To understand how a man named Vespasian became Emperor of the Roman Empire, one need only look at the events of one single year: A.D. 69, the Year of Four Emperors. With Nero died the Julio-Claudian dynasty, and because he had no heir, succession was bound to be tumultuous, and it was. The year saw the unsuccessful bids of three emperors, and finished when Vespasian came in from the east and cleared up the mess that had been incurred by the three failed emperors. Vespasian was able to attain success while the other three, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius did not, because of his successful military campaigns, which were the result of the blunders caused by previous emperors to make themselves unpopular, Vespasian's political prowess and ability to garner support of many people, and luck: he was lucky on the battlefield, and he luckily had the support of members of a revolt going on in northwest Europe, and the people who had been against Vitellius in previous battles.

One of the most important moments of A.D. 69 was the key battle between Vespasian and Vitellius at Cremona, October 24 to 25. Although Vespasian's general, Antonius Primus, was highly skilled, luck nonetheless played a major role in Vespasian's victory over Vitellius. When the sun finally rose after a chaotic nighttime battle, Vespasian's forces, which had been stationed in Syria for a long time, let out a cheer because of a Syrian custom to worship a sun-god. "This led to a vague rumor (perhaps intentionally spread by the Flavian commander) that Mucianus had arrived and that the cries were greetings exchanged by the two armies."¹ Once the Vitellians thought reinforcements had arrived, they fled from the battleground, fearing for their lives, clinching the victory for Antonius Primus. In a similar vein, Tacitus writes that the when the moon rose in the middle of the night, the light was shining in the faces of the Vitellians, making it hard for them to see, while simultaneously elongating the shadows of Vespasian's forces, making them appear to be more powerful than they really were. The moon also showed the Flavians exactly where the Vitellians were.² This seems to be one of those matters on which one should not fully believe Tacitus. It may have been true that the moon rose on the backs of the Flavians, but even a full moon would probably not cause the tides to turn that dramatically. It is probably more of a bias on the part of Tacitus for the victors; he was probably influenced by their propaganda, which may have seen the moon being on their side as a favorable portent, and therefore exaggerating it's effect on the battle.

Furthermore, the fact that the battle was held at Cremona, the same spot where a battle between Vitellius and Otho had taken place in April of A.D. 69, meant that there may have been a large number of former Otho and Galba supporters (who had somehow escaped death) who still harbored anti-Vitellius sentiments, and could therefore be easily swayed to the Vespasian cause. Former Othoians and Galbians helped to make the Vespasian bandwagon that much larger all along the way to the battle, and elsewhere as well.³ For example, once word of Galba's cruel death hit the provinces, people began to feel more affection for the late emperor; Antonius Primus capitalized on this, by putting Galba's portraits back up, causing Galba-supporters to enter the conflict on the side of Vespasian.⁴

Not only did Vespasian have the support of people who had supported previous emperors, but he was aided by the fact that a revolt was going on in Upper Germany by people who wanted to abolish the Roman Empire in favor of a Batavian or Gaulish regime. In fact, the final event to throw Vespasian over the edge was the Batavian revolt, which started out as a pro-Vespasian revolt, but later became a revolt against the Empire. The revolt of the Batavian leader Julius Civilis and three Gauls, Julius Classicus, Julius Sabinus, and Julius Tutor helped Vespasian gain momentum after his victory at the Second Battle of Cremona. Civilis in particular, though an unlikely bedfellow, was a great help to Vespasian. What Civilis and friends wanted was a revolt against the Empire. Because there also happened to be a civil war going on, he determined that it would be beneficial to support one of the factions of the civil war, so as to gain support from its members. Civilis could gain legitimacy and support by fighting for Vespasian; it would be irrational for him to side with the supporters of the emperor currently in power (after all, he was rebelling against the Empire) so he sided with Vespasian, at least temporarily.⁵ Civilis unified the forces of Vespasian and the revolters of Batavia, which was a huge help for the Flavians. "Not even Antonius Primus or Mucianus had done more to encourage the rise of Vespasian."⁶

The importance of momentum in campaigns for emperor cannot be overestimated. Nobody wants to be on the side of the emperor who lost out, because are likely to be executed by the new regime. Vespasian did have momentum before the Second Battle of Cremona, but after the battle his momentum swelled greatly. In the Senate, for example, was afraid to mention the name "Vespasian" after the Second Battle. "Not a single speaker reproached the Flavian leaders. . . . [T]hey used elaborate circumlocution in their anxiety to avoid mentioning Vespasian."⁷ While Vespasian was pretending the battle had never occurred, the senators obviously knew who really had the power. The same things had happened to Cęcina, a Vitellian general who defected, even before the Second Battle. While he was still part of Vitellius' forces, he had been afraid to speak against Vespasian, but had no qualms about insulting Vitellius.⁸ These two incidents speak to the nature of Vespasian's personality: It invited one to seek allegiance with him. While Vespasian's nature was one that won loyalty, Vitellius' did not: Vitellius' own commanders were disloyal to him, including Caecina and another general named Bassus, who both engaged in various acts of subterfuge.⁹

On top of his other flaws, Vitellius was bad at governing the empire.¹⁰ Galba and Otho had not been particularly good either, but Vitellius was clearly no Vespasian.¹¹ He had some Nero-like qualities, even organizing a memorial service for the late emperor.¹² "Vitellius himself was bent solely upon spending. He constructed larger stables for his charioteers, filled the circus with gladiatorial and wild-beast shows, and embarked on a spending spree as if his purse were bottomless."¹³ The emperor was so self-indulgent, he forgot about ruling the Empire. He squandered away a huge amount of money¹⁴ during his tenure as emperor.¹⁵ Not only did this misappropriation of funds make him look bad in the public's eyes, but it was taken away from general benefits to the state, making the infrastructure worse-for-wear; he was digging the Empire into a deep hole which only another emperor would be able to fill. Furthermore, in his paranoia about Vespasian, he spawned public discussion about Vespasian by forbidding it, and called the praetorian guard, who had apparently been discussing Vespasian, "rumor-mongers."¹⁶ It was never a good idea to alienate the prętorian guard.

Besides just frivolous spending and money-squandering, many things that Vitellius did smacked of poor judgment. Some of the things Vitellius did were directly related to his fall from power and death, and some of his choices were indirectly related to it. For example, Vitellius decided to kill Flavius Sabinus, Vespasian's older brother and Prefect of the city of Rome. While this must have seemed like a good idea to him at the time, it was a prescription for disaster, because it alienated a significant portion of citizens who thought it was a low-down thing to do.¹⁷ Other things which led to a feeling of contempt for Vitellius were the destruction of the temple to Jupiter Best and Greatest¹⁸ and the Capitol, and general panic in Rome.¹⁹ These things were seen by the public, and Tacitus, as bad omens.

If Vitellius was bumbling, Vespasian was cunning, which also helped him in his quest for the imperial throne. In the early stages of his movement, between July and the Second Battle of Cremona, Vespasian started out in Judaea and worked is way to Rome. He therefore controlled the eastern half of the Empire, with all its naval fleets,²⁰ and could cut off the grain supply to Rome; knowing this, the army of Vitellius became demoralized -- if Vespasian played this card they would be doomed. Vitellius already had enough problems, this just exacerbated his already bad situation in Rome. This act just caused another shift of momentum in favor of Vespasian. Vespasian also had a keen sense of politics. He knew that if he stayed out of the spotlight personally, his image would be heightened, because people tend to inflate what they cannot see.²¹ While Otho and Vitellius (and to a lesser extent Galba²²) were battling it out in the spotlight that is Rome, he was garnering support in far away Judaea.

Vespasian was a good leader, with good personal qualities. He was able to train his troops, and win enough people over to his side at each stage of the campaign. He also had under him some of the best generals around, Mucianus and Antonius Primus, both of whom were proven excellent commanders on the battlefield. Where he was capable his enemy was not. All these factors, and moments of sheer luck, contributed to Vespasian's momentum from beginning to the end. By acts of subterfuge before the key battle, by fortuitously winning the key battle, and by having the support of another faction in the north after the key battle, he was able to consolidate enough power to become emperor by December 20, A.D. 69. The fact that his competition was somewhat feckless made his quest that much easier.

¹Tacitus, Histories, III.25

²Tacitus, Histories, III.23

³Tacitus, Histories, III.44

⁴Tacitus, Histories, III.7

⁵Tacitus, Histories, IV.21

⁶>Tacitus, Histories, IV.24

⁷Tacitus, Histories, III.37

⁸Tacitus, Histories, III.9

⁹Tacitus, Histories, II.101

¹⁰He was also a poor time manager. He went to the Senate even when the body was not discussing anything important. (Tacitus, Histories, II.91) Surely he could have been doing something more important than watching senators speak about unimportant things.

¹¹The following statement is particularly convincing: "Otho was not popular with anyone. Yet the reason was not to be found with any preference for Vitellius." (Tacitus, Histories, II.17)
Also, the fact that these three previous Emperors were so maladroit helped to convince Vespasian to begin his campaign in the first place, after a pep-talk from Mucianus. (Tacitus, Histories, II.76)

¹²Tacitus, Histories, II.95

¹³Tacitus, Histories, II.94

¹⁴900,000,000 sesterces

¹⁵Tacitus, Histories, II.95

¹⁶Tacitus, Histories, II.96

¹⁷Tacitus, Histories, III.79

¹⁸Tacitus, Histories, III.72

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Tacitus, Histories, III.1

²¹Tacitus, Histories, II.82

²²By "lesser extent" I do not mean that Galba did not fight it out as much as Otho and Vitellius, but Vespasian was not fully immersed in his quest to become emperor during Galba's reign.

Tacitus, The Histories, Kenneth Wellesley, trans. Penguin Books, New York. 1995.