1976

1976 was different in that there would be almost no exigency under which a House
election would have taken place, as well as in regard to exigencies of the vote in a small
number of states. The issue of greatest pertinence was over the vote tallies in principally
three states, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Mississippi, as well as perhaps Delaware. On the
Republican side, Ford carried Maine by only 4000 votes in an election in which he would
carry California (narrowly), Illinois, and Michigan, and yet still loose. Actually, there were
court challenges entered for Ohio, but also for Wisconsin, Missouri, and New York.
Lower courts considered that only irregularities and not intent would have to be
demonstrated to effect some redress, while the Supreme Court, facing the prospect that it
could rule that Carter, who was already in the White House, could not be, decided that
such irregularity was not sufficient unless actual effort to produce it could also be
demonstrated. Ohio and Mississippi would have changed the outcome and the basis on
which Ford might have been able to challenge the vote in these states is different in each.
Carter collected 297 electoral votes to 240 for Ford. If only Ohio and Mississippi had
changed, Ford would have had 270 to 267 for Carter.

TABLE VI -- 1976 Results in Key States

Electors State Carter Ford Plurality

3 Delaware 122596 109831 12765
7 Mississippi 381309 366846 14463
23 Ohio 2011621 2000505 11116
11 Wisconsin 1040232 1004887 35245

The difficulties with the Ohio vote ensued from enactment there of a provision
allowing people in certain areas to register and vote with their appearance at the polling
booth on election day. Wisconsin had provided a similar measure with apparently similar
results. Widespread allegations of particularly college students, but also others, showing
up, registering and casting votes, and also voting elsewhere, raise serious questions about
the results. Assertions of busloads of people being brought across the Ohio River from
West Virginia to register and vote in Ohio also surfaced. Enough credence was given to
such charges that they served as part of the basis for court action by some Republican
officials to seek redress. The size of Carter's margin in Ohio makes it more plausible that
such actions could have changed the outcome of that state's balloting than in Wisconsin,
although that plurality is also rendered suspect. Had 3500 votes swung from Carter to
Ford in Ohio and Hawaii, Ford would have carried the College 270 to 268.

But the point here is not to establish whether or not such irregularities occurred or that
they affected the outcome. There seems little doubt about the former, and based on that
premise, the latter cannot be ruled out. Arguably, especially in such a Republican
stronghold, the vote should not have been close enough to allow for such possibilities. The
fact that it obviously was could be held to indicate a certain weakness of the Ford ticket.

The story in Mississippi is somewhat different. Not only did Republicans there have
questions about the vote and the outcome, but so did many Democrats. There were two
primary reasons for this, and they also account for the fact that while the black vote across
the country seems to have been about as unanimous for Carter as is possible, Carter did
not do that well among black voters in Mississippi. The NAACP in that state was less than
enthusiastic about supporting Carter because the head of the Carter campaign in the state
had been involved in a lawsuit against the state NAACP which had virtually left the
organization bankrupt. Perhaps even more important for many black Mississippi voters
was the presence on the ticket of Vice Presidential candidate Walter Mondale.

Clearly, Mondale would appear to represent just the sort of liberalism and advocacy of
civil rights which serves as a good part of the rationale for black support of such
Democrats. He, after all, came out of the Humphrey Minnesota organization. But a great
many voters could not forget 1964. One of the initiatives of the Summer Freedom Project
was the formation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party which carried its fight to
the National Democratic Convention and sought to be seated as the delegation from
Mississippi. Their reason is obvious given circumstances at the time in Mississippi and its
regular Democratic Party apparatus. The 'resolution' of the controversy satisfied neither
side. Two members of the MFDP were to be seated as at-large delegates at the
convention, with a pledge that the party would undertake action to alter the situation
before the 1968 convention (in fact, this proved to be one of the motivating factors behind
the substantial reforms which were instituted eventually in large part by the McGovern
Commission for 1972). The regular Mississippi delegation, was not pleased, either, and
walked out of the convention.

During the convention, the question had been brought before the Credentials
Committee which was conducting open hearings on the matter. In a convention for which
there was little news, Johnson having the nomination wrapped up, these hearings got much
attention. They were being broadcast across the nation, and the testimony of black
Mississippians and others, including Martin Luther King, was an embarrassment for the
party and LBJ. Facing an election campaign, it was not the sort of publicity they wanted.
The President asked for and received network time for a Presidential address to nation,
and this appearance pre-empted the testimony. Meanwhile, Johnson's people were busy
trying to negotiate a settlement. The deal which was struck involved Johnson naming
Humphrey as his running mate in exchange for the Senator's assistance in squelching the
tumult. And the point man for Humphrey, and the person who announced the 'resolution'
terms, was Walter Mondale. Those who were involved in the MFDP and later became
active in the reformed Mississippi Democratic organization felt quite betrayed by all of
this, and remembered Mondale in 1976. And the combination of these factors are the
reason that, while Carter scored solidly across the South in 1976, in Mississippi he
squeaked by. This was so much the case that it casts considerable shadows of doubt
across the rather thin Carter victory claim to Mississippi's 7 electoral votes. As has
become increasingly the case nation-wide, the 'white' vote is narrowly Republican, the
black vote constituting, where it is substantial, the basis of Democratic pluralities. With
such erosion of the black vote in Mississippi, it would be difficult for Carter to have won
the state. Again, the point is not that there is conclusive evidence of irregularities, but that
there is a firm basis for a reasonable doubt. Without the 31 votes in the Electoral College
from Ohio and Mississippi, Carter's electoral vote falls to 266 -- short of victory. And if, in
fact, these votes could go to Gerald Ford, his consequent total of 271 votes in the College
wins his return to the White House. ***

The case is lent further support by what happened in the Congressional elections in
1976. Normally, a party capturing the White House expects to pick up at least some seats
in the House and the Senate. This is sometimes suggested as one of the factors in the
traditional pattern of an incumbent President's party losing some seats in Congress which
it had picked up with his election in the next off-year elections. But with 1976, the partisan
texture of the Congress remained virtually unchanged.

TABLE VII -- Partisan Division of US Congress

Senate House
94th 1975-77 61D 37R 2 Other 291D 144R

95th 1977-79 61D 38R 1 Other 292D 143R

Even though other such anomalies have been seen in such patterns more recently, and
it certainly cannot attest to a contradictory impulse favoring Republicans, it clearly adds to
the doubt about the 1976 Presidential contest results. At the very least, it is indicative that
the parties fought to a virtual draw in the election.

*** Or, had Ohio and South Carolina gone to Ford rather than Carter, the electoral vote
division would have also been 271 for Ford and 266 for Carter -- the 'odd' vote in Oregon
for Reagan would probably have tipped the scale further to Ford, since under such
circumstances it undoubtedly would have been cast for him and not Reagan.

Conclusion

An important consideration is raised if these elections are put in the context of all
Presidential contests since the end of World War II. Excepting 1964, with its reflection of
shock over the Kennedy assassination, Democratic candidates have been summarily
unsuccessful in contesting the Presidency. Those elections which they ostensibly have
'won' have been by the slimmest of margins (1948, 1960, 1976, 1992). Had it not been for
the Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond campaigns in 1948, there is a real chance that
Truman could not have won. Indeed, it may be that he wouldn't have won had voters in
the west not been convinced of Dewey's election by early returns and failed to vote. For
1992, had it not been for the Perot campaign, there is little chance that Clinton could have
emerged victorious over Bush. And for both 1960 and 1976, there is at least a reasonable
doubt that either Kennedy or Carter actually 'won.' The results are contestable, at best.
Although Republican candidates at least in these races exhibited adequate weakness to
make the elections as close as they were, there effectively is much doubt that there has
been a Democratic Presidential election 'victory' in the United States since World War II.
Some might even suggest that FDR would have had difficulty winning in 1940 and 1944
had it not been for the war that was raging. Had he not been the candidate (having stepped
aside for some other Democratic standard bearer), it is even more dubious that such a
candidate (or candidates) would have been able to win. As for 1968, had it not been for
the third party candidacy of George Wallace, it is likely that Nixon would have scored a
large victory. Ironically, perhaps, Wallace almost caused Humphrey to win! (Of course,
they were both 'Democrats').

There is a larger implication to be drawn from that which may well involve the
ideology of the Democratic Party and its lack of acceptability among the citizenry. Even
where GOP candidates and policies have faced consternation among the electorate,
Democrats have not been able to take real advantage of it. Nor does it suggest much
better for Democrats in future Presidential elections unless some substantive changes
occur, either in the electorate's perception of the Party or in its ideology. The 1992
'victory,' aside from the Perot factor, demonstrates an awareness of this in the party.
Clinton and Gore ran as 'New Democrats.' Whether that really means anything or not, and
there have to be questions about that given the record of the Clinton Administration in
contrast to its rhetoric, it does seem indicative of a sentiment in at least some Democratic
circles of such a problem. And, as Clinton moves closer to the 1996 campaign, he is
returning to the rhetoric of the 'New Democrat.'

It would be futile to suggest that Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, or Clinton were
not 'elected,' but whether they actually 'won' is not so clear. Popular sentiment has not
been particularly impressive in terms of the prospects each had for re-election. That
includes, of course, Clinton's chances in 1996 (unless one listens to the ranting of the
liberal mainstream media). The reasonable doubt raised concerning 1960 and 1976 (and
1948) accentuates that, and the need for some substantive self-examination by Democrats
if they hope to be more successful in the near future in their quest for the White House or
control of Congress. If they manage to regain control of the latter and retain control of the
former in 1996, it will primarily be attributable to less than forthrightness. They will need
to be more attentive to Lincoln's maxim regarding fooling some or all of the people. A
more open appraisal of their policy posture is more likely to yield more useful fruit.

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