This article was downloaded by permission of the author from www

This article was downloaded by permission of the author from www.RethinkingFaith.com, where other articles on similar themes are available.

Dismantling A Gender-Bomber Manifesto¹

The Colorado Springs Guidelines for Translation of Gender-Related Language:

What Are They? Where Did They Come From? And What Do They Really Mean?

Any time a bomb goes off you can be sure those behind it will take the credit and publish a tract or manifesto to propagate their views. So it was in the latest chapter of the culture wars. On May 27, 1997, the International Bible Society (IBS) made a decision that exploded in controversy and the real culprits behind the matter went to press proclaiming their point of view.

IBS's controversial decision was to pull a complete reversal of its stance on gender-inclusive language and its plans for future editions of translations and publications. It decided to rescind its plans for the New International Version Inclusive Language Edition (NIVI) in the U.S. and to recall its inclusified NIrV. Its president, Lars Dunberg, then signed a shocking set of gender-biased translation guidelines that were touted by some as a milestone agreement but considered by others to be a millstone of disagreement around the neck of Evangelical progress.

The real perpetrators behind these guidelines were quick to claim responsibility for the explosive reversal and to announce their victory in print, first on the front page of the June 1997 CBMW News, published by the anti-egalitarian Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood. They next published a two-page advertisement in the October 27, 1997 issue of Christianity Today (pp. 14-15), which asked, "Can I Still Trust My Bible?" It listed not only the guidelines intended to guard us from "diminishing" the accuracy of our translations, but five "authorized" versions readers can trust. The ad offered a free information packet, containing CBMW brochures and a 32-page booklet, What's Wrong with Gender-Neutral Bible Translations? by CBMW President Dr. Wayne Grudem.

Included in this advertisement, however, was the admission that revisions to the May 1997 guidelines had already been necessary. Two of the original twelve signatures had also been dropped -- those of Dunberg and Bruce Ryskamp, president of Zondervan. The most significant change involved a concession that when the Greek speaks of brothers in the plural (adelphoi), it can mean both brothers and sisters and therefore may be so translated. We can only hope proponents of these guidelines will come to see that their faulty reasoning on this point was the same reasoning that continues to be behind their other restrictions against inclusive translation.

On the heels of IBS's explosive announcement, CBMW News boasted of its team's success with a headline: "NIV controversy: participants sign landmark agreement." The lead article, by CBMW president Wayne Grudem, described the steps they took to make it happen. On the cover, seven participants most closely associated with CBMW and/or most instrumental in the final decision, exhibited their beaming pride at the outcome of the Colorado Springs meeting in a group photo. But who were these "participants" and what did they participate in? The headline makes it sound like they represented the opposing views of the inclusive language issue. The opening sentence describes them as "twelve men with strongly differing views on a controversial issue." It sounds like something on the level of the SALT Accords happened here. Not so. The majority present were CBMW-associated or representatives from similar organizations. They were CBMW members Grudem, Tim Bayly, John Piper and R.C. Sproul; Vern Poythress of Westminister Seminary; James Dobson, who called the meeting, and Charlie Jarvis, also of Focus on the Family; NIV Committee for Bible Translation (CBT) members Ken Barker and Ron Youngblood; Ryskamp and Dunberg, who did not reenlist when the revision came around; and finally Joel Belz, publisher of World magazine, whose initial biased coverage of the NIVI prompted numerous ethics charges against the magazine by IBS and Zondervan. All of these men (they like to be called that) signed the controversial agreement, though only Dobson, Jarvis, Belz, Poythress, Piper, Grudem and Bayly stood together for the historic photograph.

Notice that no CBE leaders or prominent egalitarians were included. To call this an agreement, therefore, or to suggest these guidelines somehow resolve a controversy about gender-biased language in translation, is like calling the Confederate constitution the solution that ended the U.S. Civil War. The truth is closer to a later statement made in CBMW News, that even "two hours before the meeting started, the International Bible Society had issued a press release that contained many of the very points we [CBMW] were prepared to request from them." In other words, this was not a jury of twelve men with strongly differing views; it was more like a kangaroo court organized to lynch scholarly work done by the CBT. That sympathizers were found in two CBT members is no surprise and remains a long way from legitimizing the scholarly character -- or lack thereof -- associated with these guidelines.

But this is only the beginning of the muddled thinking and confused perspectives to be found in the explanations like those given in CBMW News, which expounded on the "agreement" and its rationale. Let's take a look at this so-called agreement and consider the CBMW defense, which crystallizes the essence of what IBS capitulated to.

The Colorado Springs Guidelines for Translation of Gender-Related Language in Scripture²

Adopted on May 27, 1997, by the International Bible Society; deletions in the September 9, 1997 Revision shown as crossed out, additions shown in bold print

A. Gender-related renderings of Biblical language which we affirm:

1. The generic use of "he, him, his, himself" should be employed to translate generic 3rd person masculine singular pronouns in Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek. However substantival participles such as ho pisteuon can often be rendered in inclusive ways, such as "the one who believes" rather than "he who believes."

2. Person and number should be retained in translation so that singulars are not changed to plurals and third-person statements are not changed to second-person or first-person statements, with only rare exceptions required in unusual cases.

3. "Man" should ordinarily be used to designate the human race or human beings in general, for example in Genesis 1:26-27; 5:2; Ezekiel 29:11; and John 2:25.

4. Hebrew 'ish should ordinarily be translated "man" and "men" and Greek aner should almost always be so translated.

5. In many cases, anthropoi refers to people in general, and can be translated "people" rather than "men." The singular anthropos should ordinarily be translated "man" when it refers to a male human being.

6. Indefinite pronouns such as tis can be translated "anyone" rather than "any man."

7. In many cases, pronouns such as oudeis can be translated "no one" rather than "no man."

8. When pas is used as a substantive, it can be translated with terms such as "all people" or "everyone."

9. The phrase "son of man" should ordinarily be preserved to retain intracanonical connections.

10. Masculine references to God should be retained.

B. Gender-related renderings which we will generally avoid, though there may be unusual exceptions in certain contexts:

1. "Brother" (adelphos) and "brothers" should not be changed to "brother or sister"; however the plural (adelphoi) should not be changed to "brother(s) and sister(s)" can be translated brothers and sisters where the context makes clear that the author is referring to both men and women.

2. "Son" (huios, ben) should not be changed to "child," or "sons" (hoioi) to "children" or "sons and daughters." (However, Hebrew banim often means "children.")

3. "Father" (pater, 'ab) should not be changed to "parent," or "fathers" to "parents" or "ancestors."

C. We understand these guidelines to be representative and not exhaustive, and that some details may need further refinement.

Fundamental Problems

I realize that for many readers of the Priscilla Papers, any further comment on these guidelines may be unnecessary; the guidelines speak for and discredit themselves. They are little less than a complete antithesis to gender-inclusive language. What's more, they treat the NIV as though it were a literalistic translation, instead of as the superior "dynamic equivalent" translation it is designed to be. For the sake of answering adherents to the guidelines, though, I offer the following observations.

First, a little review will help provide some perspective on the nature of translations. According to Gordon Fee, professor of New Testament at Regent College, a literal translation is an "attempt to translate by keeping as close as possible to the exact words and phrasing in the original language, yet still make sense in the receptor language. This results in keeping the historical distance of the text intact at all points." Since historical distance is a problem for the reader, and one dramatically illustrated when the subject of gender is addressed, a dynamic equivalent translation attempts to "translate words, idioms, and grammatical constructions of the original language into precise equivalents in the receptor language. Such a translation keeps historical distance on all historical and most factual matters, but 'updates' matters of language, grammar and style."³ Fee concludes:

The best translational theory is dynamic equivalence. A literal translation is often helpful as a second source; it will give you confidence as to what the Greek or Hebrew actually looked like. A free translation also can be helpful -- to stimulate your thinking about the possible meaning of a text. But the basic translation for reading and studying should be something like the NIV.⁴

Fee acknowledges how gender-inclusive language has sometimes resulted in awkward translations, as in some cases in the NRSV. But he notes there are solutions that can smooth out these difficulties and that should be pursued. Unfortunately, the Colorado Springs guidelines would prohibit Fee's solutions.

The point is that while some of these guidelines may be appropriate in literalist translations or interlinear texts, which have strengths and weaknesses of their own, they are overly demanding on a dynamic equivalent translation. Dynamic equivalent translators realize there are trade-offs to be made for the sake of clarity and accuracy; what they sacrifice in literalness (which can result in renderings not understandable in a receptor language) they more than gain in reproducing the author's intent. As a dynamic equivalent translation, the NIVI overcomes the historical and cultural distance intrinsic to gender-laden language.

The Colorado Springs guidelines fail to recognize the nature of the NIV's translational philosophy, which when carried out consistently needs to take the next step of gender inclusiveness. Likewise, they fail to recognize inclusive language as a legitimate receptor language for translation. In fact, they categorically dismiss a whole class of people (not just women, but modern cultured readers in general) as illegitimate and unworthy of having the Word of God in their own dialect. As a result, they insist this people-group adapt instead to the publisher's language, in much the way many traditional churches insisted that lost people adapt themselves to archaic King James English to hear the good news.

What happened at this "landmark agreement," then, was not a group of scholars getting together to wrestle with how to best translate God's Word into a dynamic equivalent for modern readers. No, that happened when the CBT met years earlier and made plans to update and inclusify the NIV and related publications. What happened at the Colorado Springs meeting was that some generals and corporals in today's culture wars got together and persuaded the CBT's business partners to capitulate to their cultural intolerance. In fact, the business partners were so inundated by pre-meeting lobbying efforts that they'd sold out their scholar-partners before the meeting even began, and showed up just to close the deal.

What About Specific Guidelines?

For the most part the guidelines themselves beg the very issues at stake in this debate, as do the clearest defenses of these guidelines, written by Dr. Grudem. The first of these defenses appeared in CBMW News in June 1997. Another appeared in the October 27, 1997 issue of Christianity Today (pp. 27-32) and was essentially a condensed version of the CBMW News article. A third, What's Wrong with Gender-Neutral Bible Translations, by Grudem (32 pages), appears to be a reworked anti-NRSV tract, updated with elements of the other two articles.

Since Dr. Grudem's heralding article in CBMW News seems to be the key document on the basic rationale (or should I say, rationalizing) behind these guidelines, I will focus primarily on it, noting significant insights to be gained from the other sources, and will consider these rationalizations in the order raised there by Dr. Grudem. But before proceeding further, the reader should be warned, Dr. Grudem's arguments for opposing gender-inclusive language often border on the other side of rude; sensitive readers are likely to be intellectually offended or morally outraged by comments he makes. Please just rest assured that I'm not making any of this up.

Starting on page 3 of CBMW News Grudem begins with the question, "What were some specific problems with the inclusive language translations?" His list begins with: "First, the loss of the generic 'he, him, his'." Now, I realize this may be hard to believe, but apparently Dr. Grudem thinks it's possible to have inclusive language and retain the use of generic masculine pronouns. Of course this is like saying, "I love youth ministry -- it's just the youth I can't stand," or, "I'd get married if it didn't mean having to have a spouse." Of course inclusive language means losing generic male pronouns! That's what inclusive language does; it eliminates the impression that everyone is or should be male, or that males represent everyone.

But, Dr. Grudem says, eliminating generic masculine pronouns in inclusive translations has "obscured the personal application of Scripture to the individual" when singular statements are translated into plural statements for the sake of inclusiveness. A statement like, "I will come and eat with him" now becomes "... eat with them" and this, he says, is less personal because he thinks it implies a corporate meal rather than a personal one. Grudem quotes this and similar passages to justify guidelines A1 and A2, which endorse the generic use of "he, him, his" and which prohibit changing gender or number when translating Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek pronouns, "with only rare exceptions required in unusual cases." (In other words, these are rules that cannot be applied consistently, and the gender defenders know it, but they will try.) But even if we could stretch our imaginations to think that pluralizing is depersonalizing, would this really be worse than the exclusifying that results from implying that Christ was speaking primarily and preferably to men? And does Grudem's objection really have any basis in experience? After all, do we assume we must be part of a corporate assembly when Isaiah 40:31 says that "those who hope in the LORD will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles; they will run and not grow weary, they will walk and not be faint"? Don't we rather assume this means each of us, and not just those who do it in groups? Of course. The same can be said for John 3:16. No one would be taken seriously who argued that "God so loved the world" means he only loved us collectively and not individually or personally.

What's more, it is hard to understand why, if Grudem feels it is so important to retain the personal impact of such verses, he would not allow a dynamic equivalent translation to follow translate these statements into the second person, e.g., "I will come and eat with you"? His objection to this is that it "restricts the sentence to the readers ... rather than keeping it universal."⁵ Again I'm perplexed. If this is so, then I suppose we have all been presumptuous in applying to ourselves statements like "It is by grace you have been saved through faith" (Eph 2:8); apparently this is not a universally applicable statement because Paul used the word "you." We must restrict Paul's meaning to the Ephesians only -- or is it restricted to people who read the Bible and not to others who hear the gospel but cannot read? Grudem makes similar objections to inclusifying by substituting "we." This, he says, restricts the meaning to the speaker and hearers.⁶ So go ahead and tear out of your Bible passages like Romans 5:1, "we have been justified by faith." This only applied to Paul and the Roman Christians fortunate enough to receive this letter. It's a good thing Martin Luther wasn't a student of Dr. Grudem or there would have been no Reformation.

Of course pluralizing such passages does no actual harm at all to their personal impact or to their intended meaning; it can convey precisely what the author said in the original language. Grudem's rejection to this option is unreasonable and smacks of an excuse to conceal some other concern. What that concern is will become clearer, I hope, as we proceed. Suffice it to say, personal impact really is not what guidelines A1 and A2 are after at all, nor is it accuracy. They only beg the question of inclusive language and are completely unsuited and irrelevant to the concerns of dynamic equivalent translation.

Grudem goes on to suggest that the generic use of "he, him, his," continues to be acceptable in English today, citing examples of common usage in everyday proverbs, alluding to current dictionaries, stylebooks, secular journals, and to some contemporary skeptics who doubt that English will ever fully make the transition to true inclusivity. But all this is like picking up a KJV Bible or a church hymnal and concluding that Elizabethan English is still an acceptable mode of communication, so let's produce publications that perpetuate that dialect. Or it's like saying that because there are still people who use racist language, therefore we should recognize racist speech as standard English. No one doubts there are still huge remnants of the literary world that have yet to become sensitive to the moral concerns of gender equality. The problem is, Grudem and his associates are part of that remnant. The question, however, is should the church remain with Grudem, years behind the culture in this moral cause, or should she be leading the way?

Grudem turns next in his analysis to the question, "What if women feel excluded?" His answer is again remarkable. He says, in effect, if they feel excluded, they just shouldn't! After all, people "easily ... learn hundreds of variations in different dialects." Women, he says, should be taught that "such usage does not in fact 'exclude women.'"⁷

Now, isn't this wonderful? Before we bring people the Word of God, rather than translating it for them into their own dialect, we should instead teach them to read one that is foreign and offensive to the way they think. If they are offended, hey, what's the big deal? They'll get over it once they understand they haven't really been left out. While I suppose we should applaud and be grateful that Dr. Grudem at least recognizes that women can be taught, this justification of gender-biased speech is like a white person telling a black person, "Hey, don't let my repeated use of the N-word bother you. I really think of you as just like me, and that word is my way of including you in my group. So just get over it." The reality is, if women really haven't been left out by the meaning of the text, then what is wrong with translating that text into the correct dynamic equivalent to express this reality with clarity? It makes much more sense to do this than to retain the offensive phrases. Perhaps Dr. Grudem would like to be told, "If you don't like egalitarianism, too bad, you'll just have to be taught it? But don't worry about it; you'll get over it!"

What is most remarkable, however, is Dr. Grudem's admission that masculine phraseology in the ancient languages was not intended to exclude women. For years he and his colleagues have been telling us that the Scriptures do indeed exclude women from many roles, based on the fact that the original languages used masculine terms to describe those roles and/or people who filled those roles. He has told us this, even when we've pointed to biblical evidence to the contrary. But now Dr. Grudem is quite clear about what we should think about excluding women on the basis of masculine language found in Scripture. He says, "the original author did not intend such an exclusive meaning, the translators did not intend such an exclusive meaning, and that is not the meaning the words have when interpreted rightly in their contexts." People, he says, can learn this "in a moment" -- although, I might add, it seems to take some people decades to catch on, Grudem and company included. Even so, Grudem is emphatic: "we have all been told a lie -- for it is a lie that such usage is 'exclusive.'"⁸ And who told us this lie? Incredibly, Grudem points at the feminists! I will believe this when I see Grudem and his colleagues truly act against this lie by ceasing to exclude women from ordination and from positions of pastors, elders, and deacons -- since now they can no longer claim that the text excludes women based on masculine phraseology in the original languages.

Grudem's next concern regards "The name 'man' for the human race," which provides the basis for guideline A3, requiring translators to use the term "man" when the text means humanity, human beings, or the human race. In his CBMW News article he gave no real reason for this, other than noting that the singular collective Hebrew noun, 'adam "has male overtones," is sometimes used for Adam the person, and of man in distinction from woman.⁹ To this, we can only ask, "So what?" The question a dynamic equivalent translator must ask is, "What does this word mean in its context and how can I render it into my receptor language in a way that best communicates that original intent to my people group?" Here Grudem's only point seems to be that we should do it this way because that's the way we've always done it -- and if we stop doing it, men will no longer seem to represent the sum of humanity. If the word means "the human race," then regardless of its "male overtones" in the original language, it should be translated to communicate its intended meaning. The translator is not, and should not be, under any obligation to reproduce any misleading connotations unfortunately attached to a word by "overtones." Nor are translators obligated to retain such incidental elements in order to accommodate possible questionable interpretations that would be preempted by inclusive accuracy.¹⁰

But Grudem and his colleagues do address this question using "man" for 'adam elsewhere, especially in the other two works cited. There Grudem expands on three arguments:

1. Terms like "humankind, human beings, and human are not names that can refer to man in distinction from woman, and thus they are less accurate translations of 'adam than the word man. The male overtones of the Hebrew word are lost."¹¹

2. This use by God in naming the race man "suggests some male headship in the race." Since both had to share the husband's name, Grudem and his colleagues infer this makes men the leaders. Abandoning the use of a male-gender-specific word for the race preempts this kind of conclusion by English readers.¹²

3. Grudem wants us to consider, "What if these ... 'patriarchal' elements in Scripture are part of what the Holy Spirit intended to be there? If we hold to the absolute divine authority of Scripture, then we should not seek to mute and content that the Holy Spirit caused to be there."¹³

These three points are very illuminating. Point 1 tells us that to Grudem, although a word in its context may mean humans in general, it is more important to retain its male overtones than to translate it in a way that clearly conveys its primary meaning, even if those overtones will create confusion and mislead some readers to think that they or those they love may be excluded, or that they are secondary participants.¹⁴ Since men cannot make exclusive claim to the title human -- quite an admission on Grudem's part -- then English should follow Hebrew, he says, in calling all humans men and all humanity man. Why? First because the Hebrew says that's what God did. But we have to ask: was the point of this to place the woman under her husband, or was it to remind a primitive and patriarchal culture that women too are partners in the same humanity? Grudem assumes the former. We assume the latter. In points 2 and 3, Grudem argues for implied headship and a possible patriarchy of the Spirit. The concern of point 1 is for the loss of accuracy, which Grudem thinks requires retaining overtones. But is not accuracy the very issue at question and might not overtones actually be misleading? Why should translators accommodate to an interpretation that is based on inferences and possibilities, which are not clear to everyone? What is clear to everyone is that 'adam in generic contexts means humanity. Any departure from what is clear only clouds accuracy. If we follow Grudem's guideline, we lose the primary meaning of inclusion -- which all agree 'adam possesses when referring to the race. If we translate inclusively what do we lose? Only the inferences and what ifs that "complementarians" read into this word but which are not explicitly in the text. Grudem himself admits they are not essential to the meaning of the text when he calls them "overtones."

Again we wonder if Grudem has not betrayed his real motives? Is it really accuracy he's after or does he want to obscure and "mute" the primary and essential meanings of ancient words in order to safeguard his own biased interpretations of word connotations? This really is the choice. He and his colleagues, by their own admission, want to build a case on peripheral "overtones" that will be lost in the transition to gender-accurate translation in the receptor language. My suggestion is this: Let translators translate what's clear. But when it comes to theories based on possible nuances and inferred meanings, why not do what pastors and exegetes have always done when they wanted to explore nuances in the ancient texts? Engage people in word studies. Such studies are rightly reserved for preaching and teaching that goes beyond the primary, central and obvious meaning captured by translators; they will continue to be required regardless of how the gender-inclusive question is settled.

In fairness to Dr. Grudem, I should say that he next raises some issues that could have been argued effectively. He asks the questions, "Should men be called men?" and "Should Jesus be called a man?" It does appear that one of the NIVI editors may have gotten a little carried away with the search-and-replace feature on the team's word processor. At times, people who were clearly men, Jesus included, have been re-described in the NIVI using neutral terms. For example, in the NIVI "man of the Pharisees" became "a Pharisee," the "men with Jesus" became the "disciples" with Jesus, and so on. But not all of these changes are necessarily bad. Some, like the change to "a Pharisee," actually make the writing crisper and more concise. In other cases though, it looks possible that an NIVI editor unnecessarily felt the need to conceal the gender of people involved. Sometimes Jesus is one of those people. If this is true, then there is certainly more work to be done on the NIVI before it should be released in the U.S. But the CBT knew that and was still busy working on its revision at the time this controversy exploded.

On the other hand, might it not be legitimate for a dynamic equivalent translator to ask if the genders of those involved hold any significance for the meaning of a given text in a given receptor language? Sometimes it may be important that a person in a particular story was male or female; sometimes it could be irrelevant and may only hinder the reader from identifying with the point of the passage.

In the case of Jesus, it certainly would be wrong to conceal intentionally the historical fact that he took on a male body, or the theological fact that he is the eternal Son of God.¹⁵ However, regardless of what "complementarians" may read into the "overtones" they perceive to be involved, the point of speaking about God and Christ with personal pronouns is not that those pronouns are masculine, but that they are personal. The point of Jesus' incarnation was not that he became a male but that he took on full humanity. The so-called "scandal of particularity" in the incarnation involves the fact that Jesus not only became human but he also became a male human, a Jew, a Roman subject, a Galilean, a person of the first-century, a carpenter, of the tribe of Judah, and so on. Sometimes some of these aspects of Jesus' identity bear more significance to a text and its context than others. Sometimes translators need to consider how these specifics will be understood by the receptor group. A dynamic equivalence translator needs to consider all of this. Sometimes, what's really most significant is that Jesus was human. In such cases, gender-specific language may only cloud the real issue of significance the author wanted to communicate. A dynamic equivalence translator may therefore prefer an inclusive rendering. To Grudem this seems like "the masculinity of Jesus [is] downplayed."¹⁶ In actuality, the humanity, the theological point, and the message of Jesus' actions are heightened.

These concerns form Grudem's basis for guidelines A4 and 5, which require certain Hebrew and Greek words traditionally rendered "men" and "man" to "almost always" and "ordinarily" be translated in the masculine. The qualifiers of exception here suggest Grudem and his colleagues recognize that even these words, which they feel are so clearly masculine, do not always behave the way they would like them to behave. This suggests the words are in fact more inclusive and more flexible than Grudem and company want to admit. Many of the examples Grudem himself cites in favor of guidelines A4 and 5 could also be used to argue against him. For example, Grudem criticizes the inclusification of 2 Peter 1:21, which refers to Old Testament prophets ("men" in NIV; "human" in the NIVI). Aware that verse 20 refers to written prophecy, Grudem concludes that since no known writing prophet of the Old Testament was a woman, there is no point in inclusifying this text. But verse 21 goes on to speak of and include spoken prophecies. Certainly we know of female prophets in both testaments and some of their "spoken" prophecies are recorded for us and therefore are written Scripture (e.g. 2Ki 22:14-20; 2Chr 34:22-28). An inclusive rendering is therefore quite justified. Likewise, Grudem objects to changing Paul's statement, "when I became a man" to "when I became an adult" (1Co 13:11). Yet this rendering is far more effective and has the advantage of maintaining consistency with Paul's earlier phrase: "when I was a child."

Next Grudem explains, if not defends, the limited endorsement given by the guidelines to specific "Legitimate uses of inclusive language," by discussing guidelines A5, 6, 7 and 8.¹⁷ It is only fair to point out that in a letter to Christianity Today, Grudem and his colleagues complained about being called "inclusive language opponents" and expressed disappointment at not being given credit for including six guidelines "that approved certain kinds of inclusive language which can retain accuracy in translation."¹⁸ It is true that some of the guidelines do allow for some inclusive speech. This is even more true now with the September 1997 revision. But in CBMW News, Grudem himself highlights only four, and these are under the section entitled, "Gender-related renderings of Biblical language which we affirm" (italics added). The guidelines that most clearly do allow for some forms of inclusive language translation are: parts of A1 and 5 and all of guidelines A6, 7, and 8, totaling five. Plus, guidelines A2 and B2 allow for some "exceptions." And B1 has been revised to be slightly more inclusive. While we welcome any guidelines that contain a sensible approach to inclusivity -- and only guidelines A6, 7, and 8 do this without mixing in other, anti-inclusive elements -- these few allowances are hardly enough to exempt these men from being called "inclusive language opponents." That would be like saying, "Because you only use some racial slurs you should not be considered a racist."

When inclusivity is allowed by the guidelines, it is sometimes stated with a curious emphasis that lends itself to ambiguity and inconsistency. For example, guideline A5, says, "In many cases, anthropoi refers to people in general, and can be translated 'people' rather than 'men.' The singular anthropos should ordinarily be translated 'man' when it refers to a male human being" (emphasis added). What this guideline does not say, though it leaves the possibility open to those who notice, is (in the words of John Piper) that "the Greek anthropos regularly signifies 'person' not 'male'."¹⁹ Another of Grudem's colleagues, Andreas Kostenberger, writing in the same issue of CBMW News, affirms that "anthropos, especially in the plural, may refer to people including men and women."²⁰ Why then, we wonder, make it sound like the "ordinary" meaning is "male"? Meanwhile, the Hebrew singular 'adam, which is the functional Hebrew equivalent of anthropos, is described as sometimes referring to people in general, yet the guidelines require it to be rendered "man." There seems to be a real problem with consistency here.

Furthermore, in guidelines A6, 7, and 8, several masculine pronouns are said to refer to people in general and therefore are allowed to be translated that way. Grudem wants credit for making this concession. But he misses the very point of our contention. Inclusivists argue that in all cases where masculine pronouns and speech mean to include both genders, then in all those cases it is more accurate to translate accordingly. How is it that in the examples of A6, 7, and 8, it is permissible, despite "overtones," because that's what the text means, while in the other cases it is not permissible even though that is what the text means? Grudem and his gender defenders have yet to offer a reasonable explanation for this kind of arbitrary imposition of obviously male-biased preferences over the translated text.

Getting back to restrictions, Grudem resumes his discussion of the guidelines by moving on to A9, which seeks to retain use of the phrase "son of man," and A10, which retains masculine references to God. Since the NIVI makes no effort to change masculine references to God (nor does any major inclusive language translation now available), guideline A10 appears to be either a preemptive strike or a cheap shot. Since it does not pertain to the NIVI, though, it is even less relevant than the rest of the guidelines and does not merit further discussion at this juncture.

Retaining the phrase "son of man," however, is a subject deserving more attention than Grudem or the NIVI translators have given to it. I admit I too winced when I read Psalm 8:4 in the NIVI, in preparation for a preaching series recently: "What are mere mortals, that you are mindful of them, human beings that you care for them?" The problem here is that this passage has clear messianic connections in the minds of New Testament authors. And the title "son of man" is one Jesus was fond of using for himself as a kind of messianic title. It is also a phrase sometimes used by the prophets of the prophets or of others.

The gender guidelines argue that the expression needs to "be preserved to retain intracanonical connections." The obvious problem with this rationale, and Grudem offers no other, is that intracanonical connections could also be retained by creating an appropriate replacement phrase and using it consistently.

There are a number of other issues Grudem could have raised concerning this phrase, but surprisingly didn't. One is that Jesus is and was a son, not just a child. He was also a man, not just a human. These facts could argue in favor of retaining the phrase. Conversely, there are several issues to consider that might argue against it. One is that Jesus was born of a woman and had no earthly father. In other words, his humanity derived entirely from a woman. Although he is the son of men by extension, just as he is the son of David by extension, the term, son of man, clearly does not mean he is the direct biological son of a man, meaning a male. Rather, the phrase is clearly messianic and intended to drive home the reality of Jesus' human nature. In this light, "son of humanity" or "child of humanity" might actually best convey the theological meaning of the phrase from an incarnational perspective. Whatever the dynamic equivalent is for this particular phrase, the solution offered by, and the rationale behind, guideline A9 are clearly inadequate.

Onto section B: "Gender-related renderings which we will generally avoid, though there may be unusual exceptions in certain contexts." Again we hear the waffling about "unusual exceptions in certain contexts." But let's ignore that and look at what we're told to avoid under this section in the September revision:

[] adding "and sister" where the word for "brother" appears in the singular (B1)

[] changing "son(s)" to "child(ren)" or to "sons and daughters" (B2) -- even though the plural of sons in Hebrew often means that, and,

[] changing "father(s)" to "parent(s)" or "ancestor(s)" (B3)

Grudem had defended the original guidelines by arguing that adelphoi could only be translated "brothers" and not "brothers and sisters."²¹ But in the same paragraph, he went on to admit that the term refers in actuality to all Christians! What then was wrong with a dynamic equivalent translation that reflects that fact? Grudem never really answered that, other than to plea for "accuracy." But what made it inaccurate? It turns out, nothing! His concern was merely to preserve without a rational justification the "male overtones" that cloud authorial intent. Thankfully he and his cohorts later discovered examples from ancient extrabiblical texts that show the term adelphoi can mean "brothers and sisters." In What is Wrong, Grudem cites four extrabiblical examples that explain the reason for their conceding this point and revising their guidelines accordingly.²² Even so, after defending the revision, and admitting the inaccuracy of rendering the word just "brothers," he expresses sympathy toward and claims to "understand" and "respect" those who choose to continue translating that way so that they won't appear to be complying with feminist culture.²³ In the same document, he also claims there have been no new discoveries that would alter our knowledge of Hebrew and Greek to change how we translate the words "that have always been translated 'father,' 'son,' 'brother,' 'man,' 'he, him, his,' etc."²⁴ What then has been the problem all this time? And why do we have to keep dealing with this same unfounded and convoluted resistance on these other points?

While conceding to inclusify the plural adelphoi, Grudem and the guidelines continue to oppose inclusifying its singular form. So let the reader understand: "If your brother sins against you, go and tell him" (Mt 18:15) cannot be translated, according to Grudem, to say "brother or sister." Are we to infer then, that the rules are different for how we behave toward our sisters? Does Jesus not mean "brother or sister"? Is it now acceptable to be angry with our sister and call her "Raca" or "You fool"? (Mt 5:22). Are we to forgive our brother seven times 70 times, but not our sister? (Mt 18:21-22) Obviously, to require this kind of treatment of the singular adelphos is to require inaccuracy for the shear purpose of maintaining an air of male primacy. This obstinate commitment to inaccuracy is appalling.

Likewise, Grudem points out that the Greek has a separate gender-neutral word for children (tekna) that the New Testament authors often used, but which at other times did not use, choosing instead to speak of all believers as "sons."²⁵ Grudem rightly points out the potential significance attached to "sonship" when and where this happens. Grudem explains that in Christ "we all (men and women) gain standing as 'sons' and therefore the inheritance rights that belong to sons in the Biblical world." This is a significant point that might get lost by replacing "sons" with "children" in some cases. On the other hand, in a culture like ours that no longer attaches the same inheritance rights to gender, the word "children" actually carries the intended meaning more effectively.

What is more surprising, though, is that Grudem admits he understands that women inherit the same rights as men in Christ. Presumably, if they are now to be treated as sons and have all the same "full rights of sons" (Ga 4:5), then certainly they must be entitled to do everything a son has the right to do! Since Dr. Grudem now sees that women are no longer excluded from the rights of sons, perhaps it is time to say to Dr. Grudem, "Welcome into the egalitarian fold! Welcome to the fellowship where women and men serve as equals and as partners on every level of leadership, including in the ordained roles, because women too are sons and it is the right of sons to do this. Thank you Dr. Grudem for finally telling your constituency the truth, that women share fully in all the rights of sons."

This brings us back to that nagging question. If in fact "sons" means to include women, as Dr. Grudem so adamantly asserts, then why complain when it is translated accordingly? I realize I am repeating myself, but Dr. Grudem continues to make the same error over and over. At the risk of repeating myself again, let me just say, "dynamic equivalent translation, dynamic equivalent translation, dynamic equivalent translation!" The NIV, NIrV, and NIVI are intended to be dynamic equivalent translations. They translate what the text means.

Finally, Grudem explains that section C: "We understand these guidelines to be representative and not exhaustive," was added because, if the spirit of these guidelines is followed, specific problems not covered by them would probably be overcome without difficulty. To this, we can only say, they may be representative, but not of dynamic equivalent translations, and apparently not of sound thinking about gender-related language. The revision adds, "that some details may need further refinement." To this we give a hearty "Amen!"

Conclusion

Grudem ends his booklet What's Wrong with a long caution about those who would control our minds by means of Orwellian manipulation of a society's vocabulary.²⁶ He even goes so far as to suggest that translations that take concern to avoid anti-Semitic language are also in danger of succumbing to "politically correct" pressure aimed at limiting our range of thought. The result for Bible readers, he claims, is that they "will never know at any verse whether what they have is the Bible or the translator's own ideas."

While it is clear that Grudem and his colleagues are genuinely concerned to have the Bible say what it says, we must sadly conclude that for all their zeal they have failed to separate its intended meanings from their own presuppositions about masculinity and femininity. Grudem is correct that language shapes how we think. But how we think also shapes language. Translation is not a mechanical substitution of receptor-language words for ancient-language words. It involves the translator in understanding both the ancient text and the modern context into which a text must speak. The translator must be able to distinguish between denotations and connotations, what is clear and what is an incidental, possibly misleading, "overtone."

Grudem is obviously out of touch with the modern context. For this we may be able to forgive him, since he makes no claim to expert credentials in matters of modern culture. But Grudem also appears to be out of touch with the Scriptures themselves, in asserting restrictions on women and on language that just are not biblical or realistic. If Grudem was just one mistaken scholar, we might just chuckle -- politely or uproariously -- at his ideas, and move on to more substantial issues. But the scandal of this issue is that Grudem is not alone. The revised Colorado Springs Guidelines boast names of scholars and Christian celebrities who should know better.

After considering Grudem's arguments, we would have expected prominent and educated Christians to be ashamed even to be associated with the kind of twisted reasoning Grudem advances. Regardless of his sincerity or zeal, and regardless of his titles, credits or degrees, Dr. Grudem is ridiculously flawed in his defense of these gender-biased rules. His ulterior motives are exposed for all to see, namely to protect translations that support his own patriarchal system and to retain an elevated position for males, the result of which can only be a perpetuated inequality for women and a continued discrimination against our sisters, daughters, mothers and wives.

What is most tragic and disconcerting is that so many have signed on with him -- let alone afforded him a place of academic standing in an Evangelical school. It makes one wonder how many have actually read Dr. Grudem's articles and works in this respect. Worse, it makes us wonder what has happened to the integrity and the devotion to Scripture that once characterized the Evangelical movement. Shallow thinking in one man can be expected. But when shallow thinking pervades such a wide range of leaders, a movement can only wonder what other immoral contracts they may sign in the dark days that lie ahead.

__________________________________________________________________________

Footnotes:

¹In a recent response to my article, "Am I Wrong Because I'm Politically Correct" (the standard, Baptist General Conference, October 1997, pp. 14-15 ), Dr. John Piper mistook my condemnation of name calling and labeling as an allusion to the sensationalized treatment World magazine gave to this topic ("Why Inclusive Language Bible Translations Give Me Pause," the standard, January/February 1997, BGC [yet to appear]). He then went on to call me "disingenuous" for calling the so-called "complementarian" view sexist, immoral and on the same level with racism, while I at the same time called upon readers to "dialogue on issues like this without name-calling, labeling or adhering to points of view simply because of the prominent personalities associated with them." My point was that people who reject a view because it's labeled "politically correct" seem to be doing so just because they don't want to be associated with cultural liberalism; they are not considering whether or not in this case the politically correct thing is truly correct. Am I now engaged in the same practice of name calling by using terms like "sexism" and "racism"? I cannot help that these things have names or that they identify views one should be embarrassed to hold. Is it further hypocrisy to use sensational or emotionally-charged language, as I might be accused of doing in this article, to describe Piper and Grudem's organization and their actions? The reader will have to be the final judge of this. I personally have no objection to a writer using colorful speech to forcefully argue for truth. The question arises when descriptions are overly exaggerated and unjustified, or when labels are substitutes for arguments. I cannot help calling discrimination against women by its name. And I will not cower from calling it immoral. If it is moralizing to take a stand on a moral issue, then so be it. As for the terrorist metaphor of this article and its subsequent imagery, let the reader beware; the facts of this controversy exceed the shock value of any metaphor I have invoked.

²Original guidelines reprinted from CBMW News, vol. 2, no. 3, June 1997, p. 6; revisions taken from "Can I Still Trust My Bible?" (advertisement, Christianity Today, October 27, 1997, pp. 14-15) and What's Wrong with Gender-Neutral Bible Translations? by Wayne Grudem, pp. 28-29 (1997 CBMW)

³Gordon D. Fee & Douglas Stuart, How the Read the Bible for All It's Worth, 2nd ed. (Zondervan, 1983), p. 35

⁴Ibid., p. 36

⁵Grudem, "Do Inclusive Language Bibles Distort Scripture? Yes," Christianity Today, October 27, 1997, p. 31

⁶Ibid.

⁷CBMW News, p. 4

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰In his article "Why Inclusive Language Bible Translations Give Me Pause," the standard, January/February 1997, BGC [yet to appear], John Piper argues that inclusive language translations preempt possible patriarchal interpretations. Therefore, he thinks translators should retain masculine overtones of the original languages as a courtesy to his views.

¹¹Grudem, "Yes" p. 28. See also What's Wrong, p. 7ff.

¹²Ibid.; see also Piper, "Pause"

¹³Grudem, "Yes" p. 28. See also What's Wrong, p. 7ff.

¹⁴And, we would argue, Grudem is one of those confused readers misled by these overtones.

¹⁵I use the term "eternal Son of God" despite the fact that CBMW board of reference member John MacArthur teaches to the contrary. As opposed to historic Trinitarianism, MacArthur writes of Jesus in his commentary on Hebrews 1:4-5: "He was not the son until He was born into this world through the virgin birth." MacArthur wrongly believes the title "eternal Son" traps one into making Jesus eternally subservient to God. But he rightly considers eternal subservience a heresy. (See The MacArthur New Testament Commentary: Hebrews (Moody, 1983), on Hebrews 1:4-5, pp. 23-24.) Ironically, Grudem does believe Jesus is eternally subservient to God. For more on the departure of Grudem, John Piper and others in the gender-exclusionary camp from historical Trinitarianism, see Gilbert Bilezikian, "Historical Bungee-Jumping: Subordination in the Godhead," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (JETS), 40/1 (March 1997) 57-68.

¹⁶CBMW News, p. 4

¹⁷Ibid., p. 5

¹⁸Tim Bayly, Joel Belz, James Dobson, Wayne Grudem, Charles Jarvis, Vern Poythress, R. C. Sproul, "Letters to the Editor," Christianity Today, October 6, 1997, p. 14

¹⁹Piper, "Pause"

²⁰Andreas J. Kostenberger, "The neutering of 'man' in the NIVI," CBMW News, June 1997, p. 11

²¹CBMW News, p. 5

²²What is Wrong, page 16

²³Ibid., pp. 17-18

²⁴Christianity Today, October 27, 1997, p. 29; What is Wrong, p. 13

²⁵CBMW News, p. 5

²⁶What's Wrong, pp. 24-27