V. Diminishing Returns

     Georgia is especially illustrative. The average Republican vote there has been steadily
on the rise, until 1992. Bush lost the state narrowly in his re-election bid, polling 43.0% of
the tally to Clinton's 43.6%. In 1988, Bush captured 60% of the state's electorate. Perot's
13.4% in 1992 accounts for nearly all of the decline in the Republican vote. It seems
unquestionable that Bush would have won Georgia had Perot not been running and drawn
off those votes. And, in 1996, as  Perot's vote total fell to 7% in Georgia, Dole picked up
the votes he needed to win a margin of 47% to 46%. Clinton's share of the vote was also
up 2.4%, but the Republican vote leap-frogged him (This occurs because of the decline in
overall vote and in Perot votes). While, as in the rest of the nation there was drop-off in
turn-out, it seems that the bulk of Perot's 6.4% drop went to Dole, whose share increased
by about five percent over what Bush had received.

     It could be suggested that Perot is in reality about building a new political party and
that the erosion of GOP strength is due to a genuine dissatisfaction with its standard-
bearers in both 1992 and 1996. But there is plenty of reason to wonder about Perot's
motivation. If he was serious, it is difficult to explain his conspicuous absence during the
balanced budget fight and the media's effort in placing 'blame' for the governmental shut-
down on the Republican Congress. Of course, back in 1989 when the government shut-
down, it was Bush's fault. Perot did come out swinging against Clinton in the waning days
of the 1996 campaign, but that served only to erode Dole's vote and re-elect Clinton.

     Perot's ravings have, however, been regularly disingenuous. He opposed NAFTA, but
enjoyed free trade status himself at his Texas airport. What he has accomplished is to
make many of the things he allegedly favored less likely to be accomplished -- from a
balanced budget to whatever. . . More importantly, it should not be forgotten that he
'owes' his fortune to the Democrats. When his fellow Texan LBJ won enactment of
Medicare thirty years ago, Perot's EDS operation got the contract to bill it, and that was
the well-spring of his wealth. It may well be that he is simply repaying the favor! 

     If that infers some sort of conspiratorial arrangement, the idea should not be dismissed
too lightly. It could, however, just as well have been a less auspicious phenomenon or
even a unilateral move on his part. It does remain a curiosity how he happened to
'withdraw' from the 1992 race (albeit temporarily) on the very day that Clinton was
nominated -- or, how he coincidentally re-entered the race just as Bush's numbers were
closing the gap; a move that 'froze' him out by drawing back enough of the votes he had
held but which were gravitating toward Bush. It is, of course, altogther possible that the
Perot candidacy was nothing more or less than it seemed to be. And yet, the  play put on it
by the media would nevertheless make the analysis here all the more pertinent even given
that.						

     That might be difficult to mesh with the impact the electoral turns have had for
Republicans in Congress. It is doubtful that they would have achieved the majority by
1994 if Perot had not put Clinton in the White House, but the movement toward a
Republican Congress, largely grounded in electoral shifts taking place in the South, was
nevertheless on track, if his actions have served to speed up the process. But it should not
be overlooked that if Perot's purpose is to build an enduring third party, if that is
successful (even in a small way), it would not be very long before Reform Party candidates
for Congress would effect the same kind of erosion of GOP strength at that level, as well.

     Yet, even the staunchest of Reform Party partisans will have to re-examine their status
now (and their effect). The effort appears very much to be exhibiting a tendency toward
half-life decline as the figure it is built upon suffers from a falling star. If it declines as
much over the next four years as it has over the last, it will cease to be much of a factor, if
it does not fade from view completely. That kind of diminishment suggests that the Perot
factor would no longer do in 2000 or thereafter what it has done in 1992 and 1996. On
that basis, the GOP would retake the White House in 2000 even as it increases its hold in
the Congress. That, of course, assumes that these voters will 'return' to the Republican
fold. They already have -- or rather, they never left it, at least in terms of voting for other
offices. In the 1996 election, for example, the Dole plus Perot vote roughly equals the
aggregate Republican vote for Congress.

VI. A Shadow of A Doubt

     Certainly, the 'success' level of Perot does connote at least some possible dissatisfaction
with either the Republican Party or its candidates for President in the last two elections.
The same does not appear to be so much the case in regard to either Congressional or
state candidates of the GOP as it does for the standard bearers, however. There, of course,
have been some serious flaws in Republican campaign efforts in these two races. Also,
Bush's violation of his 'no new taxes' pledge did not help him and there was some
sentiment that Dole was too much of a Washington 'insider.' But, without Perot's rather
heavy-handed presence, boosted considerably by the media, neither Bush nor Dole would
have lost. But that may not have been so central to the races as is often suspected,
draining some votes from the two men, but primarily from them to Perot or abstention,
but not to Clinton, whose numbers may have been shored up but not increased by such
concerns. The result is more likely to have been a more simple matter of how many pieces
the 'pie' of the electorate is cut into. Indeed, had it not been for the Perot option, such
concerns would not have impacted on either more than minimally.

     This sort of phenomenon of third party drain has not been uncommon in the nation's
history. Indeed, one aspect of realignment theory suggests that third parties arise as one or
both of the hegemonic parties fails at least in popular perception to meet expectations, and
this occurs near the end of any of the several party systems in our history (Asher 1987).
But realignment theory has its detractors (Schafer 1991). Nonetheless, George Wallace
did take so many votes in 1968 (at the close of the previous party system) that Humphrey
came within a whisper of squeaking out a win. Much the same thing took place in 1948
except that it assured Truman of victory then. That is not the spin almost universally put
on those elections, but it seems less than convincing to suggest that many of those who
voted for Wallace would have voted for Humphrey had Wallace not been running.
Similarly, the loss of votes in 1948 was undoubtedly more from Dewey than Truman, if
only on the basis of retrospective voting.

VII. The Impact of Third Party Campaigns

     We have also had to bear the consequences of such electoral blundering in 1912 and
repeatedly in the 19th Century (1800, 1824, 1844, 1848, 1852, 1856, 1856, 1860, 1884,
1888, and 1892). Sometimes it 'worked,' but not always. The splintering impact of such
politics certainly contributed to the cleavages that culminated in Civil War (Giennep 1988, 
CQ Guide, 1988). 

     It has been argued, as by Howard Gold (1995), that cases such as those represented by
the third party candidacies of Wallace and Perot, and to a lesser extent, Anderson, should
be considered as 'successes.' This is obviously to be juxtaposed to the more frequent minor
party campaigns which take place. But there are problems with analysis on the very
premise on which this is based. For example, Perot cannot be said to have been 'successful'
unless he won the election or impacted (changed) the outcome. One hundred and fifty
years ago, the lesson of such political expression was made quite obvious. The Whig Party
had as a plank of its American System program a commitment to the limitation of the
spread of slavery. While some Whigs might have wanted to abolish  the 'peculiar
institution,' they did not have the political muscle, nor were most convinced of any legal
basis for such an effort out of the unfortunate definition of human beings as chattel
property. Further, they were firmly convinced that industrialization of the nation would
render slavery obsolete as the value of labor rose (Carey, 1848). Much as future
generations may well look back upon us with disdain, it is rather easy for us to look back
askance at any toleration of such practices. And yet, there were those who ostensibly
sought through political means more radical and immediate efforts to abolish slavery. It
must be 'ostensibly' because, for instance, among their ranks would be included the late-in-
life rebirth of Jacksonian Van Buren, who in 1848 carried the banner of the Free Soil Party
for President. 

     Van Buren did not win of course. What his candidacy did do, however, was to nearly
draw enough votes from the Whig candidate Zachary Taylor that he only narrowly
defeated Van Buren's old pro-slavery Jacksonian ally, Lewis Cass. In other campaigns, the
Whigs were less fortunate. In 1844, the pro-slavery Democrat Polk defeated Henry Clay
because so many votes were siphoned off by the Liberty Party ticket headed by James
Birney. What such efforts did was to finally destroy the Whig Party after its loss in 1852
even as it maintained the political power of the Democracy's slavocracy over the nation. It
has even been speculated that a Clay victory in 1844 could have sent the country in a
direction that would have prevented the Civil War. More certain, perhaps, is that the
policies pursued by the Democrats as they maintained control through the ante-bellum
period, probably guaranteed that the conflict was inevitable. And yet, by Gold's standard,
the Liberty and Free Soil Parties might well qualify as 'successful.'

     The 'success' of the Perot campaign in 1992 and 1996 has to be seen as similarly
mitigating. It may have helped to usher in a Republican Congress, but that is far from a
certitude. It did not elect Perot, nor has it substantially helped achieve much of the
program supposedly advanced by Perot. In fact, with regard to a balanced budget, one of
Perot's big items, it may be seen as having postponed it in as much as divided government
in 1995 found Clinton able to block just such a development. It might be termed a success
if it achieved the objective of turning out George Bush (and in defeating Bob Dole). Bush
may have been no Henry Clay (although there are strong parallels between Clay and
Dole), but the point is clear. Continue