Ronald Gordon Ziegler
I. The Perot Effect
Any number of accounts of the 1996 elections will be entered, most making up in
enthusiasm and creativity whatever they may lack in substantive interpretation. Too many
pundits, political scientists, press, and Democrat politicians are all echoing variations of
the same theme. As they have increasingly since 1972 (and before), they are marching in
lockstep. They are at present proclaiming a decisive electoral victory for Clinton. In
reality, whatever it may have been, that was not it. There are some important reasons that
Dole's effort fell short. Understanding these offers some insights into and criticisms of our
political system which must not be ignored.
There is one big reason that neither Bush in his re-election bid nor Dole in his drive to
oust Clinton were successful. Or, conversely, there is that one big reason that Clinton was
able to 'win' the two contests. His name is Ross Perot. If you remove him from the picture,
both Bush and Dole win. But there were also media effects and informational cost effects
which played important roles in these two races. As for the Perot Effect, it can be seen
clearly in the popular vote for both elections. It is no less a certitude in the Electoral
College.
Table I -- Voting in 1992 and 1996(NYT, 11/7/96)
1992 1996
Clinton 43% 370 49% 379
Republican 38% 168 41% 159
Perot 19% 10%
There is an illusion of perhaps a 'strong' victory, but it is only illusion. The margin of
Clinton's victory was so thin in so many states that the Perot voter is probably a singular
difference in the outcome. In total popular votes, the Republican and Democrat candidates
collected roughly the same amount of votes in 1996 as the standard bearers had received
in 1992 ( NYT 11/7/96). The big apparent change in percentage of the vote has to do with
the decline in voter turn-out and in the Perot vote.
Some have speculated that the divided government result of the election is a sort of
collective conscious decision made by the electorate. But it is not, as so widely touted, so
much indicative of ticket splitting in any traditional sense, although that clearly occurred.
It gives added strength to the notion that the vote was a rejection of Clinton by a majority
of voters, but one divided between two 'alternatives.'
But as important as what the vote was 'against' is what the vote was 'for.' Otherwise, a
similar argument could be constructed for 1992 as a rejection of Bush. It was effectively
that, of course, but it was also more complicated than that. A consideration of GOP vote
erosion in state after state is clearly indicative of a siphoning off of Republican base vote
at the Presidential level in states which had solid Republican majorities and which
continued to do so at levels other than the Presidential vote.
Nor can it be overlooked that 1996 represents a quite peculiar phenomenon in
American presidential politics. When was the last time a President seeking re-election got
less than half of the vote? It has happened, of course . . . to Bush, Carter, Hoover, and
Taft in this century. But what do they have in common? They all were defeated. When
was the last time a President seeking re-election got less than half the votes and won?
It ain't happened! (Truman was elected in 1948 with less than fifty percent of the vote, but
he was being 'elected,' having become President when FDR died).
II. Vote Deficit
What is of consequence is that the campaigns were effected and affected. But what
seems to have been overlooked has been this impact of Perot's races on the election,
whatever the motivation behind it, for the substantive results they created. Political
scientists and pundits alike seem to be unable to acknowledge that one fact of political life.
But a strong argument can be offered that Perot's presence in the races adversely affected
both the Bush and Dole campaigns causing their loss. It is quite likely -- indeed, an almost
certainty -- that Clinton could not have won either time without that factor. A
consideration of returns across the nation fuels that analysis. In seventeen states, with 193
electoral votes, there was, in comparing 1992 with other recent elections, a real reason to
believe that if Perot had not been in the race, Bush would have carried them.
In few of these states was there a decline in the Democrat vote. However, for the
Republican ticket, the drop in each one was of significant proportion. Tracking the vote in
each over many elections seems to make 1992 aberrational. In a number of other states,
such as Indiana, the Bush vote seems to have been significantly reduced. Had Perot never
gotten into the race, or if he had even remained out once he had withdrawn, it seems
altogether plausible that not only would Bush have won re-election with perhaps 361
electoral votes, but that he would have readily carried the popular vote, as well. Bush
would not have needed all of these. He won 188 votes in the Electoral College, and there
were enough of these seventeen states where the vote was quite close enough that he
could have gotten the requisite 270 but for Perot. Even without California, Connecticut,
Iowa, Michigan, and Vermont, Bush would have won 271. And given both other races in
these states and subsequent electoral returns in them, more weight is lent to the possibility.
What can be seen in looking at voting returns in the last eleven Presidential elections in
each of these states is the clear indication of the 'vote deficit' Bush suffered a loss in to
Perot.
Variations in each party's vote in each of the past eleven Presidential contests are
around a line sloping upwards which could be suggested as a 'predictor' of expected or
potential vote for each party. (The slope could conceivably be downward, kinked, or even
level, but general population growth trends in most states should create the probability of
an upward slope in most). The variations seem to reflect short term impacts in the long
term trend. On this analysis (see Appendix A), Bush should have been expected to carry
California by about 600000 votes, having won perhaps as much as 5.5 million votes to
Clinton's 4.9 million. The 'deficit' in this number compared with the actual 1992 vote is 2.2
million for the Republicans and about .2 million for the Democrats. It is argued that the
character of the three way race increased voter turn-out somewhat, but it would seem that
most of the 'lost' Bush vote went to Perot.
If voters in California had followed the vote growth pattern of the most recent
elections, the 'average' gain might have been .24 for the GOP, giving them 5.29, and .18
for the Democrats, setting their tally slightly higher than it was at 4.88. 'Average' can be a
very misleading indicator, however, especially in this type of contest. The pattern for both
parties seems to have been a period of growth followed by a 'correction.' Although the low
growth of the Democrat vote could be seen as a 'settling,' there is little to indicate anything
normal about the GOP decline. Whether it should have been expected to hit 5.29 (or 5.5),
or more or slightly less, it should not have dropped much at all, let alone significantly,
especially against the backdrop of growing Republican strength in the state. The only
explanation for the big drop has to be Perot. Even the 'bad' Republican years of 1964 and
1976 pale against this drop. In percent change, the decline represents 1/3 of the GOP vote
in '88 (which was down itself from '84) compared to the mere 12% drop in 1964, and 16%
in 1976.
Similar patterns can be plotted for each of the states mentioned (again, see Appendix
A), as well as for the nation as a whole. A synopsis of projected vote and vote deficit for
each of the states mentioned can be constructed for 1992, indicative of the impact which
Perot had on drawing off votes which would otherwise have gone to Bush.
