| Dardanelles Victory Timeline |
Comparison with Our Timeline, and General Commentary |
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Legacies of the Great War
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The Third Balkan War
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I see some sort of conflict between Turkey and Greece as inevitable. Turkey is
not going to tolerate its humiliation, and Greece will hold its gains without
fighting for them only as long as it receives support from the western allies. In
the alternate timeline London being pro-German is an even bigger black mark than
it was in historical London (since Germany is still a powerful state). If
Constantine gets back into a position of power then Greece loses its support, and
probably loses eventually. And I can't see why that shouldn't happen, unless
Constantine can be kept out of power until he dies, historically in 1923. In
which case the key question becomes how much a British alliance is worth in the
long run.
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After the war Greece was rewarded for its belated entry into the war by being
given part of Asia Minor, surrounding Smyrna. At the time the Aegean littoral of
Asia Minor had a substantial Greek population. Mustafa Kemal was sent back to
Turkey to arrange for the demobilisation of the Turkish army, but instead
established his own government in competition with the British-controlled one in
Constantinople. Greece had accepted back Constantine as its king (he'd been
deposed under allied pressure during the war) and his pro-German sympathies made
it possible for Atatürk to secure British neutrality. He then made war on
Greece and ejected the Greeks from Anatolia, the Turk's second ethnic cleansing
of the century. The Greeks call this period the Asian Minor disaster.
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The Myth of Betrayal in Germany.
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The German people had been fed a diet of confident propaganda, and
believed right to the end that victory was within sight. The
unfavourable peace terms were inexplicable, and the German people
demanded a scapegoat.
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It seems incredible that, after four years of the most brutal conflict the
world had ever seen, the German people could have greeted peace
with anger and dismay. The leadership, however, were aware that they
had lost, even if the common people weren't. In the alternate timeline
even this isn't true, since the leadership think it's been lost for
them by Austrian perfidy and/or incompetence.
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The German government was only too happy to present them with Austria.
To the German people of 1917 any power of the perceived military
incompetence of Austria was unworthy of any respect whatsoever. It was
claimed that a deranged Austria had dragged a reluctant
Germany into the ruinous war.
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The corresponding myth was of betrayal by the government. Civilian
control of the government and the military was thoroughly discredited,
and strength became considered more important than accountability.
These were the fertile fields in which Nazism germinated. Germany's
complaint of Austria demanding its entry is disingenuous, Germany was
eager for war. I consider Germany's issue of carte blanche to Austria
in 1914 to be the key decision that brought on the first world war.
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German foreign policy abandoned Austria as more trouble than it was
worth. Diplomatic feelers were put out to Russia, France and Great
Britain. The Russian reaction was positive, since anything that split
the German-speaking powers from each other was considered good news in
Petrograd. France, also, gradually moved toward a friendlier
relationship than had existed for a long time, the compromise over
Alsace and Lorraine being more stable than dominance by either party.
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In the historical timeline it's very hard for Germany to accept its
lot, because Versailles is so crippling. It therefore plots its
revenge.
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Great Britain, on the other hand, was most concerned with its old enemy
Germany and its potential one Russia (with whom it now shared a land
border, between Russian Armenia and British Mesopotamia). Berlin had
nothing to say to such fears, and relations remained cool despite
personal links between Wilhelm II and the British royal family. By
abandoning Austria Germany greatly weakens the European front against
Russia. Austria-Hungary is far too weak on its own to stand up to the
sort of pressure Russia can exert.
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British fear of Russia corresponds to allied action intervention
against the Soviet Union. In the one case Russia is feared because it
is strong, in the other it is hated because it was weak. Life can be
dreadfully unfair, and the Russians know that better than anyone.
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Italian dissatisfaction.
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Italy was thwarted in its ambition to take Dalmatia. Negotiations were
begun with Russia, with a view to a further partition of Austria.
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Italy wasn't happy in the historical timeline either, but a hatchet job
on Yugoslavia was politically impossible. Italy instead invaded
Abyssinia and Albania.
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Czech and Polish Discontent
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The more sophisticated minorities of Russia and Austria-Hungary will be a problem.
In Russia they'll be oppressed for the time being. Austria-Hungary, though, may
not be strong enough to resist demands for some sort of representation.
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With the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the disintegration of
Russia, the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks gained their independence,
contributing to the new patchwork of states across Eastern Europe. In
the 1930s these states would prove too divided (internally, as well as
one from another) to resist the fascist tide. There's less sympathy for
the Czechs and so forth in this setting, because the Czech legion
hasn't had a chance to impress and people like Masaryk haven't had a
chance to lobby.
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Russian revolution?
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Russia's fundamental weaknesses are still there, and Nicholas II isn't
going to be able to solve them. But for the time being they'll be kept
below boiling.
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No revolution in 1917. This is because the war is going better, the
existence of overseas markets means that there is less suffering, and
the war almost ends too soon even for an historical revolution.
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The Spanish Influenza
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In 1919 an unusually virulent strain of influenza will spread across the
entire world, killing millions. It may or may not have the misleading name
"Spanish 'flu".
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The historical death toll was more like tens of millions. Wartime shortages,
unsanitary conditions in trenches, and a lot of travel are the reasons I
assume a greater death toll in our timeline than the alternate one.
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The Recession of 1930
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I expect there'll be some sort of stock market crash and recession, if
not full-blown depression, around 1930.
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The extra two years of the war devastated Europe more severely. The
European economies were more dependent on American loans, and the
American banks themselves more extended. When the stockmarket crashed
in 1929 the world economy collapsed like a struck tent.
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Russian monster?
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With Germany and Austria humbled, and a new role as protector of Christian
Armenians in southwest Asia, Russia is ascendant. "Russia is never
as strong as it looks: Russia is never as weak as it looks." At this
time Russia is strong, and looks even stronger. On the other hand it has
just bitten of a chunk and new territory and won't feel too unhappy to be
given a chance to digest it.
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It took until the 1940s for Russia to become a monster again. In the
alternate timeline Russia is spared two revolutions, a civil war and
Joseph Stalin's distinctive style of governance, so it looks dangerous
from the word go.
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Japan and China.
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Historically China entered the war in order to gain some sympathy,
particularly from the United States. It paid off, with Japanese
encroachment on the Chinese in the 1930s being the main cause (directly
and indirectly) of the Pacific theatre of the second world war. In the
alternate timeline the Chinese don't make war, so there's far less
sympathy for them amongst the western allies. On the other hand neither
do the Americans, so this isn't a factor here.
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Rasputin.
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As long as the tsarevitch is sick and the tsarina is befuddled,
Rasputin will have some influence. But with the tsar present to keep
an eye on him he'll be kept under control.
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Rasputin became powerful when the tsar went to the front, because the
tsarina was left in charge.
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United States isolation?
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The U.S. attitude to the war is likely one of contempt. The Anglophone
democracy "special relationship" with Britain may exist, but it's quiescent.
America has no real reason to get involved politically in the wider world.
The United States Navy may wither away, like Cheng Ho's fleets. The army
has had no real role since the Spanish were defeated, and will also probably
shrink.
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It's much easier to dismiss war as pointless if you don't need to justify
your own involvement in it.
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Less severe effect on Europe relative to United States
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The United States profited from trading armaments and has become arguably
the largest single economic power.
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The United States' massive economic power throughout the middle of the
twentieth century was to a large extent a consequence of the
devastation of all potential rivals. If Europe isn't as badly crippled
by the Great War, and isn't holding the mortgages of Britain and France
(because they haven't run out of gold or foreign currency reserves to
the same extent), then the United States won't be as influential. Since
the Americans tended to be a little more idealistic than the Europeans
(not to be confused with a high moral position) this means the post-war
world will be a more pragmatic place.
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Less severe effect on traditional social structures
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The losses in the war are terrible, but ultimate success is seen as
at least partially justifying the cost. On the other hand, almost everyone
knows someone who died in the trenches.
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The war is won without everyone losing so many people that they
couldn't function. So the relevant generation still functions, you
don't get the well-remembered effect of "the old men are still running
everything because the people who should have taken over died in the
war". Well, not as much.
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Less pacifism
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Less doesn't mean none, of course.
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If you need an argument against war it's hard to beat the historical first
world war.
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Blitzkrieg
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Land battleships were seen as a very interesting new development, but
their use had
been so limited that there was enormous debate as to their best use.
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Only a very limited use of tanks, but any use is enough: everyone is
going to want this toy for themselves.
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League of Nations.
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The war ended, Europe settled back into balance of power politics. There
was some discussion of new security structures, but nobody was really
willing to give up enough sovereignty to make them work.
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No Americans means no league.
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The Quadruple Monarchy: Austria-Hungary-Bohemia-Illyria.
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Austria-Hungary restructured itself into a quadruple monarchy, rather
than a double: giving the Czechoslovaks and South Slavs the right
to their own elected assemblies. This movement toward a perceived
greater democracy gained Austria considerable sympathy in the west,
although power remained firmly in the hands of the aristocracy and
the upper middle class. Loss of territory had left Austria with few
enough Poles that their demands for autonomy could be ignored for now.
Whether the new system would function would depend partly on whether
Austria's giant enemies - Germany and Russia - gave it time.
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I figure Austria-Hungary can't survive without some changes. One of
them is to give the Slavs a stake in the country, like the Austrians
and the Hungarians. There are two relevant groups of Slavs: the
Czechoslovaks, who may be too sophisticated to ignore, and the Croats
and Slovenes, who have to be persuaded to vote the right way in a
plebiscite. The name Yugoslavia would piss off Serbia something chronic,
of course, so I've chosen the name Illyria for the Sloveno-Croat state
within the empire. Dalmatia was my other idea.
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