| Dardanelles Victory Timeline |
Comparison with Our Timeline, and General Commentary |
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By the end of 1914 the western front had apparently stabilised
along a line of trenches from Switzerland to the North Sea. Even before
the trenches had been constructed the French army's attempt to push
east had been a bloody disaster.
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Historical events, predating the point of divergence.
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Some of the French general staff, led by Marechal Joseph Joffre and
with the lukewarm support of the British commander Sir John French,
supported a renewal of the attacks regardless. Most of the British
strategists wanted an operation that used Britain's naval might to good
effect. Proposals included a landing on Germany's Baltic coast or
inserting troops into Montenegro and Albania to support Serbia.
The British War Minister, Field Marshall Earl Kitchener, seemed mired
in pessimism: believing that the war would have to won on land with
an army of millions, and would take three years.
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French was more than lukewarm in support, and the French general staff
more united. The Baltic proposal is historical, the Serbian one I've
made up since it's an obvious idea. Kitchener's beliefs are historical:
they were proven spot-on in our timeline.
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The idea that Britain eventually came to champion was an operation
against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had entered the war on the
Central Powers' side at the end of October 1914. To date its offensives
had been bloody fiascos, but that was arguably all the more reason to
regard it as an easy target. The Ottoman navy was obsolete, although
two modern German warships with German crews, the Göben and the
Breslau, were operating out of Turkish ports under nominal Turkish
command and names.
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Pretty much historical. The only time the Ottomans fought on their home
soil was during the Dardanelles campaign, and they did a pretty
reasonable job. But the rest of the time, fighting on the periphery of
their empire, they were hopeless. The Ottoman leader at the time was
Enver Pasha, a soldier whose delusions began with adequacy and
progressed from there. This didn't help.
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The key decision-making body in Britain at the time was the War Council.
Its most powerful member was Lord Kitchener, but by far the most inventive
intelligence was Winston Churchill. Churchill had persuaded the government
into an aggressive diplomatic stance with respect to the Turks, and arguably
been responsible for the Ottoman Empires's entry into the war.
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More or less historical.
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Colonel Hankey, Secretary to the War Council, proposed a joint naval and
military attack on Turkey. Much of his plan depended on factors beyond
his control: many of the troops, for instance, were to come from (currently
neutral) Greece and Romania, and the Russian army were expected to march
into Hungary in order to distract the Austrians. This received general
support from the war council, with Kitchener suggesting an army of 150,000
troops.
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Again, historical.
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Opposition to the plan came from two sources. Sir John French, commander of
the British armies in France, still wished to launch a fresh offensive. But
the terrible casualty figures of 1914 had blunted his enthusiasm, and he did
not press the War Council as strongly as he might.
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Historically the War Council reluctantly agreed to French's requests, saying
that this was his last chance: if the offensive failed a new theatre would
have to be found. The War Council's refusal actually seems the more likely
course to me.
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The second source of opposition was Churchill, who wished to send a purely naval
force to the Dardanelles. Churchill had attempted to persuade Admiral Carden to
support his plan, but Carden had responded that he believed the project probably
impossible. Churchill nonetheless made an impromptu presentation at the War
Council, where Hankey, forewarned by Carden, conducted a detailed rebuttal of the
proposal to which Churchill, with his ideas as yet half-formed, could not
effectively respond. Hankey then reminded Churchill of Churchill's own statement
in 1911 that "it is no longer possible to force the Dardanelles ... nobody would
expose a modern fleet to such a peril". Churchill, always prone to bipolar
disorder ("manic-depressive" in older terminology), retreated into a deep
depression and played no significant part in the War Council's deliberations
for weeks.
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Historically Churchill persuaded the War Council to first attempt a purely naval
operation. It seems astonishing in retrospect that even as eloquent an orator as
Churchill could persuade such an august body to make a major change in policy on
the basis of a few minute's exposition and almost no discussion. In order to
prevent this I've indulged in a little contrafactual overkill: making Churchill
less eloquent on the day, Carden more assertive and politically active, Hankey
more assertive; then piling one of Churchill's "black dog" depressive episodes on
top of that. It's perhaps excessive but I may as well get all my justifications
on the table at once.
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During February the entire Dardanelles area was defended by just one Ottoman
division, about 15,000 men split up into garrisons of a few thousand each.
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Historical. The official Turkish history of the Dardanelles campaign states that
"Up to 25th February it would have been possible to effect a landing successfully
at any point on the peninsula, and the capture of the straits would have been
comparatively easy.". This neglects the sheer physical difficulties of a winter
landing, which I presume to be substantial in the absence of better knowledge.
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A second division arrived in mid-February, to defend the Asiatic coast.
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In our timeline the purely naval attack went in on the 19th of February, and this
spurred the Turks into sending a lot more troops. Without that obvious threat I'm
having the Turks receive only modest reinforcements. The naval attack took very
heavy losses and achieved nothing, largely because battleships couldn't enter
minefields and the minesweepers couldn't go near the guns in the forts: as long
as the forts and minefields were together the British were pretty helpless.
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As part of German military assistance for Turkey, General Liman von Sanders was
sent to inspect the Turkish defences around the Dardanelles and Thrace. He
pronounced them hopelessly disorganised, and immediately advised extensive
entrenchment and repairs to key roads. The Dardanelles were not, however, seen
as a critical theatre, and fewer resources were allocated than von Sanders
had advised.
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Liman von Sanders was historically placed in command of the Dardanelles forces.
In the alternate timeline the threat to the Dardanelles hasn't been magnified
in the minds of the Turks and Germans by the naval attack, and it doesn't seem
worth wasting von Sanders on it full time. So von Sanders has
more of a travelling brief, with responsibilities beyond the Dardanelles.
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By mid-March Turkish defences were better, but far from perfect. A third division,
rather understrength, had arrived and von Sanders concentrated it at the neck of
the Gallipoli peninsula. He considered this the vital point, since its capture
would cut off whatever forces were placed in the peninsula itself, along with the
forts. In the event only a token force was available to garrison the beaches themselves.
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By late March in our timeline the Turks would have six divisions in the vicinity
of the Dardanelles. The concentration on the neck of the Gallipoli peninsula is
historical. The neck was the first place the British looked to land, but they
realised the defences were too tough and had to relocate southwards.
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Overall command and the naval forces were placed under the command of
Vice-admiral Hamilton Carden.
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Carden is the historical commander for the February attack on the forts, after
their failure he was replaced by Rear Admiral John de Robeck.
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The land force would be under the command of Charles Monro.
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The historical commander was General Ian Hamilton, who, to put it kindly, seems
to have squandered some opportunities. Monro replaced him much later and
conducted the withdrawal with great skill, since there isn't going to be a
withdrawal in the alternate timeline I'll take the opportunity to introduce him
now.
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The landings were planned for the 19th of March.
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I've scheduled the (anhistorical) landings a month later than the (historical)
naval attack because I couldn't see a landing going ahead in winter. If the
landing could go ahead earlier then it would probably be a lot easier, because
the Turks have almost nothing there. But I don't want to cheat too much.
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