Philosophy is very broadly defined as the "love of wisdom" (love meaning an affection toward something of great value; and, wisdom meaning the possession of good judgment). I infer this to mean that philosophy is an appraisal of moral judgment (judgments of the kind that either describe or prescribe something as "good" or "bad"), disclosing knowledge of good and bad moral judgments. The quality of knowledge involved in making moral judgments, however, has always been controversial, and largely as a consequence of those judgments. Judgments that describe something as "good" or "bad" (e.g., "that food is bad") are distinct from judgments that prescribe some action as being "good" or "bad" (e.g., "you should not eat bad food," or simply "it is bad judgment to eat bad food"). The description (e.g., the subject of what "is") is practically the same as claiming knowledge, as in a statement of belief. The prescription (e.g., "should" or "should not"), however, may or may not lack such descriptive ascent to belief. Knowledge of a thing does not easilly transpire toward judgment, unless some manner of guidance has been engaged. Historically, we have always relied upon some form of authority to ensure that the manner of guidance is consistent with our moral knowledge. Nevertheless, as stated above, the quality of knowledge involved in making moral judgments has always been controversial, and largely as a consequence of those judgments.

This website, titled "Autonomous Philosophy," consists of material oriented toward an adult audience of English speaking readers (which is more a matter of circumstance than a deliberate choice, since adults are generally expected to reason autonomously, though to an extent of their choosing and self control; and, I do not so fluently think or speak in any other language). For the most part, I am simply trying to organize my philosophical outlook, here, or simply my philosophy

Communication (that is to say, any communication), especially the reciprocating or "interactive" sort (if there are really any other alternatives), requires rationality on the part of any relevant participant (which typically requires the application of rules that a relevant language depends upon for its usefulness, i.e., the meaningful equivalent of correctness). But, as we learn from so many attempts in life, to communicate any precise knowledge requires more than pragmatic analogies and whatever rhetorical introduction attracts our attention to it. Language usage can not abandon rationality as the source of its usefulness. But logical analysis and rhetorical interpretation are quite often incompatible toward obtaining knowledge solely from communication. Hence, reasoning has been thought to be inferior to sensible experience, even though reasoning is required to actually make a case for that experience. 

So, we try to simplify ourselves by simplifying how we communicate, as well as to simplify how we think and, subsequently, to simplify how we interact. Ultimately, in the beginning of any history of intellect, some sort of organized commitment to communicate correctly is inherent at the very onset of conveying information (e.g., pictographs, symbols, sign language, etc.). But it must have been a terribly experimental task, unless such intellect possessed the intuition to recognize such signals as information. Similarly, in a world now composed of thousands of years in intellectual history, the information we give, receive, and use, requires us to learn the language. We begin to differentiate between various sorts of information (e.g., colors, sounds, tastes, feelings, and so on). We begin to realize there is something veryy valuable in the knowledge of such information and, eventually, that value preponderates a usefulness making the communication of such information to be a habit forming virtue of intellectual skill. We try to inculcate that skill in our younger, lesser experienced poppulation. How we do so without incuring dangers of poor usage becomes an even greater preponderance of our morality. 

We make a case, no matter how naive or ignorant, for what we believe to be the truth about something, and in the very least for the sake of claiming such a belief to be exemplifying in part or wholly what we know. In the course of human history, such positive "case making," so to speak (or simply, stating our beliefs with reasons for accepting those beliefs; true belief being qualified as knowledge), has always been confronted with some sort of skepticism (the negation, or rejection, of those beliefs). We say that such stated beliefs are "positive" because they posit (or assert) reasons for accepting them, and "negative" when they negate (or deny) reasons for accepting those beliefs. I regard these qualities (positive and negative) of "case making" as aesthetic qualities of communication, since these qualities either attract or repel our attention to the actual informative labor of communication. Subsequently, the aesthetics leads intuitively to moral judgments, but unfortunately  with or without commensurate reasoning (the likes of which ordinary language betrays for the sake of overly simplifying the task of performing correct reasoning). Many students of philosophy as well as professionals in the business of philosophy would identify these qualities (positive and negative) as truth values (true or false) associated with the symbols "+" and "-" respectively. Nevertheless, the aesthetics of communication confronted by skepticism innures participants to more rigor of argument than such participants are ever willing to endure and I believe that is the fault of oversimplified communication (e.g., fallacies, or incorrect reasoning). 

While there may be some ambiguity in the text, here, at this website, especially where rhetorical statements are made (this being presumed to be obvious), such ambiguity can easilly be removed by performing logical analysis (e.g., eliminating unnecessary words where a valid conclusion is possible in their absence; or, checking other relevant statements, especially for emphasis; validity being the only preponderance of rationality). While such logical analysis is a naturally difficult task, best performed by the author if and only if  such problems of rhetorical interpretation are known, it is not impossible. It is not possible for an author using rhetoric to anticipate all possible consequences of logical analysis. This does not mean, however, that the failure of logical analysis corresponds to meaninglessness or that no objective moral judgment is possible. I make my conclusions obvious, hopefully with sufficient reasons to avoid any problem of interpretation. Correct reasoning is universally correct. Some of the beliefs advanced in the attempt to reason with false premisess and false conclusions is not necessarilly within the realm of universal human rationality, but rather particular human subjectivity (which should be recognized as a naturally objective condition of communication between autonomous minds). As such, autonomous philosophy describes nearly all philosophy to be a fundamentally autonomous activity. The only non-autonomous function of universal rationality would be the acknowledged objectivity of universal correctness, something impossible to people who either wholly fail to transliterate language or fail to reason correctly. 
 
 

 ...to be continued.
Website Information

 
Author and composer of this site: Peter C. Rugh (pcrugh.geo@justice.com)
The address of this site: "www.geocities.com\pcrugh.geo\index.html"
The address of this page: "www.geocities.com\pcrugh.geo\index.html"
Date of publication: October 3rd, 2006
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