On June 1st 1976 Syrian military forces entered the Lebanese capital Beirut with the declared intention to bring an end to the Lebanese Civil War, which had been raging for more than a year. Israel did little to oppose the Syrian move, hoping it would bring stability to war torn Lebanon, fertile ground for Palestinian organizations terrorizing Israel. The Syrian presence in Lebanon was, nonetheless, very alarming to Israel. While Israel and Syria shared only a short border along the heavily fortified Golan Heights, Israel now faced the prospect of a much wider frontier incorporating the Israeli-Lebanese border. The Syrian army could now outflank to defences of the Golan Heights and attack Israel from the north. October 1976 therefore saw the establishment of the U.S. sponsored "Red Lines Agreement". This unofficial agreement saw Israel accepting Syria's domination of Lebanon, while setting Israel's three red lines; crossing these, the Syrians were assured, would invoke an Israeli military response :
Although ultimately victorious, the IAF had emerged bruised and battered from the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Arab surface to air missiles managed to hinder IAF operations and cost Israel the lives of many of its air crews. More than any other day, October 7th 1973 symbolized the IAF's failure to deal effectively with the Arab SAM threat, the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) operations over the Golan Heights costing Israel 6 Phantoms for the destruction of but a lone SAM Battery. At the time, experts had even gone as far as to suggest that the days of the close support and attack aircraft had ended, and that the IAF would no longer be able to provide sufficient assistance to Israeli forces on the ground. Neither was the effectiveness of their air defences lost on Arab military planners. Arab air defence forces became the key Arab element in dealing with Israel's superiority in the skies. Such was the confidence in their anti aircraft abilities that various Arab leaders envisioned a state in which their militaries could reach a strategic parity with the IDF and manage to confront Israel without the need for a strong Arab coalition. It was against this background that the third Israeli red line drawn up, Syrian SAMs now appearing to pose a very dire threat to Israeli national security.
The Syrian presence in Lebanon, however, failed to quell the fighting between various Lebanese factions and
the Syrian military was soon drawn into the fighting as well. Although initially siding with the Christians,
by early 1978 conflicting interests had turned the former allies into opponents and the Syrians were fighting
alongside Palestinian and Muslim militias against the Christian Falanges.
Israel's animosity to the same forces now confronting the Christians drew Israel into the conflict as well, and Israel begun
supporting the Lebanese Christians with money and arms. Tightening relations eventually led to an Israeli promise, made in August 1978,
to prevent the Syrian Air Force from attacking Christian strongholds.
When Syria launched a major offensive against the town of Zhahla in April 1981, therefore, the
Christians were quick to turn to Israel for assistance. Not only did Israel see the Syrian entry into Zhahla as a violation of
the 1976 agreement, but the Syrians had by now begun using helicopters in their operations. On
April 28th two Mi-8s supporting Syrian forces around Zhahla were downed by a pair of IAF F-16s, the type's first worldwide
kill. Previous months had also seen clashes between the IAF and SAF, some resulting in downed Syrian aircraft, but
the loss of the two helicopters in what it perceived as an aggressive and unfair Israeli move was Syria's last straw.
The same day saw Syrian SA-6 batteries moving to pre-prepared positions within the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, crossing Israel's third "red line".
Upon learning of the Syrian infringement the Israeli government quickly authorized the IAF to strike at these missiles and destroy them. Plans
were drawn up, aircraft were fueled and armed and men briefed, but poor weather postponed the strikes. Fighting with the
PLO, meanwhile, erupted in South Lebanon and Israel's attention was drawn away from the Syrian missiles. The fighting eventually
ended with an American brokered cease-fire, bringing silence to Israel's troubled northern settlements. The cease-fire, however, did not
facilitate the removal of the Syrian missiles and these remained in place in the Bekaa Valley, a brooding menace waiting for the IAF just beyond Israel's northern
border.
The year long calm on the Israeli-Lebanese border ended in June 1982 when fighting erupted once against between Israel
and the Palestinians. On June 6th 1982 Israel launched operation "Peace for Galilee" and IDF ground forces, with close IAF
support, begun a northward thrust into Lebanon which would eventually lead them to the gates of Beirut. Initial plans had
called for the operation to be directed solely against the armed Palestinian presence in South Lebanon, but as the PLO's ally,
Syria was soon obliged to participate in the fighting as well and the SAF begun confronting the IAF and flying attacks against Israeli forces. By June 9th it had
become apparent to Israel that the Syrians would have to be prevented from interfering with its operations against the PLO.
As IAF freedom of action was being hampered by the Bekaa Valley SAM sites, with more missiles reportedly being installed every day, IAF
strike plans against the sites were revived.
... To Be Continued
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