Phenomenology was introduced into Japan by Nishida Kitaro. [...] Nishida is the greatest figure in modern Japanese philosophy, not only because of his founding of the Kyoto school, but also through his broad influence on the philosophical activities of this country in general. Scarcely any Japanese philosopher of any originality has been uninfluenced by his thought. This fascination seems to come from his deep insight into reality as the ultimate unity that dominates through the multiplicity of world phenomena. This unity is not a mere object of cognition, but rather something that demands the whole personality of each observer. Perhaps he attained his insight through his many years often practice in his earlier years. Some of his poems (waka) reveal the purity and deep innocence of his personality to us. He expressed the unity of universe and personality initially by the phrase “pure experience” (junsui keiken) and then, in his later thought, with special reference to Plato’s chōra by the term “ seated field” (basho). This is the unity of ( anonymous ) consciousness and true Being. All oppositions and even all contradictions are reconciled in this unity because all differences always assume a unity. Nishida was so concerned to ascertain this unity in phenomena that their differences were for him of only secondary significance, at least compared with their unity. Coincidentia oppositorum in various dimensions of experience was for him both an ideal and a reality. Concerning such an ultimate unity, Sein and Sollen are one and the same. This all - embracing character of his thought gave it a kind of incomprehensible fascination. If phenomenology is a way of searching for truth through various phenomena as they occur, Nishida’s thought is quite phenomenological. “Truth must be nothing other than reality as such.“

SATOMI TAKAHASHI of Tohoku University in Sendai studied phenomenology in Freiburg during 1926 - 27 , about the same time as Tanabe , and became the founder of the phenomenological tradition at his university . His monograph Husserl no genshogaku ( Husserl’s phenomenology , 1931 ) , is one of the earliest comprehensive introductions of phenomenology in Japan . Moreover , his article ' ' Genshogakutei kangen no kanosei , , ( The possibility of the phenomenological reduction , 1930 ; cf. Zentai no tachiba [ The standpoint of totality , 1 932 ] ) may be called one of the most profound arguments ever dedicated to this theme . Concerning the relation between the phenomenological EPOCHE AND REDUCTION and the neutrality modification , he asserts , even contrary to Husserl‘s opinion , that the latter is always involved in the former as a part of it . In other words , the phenomenological reduction is the act of reflection upon what is neutralized in its thesis of Being . The iterability of the neutrality modification , which is denied by Husserl , is admitted . Every being that is neutral - ized is founded by Being in the condition ( Zustand ) of primal experience , which culminates in eternal love . On the other hand , Takahashi denies the absolute immanence of the stream of consciousness posited by Husserl in Ideen einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie I (1913 ) as the mere result of the latter ‘s metaphysical assumption of Cartesian dualism . Takahashi was consistently interested in the phenomenon of TIME and , through confrontation with HENRI BERGSON , HEIDEGGER , WILLIAM JAMES , and Augustine , etc . , he reached his own position ( Jikanron [ On time , 1953 ] ) . In his opinion there are three possible views according to whether the pivot of time is regarded as being ( 1 ) in the past , ( 2 ) in the present , or ( 3 ) in the future . Bergson holds the first , Heidegger and Hermann Cohen ( 1842 - - 1918 ) hold the third , and St . Augustine and FRANZBREN 執 No hold , if anything , the second . Takahashi does not mention Husserl , whose position , however , seems to stretch over the second and third views ．Takahashi himself claimed to take no exclusive position . He accepted not only the time that starts from the future and past , but also the one that either flows from the present over into past and future or arrives at the present from both opposite directions simultaneously . Among such times centering upon the present he discriminates ( 1 ) the intellectual ( reflective ) ' ' thin ' ' present and ( 2 ) the emotional ' ' thick ' ' present . The latter embraces both future and past tightly in it - self , the most eminent example of which is the present residing in love .

Takahashi Satomi (1886-1964) is a representative systematic philosopher in modern Japan who ranks with Nishida Kitaro and Tanabe Hajime. He is known as the first to recognize the significance of Nishida’s maiden work A Study of Good. He was both the greatest appreciator as well as the keenest critic of Nishida and developed his own system of metaphysics which stands comparison with that of Nishida. He consistently defended his metaphysical standpoint throughout his life and took a firm stand not only against Nishida philosophy, but also against Marxist philosophy, the totalitarianism in the war period, and the shallow rationalism in the postwar period.
Takahashi was born on November 28, 1886 at Yonezawa City (Yamagata Prefecture). After finishing the Yonezawa Middle School in 1904, he entered the First Higher School (Tokyo) in the same year. After graduating from the same in 1907, he went on to the Tokyo Imperial University at which he majored philosophy, graduating in 1910. At the university he attended the lectures given by Raphael Koeber, Inoue Tetsujiro, Hatano Seiichi and others and took interest in the philosophies of Kant, Spinoza, Hegel, etc. His graduation thesis was on the monadology of Leibniz. In this thesis he tried to describe and criticize systematically the philosophy of Leibniz and, as a result, his fundamental philosophical standpoint was already established.
After graduation he was enrolled at the graduate school of the university and studied the theory of space of Kant and more widely the theory of space in general. During that time he published an article criticizing A study of Good by Nishida (1912) and a translation of Matter and Memory by Bergson (1914). On the other hand, he had an interest in neo-Kantianism and phenomenology which were popular in Japan in those days, and especially sympathized with the Marburg school.
In 1915 he took the post as a teacher of German at the Sixth Higher School (Okayama). While teaching German he studied mainly pragmatism. In 1919 he was transferred to the Niigata Higher School where he taught German and logic. In 1921 he was appointed assistant professor at the department of science of Tohoku Imperial University and lectured on philosophy of science, especially on philosophical theory of number. In this lecture he owed much to the mathematical logic as well as the theory of number expounded in Neo-Kantianism. In addition, he lectured on introduction to philosophy and on modern philosophy at the newly established law and literature department of the same university as part-time lecturer, later as assistant professor. In these lectures and seminars he used Logic by Cohen, Ideas and Logical Investigations by Husserl. Thus the philosophy of Marburg Neo- Kantianism and phenomenology became his chief concern.
In 1925 he went over to Germany, United Kingdom and France for two years as a research fellow of the ministry of education. At Heidelberg University he attended lectures given by Rickert, and came to appreciate the Southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism (philosophy of value) more highly than ever. Then he moved to Freiburg and studied under the guidance of Husserl. His Phenomenology of Husserl (the first monograph of Husserl in Japan) was written on the basis of lectures and seminars given by Husserl at that time.
Returning from abroad in 1928, he became professor of philosophy at the law and literature department of the Tohoku Imperial University and devoted himself to the study of theory of time and ontology as well as epistemology. He took up Bing and Time by Heidegger in his seminar for several years. On the other hand, he could not be indifferent to Nishida philosophy and Tanabe philosophy which were leading of the philosophical circles of Japan. He also took up again critical study of dialectic by going back to Hegelian origin.
While he was influenced by various schools of philosophy in Europe, America and Japan, he found that none of them gives him full satisfaction. He endeavored to establish his own ontology by criticizing those schools theoretically and felt that he had reached a satisfying conclusion to a certain extent. His standpoint is that of “The ultimate Being” which includes and transcends the dialectic movement. He believed that his standpoint encompasses various standpoints of philosophy from ancient to modern times. He also tried to make critical study of the character of oriental culture, especially of Japanese culture.
Since 1937 he was appointed three times to the head of the law and literature department of the Tohoku Imperial University. In 1947 he was appointed to the president of Yamagata Higher School but resigned next year and retired into his native city of Yonezawa. However in 1949 he was elected to the president of the Tohoku University and, after reelected to the same post three times, resigned in 1957. He was then granted the title of professor emeritus of the Tohoku University. He also was conferred the degrees of doctor of literature in 1948 and was elected to a member of the Japanese Science Council in 1950. After resignation from the presidency of the Tohoku University, he retired from public life and moved to Tokyo. In 1964 he died of cancer at Tokyo. His complete works (7 volumes) were published by Fukumura-shuppan in 1973. His main works are as follows:
Phenomenology of Husserl (1931)
Standpoint of Totality (1932)
Experience and Being (1936)
Epistemology (1938)
History and Dialectic (1939)
A System Which Includes Dialectic (1942)
Essence of Philosophy (1938)
My Philosophy and My View of Life (1951)
Theory of Time (1953)

GOlCHI MIYAKE , who studied In Freiburg during 1930-31 and later taught at Sendai and Kyoto , ex - pressed an elemental doubt about the validity of the Husserlian epoche . Referring to some portions of Formale und tranzendentale Logik ( 1929 ) , where the naivete of TRUTH and EVIDENCE becomes progressively apparent , Miyake says : ' ' Here this gradual realization which Husserl called painful but inevitable stands involved in the depths of transcendental subjectivity , leaving a profound anxiety . Husserl thought it possible to overcome this gradual realization , but if we consider it frankly , are we sure of this ? ' ' ( Heidegger no tetsugaku [ Heidegger’s philosophy , 1 950] ) .
Miyake reports that during his stay in Freiburg he asked OSKAR BECKER and even Husserl about this point and also pondered it himself in manyways , but he could not gain clarity . Miyake found the phenomena of horizon and TIME becoming the foundation of Husserlian phenomenology . In these , the living Being of the philosophical truth could be found , combining the static and the dynamic , the finite and the infinite . But an ' ' anxious , ' relativity and naivete emerges here in the to - be - concluded but never - ending process that becomes the fundamental phenomenon of philosophical reasoning . This is an extreme situation for the phenomenology of REASON . But insofar as phenomenology stands upon reason , it will be impossible to lessen this crisis by re - course to a more fundamental ground . Miyake asks in the face ofthis impasse : ' ' Should not philosophy stand upon a more original ' truth , than scientific truth ? , , The fertile accumulation of phenomenological studies in the 19305 by the thinkers mentioned and by others was not continued smoothly and without interruption by their successors . The disruption in the tradition caused by World War II was grave . From the end of the war until the beginning of the 1960s , Husserl’s phenomenology was known chiefly as the forerunner or background of Heidegger ‘s and JEAN-PAUL SARTRE ‘s ontological thought , and was rarely the proper theme of study . But together with the rise of the name of MAURICE MERLEAU - PONTY and the Introduction of Husserl ‘s later thought , interest in this common ancestor of EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY was awakened , and the renaissance of Husserl’s phenomenology in Japan during the 19705 followed . Since then several phenomenological thinkers of originality have emerged , among whom three may be mentioned .