The 100th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment Short History

The 100th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment was organized at Camp Irwin, Joliet, in August 1862, and was mustered into service on August 30. The entire Regiment was recruited in Will County and it is sometimes referred to as the “Will County Regiment.”

Its first colonel was Frederick A. Bartleson, who was widely known as the first volunteer in Will County when he enlisted shortly after Fort Sumter in the 20th Illinois Infantry. By the time of the mustering in of the 100th, Bartleson was a veteran officer and had lost an arm at the Battle of Shiloh, April 6, 1862.

On September 6, 1862, the Regiment moved via Springfield to Louisville, Kentucky, where it was placed in the First Brigade, Second Division of the Army of Kentucky. The regiment’s arrival coincided with the Confederate invasion of Kentucky by the Army of Tennessee under General Braxton Bragg.

On October 1, the Regiment was transferred to the Fifteenth Brigade, Sixth Division, the Army of the Ohio,. The Regiment participated in the Perryville campaign as the Army of the Ohio under Major General Don Carlos Buell pursued Confederate forces. The movement culminated in the battle of Perryville, October 8, 1862, however, the 100th Illinois was not engaged in this action.

The Regiment marched in pursuit of Bragg to Wild Cat, Kentucky, and moved via Columbia and Scottsville, Kentucky, and Gallatin, Tennessee, to Nashville, where it arrived November 26, 1862.

Perryville was a costly engagement given that only parts of both armies were engaged. Buell was actually unaware that battle was being fought until it was over. While considered a victory, Buell was relieved of command for his lackluster handling of the aftermath of Perryville. In his place, the War Department sent General William S. Rosecrans, recently the victor at the Battle of Iuka, to Nashville.

Rosecrans spent several months reorganizing and re-supplying the Army of the Cumberland. On December 26, 1862, Rosecrans began moving his army out of Nashville toward the Confederate forces thought to be in the vicinity of Mufreesboro. The 100th Illinois, part of Thomas L. Crittenden’s left wing, was order to move down the Nashville Pike towards Murfreesboro. The day was cold and rainy and progress was slow as advanced forces stopped to shell possible hiding places for rebel skirmishers. The 100th camped that night without fires or tents.

There was Confederate cavalry and infantry in LaVergne, Tennessee and on the 27th, the 100th along with the rest of Hascall’s Brigade was ordered to push to LaVergne and to Stewart’s Creek and secure the bridge over it. The 100th was placed on the left flank behind the 26th Ohio Infantry as it advanced. The brigade had to cross an open field which was covered by Confederate infantry well concealed in and around the town’s buildings and fences. A famous diarist, Sam Watkins, of the 1st Tennessee Infantry describes the action: “I remember they had to cross an open field in our front, and we were lying behind a fence and as they advanced, we kept up firing and would run them back every time, until they brought up four regiments that whooped, and charged our skirmish line, and then we fell back again.” The brigade continued to push the Confederates back through the town and beyond, advancing about a mile and a half beyond the town.

During the day’s skirmishing, the brigade’s casualties were light, totally 27 wounded, all in the two front line regiments the 26th Ohio and 58th Indiana. These occurred during the charge that drove the Confederates from the town.

At this point, General Hascall moved the 100th Illinois to the front of the advance as it pushed to Stewart’s Creek.

To be continued…

The Battle of Chickamauga (Part 1-September 19, 1863)

from The Campfire Courier, The Journal of Company C, 100th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, December 1999

The 100th Illinois had moved at a position along Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon's Mill on September 11th. Skirmishing had broken out that day as Harker's brigade had scattered rebel forces trying to destroy the mill. The ground they occupied had been the campsite of General Polk's command the night before. The soldiers could see campfires of the enemy on the other side of the creek. No serious action took place for the following week except for occasional picket. Crittendon’s entire corps began to move into the position as General Rosecrans worked quickly to try and consolidate his widely scattered army. The 100th I1linois Regiment along with the rest of Buell’s and Harker's brigades of General Thomas Wood's division, remained camped at the mill as the two armies came closer to one another on the eve of battle. Wood's other brigade, under Wagner’s command, had remained back at Chattanooga.

On September 18th, 1863 a brigade of Confederates approached on the other side of the creek around noon. Federal artillery drove them back into woods. The movement had been designed by General Bragg as a feint. Bragg's army managed to capture crossing points at Reed and Alexander bridges, but stubborn resistance from Wilder and Minty`s brigades delayed Bragg from making any other gains that day as he prepared to assault Rosecrans the following morning. The defensive stands by Minty and Wilder allowed Rosecrans the time necessary to consolidate most of his army to meet the rebel threat.

The battle began the following morning as General Bragg sent troops out to work their way around the Federal left. His plan was to launch his primary attack against the Federals at Lee and Gordon's Mill. The plan went astray when Rosecrans had the cows of General George Thomas conduct a night march on the 18th to extend the Federal line on the left. As forces under General Nathan Bedford Forrest tried to work their way around the Federal left they unexpectedly ended up encountering infantry units of Thomas. The fighting began around Jay's Mill at about 8:30 A.M. Bragg was forced to send reinforcements from his center to his right. Rosecrans would end up responding in kind. As a result, the fighting became heavy on the Federal left and eventually began to work its way down the line. Bragg abandoned the idea of concentrating his main attack against Lee and Gordon’s Mills and continued to feed in reinforcements in a piece meal fashion, as did Rosecrans. The terrain was heavily wooded and did not allow for large battlefield movements. As a result, several smal1er contests erupted up and down the line with brigade against brigade, and in some cases a coup1e of regiments opposing a similar force. Confusion prevailed as the terrain made it difficult to maintain formations.

As the battle heated up the soldiers oft he 100th Illinois remained steadfast in their confidence. Captain Harlow Goddard, of Company H, in a letter home to his wife states:

“The rebs lost their chance when they allowed us to advance and choose our position. We feel confident of gaining a complete victor...”

Buell's brigade remained at Lee and Gordon's Mill until 3 p.m., when General Wood was ordered to move the division to the Viniard field to reinforce the division of Jeff C. Davis. Davis was being hard-pressed by the Confederates and needed help to stave off their advance. Buell's brigade marched up the Lafayette Road to the field and formed behind the batteries of the 8th Indiana and the 6th Ohio. The brigade began to advance in 2 lines with the 100th Illinois and the 26th Ohio in front. Another large force of Federals (Carlin`s brigade) were engaged to their front. As the brigade began their advance the Federals in their front broke and began to flee. The routed soldiers passed through the ranks of Buell’s brigade causing confusion and chaos. A retreating union battery passed through the ranks of the 100th Illinois running over one man (Joshua Bush, of Co. G) and injuring several other members of the regiment. The panic and confusion caused Buell’s brigade to break as the Confederates pressed on. The brigade was now compelled to fall back after beginning their advance only a few minutes earlier. As the other regiments fell back, the 100th Illinois held their position for about five minutes and engaged the Confederates in a desperate contest before they were compelled to finally fall back. In this short engagement, the regiment suffered the majority of their casualties during the battle. Among them was Corporal Charles P. Spencer, of Company E, who was regarded as one the best soldiers in the regiment. He had stepped out a little in front of the line, and falling upon one knee was firing rapidly, when he was struck with a ball in the forehead and killed instantly. The extra time the regiment bought allowed for the 8th Indiana to remove their cannons before they fell into the hands of the enemy.

The men fell back and crossed another narrow, open field where they suffered considerable loss. The Federals halted and reformed at the edge of the woods where Wilder's brigade assisted them. An aide of General Wood rode by and gave the order for a counterattack. Colonel Bartleson had the regiment fix bayonets and they began to advance with the other Union troops. The rebels were pushed back across the field and into the woods where they rallied and opened up with a short and murderous fire. They began to advance again as the regiment to the left of the 100th Illinois fell back. The regiment held their ground until the regiment to their right gave way, and they began to endure fire on both flanks. The Federals fell back again to Wilder's position where they were once again rallied and the Confederate advance was thwarted. Each inch of ground was contested until nightfall as each advance was met by a counterattack. The 8th Indiana ended up losing their cannons during one of the rebel advances. During one of the union counterattacks Major Charles Hammond led a group of volunteers from the regiment that rescued 3 cannons that had been temporarily captured and hauled them away by hand.

Colonel Buell gives the following account of his brigade's actions at the Viniard field in his official report after the battle:

“...After marching about 2 miles 1 was directed by General Wood to form my command fronting to the east and parallel to the road. My brigade was formed in my lines. The front line east of and the rear line on the west side of the road, with a distance of about 75 yards between the two; the eighth Indiana battery in the front line, with the 26th Ohio, commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel Young on the left, and the One hundredth Illinois Regiment, Col. F. A. Bartleson on the right. The rear line was composed of the fifty-eighth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Embree, on the right, and the Thirteenth Michigan, Colonel Culver on the left.

With my command formed thus, the Twenty-sixth Ohio and a part of the battery were in heavy timber, while the other regiments and remainder of the battery were in open ground. Just in front the One hundredth Illinois was another battery already engaged with the enemy. (2d Minnesota – Editor)

While my troops were being formed the enemy’s balls were whistling about our ears, and the battles raging most fiercely, seemed approaching nearer, although I had been informed several times by staff officers that we were driving the enemy, and that our force was only needed to finish the rout. I was not yet informed as to the positions of troops around me whether we had troops in front and on my left flank. The formation of my command was not yet complete, when everything on my immediate front and left gave way, and hundreds of our own men ran through my ranks calling “Fall back! Fall back!'' as they themselves were in shameful rout toward the rear. My command was cautioned particularly to lie down, hold fire, and countercharge the enemy. Immediately following the mass of panic-stricken men of our own army and parts of two batteries (all of which passed through and over my men) came the enemy in a heavy force on my front and left flank. Knowing my front regiments could not long withstand such a shock, I ordered a charge bayonet with my rear regiments. The attempt was manfully made. They met hundreds of our own men on a fence in front of them; they met artillery and caissons, besides the enemy's fire, so that it was impossible to keep any kind of a line, but not withstanding such obstructions, they gained some distance to the front. At this period my brave men, both front and rear lines, strove desperately to hold their ground. The Twenty-sixth Ohio and One hundredth Illinois, being in front, had already lost nearly one-half. Just here the slaughter was completed; the Fifty-eighth Indiana and Thirteenth Michigan men fell by scores. Colonel Culver, Thirteenth Michigan, stunned by a shell; Lieutenant-Colonel Waterman, of the One hundredth Illinois, fell wounded ; Captain Ewing, acting major of the Twenty-sixth Ohio, fell wounded ; Captains Davis and Bruce, Fifty-eighth Indiana, Captains Fox and Hosmer, Thirteenth Michigan, Captain Ross, Lieutenants Burbridge and Willaims. Twenty- sixth Ohio all fell pierced by bullets. Overpowered on both front and flank, my men faltered and finally fell back about 200 yards across a field in our rear. Here my men were rallied, and again they charged forward, retook the ground, and also 3 pieces of artillery that were lost in the first part of the action. Again the enemy came forward like an avalanche, and forced my men back a short distance; again my men rallied, and retook the same position they had formerly held. The enemy came forward a third time, but were effectually repulsed, and the sun went down with my command holding the field a short distance in advance of its original position. My command had been engaged since about 3 o’clock and had lost most heavily. During the whole of these three hours fighting, the Eighth Indiana battery, Captain Estep, had done fine execution, and had suffered severely, the captain himself slightly wounded in the neck and arm. The wounded of my brigade were all gotten off the field by 10 P.M. Over 100 wounded men were taken out of a ditch in the field where we had fought.”

General Wood gives the following account of the action from his official report:

“Seeing no other reserve at hand, and assured that both Harker and Carlin were seriously engaged, I determined to hold Buell’s brigade in hand to meet emergencies. And it was fortunate I did so, for ere long Carlin’s brigade was swept back out of the woods, across the cornfield, and into the woods beyond the field, on the western side of the road, carrying everything away with it. When I observed the rush across the cornfield, I was near the 100 Ill. With a view of checking the advancing and exultant enemy, I ordered Col. Bartleson, commanding the 100th Ill., to fix bayonets and charge on the foe. The bayonets were promptly fixed, and the regiment had just commenced to advance when it was struck by a crowd of fugitives, and swept away in the general melee. The whole of Buell’s brigade was thus carried off its feet. It was necessary that it should fall back across the narrow field on the western side of the road to the edge of the wood under whose cover it rallied. As soon as possible it was formed along the fence, separating the field from the woods, and with the aid of a part of Carlin’s brigade, and a regiment of Wilder’s brigade, dismounted, repulsed the enemy…So soon as the enemy was repulsed, I addressed myself to reforming Buell’s brigade, for the purpose of advancing it to recover the lost ground. Order being restored and a sufficiently solid formation acquired to warrant an advance, I led the brigade back in person, and reoccupied the ground from which it had been forced — the site on which it had been originally formed. In this advance my horse was twice shot, the second time proving fatal. I dismounted one of my orderlies near me and took his horse. In this advance a portion of Carlin’s brigade participated, led by General Carlin. Estep’s battery, attached to Buell’s brigade, accompanied the advance. Scarcely had the lost ground been repossessed than the enemy emerged from the woods on the eastern side of the corn-field, and commenced to cross it. He was formed in two lines, and advanced firing. The appearance of his force was large. Fortunately re-enforcements were at hand. A compact brigade of General Sheridan’s division, not hitherto engaged, was at the moment crossing the field in the rear of the position then occupied by Buell’s brigade and the portion of Carlin’s. This fresh brigade advanced handsomely into action, and joining its fire to that of the other troops, most materially aided in repelling a most dangerous attack. But this was not done until considerable loss had been inflicted on us. The enemy advanced near enough to cut down so many horses in Estep’s battery that he could not bring off his guns; but as our infantry held its ground, they did not fall into the hands of the enemy…”

Major Charles Hammond of the 100th Illinois gives the following account of the regiment’s activities for the 19th as follows:

“Sir: I have the honor to report that on the 19th of September, at about 3 p.m., this regiment (Col. F. A. Bartleson, commanding) lay in position on the right of the Third Brigade (Wood’s division), which was protecting the ford at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. Orders were received to move at once in the direction of Chattanooga on the Chattanooga and La Fayette road. As a part of the First Brigade, this regiment in the advance, it proceeded rapidly about 2 miles and formed in line of battle on the right of the road, a battery of Davis’ division, and the Twenty-sixth Ohio Volunteers, on our right and left, respectively, to support the right of Davis’ division, which was being heavily pressed and giving way. But a few moments intervened for our front to be cleared of our own troops, when the order to advance and charge was given and promptly complied with, under a heavy fire of musketry, and with a loss of nearly 100 men in killed and wounded, including Lieutenant-Colonel Waterman, who was severely wounded in the right arm. On the order to retreat being given, the regiment fell back and made a stand, first behind a breastwork of rails on the left of the road, and afterward advanced to the right of the road, driving the enemy before us, making a stand which was maintained until relieved by troops of Sheridan’s division, when we again retired to the rear of the breastworks and lay down on our arms for the night.”

There was one amusing incident of note that occurred within the regiment during the course of their fight. Captain Rodney Bowen was a reader in the Episcopal Church, a lay reader. He was known in the regiment as a real good, Christian gentleman. During the afternoon struggle at the Viniard field, Captain Bowen had been heard giving expression to some words that are not considered strictly in accordance with the usages of gentility. The soldiers were lying down behind the rail pile shortly after dark when Colonel Bartleson walked up to Bowen. “Captain, seems to me I heard you saying things that you hadn’t ought to say, this afternoon,” said the colonel. “Yes, but there are times when a man can’t say anything else!” replied the captain. Captain Goddard continued writing his letter adding the following entry:

“...There is something grand and glorious that sends a thrill through one’s frame as they sit as I do and hear the roll of musketry and roar of artillery. How exciting. You lose all sense of danger, yet how many poor fellows are bidding a last farewell to earthly joys and sorrows and how many loved homes are being made desolate...”