There are three main sources from which the Battle of Kadesh can be reconstructed. Egyptian reliefs from temples of Ramesses II, especially from the Ramessium, illustrate many aspects of the battle from Egypt's point of view. There are few Hittite records that provide accurate information, but they are not as extensive as the Egyptian records. Finally, there is an epic inscription (referred to as a the “Poem,” though it contains neither meter nor rhyme scheme), written by an unknown talented Egyptian scribe, that recorded most of the events that took place in the Battle of Kadesh. The author of the Poem greatly exaggerates the power of Ramesses, and the position of Egypt when the battle is over.
Ramesses II led the four divisions up through Gaza, Canaan, Galilee, and up to the township of Kumidi, the administrative center for their allies from Upi (Kitchen 52). They then marched up through the woods of Labwi to reach the ford across the Orontes River near Shabtuna. Here, on the heights above the city of Kadesh, the Amun and Re corps made camp. The inhabitants of the city of Kadesh had cut a channel from the river to a stream south of town, which had turned the town into a virtual island. It was quite possible that Ramesses did not know the whereabouts of Muwatallish’s force, as is claimed in the Egyptian sources. However, Ramesses did choose an excellent defensive position, possibly anticipating that there would be a conflict very soon. That night, Egyptian soldiers captured two Shoshu tribesmen lurking close to the camp. They told Ramesses that they were deserters of the Hittite army, and that a frightened Muwatallish had retreated to the north near Aleppo. Ramesses, flattered and deceived, proceeded to divide his forces. He immediately took the Amun Corps, constituting only one quarter of his army, across the Orontes River ahead of the main body to capture the city before Muwatallish's forces could arrive to stop them. The Re Corps followed at a significant distance, thought to be about a mile and a half, while the Sutekh and Ptah Corps remained on the southern bank of the Orontes (Ceram 173). This took a significant amount of time, and the Amun Division only made it to the western side of Kadesh by nightfall.
On the west face of a pylon in the Ramesseum in Thebes, many reliefs depict the battle. First, there is a representation of the Egyptian Amun camp on the Orontes River. Unmanned chariots are lined up, soldiers tend to the horses, and archers string their bows. The entire Hittite army was camped across the river. The deserters were actually spies. Muwatallish was now mobilizing forces near the thick vegetation around Kadesh. When scouts returned with Hittite prisoner, they revealed the position of the entire Hittite force, right across the river. That night, aware of the impending danger that he was now in, Ramesses dispatched soldiers to bring the Ptah and Re Corps to his aid.
The next morning, Muwatallish did not waste any time and sent a chariot force across the river on the eastern side of Kadesh. The Re Division had just crossed the river and was hastening toward the Amun camp to aid the Pharaoh. Muwatallish probably anticipated this meeting, but not its great success. The Re Division was ambushed, and panicked. "They attacked the army of Re in its center while it was marching unsuspecting and not ready for battle," the poem goes (Poem 120-130). As the remaining warriors and chariots of the broken Egyptian force scurried to the encampment of the Amun Corps, the Hittite chariotry took advantage of the situation and followed them. Now, as the remnants of the panicked Re Corps created confusion in the camp, Muwatallish sent another 1,000 chariots to reinforce the pursuers, who then put into use the tactic of swift encirclement. Hittites surrounded the encampment on all sides, then closed in.
The actual number of this Hittie chariotry force is debated. The Poem and other Egyptian accounts cite that the initial attack consisted of 2,500 chariots. If that were so, the battle might have been over immediately; but instead the Re Division was simply broken up. Also, it is said that Muwatallish dispatched 1,000 more chariots at a later point in the battle. This leads one to believe that the actual force may have consisted of 1,500 or less. Whatever the numbers, this unit of Hittite chariotry, consisting of men from Arzawa, Masa, and Pidasa, now had a significant tactical advantage. Not only did they use panic-stricken people as living weapons, just as Germany did in small villages in World War II, but they also cut off the commander and two divisions from the rest of the armies. While the Ptah Division was marching north, unaware of the disaster, the Hittites were in a position to destroy each division of the Egyptian army one by one. An Egyptian relief shows this attack on the Amun camp. Fallen horses and injured or dead Egyptian soldiers adorn the relief. Pharaoh's tent is in the center as Hittites, depicted in long kilts and helmets, are going through and killing the ranks on one side of the camp. “. . . whereas there was no high officer with me, no charioteer, no soldier of the army, no shield-bearer, my infantry and my chariotry scampering away before them, and not one of them stood firm to fight with them” (Poem 85 – 90). The Egyptian army under Ramesses II was surely about to be annihilated, but luck takes a part in any battle.
The Hittite soldiers fought without pay to fulfill a feudal obligation or to get rich from the spoils of war (Macqueen 59). The only payment they received was whatever they were able to plunder in battle, and sometimes this was a great incentive to fight. It seems that Hittite soldiers in the assault were lured to riches inside the tents and on the dead, and initiative was lost. In their greedy rampage, they missed a chance to capture or kill Ramesses II, his family, and the highest-ranking nobles of Egypt. They could have also destroyed all the unmanned chariots and other equipment in the camp to prevent a counter-attack.
Remaining Egyptian soldiers, now more scattered and unorganized than before, were able to detain the looters until reinforcements could arrive. Suddenly, reinforcements came from the east in the form of a single regiment. The Egyptians were now able to overcome the surprised Hittite plunderers (Ceram 176). "Ramesses the Great" owes his life to them. There is dispute on exactly who these saviors were, because there is only one mention of them made in Egyptian records. Some people believe this force to have originated in Amurru, which Ramesses had previously conquered and fostered support (Kitchen 60). Others believe them to be Canaanites or even the Set Division, which should have been far to the south at this point. The poet that recorded the battle attributed the king's counter-attack to divine intervention. Gathering whatever chariots and men he could, Ramesses and his bodyguards charged through the Hittite force. The poet describes Ramesses as he "drove rapidly forward, thrusting into the enemy army of the Hatti; he was all alone and no man was with him" (Poem 150). The Report, a shorter account of the battle included on reliefs, goes on to describe a very exciting work of fiction:
Then he mounted upon “Victory in Thebes,” his horse,
and he started forth quickly alone by himself,
His Majesty being powerful, his heart stout,
and none could stand before him (Report 86 – 91).
He drives them into the river where they drown in the swift currents. The intense action and heroism involved here has only a loose basis on reality. It is plausible to assume that Ramesses had actually hit his first tactical move. He attacked the Hittite front along the river where it was the weakest, penetrating the encirclement and securing his back. Many scholars recognize this as a counter-attack, but it was actually an escape. The reliefs on the Ramessium show Ramesses alone in his chariot firing arrows at the Hittites. Soldiers and horses lay dead at the feet of the larger-than-life pharaoh.
What is still mystery is what Muwatallish was thinking when he did not send his large infantry to support his ruined chariot force. If he had not failed to do this, the Hittites might have won the greatest victory of the ancient world by destroying three quarters of the powerful Egyptian army. Instead of supporting his fleeing chariot force, he held back his infantry. As night fell, Muwatallish decided to cut his losses and retreated his forces back into Kadesh from the Egyptian battlefield. Today’s fighting was over, and no great victory was accomplished, but rather a stalemate.
More fantasy follows in the Egyptian sources, that imply that Ramesses was the decisive victor at the Battle. Muwatallish apparently lays the capital of the Hittite Empire at his feet (Poem 295 - 300). Even if Ramesses had defeated the Hittites, why would they give up their entire empire after one border dispute? Furthermore, Muwattalish’s forces had not run out of steam yet; this will be discussed later.
Ramesses looked to his own armies in rage, considering their "weakness" an act of treason. Muwatallish watched as he supposedly killed his own men on the bank of the Orontes. Ramesses now knew that his goal of conquest was not going to be achieved. Ramesses received a message from the prince of Hatti as he began to retreat (Poem 300 - 330). According to the poet, Ramesses the Great, the commander endowed with godly power, having just slaughtered the Hittite army now sought diplomacy with those whom he just defeated.
Hattusilis III, supreme commander of the army camp and chariot forces of the Hittites and Muwatallish's brother, is thought to have conspired against his brother at the battle with the ruler of Amurru, under Egyptian control at the time (Ceram 187). After the battle, however, the Amurru king Benteshina, turned his allegiance to the Hittites. Perhaps dealings with Hattusilis had influenced this decision. This is also further proof that the Hittites were victorious in this battle; it is not logical that an ally of the victorious empire would change sides to the beaten.
The Hittites allowed Ramesses and his army to retreat honorably while Kadesh remained in the Hittite sphere of influence. As Ramesses led his army away, Muwatallish moved south instead of back north. He overwhelmed formerly Egyptian Kumidi, then down into Damascus, eventually to occupy all of the province of Upi. He then turned back northward, leaving his brother Hattusilis in charge of the new areas (Kitchen 63). Either Ramesses was powerless to stop these incursions or he had agreed to their delivery. Either way, for it to have come to this meant that Ramesses was not a decisive victor at the Battle of Kadesh.
