Arab hopes are fast dwindling that the United States will be able to play the role that President Reagan staked out on Sept. 1 when he unveiled his Middle East proposals.
Watching Israel's efforts to annex the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza and its continued military occupation of a large part of Lebanon, Arabs are troubled above all by the Reagan Administration's failure to challenge or restrain Prime Minister Menachem Begin.
The Arabs still believe, however, that a practical basis for solving the Middle East conflict can be found, given fresh determination on the part of America to bring some balance to its policies--to insure the achievement of Palestinian national rights and to make clear to Israel, once and for all, that its attempts to impose military hegemony and political conditions on its neighbors can only lead to further deterioration in the region.
Together, the Reagan proposals and the declaration made last September at the Arab summit conference in Fez, Morocco, could provide the underpinnings of a just and comprehensive settlement. (The Reagan plan calls for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, returning those territories to rule by the Palestinians in association with Jordan. The Fez plan also calls for Israeli withdrawal, while endorsing both Palestinians' right to self-determination and the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as their representative in any negotiations.) But no Arab leaders are willing to negotiate under duress, and they are extremely wary of plunging into a process that would produce only endless and unfruitful negotiations instead of a credible, practical peace.
Arabs feel that it is unrealistic of the United States to insist that we recognize Israel and join it at the negotiating table while, at the same time, Washington says nothing about Israeli actions in Lebanon and the occupied territories that seem aimed precisely at precluding the possibility of successful negotiations.
The Arabs wonder why the Reagan Administration does not recognize that Israel is embarrassing and manipulating it, threatening to paralyze United States policy throughout the Middle East.
Arabs see the Israeli strategy as a see-saw: American pressure on Israel to move faster on withdrawal from Lebanon is thwarted by sudden spurts of illegal Jewish settlement in the West Bank, thus diverting American attention and prolonging the Israeli military presence in Lebanon. At the same time, any possible effort by the Reagan Administration to elicit Israeli recognition of Palestinian rights is delayed and prevented by Israeli intractability in talks on withdrawal from Lebanon.
It is for this reason that Arabs looked on with confused dismay when in late December Congress added several hundreds of millions of dollars to the considerable aid Israel already receives from the United States.
The Arabs have expected that, at a minimum, Washington would use its economic leverage to express disapproval of Israel's conduct in Lebanon--and instead America seems determined to help Israel defray the costs of the war.
Arab leaders cannot help wondering whether by participating in United States efforts to bring order to the region they are, in effect, sanctioning an American reward for Israeli actions in Lebanon.
Arabs fear above all that the promise offered by President Reagan's initiative will become yet another victim of Israeli designs. They were encouraged that Mr. Reagan focused attention on the Palestinian issue--the root cause of the Middle East conflict--and declared, in effect, that the West Bank and Gaza are part of the Arab patrimony, thus implicitly refuting Menachem Begin's claim these territories are part of Israel. They were also heartened by the President's call for a freeze on Israeli settlements--and are troubled now by the prospect that the Reagan plan will be permitted to atrophy. The Arab countries disagree with some aspects of the Reagan proposal, particularly its rejection both of an independent Palestinian state and of the P.L.O. But as the Arab League delegation, headed by King Hassan of Morocco, made clear during its visit to Washington in late October, the Arabs are making efforts to synchronize many aspects of the Reagan and Fez plans and iron out the differences between them--especially over Palestinian self-determination and total Israeli withdrawal both from Lebanon and the territories occupied in the 1967 war.
The negotiations between King Hussein of Jordan and the P.L.O. cannot help but contribute to a further clarification of the Arab position--and the outcome of those talks would be vouchsafed by an Arab consensus.
King Hussein's visit to Washington in December was an attempt to probe the United States' commitment to create conditions that would be favorable to an overall settlement of the kind envisioned by both the Reagan and Fez proposals. Yet neither King Hussein nor any other Arab leader can offer to join in a negotiating process unless they can rely on President Reagan's ability to deliver on his declared commitments.
With time running short both in Lebanon and in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, the Arabs are increasingly aware that they must soon reassess their position. They cannot continue indefinitely to put their faith in an American proposal that is disregarded and indeed flouted by Menachem Begin's Government. Nor do they feel they can trust the United States as long as it continues futilely to placate Israel in the hope influencing it. Finally, the Arabs seriously question the current exclusion of the rest of the international community from the search for peace in the Middle East.
Much may still depend on America's ability to implement its own declared policies--particularly its call for a freeze on settlements.
The visits to Washington of both King Hussein and King Hassan's Arab League delegation demonstrated the Arabs' readiness to achieve an overall settlement through consequential negotiations. But no Arab leaders will come to the table until they fell confident that they will not come away empty-handed, and they will join in futile negotiations that would only allow Israel to buy time to establish new realities in the occupied territories that undermine the prospects of achieving peace.
It is still in Washington's power to reassure the Arabs--by
exploring possible bridges between the Fez and Reagan
plans and showing that it is willing, when necessary, to be firm
with Israel. But time is running out. A failure to move
quickly now could have grave consequences for the chances of
peace in the region.
Clovis Maksoud is the Arab League's permanent
observer at the United Nations and chief representative in the
United States.
(text of January 11, 1983 New York Times op-ed
piece)
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