Throughout history, the concept of justice has been one of humankind's most revered virtues. There are, however, differing conceptions of what the word means. From ancient to modern times philosophers, attorneys, judges, politicians, and the man on the street have argued about and emphasized the importance of justice. "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought," wrote one philosopher as recently as 1971.1 Three of mankind's most famous thinkers, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, as represented through the writings of Plato, and Thomas Hobbes have wrestled with the concept and come up with mighty different ideas. I will examine these three thinkers to determine which formulates the most desirable concept of justice.
Thrasymachus, a cynic toward justice, offers us the first definition of justice in his objections to Socrates: "[J]ustice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger."2 Applying Thrasymachus's logic to history, then, the white man was acting justly in nearly wiping out the Native American tribes, and when he kidnapped and enslaved thousands of Africans, because the white man was technologically superior and thus had "the advantage of the stronger." This is obviously a flawed view of justice, but Thrasymachus's view can apply to how governments regard their subjects, not just how governments regard and interact with outsiders.
Thrasymachus, like Hobbes, applies the concept of justice to different types of government. Unlike Hobbes, though, Thrasymachus sees justice in each case as the same thing. For Thrasymachus, "Democracy makes democratic laws, tyranny makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others. And they declare what they have made — what is to their own advantage — to be just for their subjects. ... This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule."3 For Hobbes, though, governments are inherently either just or unjust, by definition. Therefore, a democracy is always a just form of government and tyranny must be unjust.4 Some would say this is nothing more than an exercise in semantics, as Hobbes may be simply using different words to describe the same ideas as Thrasymachus. However, this is not the case. Hobbes clearly recognizes that some types of government, like tyranny and oligarchy, can be inherently unjust by virtue of their structure, while Thrasymachus would say all governments are just because they exert authority over their subjects, and the will of the ruler over the ruled is always just, even if Thrasymachus and everyone else would call that ruler a tyrant.
Aside from his theory pertaining to rulers, Thrasymachus also discusses the concept of justice as it applies to the average citizen. The inescapable fact is that Thrasymachus is drunk with lust and admiration for those who are unjust — those who are ruthless and willing to step on others for their own success. He sees just people as goodie-goodies or schmucks who follow the rules (and will never succeed in life), while unjust people, those willing to bend or even break the rules to their advantage, will reap the rewards of their selfish actions. In Thrasymachus's scheme, a person who obeyed every nuance of the law could not come out a winner in life. Thrasymachus's typology has more to do with consequences than with actions. Thrasymachus sees the unjust person as smarter and using better judgment, and thus he allows that unjust people can act in just ways when it is prudent. If in a certain situation it is to one's advantage to act in a supposedly "just" way (like when there are a lot of people watching this unjust person's actions), even the unjust person will act that way, because she or he uses better judgment.5
Glaucon, on the other hand, is not so obsessed with acting unjustly as Thrasymachus. For him it is a matter of practicality. For Glaucon, perception of justness is more important than actually being just. He says people who claim to praise justice actually only praise the rewards society gives one who is perceived to be just and therefore a reputation for justness is more important and should be a more important goal than an individual's actual justness.6 So for Glaucon, a person is just only because it tends to make others think they he or she is just.7 In the myth of Gyges, an invisible man chooses to do whatever he wants because society does not put any constraints on him. Glaucon and Thrasymachus argue that it is for the opinions of others that one practices justice. Hobbes goes one step further and codifies that nebulous opinion into state law. Now people must face a more severe penalty for being unjust than ostracism, they face the state.
Hobbes, (like Thrasymachus and Glaucon to a lesser extent) realizes justice is necessary for people to live together in civil society. It is the mortar that allows inherently conflictual people to live together in a city. If justice ceased to be meted out by Hobbes's sovereign power, contracts between members of society (eventually the social contract as well) would be invalid, society would collapse. People would turn upon one another in droves. It would be a return to the state of nature, a constant war of all against all. For Hobbes, justice is therefore the long, strong arm of the sovereign. Though it has fallen out of favor in modern times for such intangibles as "individual rights," this long, strong arm of the sovereign -- law -- is the basis of Hobbes' Leviathan. Protecting people from the unjust acts of one another is the chief role of Hobbes' government, nothing short of its very raison d'etre.8 This is somewhat similar to Thrasymachus's position that justice is whatever the powerful say it is. Hobbes puts the sovereign in the roll of overseer, enabler of justice (purveyor of laws), a seat of power not specifically to be used for private gain, while Thrasymachus emphasizes the fact that the ruler can do whatever he wants. Thrasymachus factors the ruler himself into the equation, while Hobbes' sovereign is removed, the abstract enabler.
Hobbes, then, offers us a better conception of justice than our ancient thinkers. While Glaucon only believes that a perception, nothing more than a mere façade of justice is needed, Thrasymachus goes so far as to define injustice as a virtue. Hobbes, on the other hand, is a realist. He understands that, as Glaucon points out, people will not be just unless there is some incentive for them to be so. Hobbes correctly notes that this incentive is the government's coercive power: laws. The only problem with Hobbes' conception of justice is that it is not well-articulated. Glaucon and Thrasymachus offer a more comprehensive explanation of a poorer definition of justice. In the end the only thing besides religion that can keep people acting justly is outside influences, be it the state or just other's opinions.
1Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971) 3. [Emphasis added.]
2Plato, Republic 338c.
3Plato, 338e.
4Hobbes says, "For they that are discontented under monarchy, call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy, call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy, call it anarchy . . ." (Leviathan Ch. 19).
5Plato, 348c-e.
6Plato 366e.
7This from Plato, 357e-358a: "[J]ustice . . . is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from their reputation for justice, but is to be avoided because of itself as something burdensome."
8Hobbes' "fifth doctrine" of Leviathan Ch. 29.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, in Modern Political Thought: Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Ed. David Wootton. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996. 122-302.
Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap P., Harvard U. P., 1971.