One further observation related to his repeated to his repeated use of the term 'feudal socialism' (64)
both in regard to the secession and throughout the book is that such a concept is fundamentally a
redundancy, socialist forms coming down to little more than a hybrid version of feudalism, if in an
ostensibly 'industrial' economic setting. Marx and Engels, of course, and Hartz reminds us of this, were
critical of the idea in their critiques of other socialists in Europe at mid-century, arguing that as capitalism
had come out of a feudal order it had destroyed, it could not be 'reabsorbed' into it (65), but even their
system is trapped, if not into being 'reabsorbed' into it, then by its inevitable proclivity toward its re-
emergence. 

     Whatever one may think of Calhoun's constitutional mechanics theories, and Hartz finds even
Fitzhugh "rightly terrified at the doctrines of the 'Calhoun school,'" (66) there is in Calhoun at least the
precursor of some rather contemporary sounding political science: 

	"There is also Calhoun's theory of the 'concurrent majority,' which supplemented
	state nullification with the nullification of individual 'interests.' When we pile the 
	one on top of the others, we have a scheme of man-made political instruments ..," (67)

which approaches in many respects modern interest group analysis (countervailing forces, iron triangles,
hyperliberalism, incrementalism, policy atropy, etc. as in Lowie and Lindblom, et al). 
   
     If the checks and balances system of the Framers was meant to check violent disparity of interests, it
certainly was desperately challenged with this conflict. It would not at all be inappropriate to label the
Civil War as a clear-cut example of system failure. The strength of the civil religion construct which is the
center-piece of this project was severely strained by the conflict, too.  There was quite obviously a breach
in the American civil faith with his division, but what may be more important is that there would have to
be a Confederate religious faith operative, perhaps grounded in the historical general 'American' one, but
also clearly differentiated from it, and which possessed the vitality and strength to sustain the rebellion in
the most tragic of circumstances, especially given some of the more glaring internal inconsistencies of the
theoretical system. 'Dixie' and Lee remain today powerful symbols in some areas, and the state flags of
Georgia and Alabama carry variations of the 'stars and bars,' while Georgia was the last state to adopt a
Lincoln birthday holiday, still not celebrated with the same 'enthusiasm' as elsewhere. 

     In his DISQUISITION, Calhoun articulated a distinction that distinguished government and
constitution (68), and whatever else this ideological construction did, it suggests the kind of invention
which civil religion represents as a social glue constitutive of the ramparts of governmental support.

     Part of the difficulty with the interpretation of Southern philosophy for Hartz may lie in the inordinate
emphasis which he seems to place on Fitzhugh as opposed to Calhoun. This is as much the case for the
period after the war as it is prior to that time. And the issue really isn't whether Fitzhugh can be taken to
have been broadly reflective of rebel thinking, a somewhat tenuous proposition, so much as it is that
voices like Calhoun's can be held to be somewhat more representative, especially among the elites of the
South which ran the show. But that may be one of the manners in which the trouble which Hartz has in
accepting the liberality of the South is rationalized. In portraying the 'Crusade Against Free Society'
carried on against 'free labor' in the North and beyond, that point becomes important for Hartz (69). He
would like to make Fitzhugh more reflective of Southern thought than Calhoun, though he admits to a
certain validity to the assessment by Marx of situations in Europe of little beyond a 'literary battle' of most
philosophical writers in the South:

	"The battle of the Southerners was so literary that historians have only just
	begun to unearth it from the dust-ridden books in which it is buried." (70)

     The case he attempts to make that liberalism was at least not the dominant ideology in the region is
largely based on that false notion, that 'Tory socialism' was dominant over 'Tory capitalism.' This sense is
produced by way of emphasis moreso than argument, but then, it would be hard to do it in any other
manner, but the dichotomy is more imagined than real, in any case, the problem being that of 'liberalism'
itself, albeit in variated form. While it may be a literary device intended to convey the sentiments of
another's thought vicariously through the author, it is not clear that the characterization of capitalism by
Hartz is his or that of someone else:

	"Instead of confronting the ruthless class oppressions of a capitalism that 
	was rapidly reaching its peak, they confronted the easy early stages of a
	capitalism whose longevity was to be the marvel of the world," (71)

but the sentiments seem clearer, and his own, when he draws together the paragraph with:

	"They [Southerners] did not look backward to feudalism and they did not look
	forward to socialism ... [so that] ... they had removed Hamilton from history
	altogether." (72)

Here is the author's tacit acceptance of the Marxist interpretation of history.  If 'wage-slavery' and
'exploitation' were basic notions in Fitzhugh, his economic theory as expressed in CANNIBALS ALL!
carriers that analysis somewhat further:

	"My chief aim has been to show that labor makes value, and Wit exploitates
	and accumulates them ... "  (73)

adding that because capitalist surplus value in the North exceeded that extracted by slaveholders and that
this would only continue, "the increasing concentration of capital" would eventuate in "a revolution in
behalf of slavery." (74) Indeed, as socialism demonstrated, the world was 'drifting' in the direction of the
Southern system. And this came down to a justification of a tyranny of a majority within a liberal
democratic framework and such a position inevitably leads to Malthus. (75)

     There is, however, found, if in different degrees, a Southern 'promotionalism' as well as 'paternalism'
as an addendum, whether in Fitzhugh or Calhoun (76). While the character of such promotions differs
considerably from Hamiltonian and Whig initiatives, these being much more parochial and less capital
intensive in nature, it is the case that what they wanted to promote in the South "was industry, cities,
manufactures ... " (77) And Hartz reminds us that these were the things they had been so critical of in the
North and which had led to "'wage-slavery,' class conflict, 'socialism,' crime, riots, mobs." (78) Promotion
is not necessarily identical with accomplishing, and these configurations both had a variant form and less
of a basis for achievement through funding provisions. If it was less of a free trade system than found in
the North, it was not laissez faire, either. At the same time, however, some of the corner-stone provisions
of Whiggish policies were conspicuously absent, such as protective tariffs and national banking. And as
the above quote from Fitzhugh makes clear, the ideological foundations were substantively different than
those, for example, of Henry Carey. The South, in addition, was severely constrained from realization by
capital shortage, human or financial, with so little base for capital generation and so much capital locked
up in the slave system. It also had to contend with stiffer philosophical opposition and political counter-
weighting in the halls of government. The philosophical rhetoric of the region was, too, rampant with
rather abstract polemics and diatribes against Yankee money-making greed and the like. (79) In view of
all this, however, it is the contention of Hartz that:

	"... they were prophets in the American wilderness." (80)

     The 'religious' connotation of that choice of words is probably more strongly used in the context of this
paper than Hartz intended, but what is curious is his desire to call Carey a conservative but these southern
thinkers liberal. (81) Also somewhat curious is what may be vicarious attacks on Carey. As he has at other
junctures, Hartz attacks the idea of 'harmony of interests,' Carey's terminology, though there is no mention
of Carey and he is, indeed, implying something quite different with the concept (82). He similarly makes
use of Carey's term 'Association,' though attributing it to Henry Hughes although with essentially the same
content. (83) And, if there is a contradiction in the Southern 'faith,' there is, likewise, in Hartz. Fitzhugh
is virtually touted for his position on 'capitalist oppression' in the North which is attacked for its greed,
drive for money, and materialism, (84) while in the next breath, (85) the American and Hamiltonian
'conservatism,' which is better termed 'republican,' is portrayed as politically and economically liberal. It is
in this general context, however, that Hartz depicts the Southern conceptualization of their 'aristocracy'  as
virtually of the character of the Hebrew patriarch, (86) as he dances around its civil religion. It is probably
no wonder that these layers, in seeking to re-establish their ideological and power system in the period
after Reconstruction, called it 'Redemption.'

     The 'conservatives' of Whiggery might better be termed conservative liberals in Hartz' system, but a
much more apt terminology for them would probably be simply 'republican.' Their economic theory was
oriented toward what should more precisely be called republican capitalism than Hartz' term democratic
capitalism. Hartz has them abandoning elitism for this orientation by 1840, (87) but what had been altered
by the time of the emergence of the formal Whig Party was scarcely their economic perspective. If their
political tactics changed, it was toward a more popularized strategy perhaps, but Harrison's 'hard cider
and log cabin' campaign probably  benefited less from that than from both the collapse of the economics of
Jackson and Van Buren and the growing realization in the citizenry that the real elitist aristocracy was
grouped around 'King Andrew' and the Van Buren 'Regency.' This vision of the Jacksonians may have its
detractors, but is not unrecognized in the literature. Francis Jennings, for example, presents precisely such
a view of Jackson and his cohorts in his The Founders of America (88).It may be a valid observation to
find Lincoln incorporating a 'Jeffersonian ethos' to the American System, but the programmatic stance
remained largely unaltered, and the conceptualization which such an ethos supposedly represents was
really nothing new, for it was a central aspect of the American System, correctly understood, all along.
That is not to say that Lincoln was a particularly erstwhile representation of both stances. His style was
well-suited in its rhetoric to popular Biblical patterns, but he had been a Whig before he was a
Republican.

     Moreover, that dualism in Lincoln is probably something which has grown over time in retrospect with
his apotheosis. It should be remembered that his election in 1860 was as a minority President and one
whose strength was very sectional. Rather than seeing Lincoln as someone who "democratizes an elitist
liberalism," he is better viewed as republican. The 'New Whiggery' of Democratic Capitalism which Hartz
sees emerging after the Civil War had been there all along, albeit in an evolutionary incipient form.
Furthermore, the genealogy can be traced from Franklin and the Constitution to Hamilton and the
Federalists to Daniel Raymond and on through Marshall, Henry Clay, Peshine Smith, Henry Carey, and
Abraham Lincoln.

     The discovery of America which Hartz ascribes to the new Whiggery was not new, nor did it involve
"giving up its Hamiltonian trappings." Those simply were never what they were said to have been,
anyway. And the tradition of laissez faire and natural rights which for Hartz is such a corruption is as
thoroughly misunderstood then as it is now. There was not really an abandonment of Hamiltonian
promotionalism any more than the New Deal was any sort of rekindling of it. Nor was it the fear-
mongering tyrannical beast which Hartz would make of it. If market orientation predominated, it was
because the economic system had reached the level of development making it possible. That does not
preclude promotionalism, but merely alters its form to fit the conditions. The fact that Hartz stresses the
Progressive approach of incrementally seeking its agenda devoid of class-based rhetoric (89) serves to
illustrate and expose its actual nature. Progressivism may not have been 'socialism' per se, but it was, and 
is, the 'slippery slope' which would create it. In fact, it was Progressivism which invoked the 'terror' of 'red
scare,' and the issue was one of tactics toward an all too common end it held with socialism (as well as a
dusting of political economy in Marx's socialism which recognized in very limited ways some of the
problems of limited wealth notions and the contribution of capitalism). Wilson, from the Espionage Acts
to the Red to the income tax and the Palmer Raids may be the most obvious case study, but the same
manifestations are apparent in Theodore Roosevelt's Progressivism from its trust-busting to its
'conservationism.' It was the contemporary version of the same jacobinism which republican capitalism
had always had to contend with. 

     That point is underscored beginning with Harding and ranging throughout the Twenties. The 'Return
to Normalcy' was republican liberalism if you must. The rampaging encroachment of government had to
be contained and reversed. And in spite of the popularized  fiction about the period, its 'promotionalism'
was one of its most ingenious features. This was what came under attack from the jacobin elites. Thus,
Sinclair's imprisonment killed the deal with Lenin to develop the Soviet oil fields, and Elk Hills and
Teapot Dome, scuttled in part by improprieties to be sure, were actually promotional efforts by
government to support market mechanisms. Nor was it laissez faire that brought on the depression.
Exactly the opposite was in fact the case. It was interventionist control under the guise of supposed
promotionalism which sparked, deepened, and prolonged the crisis. And when the economic disruption
finally was put right, it was out of a very much 'supply-side' promotionalist Arsenal of Democracy
Roosevelt was forced by the necessities of the world situation to implement.

     This reading of Hartz does not read republicanism out of liberalism but it does suggest that Hartz has
done just that. Whether the matter of conformity can be attributed to it in the same manner which Hartz
locates it as arising in his self-assured liberal society is beyond the scope of this treatise. It might be
suggested, however, that the McCarthy debacle, as a generic entity, began out of a Progressive Presidency,
Truman, and was very much throughout its course under the watchful eyes and hands of such Progressives
as the Kennedys. One of the curious things about the McCarthy capers was the manner in which it mis-
specified the 'enemy,' a move which effectively purged Progressivism of many of its more Marxist
elements, leaving it under the control of the social democracy. McCarthyism can be directly traced to
Democratic Party purges of 'communists' with the conclusion of the 'Third Period,' and can be seen clearly
in associated union purges, such as that by the UAW of the Frankhouses. And somehow, mysteriously,
through the final chapters of Hartz, democratic liberalism becomes the starkly interventionist social
control mechanism which we have come to recognize it to be. Having lost its faith (if it ever held any) in
human nature, it has also come to abandon the civil religious tradition, much in the way that Rousseau
saw the deterioration of the General Will in inverse relationship to the expansion of the state's authority.

     One can readily see the anti-democratic impulses in Progressivism on the 'output' side while there was
a sense of democratization on the 'input.' A critical problem in the process, however, was the erection of a
wall between the two. Thus, the 'professionalization' that is represented by such as the Federal Reserve
and City Manager also removes both from political responsibility. How do you spell jacobin? More
critical, perhaps, would be the sense in which Rousseau's collapsing General Will indicates a loss of faith
by people in themselves as government takes over to micro-manage their lives. If liberalism began as with
the empowering conception of man operating against a limited government given to promote its interests,
it has become the 'savior' of the victims of this society of evil creatures, granting entitlements instead of
protecting rights, in an ever-progressing trend throughout this 'Progressive' century. And the extension of
entitlements is tied to group identification, such affiliation largely negating the individualism upon which
'rights' are grounded. Hartz even describes this:

	"We see this in the very primitive question of community ... as the collective
	ethos of the new liberalism supplanted the individualism of the old." (90)

     The philosophical juncture of this community as the collective existence of the people and the
economics of primitive accumulation and autocannibalization enforced by state through corporatist group
structure determination is precisely the definition of fascism. And, to repeat, having lost its faith in human
nature and also having come to abandon the civil religion, the collective representation upon which the
people grew in dependency as the guarantor of entitlements renders the corporatist state as the new deity
and religion. The old deity is dead and replaced by the state and any concept of filoque is lost, as well. The
individual is, after all, largely incapable of running his own affairs. The Old Covenant, now broken in its
failure, must be replaced by a new covenant in which the state is the savior.  Progressivism, Hartz
attempts to explain, is at considerable variance with socialism, of any variation, however. The two systems
in his analysis are essentially incompatible. In America, socialism had to compromise with progressivism
on such issues as regulation and trusts, and this proved devastating to the, especially in view of their
already  weak American presence. (91) Even where such accommodation was achieved, though, even with 
it, the differences were substantive:

	" ... it was the trust issue which really played havoc with the American 
	socialists, not because socialism did not blast monopoly but because
	its approach to it was radically different from anything the Progressives
	advanced. First of all, it did not blast monopoly in order to establish
	individualism, but rather to establish collectivism ..." (92)


     But then, that is what Progressivism did. And Hartz describes DeLeon's agreement with Bryan and
Roosevelt:

	" ... that America had once been a land of freedom and that trusts had 
	changed it when of course Marxism held that no capitalist society at
	any time, even in its  early fluid stages, was ever really free." (93)

     And yet, at least for Marx and in relativistic terms, it did just that. Capitalism was an advance over
feudalism in part on those grounds. The problem with trusts is representative of their mutual dilemna.
Both opposed the economy of scale and profit that trusts entailed. But this is very poor economics. It
delimits social surplus and the chase becomes a footrace to Malthus. There are myriad variations of
'socialisms,' of course, and some of these closely approximate the Progressive ideology. Actually,
Progressivism possessed patterns quite similar in some respects to anarcho-syndicalism (which also
closely approximates corporatist -- fascist -- forms), while in others it cohered with Marxism. Hartz, in
drawing the contrast, also points up some connections:

	"The point of connection, of course, was the charge that trusts and monopolies
	extracted from the state ... so that a restoration of the true 'America' automatically
	called for elimination of the political corruption which its economic corruption
	inspired." (94)

     There was also the difficulty of the concentration of power and wealth with which they were
concerned. The imperative of social surplus creation exposes this difficulty, but Hartz points up a
contradiction arising out of regulation motivating oligarchs 'to get closer to the government' forging
wealth and political power even more 'inexorably' concentrated. And that smacks of the corporatist state
problem. As has been addressed elsewhere in this examination, the entire idea of a Third Way between
capitalism and socialism is a falsehood anyway. But even if one cannot accept the 'slippery slope' thesis, it
is difficult to overlook at least considerable commensurability between socialism and progressivism. It is
fundamentally the equivalent of 'social democracy,' which is, in fact, just one of the 'mild' strains of
socialist theory. Both at base rest on the central conceptualizations of limited wealth and of human beings
as inadequate and in need of direction from an 'enlightened' elite of experts, professionals, cadre, etc.
Neither of them is liberalism. And quite to the contrary of the thesis that is the heart of Hartz that the
conformity character of liberalism produced the 'red scare,' they were much more a purge of by
progressives, a battle between progressives and 'radical' socialism, which he comments on at least in terms
of historical analysis:

	"Progressivism and the Marxian socialism it so passionately excluded blended
	into a kind of common iconoclasm, with men moving interchangeably between 
	the two." (95)

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