As explained earlier, capitalism will suffer from a boom-and-bust cycle due to the above-mentioned objective pressures on profit production, even if we ignore the subjective revolt against authority by workers. It is this two-way pressure on profit rates, the subjective and objective, which causes the business cycle and such economic problems as "stagflation." However, for supporters of the free market, this conclusion is unacceptable. Thus they usually try to explain the business cycle in terms of government intervention in the market, particularly state control over credit. This analysis is defective, as will be shown below.
It should be noted that most supporters of capitalism ignore the "subjective" pressures on capitalism that we discussed in section C.7. In addition, the problems associated with rising capital investment (as highlighted in section C.7.2) are also usually ignored, because they usually consider capital to be "productive" and so cannot see how its use could result in crises. This leaves them with the problems associated with the price mechanism, as discussed in section C.7.1.
The idea behind their "state-control-of-credit" theory of crises is that interest rates provide companies and individuals with information about how price changes will affect future trends in production. Specifically, the claim is that changes in interest rates (i.e. changes in the demand and supply of credit) indirectly inform companies of the responses of their competitors. For example, if the price of tin rises, this will lead to an expansion in investment in the tin industry, so leading to a rise in interest rates (as more credit is demanded). This rise in interest rates lowers anticipated profits and dampens the expansion. State control of credit stops this process and so results in the credit system being unable to perform its economic function. This results in overproduction, speculation, and so forth. Hence, according to the argument, by eliminating state control of credit these negative effects of capitalism would disappear.
This explanation of the business cycle as lying in the features of the credit system is flawed. It is not clear that the relevant information is communicated by changes in interest rates. This is because interest rates reflect the general aggregate demand for credit in an economy. However, the information which a company requires is about the over-expansion in the production of a specific good and so the level of demand for credit amongst competitors, not the general demand for credit in the economy as a whole. An increase in the planned production of some good by a group of competitors will be reflected in a proportional change in interest rates only if it is assumed that the change in demand for credit by that industry is identical with that found in the economy as a whole.
There is no reason to suppose such an assumption is true, given the different production cycles of different industries. Therefore, assuming uneven changes in the demand for credit between industries, it is quite possible for over-investment (and so over-production) to occur, even if the credit system is working as it should in theory. The credit system, therefore, does not communicate the relevant information, and for this reason, it cannot be the case that the business cycle can be explained by departure from an "ideal system" (i.e. laissez-faire capitalism).
In other words, a pure "free market" capitalist would still have a business cycle as this cycle is caused by the nature of capitalism, not by state intervention. In reality (i.e. in "actually existing" capitalism), state manipulation of credit is essential for the capitalist class as it is more related to indirect profit-generating activity, such as ensuring a "natural" level of unemployment to keep profits up, an acceptable level of inflation to ensure increased profits, and so forth. If state manipulation of credit caused the problems of capitalism, we would not have seen the economic successes of the post-war Keynesian experiment or the business cycle in pre-Keynesian days.
It is true that all crises have been preceded by a speculatively-enhanced expansion of production and credit. This does not mean, however, that overproduction results from speculation and the expansion of credit. The connection is not causal. The expansion and contraction of credit is a mere symptom of the periodic changes in the business cycle, as the decline of profitability contracts credit just as an increase enlarges it.
Paul Mattick gives the correct analysis: "[M]oney and credit policies can themselves change nothing with regard to profitability or insufficient profits. Profits come only from production, from the surplus value produced by workers. . . . The expansion of credit has always been taken as a sign of a coming crisis, in the sense that it reflected the attempt of individual capital entities to expand despite sharpening competition, and hence survive the crisis. . . . Although the expansion of credit has staved off crisis for a short time, it has never prevented it, since ultimately it is the real relationship between total profits and the needs of social capital to expand in value which is the decisive factor, and that cannot be altered by credit" [Economics, Politics and the Age of Inflation, pp. 17-18].
In short, the apologists of "free market" capitalism confuse the symptoms for the disease.
Where there is no profit to be had, credit will not be sought. While extension of the credit system "can be a factor deferring crisis, the actual outbreak of crisis makes it into an aggravating factor because of the larger amount of capital that must be devalued" [Mattick, Economic Crisis and Crisis Theory, p. 138]. But this is also a problem facing private companies using the gold standard, as advocated by right-Libertarians (who are supporters of "free market" capitalism), since "the expansion of production or trade unaccompanied by an increase in the amount of money must cause a fall in the price level. . . Token money was developed at an early date to shelter trade from the enforced deflations that accompanied the use of specie when the volume of business swelled. . . Specie is an inadequate money just because it is a commodity and its amount cannot be increased at will. The amount of gold available may be increased by a few per cent a year, but not by as many dozen within a few weeks, as might be required to carry out a sudden expansion of transactions. In the absence of token money business would have to be either curtailed or carried on at very much lower prices, thus inducing a slump and creating unemployment." [Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation, p. 193]
To sum up, "[i]t is not credit but only the increase in production made possible by it that increases surplus value. It is then the rate of exploitation which determines credit expansion" [Paul Mattick, Economics, Politics and the Age of Inflation, p. 18]. Hence token money would increase and decrease in line with capitalist profitability, as predicted in capitalist economic theory. But this could not affect the business cycle, which has its roots in production for capital (i.e. profit) and capitalist authority relations, to which the credit supply would obviously be tied, and not vice versa.
If state control of credit does not cause the business cycle, does that
mean Keynesianism capitalism can work? Keynesian economics, as opposed
to free market capitalism, maintains that the state can and should intervene
in the economy in order to stop economic crises from occurring. The
post-war boom presents compelling evidence that it can be effect the
business cycle for the better by reducing its impact from developing into
a full depression.
The period of social Keynesianism after the war was marked by reduced
inequality, increased rights for working people, less unemployment, a
welfare state you could actually use and so on. Compared to present-day
capitalism, it had much going for it. However, Keynesian capitalism is still
capitalism and so is still based upon oppression and exploitation. It was, in
fact, a more refined form of capitalism, within which the state intervention
was used to protect capitalism from itself while trying to ensure that working
class struggle against it was directed, via productivity deals, into
keeping the system going. For the population at large, the general idea
was that the welfare state (especially in Europe) was a way for society
to get a grip on capitalism by putting some humanity into it. In a confused
way, the welfare state was supported as an attempt to create a society in
which the economy existed for people, not people for the economy.
While the state has always had a share in the total surplus value produced
by the working class, only under Keynesianism is this share increased
and used actively to manage the economy. Traditionally, placing checks on
state appropriation of surplus value had been one of the aims of classical
capitalist thought (simply put, cheap government means more surplus value
available for capitalists to compete for). But as capital has accumulated,
so has the state increased and its share in social surplus (for control over
the domestic enemy has to be expanded and society protected from the
destruction caused by free market capitalism).
Indeed, such state intervention was not totally new for "[f]rom its origins,
the United States had relied heavily on state intervention and protection for
the development of industry and agriculture, from the textile industry in the
early nineteenth century, through the steel industry at the end of the century,
to computers, electronics, and biotechnology today. Furthermore, the same has
been true of every other successful industrial society." [World Orders,
Old and New, p. 101]
The roots of the new policy of higher levels and different forms of state
intervention lie in the Great Depression of the 1930s and the realisation
that attempts to enforce widespread reductions in money wages and costs
(the traditional means to overcome depression) were impossible because
the social and economic costs would have been too expensive. A militant
strike wave involving a half million workers occurred in 1934,
with factory occupations and other forms of militant direct action
commonplace.
Instead of attempting the usual class war (which may have had revolutionary
results), sections of the capitalist class thought a new approach was
required. This involved using the state to manipulate credit in order to
increase the funds available for capital and to increase demand by state
orders. As Paul Mattick points out:
"The additional production made possible by deficit financing does appear
as additional demand, but as demand unaccompanied by a corresponding increase
in total profits. . . [this] functions immediately as an increase in
demand that stimulates the economy as a whole and can become the point
for a new prosperity" if objective conditions allow it. [Economic
Crisis and Crisis Theory, p. 143]
State intervention can, in the short term, postpone crises by stimulating
production. This can be seen from the in 1930s New Deal period under Roosevelt
when the economy grew five years out of seven compared to it shrinking
every year under the pro-laissez-faire Republican President Herbert Hoover
(under Hoover, the GNP shrank an average of -8.4 percent a year, under
Roosevelt it grew by 6.4 percent). The 1938 slump after 3 years of growth
under Roosevelt was due to a decrease in state intervention:
"The forces of recovery operating within the depression, as well as the
decrease in unemployment via public expenditures, increased production up
to the output level of 1929. This was sufficient for the Roosevelt
administration to drastically reduce public works. . . in a new effort to
balance the budget in response to the demands of the business world. . . The
recovery proved to be short-lived. At the end of 1937 the Business Index
fell from 110 to 85, bring the economy back to the state in which it had
found itself in 1935. . . Millions of workers lost their jobs once again."
[Paul Mattick, Economics, Politics and the Age of Inflation, p. 138]
With the success of state intervention during the second world war,
Keynesianism was seen as a way of ensuring capitalist survival. The
resulting boom is well known, with state intervention being seen as the
way of ensuring prosperity for all sections of society. Before the Second
World War, the USA (for example) suffered eight depressions, since the war
there has been none (although there has been periods of recession). There
is no denying that for a considerable time, capitalism has been able to
prevent the rise of depressions which so plagued the pre-war world and
that this was accomplished by government interventions.
This is because Keynesianism can serve to initiate a new prosperity and
postpone crisis by the extension of credit. This can mitigate the conditions
of crisis, since one of its short-term effects is that it offers private
capital a wider range of action and an improved basis for its own efforts
to escape the shortage of profits for accumulation. In addition, Keynesianism
can fund Research and Development in new technologies and working methods
(such as automation), guarantee markets for goods as well as transferring
wealth from the working class to capital via taxation and inflation.
In the long run, however, Keynesian "management of the economy by means of
monetary and credit policies and by means of state-induced production must
eventually find its end in the contradictions of the accumulation process."
[Paul Mattick, Op. Cit., p. 18]
So, these interventions did not actually set aside the underlying
causes of economic and social crisis. The modifications of the capitalist
system could not totally countermand the subjective and objective limitations
of a system based upon wage slavery and social hierarchy. This can be seen
when the rosy picture of post-war prosperity changed drastically in the 1970s
when economic crisis returned with a vengeance, with high unemployment
occurring along with high inflation. This soon lead to a return to a more
"free market" capitalism with, in Chomsky's words, "state protection and
public subsidy for the rich, market discipline for the poor." This process,
and its effects, are discussed in the next two sections.
Basically, the subjective and objective limitations to Keynesianism we
highlighted in the last section were finally reached in the early 1970s.
Economic crisis returned with massive unemployment accompanied with high
inflation, with the state interventions that for so long kept capitalism
healthy making the crisis worse. In other words, a combination of social
struggle and a lack of surplus value available to capital resulted in the
breakdown of the successful post-war consensus.
The roots and legacy of this breakdown in Keynesianism is informative and
worth analysing. The post-war period marked a distinct change for capitalism,
with new, higher levels of state intervention. So why the change? Simply put,
because capitalism was not a viable system. It had not recovered from the
Great Depression and the boom economy during war had obviously contrasted
deeply with the stagnation of the 1930s. Plus, of course, a militant working
class, which has put up with years of denial in the struggle against
fascist-capitalism would not have taken lightly to a return to mass
unemployment and poverty. So, politically and economically a change was
required. This change was provided by the ideas of Keynes, a change which
occurred under working class pressure but in the interests of the ruling
class.
The mix of intervention obviously differed from country to country, based
upon the needs and ideologies of the ruling parties and social elites. In
Europe nationalisation was widespread as inefficient capital was taken
over by the state and reinvigorated by state funding and social spending
more important as Social Democratic parties attempted to introduce reforms.
Chomsky describes the process in the USA:
"Business leaders recognised that social spending could stimulate the
economy, but much preferred the military Keynesian alternative - for
reasons having to do with privilege and power, not 'economic rationality.'
This approach was adopted at once, the Cold War serving as the justification.
. . . The Pentagon system was considered ideal for these purposes. It extends
well beyond the military establishment, incorporating also the Department of
Energy. . . and the space agency NASA, converted by the Kennedy administration
to a significant component of the state-directed public subsidy to advanced
industry. These arrangements impose on the public a large burden of the
costs of industry (research and development, R&D) and provide a guaranteed
market for excess production, a useful cushion for management decisions.
Furthermore, this form of industrial policy does not have the undesirable
side-effects of social spending directed to human needs. Apart from unwelcome
redistributive effects, the latter policies tend to interfere with managerial
prerogatives; useful production may undercut private gain, while
state-subsidised waste production. . . is a gift to the owner and manager,
to whom any marketable spin-offs will be promptly delivered. Social
spending may also resource public interest and participation, thus enhancing
the threat of democracy. . . The defects of social spending do not taint
the military Keynesian alternative. For such reasons, Business Week
explained, 'there's a tremendous social and economic difference between
welfare pump-priming and military pump-priming,' the latter being far
preferable." [World Orders, Old and New, pp. 100-101]
Over time, social Keynesianism took increasing hold even in the USA, partly
in response to working class struggle, partly due to the need for popular
support at elections and partly due to "[p]opular opposition to the Vietnam
war [which] prevented Washington from carrying out a national mobilisation. . .
which might have made it possible to complete the conquest without harm to
the domestic economy. Washington was forced to fight a 'guns-and-butter' was
to placate the population, at considerable economic cost." [Noam Chomsky,
Op. Cit., pp. 157-8]
Social Keynesianism directs part of the total surplus value to workers
and unemployed while military Keynesianism transfers surplus value from
the general population to capital and from capital to capital. This allows
R&D and capital to be publicly subsidised, as well as essential but
unproductive capital to survive. As long as real wages did not exceed a
rise in productivity, Keynesianism would continue. However, both functions
have objective limits as the transfer of profits from successful capital to
essential, but less successful, or long term investment can cause a crisis
is there is not enough profit available to the system as a whole. The
surplus value producing capital, in this case, would be handicapped due
to the transfers and cannot respond to economic problems with freely as
before.
This lack of profitable capital was part of the reason for the collapse
of the post-war consensus. In their deeply flawed 1966 book, Monopoly
Capital, radical economists Baran and Sweezy point out that "[i]f
military
spending were reduced once again to pre-Second World War proportions the
nation's economy would return to a state of profound depression" [p. 153]
In other words, the US economy was still in a state of depression,
countermanded by state expenditures [for a good, if somewhat economic,
critique of Baran and Sweezy see Paul Mattick's "Monopoly Capital" in
Anti-Bolshevik Communism]
In addition, the world was becoming economically "tripolar," with a revitalised
Europe and a Japan-based Asian region emerging as major economic forces. This
placed the USA under increased pressure, as did the Vietnam War. However,
the main reason for its breakdown was social struggle by working people. The
only limit to the rate of growth required by Keynesianism to function is
the degree to which final output consists of consumption goods for the
presently employed population instead of investment. And investment is the
most basic means by which work, i.e. capitalist domination, is imposed.
Capitalism and the state could no longer ensure that working class struggles
could be contained within the system.
This pressure on US capitalism had an impact in the world economy and was
also accompanied by general social struggle across the world. This struggle
was directed against hierarchy in general, with workers, students, women,
ethnic groups, anti-war protesters and the unemployed all organising successful
struggles against authority. This struggle attacked the hierarchical core of
capitalism as well increasing the amount of income going to labour, resulting
in a profit squeeze (see section C.7) creating an
economic crisis.
In other words, post-war Keynesianism failed simply because it could not,
in the long term, stop the subjective and objective pressures which capitalism
always faces.
C.8.1 Does this mean that Keynesianism works?
C.8.2 What happened to Keynesianism in the 1970s?