In other words, although most Dead Sea Scrolls researchers would, most probably, reject as preposterous (as well as disproven) the suggestion that there is an explanation of the "resurrection of the dead" other than as the doctrine of a physical resurrection from the grave (and the Ptolemaists responded similarly to the Copernicans)--and would categorically deny that any such explanation, even if it existed, would have any serious implications upon Dead Sea Scrolls research in general--the precise context in which to interpret the oblique and cryptic references to the "resurrection of the dead" in the Dead Sea Scrolls is not immediately obvious. And the argument being presented here is that these passages cannot be understood accurately at all unless it is first understood that there was, at one time, an alternate (and, by the way, a much more intellectually challenging) understanding of the "resurrection of the dead"--an understanding which had to be rejected and suppressed (and whose followers had to be exterminated; as were many hundreds of the original followers of Jesus, as well as tens of thousands of Albigensians several hundred years later) because it threatened the power of the religious officials and the very existence of the Jewish and Christian religious establishments themselves.

Thus, before there is a consideration of the metaphorical and cryptic references to the Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" in the Dead Sea Scrolls, there will be, first, an examination of the philosophical elements of this Revelation and Doctrine in the Nag Hammadi Codices; and, secondly, an examination of the statements of Jesus and other references in the Gospels to the Revelation and Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead".

In a larger context, however, it should be understood that the Prophets, Daniel, the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Gospels and the Nag Hammadi Codices represent the progression of an explanation of the Revelation and Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" from the metaphorical and cryptic language of Isaiah, Daniel and Ezekiel, to the public--but, nevertheless, 'veiled'--statements of Jesus in the Gospels, to their more philosophical elucidation in the Nag Hammadi Codices. And the determined opposition to, and misinterpretation of the Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" by the Jewish and Christian religious establishments necesssitated not only the hiding of both the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Nag Hammadi Codices; but, even more importantly, the arrival of the prophet Mohammed hundreds of years later to affirm, once again, the Truth about the "resurrection of the dead" (as had been Prophesied by Jesus in Matthew 17:11)--although, following in the footsteps of the Jewish and Christian religious establishments, that Truth is also now officially rejected by the Muslim religious establishment as well.

(I would point out, by the way, that this entire approach to undersanding the metaphors and symbols of the Dead Sea Scrolls would be sharply ridiculed by most Dead Sea Scrolls researchers as not being worthy of serious consideration. Rather, they would insist that these metaphors are simply 'poetry' with no deeper meaning--as was also said of the Koran--having no Doctrinal relationship whatsoever to either the Nag Hammadi Codices or the writings of either the Jewish or the Islamic mystics.)

In his introduction to "The Nag Hammadi Library in English" (Harper & Row, New York, 1977), James Robinson explains, as follows, the origin of the conflict between the writers of the Nag Hammadi Codices --whom he refers to as "Gnostics"--and the early Christian religious establishment:

"Those who collected this library were Christians, and many of the essays were originally composed by Christian authors. In a sense this should not be surprising, since primitive Christianity itself was a radical movement. Jesus called for a full reversal of values, announcing the end of the world as we have known it and its replacement by a quite new, utopian kind of life in which the ideal would be the real. He took a stand quite independent of the authorities of his day...and did not last very long before they eliminated him. Through a remarkable experience of his vindication, his followers reaffirmed his stand--for them he came to personify the ultimate goal. Yet some of his circle, being a bit more practical, followed a more conventional way of life. The circle gradually became an established organization with a quite natural concern to maintain order, continuity, lines of authority, and stability. But this concern could encourage a commitment to the status quo, rivalling, and at times outweighing, the commitment to the ultimate goal far beyond any and every attained achievement. Those who cherished the radical dream, the ultimate hope, would tend to throw it up as an invidious comparison to what was achieved, and thus seem to be disloyal, and to pose a serious threat to the organization." (pg.3)

"Christian Gnosticism emerged as a reaffirmation, though in somewhat different terms, of the original stance of transcendence central to the very beginnings of Christianity. Such Gnostic Christians surely considered themselves the faithful continuation, under changing circumstances, of that original stance which made Christians Christian. But the 'somewhat different terms' and 'under changing circumstances' also involved real divergences, and other Christians surely considered Gnosticism a betrayal of the original Christian position. This was the conviction not just of those who had accommodated themselves to the status quo, but no doubt also some of those who retained the full force of the original protest and ultimate hope. But as Christianity became organized and normalized, this divergence between the new radicals and those who retained the more traditional Christian language became intolerable"...(pg. 4)

And, in a very short passage, James Robinson places his finger on the precise doctrinal reason for this divergence between the "Gnostics" and the official Christian religious establishment--a divergence which continues to this day: a sharp disagreement over the understanding of the "resurrection of the dead":

"Gnostics came to be excluded from the Church as heretics. In the New Testament two such Gnostic Christians are repudiated at the beginning of the Second Century (2 Timothy 2:16-18):

'Avoid empty and worldly chatter, those who indulge in it will stray further and further into godless courses, and the infection of their teaching will spread like a gangrene. Such are Hymenaeus and Philetus; they have shot wide of the truth in saying that our resurrection has already taken place, and are upsetting people's faith.' (pg.4)

"This view, that the Christian's resurrection has already taken place as a spiritual reality, is advocated in the "Treatise on the Resurrection", the "Exegesis on the Soul" and the "Gospel of Philip" in the Nag Hammadi Library! [Punctuation in the original.] (pg. 5)

Thus, in sharp contrast and contradiction to the view that the "resurrection of the dead" is strictly a 'fleshly resurrection'--that is, refers exclusively to the future resurrection of a physical body from the grave (a position taken, obviously, by Paul, the Pharisee); Robinson asserts that the "Gnostics" interpreted this term as not only having "already taken place"--at least for a select few--but as also having, instead, a spiritual reality.

But what, precisely, was it that had "already taken place" for the "Gnostics" if not for the followers of institutional Christianity? What could this spiritual reality possibly have been other than a Revelation from God?

And the hypothesis that this "spiritual reality" included both the Revelation of the Memory of the Creation and the revelation of the memories of previous lives--an hypothesis which, obviously, does not have as its origin the human intellect--is supported by a close and detailed reading of the "Treatise on the Resurrection", the "Exegesis on the Soul" and the "Gospel of Philip":

1) The "Treatise on the Resurrection" (pgs. 50-53 of "The Nag Hammadi Library in English") should be read in its entirety, first of all, in order to appreciate fully the concepts that are being discussed. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, there are a number of passages in this document which can reasonably be understood only as pertaining quite clearly to some of the philosophical implications of the receiving of the Revelation of the Memory of the Creation and the revelation of the memories of previous lives--the importance of which is officially denied, ridiculed, and scoffed at (not for merely economic--but, also, for psychological reasons) by the officials of the monotheistic religious establishment.

Almost as if echoing the discussions in some of the esoteric writings of the Eastern religions such as Buddhism, for example--and in language which is both completely unfamiliar as well as utterly beyond the considerations of normative Judaism and Christianity --one of the recurring themes of the "Treatise on the Resurrection" is the conflict between reality (Knowledge or Truth) and illusion; which is expressed in the following statements:

"...do not think that the resurrection is an illusion. It is truth. Indeed, it is more fitting to say that the world is an illusion, rather than the resurrection which has come into being through our Lord, the Savior, Jesus Christ." (pgs. 52-53)

"But what am I telling you now? Those who are living shall die. How do they live in an illusion? The rich have become poor, and the kings have been overthrown. Everything is prone to change. The world is an illusion!--lest, indeed, I rail at things to excess!" (pg.53, punctuation in the original)

Now, the principal reason why statements such as this simply cannot be understood from within the current interpretive paradigm of Jewish and Christian theology is that they do not merely express a philosophical disagreement; but, in fact, originate from a particular Revelational experience--the Revelation of the Memory of Creation and the revelation of the memories of previous lives; and express some of the philosophical implications of that "spiritual reality".In other words, the denial by the official Jewish, Christian and Muslim religious establishments of even the possibility that a person can receive a revelation of the memories of previous lives (or, for that matter, a Revelation of the Memory of the Creation) is so categorical, so determined, so relentless, that any serious discussion of the philosophical implications of such a Revelational experience is instantly and reflexively rejected out of hand as being of no more use that a discussion with a lunatic about the philosophical implications of, for example, the existence of unicorns.

Yet, for those who had (and have) received such a Revelation--these were (and are) quite serious matters. And, in fulfillment of the Prophecy of Daniel that 'these words will remain secret and sealed until the time of the End', the Truths which have been 'sealed' in the Nag Hammadi Codices simply cannot be unsealed unless it is first understood that this Revelational experience is at the very foundation of many of the statements in not only the Nag Hammadi Codices, but also the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Gospels.

The reason why the "Treatise on the Resurrection" defines the world as an illusion is not the result of any philosophical a prioris; but, instead, a consequence of the Revelation of the "resurrection of the dead" Itself. That is, a person who receives the Revelation of the "resurrection of the dead" is, among other reactions, struck by the fact that, prior to this Revelation, the world of sense experience was considered to be the only reality. That is, the world of sensation and perception--and the emotions, thoughts and memories which derive from those sensations and perceptions--completely encompasses the normal human personality's definition of reality. But, once a person has received the Revelation of the Memory of Creation--once a person directly experiences that he or she has lived previous lives (this is neither an illusion nor psychosis); consisting of multitudes upon multitudes of sense experiences, perceptions, emotions, thoughts and memories of which that person is now no longer aware--that person's definition of reality is, in fact, turned upside down. What then becomes most real is not the physical world which is perceived through sensation and perception--nor the emotions and thoughts which emerge as a consequence of those sensations and perceptions--but, rather, that the human personal identity was specifically Created by God, and will continue to live life after life after life through the "resurrection of the dead" (cf. the "Thanksgiving Hymns" of the Dead Sea Scrolls.)

In addition to presenting a discussion of the quite fundamental change in the perception of Truth and illusion which occurs with the Revelation of the "resurrection of the dead", however, there are also a number of more philosophical statements in the "Treatise on the Resurrection" explaining some of the more abstruse implications of the "resurrection of the dead" as well as Its relationship to the metaphysical doctrine of 'reincarnation'. And chief among these statements are the following:

"There is one who believes among the philosophers who are in this world. At least he will arise." (pg. 51-52)

And the explanation of this and the following passages (see below) demonstrates the relationship of the Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" to not only the metaphysical doctrine of 'reincarnation', but also the Buddhist Doctrine of Rebirth:

The 'philosopher which is in this world' is Plato, who held to the doctrine of 'reincarnation'--a doctrine which (like the doctrine of a metaphysical 'heaven' and 'hell') is based upon the belief in an eternally-existent metaphysical 'soul' (which is either successively 'reincarnated' into a series of physical bodies or goes to 'heaven' or 'hell' after death). That is, the metaphysical doctrine of 'reincarnation' is based upon the belief in a doctrine which, it must be remembered and emphasized is not to be found in either the Torah, the Prophets, the Gospels or the Koran. But, to demonstrate that the Doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" is not precisely equivalent to the doctrine adhered to by the 'philosopher in the world', this oblique reference to Plato is immediately followed by statements which, to the ears of the Christian interpreters of the Nag Hammadi Codices, must be completely unintelligible:

"And let not the philosopher who is in this world have cause to believe that he is one who returns himself by himself-- and that because of our faith!" (pgs. 51-52) (Italics added)