disclaim that extraordinary situation, as highlighted on the Sunday program. If so, I would like to hear how.

   legislation does not allow for overseas phone calls to be intercepted where an Australian citizen is involved at the other end. Tell me about it! I believe that that is already occurring all over the world through this massive intercept system of telecommunications. I believe that this piece of legislation is nothing more than a diversionary titbit. It does nothing to reassure me--and will do nothing to reassure those few Australians who know about this spying system--that there are very clear guidelines, controlled by the elected members of this nation, on this massive international spy system. I reiterate: it is no longer in the nation's interest that this spy system be contained. There are no guidelines --or, if there are, let them be brought before this Senate--to say that this spy system is confined to working in Australia's national interests and against the interests of those who might engage in criminal or political activities that are inimical to Australia's interests. Where are those guidelines? Let the government produce them--certainly before I will give assent to this legislation. As far as the international spying component of it is concerned, the legislation is loosely worded, ill-considered and certainly not transparent in the parliament laying down regulations--laws--which confine the activity of not just the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation but of the international operators like the American spy facilities which are using our facilities, as far as I know, and I will guarantee as far as any government representative here knows, against Australia's interests, for goodness sake.

   Is the Channel 9 program wrong? Was it factually flawed? Is its information able to be countermanded by the government? If not, I say to the Senate: the facility at Geraldton and the similar facility in New Zealand--which Nicky Hagar broke into and got lists of citizens names out of because it was unattended at night--are set up in a manner which can have US, Canadian and UK interests working against Australia's economic wellbeing. For example, it can give multinational corporations the opportunity, through the interception of telecommunications, to get the drop on their Australian competitors--to give international markets the opportunity to beat Australia when it comes to international sales of commodities out of this country. This is laid down quite clearly on the public record.

   I was amazed that that program, which went to air on 23 May last year, drew such little comment from the Australian political and business community. I am concerned as a democrat that this parliament is not in control; is not laying down guidelines as to what our intelligence operatives are allowed and not allowed to do. You look superficially at this piece of legislation and there is one sentence that says, `You can't spy on Australian citizens overseas,' but the evidence on the face of it is that every Australian citizen's phone calls are being spied upon. Moreover, Australia is allowing its facilities to be used so that foreign countries can download from this massive computerised selection of phone calls, can take that information for their own use and can pass it on to their own corporate sectors without Australians knowing about it, without the Australian security intelligence network intervening and without Australia's government or elected politicians knowing what is going on. This demands an explanation.

   The government has only one representative in this chamber at the moment. It is time for them to get up and explain what is happening at Geraldton, Pine Gap and the facility in Darwin with respect to the downloading of information out of the satellite systems and the conveying of Australians' phone calls, Internet communications and faxes--everything as far as international communications are concerned--all of which are being spied upon. One of the answers will be that in reaction to what is called the Anglo system--this massive Echelon computerised spying system--the French have responded with the same, and you could not blame the Chinese and the Indonesians for responding likewise. Everybody is into it, one presumes.

   Let us have some light thrown on this system. In this democratically elected chamber, let us have an account of where we stand in the modern world of spying. Let us be clear about the fact that, post Cold War, the focus of spying has become commercial and that there is great opportunity--in fact, I think it is going on worldwide--for commercial interests to gain or to lose by what that spy system is doing. In fact, on the Sunday program there was an inherent complaint that the information going out of the Australian and New Zealand facilities to corporations overseas gives them the drop on their Australian counterparts and there was an inherent request that, if this is going to continue, ASIO should be put at the service of the Australian corporate sector. I am not calling for that; I am calling for an explanation from the government as to what is the state of play in this system. What are the safeguards at Geraldton, Pine Gap, Darwin and the New Zealand facility? What communications are occurring between Australia and New Zealand to safeguard our national interests against the much bigger players in this field who are using our facilities? I cannot give assent to this legislation, even though all other parties in the Senate have done so, because I am very concerned that we as parliamentarians are not up to speed on this issue that affects every Australian citizen.

[Another Senator then spoke on the bill, but didn't address Echelon to much extent]

Senator VANSTONE  (South Australia--Minister for Justice and Customs) (10.05 a.m.) --I have just a few things to say in response. I thank senators for their contributions to the debate on the Telecommunications (Interception) Legislation Amendment Bill 2000. Senator Ludwig's contribution acknowledged the work the committee did. As to Senator Brown's contribution: Senator Brown, you might be lucky, it might be a slow news day and there might be a journalist who has not read the bill, who is happy to take your remarks at face value, and you will get a bit of a run. It is the easiest and oldest trick in the book to make all sorts of allegations in relation to a country's intelligence network knowing that they cannot be responded to and therefore hoping that what you say gets a run, because it cannot be answered. Can I put it in short form for you, though: as I understand it, what you are suggesting is that all calls can be listened to all of the time. What needs to be emphasised is quite simply that calls can be intercepted only under a warrant and that warrants can only be obtained by ASIO for foreign intelligence purposes. If you do not accept that, Senator, there is nothing more I can add other than to refer you back to the provisions of the bill.

[Edited out here: Senator Vanstone's comments about the review period of the bill and admissibility of evidence.]

   In conclusion, I want to highlight that this bill is critically important for law enforcement. Unfortunately, law enforcement and national security agencies have fallen behind in terms of technology development. When criminals are using more sophisticated technology, we need to make sure that our law enforcement agencies and our national security agencies have the most sophisticated and effective investigative tools available. It is, as Senator Ludwig said in his remarks, something that requires a balance between the needs of the agencies and the need for privacy, and we think we have achieved that balance. The already well-established procedural and accountability provisions of the interception act will apply to these new named warrants. I thank senators for their support of the bill.

Question resolved in the affirmative.

Bill read a second time.

Senator BROWN  (Tasmania) (10.10 a.m.) --I ask the minister whether she could elaborate on the functions of the Geraldton facility and the Waihopai facility near Blenheim in New Zealand--what they do and who has access to their information. Could she also tell us whether information that is gathered at those facilities, in Pine Gap and in Darwin does indeed, as I said earlier, go to foreign intelligence networks?

Senator VANSTONE  (South Australia--Minister for Justice and Customs) (10.11 a.m.) --Senator, I would just refer you to what I said in my concluding remarks about inquiries into these matters. They cannot be responded to. I am sure you understand that.

Senator BROWN --No, I don't.

Senator VANSTONE --Well, I am sorry.

Senator BROWN  (Tasmania) (10.11 a.m.) --I do not accept that in this democratically elected parliament we cannot get assurances from the Attorney-General or the Minister for Justice and Customs that our intelligence facilities are used only for the purposes of defending the national interest and for catching up with criminals and that they are not being abused. Spying for commercial purposes, for example, is way outside what the Australian public or business community believes are the intelligence agencies' permitted functions. I would remind the committee that I was not the origin of this very startling concern that we have moved into an age of telecommunications where all citizens' phone calls are already being spied upon and that the information war between intelligence agencies is now for commercial advantage. I am asking the minister whether this is the case. Is the American intelligence network and their facility near Fort Meade, which has 20,000 people working in it, using information from the Geraldton facility or other facilities in Australia, including information which is of a commercial nature and which is not vetted by the Australian intelligence network?

   It is a pretty important matter. All we need is for the minister to stand up and say, `I give you an assurance that the claims made on the Sunday program last year are wrong. I give you an assurance that all phone calls are not being scanned by dictionary computers looking for words which will download specific phone calls, Internet communications and faxes for viewing by not just the Australian intelligence network but the intelligence networks of other countries, including the UK and the US.' I would like the minister to give an assurance, because that is what this parliament expects: that the US or anyone else is prohibited from using our facilities to download commercially interesting information which could be used against Australia's interests. We are in the extraordinary situation--if this program is correct, and I believe it is--where the facilities in this country and in New Zealand can be used against the national interest.

   The minister has withdrawn at the outset to the totally unwarranted defence of `I can't discuss this matter because it is top secret'. I do not accept that. This is a democracy, and it is important that in a democracy the parliament knows what is going on. The Senate committee was not privy to this information. I do not know of any other committee that is privy to this information. As far as the public knows, there are no guidelines set down by government, by cabinet, by the Prime Minister or by anyone else on these modern spying facilities to protect our nation's interest. The charge here is one of great concern. This is not a frivolous matter, and I dismiss the minister's trivialisation of it. The minister should get up in this chamber and reassure Australians that this very serious development in the international use of our facilities against the national interest is not occurring, cannot occur, will not happen and has not happened.

   On the face of it, it is happening and will happen. If the Canadian arm of this system can intercept phone calls to give Canadian wheat growers the drop on the US wheat growers, what does that say about the future position of Australian wheat growers, who use international communications to ensure that they get the most advantaged position on the world market? Is the Geraldton facility available for the US spying facilities to intercept those phone calls simply by inserting the word `wheat' into the dictionary which downloads all international communications with this country, and transfer them to Fort Meade, where under President Clinton's direction commercial interests are now part of the American intelligence job? Are we in the position where Geraldton, for goodness sake, can be used against the interests of our wheat industry, our wool industry or our manufacturing industries? The program said that this information does flow to the big corporate sector in the US from Fort Meade. The program also said that the Americans have free access to Geraldton and Waihopai in New Zealand and they download their own stuff, which goes straight to Washington, with no intervention by Australia's intelligence network. Sure, Australia downloads its own stuff, but, at least in New Zealand, the list of interests that the US has is longer than that of the New Zealand spy network itself. And that information goes straight to Washington, as I said. Unless we hear otherwise from the government, Australians are being invited to believe that the same situation occurs in this country.

   I am as concerned about the national interest as anyone else and know that there are matters that the government is not going to want to discuss openly in this chamber because they are mega-critical and sensitive to the national interest and might draw Australia into an embarrassing situation vis-a-vis, for example, spying on embassies, spying on diplomats or spying on members of parliament elsewhere in the world. That is not what this debate is about, or at least it is not what my interest in this debate is. We have gone far beyond that. This is about spying on the whole of the telecommunications network, on everybody's phone calls, and about the use of our facilities by other countries against our own nation's interests. We have gone from the use of intelligence facilities in the national interest to this situation, with the globalisation of world trade interests in particular, of our own spying facilities being used against us. All I want to hear from this minister is that that is not happening, that cannot happen and that will not happen, and that there are measures in place which prevent that from happening.

CHAIR --The question is that the bill stand as printed.

Senator BROWN  (Tasmania) (10.21 a.m.) --Surely this cannot happen. Surely we cannot have a government corroborating what I said by the minister sitting there dumbfounded. Surely what we are hearing here is that everything I am saying is true. By her silence, Minister Vanstone is corroborating the matters I bring forward.

   The minister said earlier that I am on my feet simply to get a line in a newspaper, but I can tell the minister that sitting there in silence, in response to the very important matters which I have raised, is going to raise interest. All she has to do is stand up and say, `Senator Brown, you are wrong because I give you these assurances.' Instead, she has chosen to say nothing at all. That is indefensible. I reiterate: I am not asking for her to divulge sensitive issues.

Senator VANSTONE --I rise on a point of order, Madam Chair. It is inappropriate for Senator Brown to use an opportunity of speaking to infer that the government response contained things which have not been said. He knows what has been said. He has been told that intelligence matters such as these are not discussed and he is now seeking to misrepresent that in a most unsatisfactory way.

The CHAIRMAN --There is no point of order.

Senator BROWN --That is not a point of order, and it is no defence. I point out that I flagged the matters I would raise this morning last night, so that the minister could come in here well prepared to answer my concerns. Instead, she is failing altogether to answer them and is trying to trivialise the matter. I find that totally unsatisfactory. We have a piece of legislation diverting our attention from matters of surveillance of criminal or diplomatic importance. There have been amendments proposed by the Australian office of the Privacy Commissioner and New South Wales legal interests, but the question remains: what about the whole other field that I have brought to the Senate's attention? This is the time to debate it. This is not a matter of spies, security, diplomacy and the protection of the national interest in the way in which Australians think when the name ASIO comes to the fore. I am talking about the interception of everybody's overseas phone calls. I am talking about the use of our facilities against the national interest. I am talking about foreign countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada using our facilities against our interests. All I have asked for is an assurance from the minister that that cannot happen, is not happening and will not happen.

   The minister is well aware of the Channel 9 program. I would like her to be able to say that it was fallacious, that the information coming from ex-members of the US intelligence network, from New Zealand and from former Australian operatives is wrong. That program underscored that there are people now working in those networks who feel bad about it. They no longer feel good and that they are working in the interests of their nation. They feel that their whole modus operandi has been diverted into a scramble for commercial interests, which can be very much against the interests of citizens and businesses in the countries in which it is occurring.

   Last night, I mentioned that this Echelon system was used even by former Prime Minister Thatcher to gather information on two ministers in her own cabinet, according to that program. What happened was that, rather than lay open the possibility that it would come to light that this process was under way through the UK arm of this facility being the spying agency, the Canadian arm was brought into play to gather information on two ministers. I guess the Australian government is not going to comment on that. I would like to hear an assurance from our government that no such thing can occur in this country and that no foreign country could use our facilities to spy on citizens, let alone parliamentarians, in such a fashion. The Channel 9 program went on to report how the wife of Prime Minister Trudeau in Canada had been spied on--her calls had been intercepted. The minister is not going to comment on that, as well.

   We are linked up to this Echelon system, established by the United States. Our facility at Geraldton is basic to it and this legislation, if it is put in place, is going to do nothing to change the two basic facts which concern me. All calls are being intercepted and selectively downloaded. Every day, information is going to the United States, the UK, Canada and New Zealand, without that information being recorded or analysed by Australia's intelligence authorities. We know that is not confined to matters of national interest, in the usual sense of those words, but that commercial interests are now becoming predominant in what is downloaded out of this facility.

   I cannot believe that the minister can sit reading the newspaper when she ought to be preparing an answer to the charges I am making. I cannot believe, having been given overnight warning that I would be raising these matters, that the government not only refuses to refute them but sits in silence on the other side. Yes, if you want to stymie a story, say nothing about it. Yes, if you want to downplay the public interest, then refuse to address it. But this is a matter which will lead to a continuing deterioration in the public perception that the parliament is here to defend the rights of Australian citizens. It is not doing that at the moment. This government is selling out on the rights of Australian citizens and businesses. That is a very serious matter indeed.

Bill agreed to.

Senator BROWN --The answer is no. Chair, will you record my opposition?

The CHAIRMAN --Your comments have been noted.

Bill reported without amendment; report adopted.