Freedom in the Existentialist Views of J.P. Sartre and A.Camus

by Boriana Handjiyska

Introduction

Freedom is a topic extended all around the world. There have been many wars, revolutions, uprisings for the sake of freedom. Many speeches begging for it. Many campaigns pleading for it. And many misunderstandings in relation to it, since people perceive freedom differently. There is no precise definition of this word. Freedom is not only the formal juridical freedom but there is much more attached to it. It appears constantly in the small things in everyday life. How is it expressed? How free are we really? These questions have bothered the existentialist philosophers J. P. Sartre and Albert Camus. The topic interests me because living in a free country I have always taken it for granted. I was thinking one can do anything one wants because we are free by the constitution. However, as I am growing up I see that there are many things I want to do but the Other does not want me to do or things we both want to have but there is no possibility that we can both have them. The Other acts as setting the boundaries of my freedom. Sartre develops this idea further in his book Being and Nothingness.

Also there are the things one should not or should do e.g. one should not be climbing the trees on the street, should not be jumping in the tram but one should be crying at the funeral of one’s mother - things that are not against the law but are against the habits of society. So I see I am not so free as I thought I am. Society plays an important role in our behaviour. Albert Camus was impressed by how much society defines our freedom. His philosophy on the topic he has asserted in his book The Outsider.

In the present work I am going to explore the following questions: „to what extend are we an image of our own project?“ and „how free are we to choose ourselves?“ according to Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. My analysis of their philosophical thoughts will be based on Sartre’s work „Being and Nothingness“ and Camus’ book „The Outsider“. I am going to investigate the two philosophers separately in order to deepen our understanding of their ideas, starting with introducing the concepts of Sartre.

Main part

According to J. P. Sartre freedom is what everyone has - me, you. A being-for- itself has absolute freedom in relation to things. Another being-for-itself has an absolute freedom in relation to things also. However, when these two absolute freedoms meet the absoluteness is not possible anymore. A competition between freedoms occurs. My freedom is there where the Other’s is not. The Other sets the boundaries of my freedom. Sometimes it happens that I by purpose give away my freedom. One example is the army. When a soldier goes to the army he gives a promise to obey his masters. This way he automatically gives away his freedom because to be free is to be able to choose. Sartre calls this Bad Faith. The soldier escapes from his responsibility by giving away his freedom, by saying he was just an instrument for somebody else’s choices. However, this excuse is doomed to failure because it was still he who was killing people, it was his responsibility - „Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose.“ Another act when freedom is affected by Others is love. When a person loves s/he gives away her/his freedom to the Other. This again is an act of Bad Faith. „I am condemned to be free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free.“ Freedom is the ability to choose. We are a choice which we know well because of our facticity. We are choosing all the time, constantly, perpetually. Freedom is an essential thing for us human beings, beings for-ourselves. Total freedom is not possible since there is an everlasting competition between the freedoms available in a particular place and time. Total without-freedom-ness is not possible either since any attempt to give it away is doomed to failure - it will still be my choice. J. P. Sartre makes an attempt to describe what freedom exactly is in Part 4, chapter 1 of his book Being and Nothingness. However, he says, he finds it difficult since describing something is looking for its essence. And „freedom has no essence“ . „Freedom makes itself an act, and we ordinarily attain it across the act which it organizes with the causes, motives and ends which the act implies“. That is to say that freedom is revealed by the act, we can experience the freedom only through act. It is not possible to describe freedom that is valid both for me and for the Other, thus no essence of freedom may be concluded. The freedom in one individual is different from the freedom of any other individual, there is nothing in common which can be named essence. Freedom is beyond essence since it is „the foundation of all essences“. After explaining this, Sartre concentrates his efforts on describing his own freedom. He says that he has a consciousness. His consciousness is nothing (not a thing) but an activity. It is annihilated, made „nothing“ in which he is undetermined, free to project and choose himself. „Under these conditions freedom can be nothing other than this nihilation“. We are free because we are not „enough“, the human reality is not „enough“, there is space for changes, for choosing and projecting, because there is a nothingness that we possess which nothingness is actually our freedom. Sartre goes further and finds the freedom that beings-for-themselves (human beings) refuse to recognise as existing. Everything I do, everything I experience is subjective and I am the one that constructs its meaning. „Psychologically in each one of us this amounts to trying to take the causes and motives as things. We try to confer permanence upon them. We attempt to hide from ourselves that their nature and their weight depend each moment on the meaning which I give to them;“. I find this statement very important, but not original since a similar thing was said by Nietzsche a hundred of years before, because it allows a different view of the things in the world. It reveals the potential of the thoughts. When everything depends on the meanings we give, then, we should think positively and we should give the meanings that we want, however unusual they are, not the ones we are expected to give and this would bring us closer to reaching our purposes.

Further, Sartre concentrates on the question „what does it mean to be free?“. He says that the common opinion is that to be free means more than just to choose oneself. „A choice is said to be free if it is such that it could have been other than what it is.“ And he gives an example: He goes on a hike with friends; he feels fatigue and gives up, but all his friends reach the resting place, although they feel fatigue as well. Could he have done otherwise? Obviously the answer is „yes“, but what interests Sartre is the other question: „Could I have done otherwise without perceptibly modifying the organic totality of the projects which I am; or is the fact of resisting my fatigue such that instead of remaining a purely local and accidental modification of my behaviour, it could be effected only by means of a radical transformation of my being-in-the-world - a transformation, moreover, which is possible?“ He, then, goes into describing the relation between the fatigue and his body and between the fatigue and his companion’s body which does not elucidate the above question very much. The desired answer I found a few pages later where Sartre says: “...every action, no matter how trivial, is not the simple effect of the prior psychic state and does not result from a linear determinism but rather is integrated as a secondary structure in global structures and finally in the totality which I am.“ Or, said with other words, he could not have done otherwise without perceptibly modifying the organic totality of the projects which he is because his action becomes a part of his totality; making a different action would consist in changing this part of his totality and therefore will modify it perceptibly. The straightforward answer he gives later on by saying that in the above described situation „...not...I must necessarily stop ... I can refuse to stop only by a radical conversion of my being-in-the-world; that is, by an abrupt metamorphosis of my initial project - i.e., by another choice of myself and of my ends. Moreover this modification is always possible.“ We are free to choose and every choice, however trivial it is, constructs ourselves, modifies us in a certain way that would be different if our choice was different.

This assertion implies that we should give equal importance to our behaviour in everyday life not only in front of others but also when alone or engaged with trivial things since behaviour is the consequence of choices that we are making and, as we said, every single choice constructs us in a particular way. This whole construction of trivial choices, which is actually me, will influence my choice when I am faced with an important decision. Sartre does not actually say this implication but what I am trying to do is to give a practical application of Sartre’s philosophy and thus to show its closeness to reality. Let us return now to the original text.

It is possible, though, to intrude “upon myself... projects which contradict my initial project without... fundamentally modifying the initial project“. To elucidate this assertion Sartre gives an example with inferiority complex: Let us take that Sartre’s goal is to choose himself as „inferior in the midst of the others“. At the same time he has a stuttering defect, which supports his inferiority complex. By trying to eliminate this defect he contradicts himself since he is actually trying to eliminate the support of his inferiority complex. However, even if he manages to push aside the stuttering defect he does not stop feeling inferior, for this is not his aim. In the place of the old suffering now occurs a new one which acts as a substitute for the stuttering defect and aims at pursuing the same initial project (to choose himself as inferior). In this way the initial project is not altered at all, the only changed things are the means of fulfilling this project. Sartre goes further in clarifying this example. „The choice of total ends although totally free is not necessarily nor even frequently made in joy“. I find this statement rather pessimistic. It means that we are perpetually choosing things we do not like and thus acting masochistically. As in the example above choosing to feel inferior is not a choice of pleasure but one of necessity to choose. The fact that the inferiority was voluntarily chosen „does not mean ... that he [the one that feels inferior] is to experience any joy when ... [it is] most forcefully realized“, although one could argue that at the time when he made the choice he actually believed that this was the right thing for him. This would be logical since if he did not think it was good for him he would not have done it. To feel inferior in a particular field implies of necessity to wish to be great in this particular field. „The choice of inferiority implies the constant realization of a gap between the end pursued by the will and the end obtained“. According to Sartre choosing an inferiority complex is an act of Bad Faith because the consciousness escapes to recognise the „true ends“ and creates a false image of the achieved success.

The next question to occur is to what extent can I choose myself e.g. „Can I choose to be tall when I am short? To have two arms if I have only one?“ Sartre is interested in ascertaining the relation between freedom and facticity. He does this by firstly introducing the argument of the deterministic point of view which maintains that we can not escape our facticity, we are made „by the climate and the earth, race and class, language..., heredity..., acquired habits...“ Sartre accepts this argument but he says that it is not relevant to the question of freedom that he is discussing. „In particular the coefficient of adversity of things can not be an argument against our freedom, for it is by us - i.e. by the preliminary positing of an end - that this coefficient of adversity arises.“ To make this assertion clear Sartre gives an example. If you want to remove a crag from its place it will resist and this way it will be negative. However, if you want to look at the view from above, it will be helpful and therefore positive. The crag, not illuminated by an end - displacing or having a better view - is neutral. So it is I who chooses if the crag will be positive or negative in relation to me, if it will be of help to me or of perplexity. Our freedom is synthesised. Although the many conditions that construct us and our experience are determined, we can organise them as we want. We are free to create of them, and ourselves whatever we like. However, it was not I who chose the crag to be there at all. We can not choose the situation but we can choose how to orient it towards ourselves, which is the more important of the two. Since if we could choose the situation it would become subjective - now only the perception of it is subjective - and by definition a situation is objective.

Choosing how to orient a situation should not be equal to a simple wish, though. „The choice, being identical with acting, supposes a commencement of realization in order that the choice may be distinguished from the dream and the wish.“ In order for a wish to become a choice there has to be an attempt at fulfilling it, otherwise it remains a simple wish which is not relevant to the question of freedom.

The next question to occur is about the relationship between our past and our freedom. Sartre has already proved that we choose ourselves. However, we have a past. Do we also choose our past? Obviously the answer is no „...the freedom which escapes towards the future can not give itself a past according to its fancy...“ and then „it can not produce itself without a past“. We make all our decisions on the basis of our past. Sartre gives an example with an officer in the Navy who tries to escape his past by means of suicide. The fact that he tries to escape it, shows that the past does exist and is also irremediable. Another point is that there are many things which happened earlier but which are still existing e.g. „the suit of clothes which I selected six months ago, the house which I have had built, the book which I began last winter...“ Past is not only what has happened but it is also continuous into the present. Or, put the other way round, presence is partially past, „essence is what has been“. However, Sartre sees here a paradox. „I cannot conceive of myself without a past; better yet, I can no longer think anything about myself since I think about what I am and since I am in the past; but on the other hand I am the being through whom the past comes to myself and to the world.“ The question is how is it possible that I am partially presence and partially past and at the same time I am the one who makes into existence this past. There is a sort of contradiction here and Sartre tries to explain it. He introduces a new term „what is“ with which he names the past. The future according to Sartre, „is the not-yet-existing-state of what is“. The future is based on what is. What is does not explain what is not yet. The end gives meaning to what is. However, this end is found in the future. Therefore actually the future illuminates that which is the past. The future makes the past irremediable since „if the past is that in terms of which I conceive and project a new state of things in the future, then the past itself is that which is left in place, that which consequently is itself outside all perspective of change.“ Thus there is an unbreakable connection between the future and the past since in order for a future to exist there ought to be a past and in order for a past to exist there ought to be a future.

Here Sartre again has taken an unusual position. Normally the story goes from past through present into future. Sartre starts from the future going back to the past. He does not mention present at all. He tries to look either from the past into the future or the other way round which I think is not correct since the one that looks is always situated in the present. Therefore if something illuminates past and future the most it should be the present. The whole work of Sartre is based on the presupposition that freedom does exist. Albert Camus presupposes this as well. However, the two philosophers view freedom from different angles: the former considers it something innate and inner for the being-for-itself, while the latter views it as something external liable to influence by society. According to Camus we are originally free, but once having entered into society we are obliged to follow its habits and requirements. This is where Camus encounters absurdity. People decide that there is some particular truth and everyone starts to believe in it in order not to look a fool in the other’s eyes. If somebody does not accept this truth he is considered „outsider“. His truth might have been as logical and as understandable as the truth of the society, but no-one would pay attention to it - he would simply be claimed to be „outsider“. This is the case with Meursault. Already in the beginning of Camus’ book „The Outsider“ the clash between Meursault’s actions and the probable opinion of society can be felt: after saying „It’s not my fault“ Meursault immediately thinks “maybe I shouldn’t have said that“. Why not? The expressed idea was correct: it was not his fault. Who, then, decides what is right to be said and what is wrong? Who decides whether Meursault should see his dead mother in the coffin or not - „Don’t you want to [see your mother]? I answered, No. He didn’t say anything and I was embarrassed because I felt I shouldn’t have said that.“? Who decides what is the sort of thing to be said to a gentleman whose mother has died recently - „Just then his wife had said to him [the caretaker], That’s enough, that’s not the sort of thing to be telling the gentleman“?. The power of society leaves its mark even on the trivial moments in human life. Its habits are strongly set into a human’s mind. No matter whether they are justified or not, logical or not, they are considered right. Everything contradicting them is said to be immoral and their source is punished. To illustrate this Camus creates his character Meursault, the outsider, who in the end of the book is executed, partly because he did not cry at his mother’s funeral. During the process against Meursault the just representative of the law, Meursault’s lawyer, makes him promise not to say at the hearing, or in front of the examining magistrate that „to a certain extent all normal people sometimes wished their loved ones were dead“. He is angry because of the non-standard ideas of his client. He even asks Meursault „if he could say that I’d [Meursault] controlled my natural feelings that day. I said, 'No, because it’s not true.' He looked at me in a peculiar way...“ The representative of the society in the face of the lawyer and the outsider can in no way understand each other, neither of them can accept the other - they have radically different value systems.

Conclusion

Both Sartre and Camus believe that freedom does exist. Sartre tries to open people’s eyes and make them see that they are free to choose and create themselves, and that their happiness lies in their own hands. Camus urges them to realise how much they have limited their own freedom by giving it away for the benefit of society. Both philosophers are concerned about the human present and future. Each in his own way reveals new truths to human beings about themselves showing them new potential for happiness, encountered in the freedom that everyone possesses.

Bibliography

Camus, Albert, „The Outsider“, Penguin Group, Harmondsworth (1983).

Sartre, Jean-Paul, „Being and Nothingness“, Routledge, London (1995).

Сартр, Жан-Пол, „Сартр за Сартр ситуации“, ЕА, Плевен (1996).

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