THE PREMATURE BURAL:
AMERICA'S SEVENTH PARTY SYSTEM
THE PREMATURE BURIAL:
AMERICA'S SEVENTH PARTY SYSTEM
It may actually be a little too neat for such a multivariate process, but there is some sense
that the United States has proceded through a rather tightly structured party evolution
process since the inception of the constitutional order. As we now approach our 54th
Presidential election in 2000, on this 'schedule,' we will be concluding with that race our
sixth party system, poised to embark on a seventh with the first election of the new
century. It is the potential character of that next party system which is the purpose of this
examination.
The Six American Party Systems
Sixth System Fifth System Fourth System Third System Second System First System
2000 R? 1964 D 1928 R 1892 D 1856 D 1820 DR
1996 D 1960 D 1924 R 1888 R 1852 D 1816 DR
1992 D 1956 R 1920 R 1884 D 1848 W 1812 DR
1988 R 1952 R 1916 D 1880 R 1844 D 1808 DR
1984 R 1948 D 1912 D 1876 R 1840 W 1804 DR
1980 R 1944 D 1908 R 1872 R 1836 D 1800 DR
1976 D 1940 D 1904 R 1868 R 1832 D 1796 F
1972 R 1936 D 1900 R 1864 R 1828 D 1792 F
1968 R 1932 D 1896 R 1860 R 1824 NR 1788 F
A great deal will be learned about the nature of that evolving system in the upcoming
Congressional contests of 1998, but there is much reason to think that it will be a
predominately Republican era. This may seem like old hat to some who have grown
dismissive toward to ideas of realignment theory in recent years, but it is probable that
those who would pronounce the end of realignment may find themselves facing a
phenomenon which can echo Mark Twain's retort that announcements of his death were
premature.
The Democrats are hopeful, of course. Al Gore, Richard Gebhardt, Bill Bradley, and
others, bouyed up by Clinton's twin victories, strike out confidantly, anticipating that one
of their number will occupy the oval office into the new millenium. And given that the
party which won the final contest of each cycle only to find their party in a dimuitive status
as the subsequent cycle developed, they might have some cause for optimism -- except
that is too shortsighted a view of the cyclical patterns.
Another peculiarity of the cyclical pattern involves the fact that in only one instance was
there an incumbent President seeking re-election with the transfiguration that was involved
in the cyclical pattern. That was Herbert Hoover, and as events would have it, that served
to be little help to him in his bid for a second term. Indeed, that one case has probably
come to represent the primary examplar of classical realignment puruant out of it.
However, there is a larger pattern that can be culled from the races. Since the Civil War,
and especially since the dawn of the Twentieth Century, each election has been the
Republicans to lose. Indeed, since the beginning of the second party system in 1824, the
process has rendered the Democrat candidate without good prospect barring some
extraordinary circumstance. In fact, this phenomenon even dates back into the incipient
first party alignment.
THE FIRST PARTY SYSTEM
When Jefferson was elected in 1800, it was called the Jeffersonian Revolution, but his
victory was anything but spectacular. Although he edged out Adams in electoral votes, the
development of parties led to a glich in the elective process which threw the election into
the House where Jefferson won largely on the strength of Hamilton's lack of enthusiasm
for Adams and his outright contempt for Aaron Burr. That tale, of course, is legend, and
needs no repetition here. But Jefferson's re-election was scarcely any more spectacular.
Opposition to him was in disarray. The flagging Federalist Party, if it may be called that,
was imploding. Jefferson's jacobin organization was in many respects the only game in
town, and yet he only narrowly was able to accomplish re-election.
In his stead, a string of ostensible Democrat-Republicans who often pursued a policy
course much more in tune with the old Federalists than that of Jefferson came to the office
in what has been termed a 'Virginia Dynasty' accompanied by an 'Era of Good Feelings.'
Both Madison and Monroe were more Federalist than jacobin and reversed much of the
ineptitude of Jefferson policy if they did not return full tilt to Federalist orientation. A
great deal of the foundation of the nation was laid during this period by the Federalist bent
Marshall Court, as well.
THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTY ALIGNMENTS
Quincy Adams, of course, followed them into what was by then called the White House,
whitewashed annually as it had to be ever since it was burned by the British in the War of
1812. But that election has been labeled suspect from the moment it occured. Actually,
however, what brought him to the office in 1824 was quite different than what is generally
portrayed. The tacit alliance among political allies Quincy Adams, William Crawford, and
Henry Clay was structured into regional candidacies from New England, the South and the
West, and in quite explicit opposition to Jackson and his political forces. Though Jackson
got more popular and electoral votes is not the issue, the combined total of the National
Republicans was not only significantly greater, but taken together constituted a clear
majority in each. But it also put selection of the President in the hands of the House once
again. Clay would be the expected favorite since he was the Speaker of that House, but he
was excluded from consideration by them because he had come in fourth in the field and
the Representatives could only pick from the top three in electoral vote by Constitutional
rule. Crawford was back in Georgia deathly ill, and thereby was not an option. The
choices left to the House were Quincy Adams and Jackson. Both the majority of the
Congressman and the majority of the delegations would have likely gravitated to Adams
since he got the most votes among the three, anyway, but under the circumstances of their
choice limitations, they would line up behind him as they did. The political machinations of
Jackson around a 'corrupt bargain' and 'tariff of abominations' trickery were structured into
a four year campaign of deceit that was mixed with blatant vote fraud to produce his
election in the ensuing election in 1828 and a narrow re-election in 1832 built on even
greater levels of fabricated voting in the west and south. Van Buren picked up the struggle
with some alteration of 'support' from the northeast to win in 1836. All three elections
were effectively stolen, although a fourth was impossible given the dire economic straits
the policies of the Democrats had left the country in by 1840.
The Whig Party candidacies of 1844, 1848, and 1852 were dealt a different manner of
trickery. In all three races, radical anti-slavery forces mounted well-financed campaigns
which cost the Whig candidates enough votes in all three years to make the outcomes
extremely close. But the result was also to guarantee the election of pro-slavery
Democrats in '44 and '52 and nearly so in '48. Taylor's victory in the middle election was
almost sabotaged by Van Buren, the organizing genius of the Jacksonian Democrats, being
resurrected as the anit-slavery candidate that year. A similar strategy undermined the first
Republican candidate in 1856, and the nation was so fragmented by 1860 that pro-slavery
forces divided sectionally in 1860 to elect the second GOP nominee, Lincoln. And, even
though Lincoln got few votes in the South in winning with only a plurality, he did carry
the electoral count, and would have probably won the popular vote, as well, were it not
for the neo-Whig Bell drawing off Whig voters. In fact, his electoral vote was a landslide
victory, and Republicans would have controlled the Congress even had the Southern
members not withdrawn after secession. That 1860 Republican win, however, actually
marks the beginning of another, third, party alignment in the country which meant
Republican triumphs in every election except those of 1884 and 1892 when a new third
party combination drew off votes to free money and populist candidates and cost them
those elections.
ALTERATIONS OF VOTING PATTERNS WITH THE FOURTH SYSTEM
There was only one Democrat who managed to win election to the White House during
the fourth alignment. Theodore Roosevelt split the Republican vote with Taft in 1912
making it possible. Wilson squeaked out a re-election in 1916, but only on the basis of
limited third party campaigns in some states. In every other race from 1896 when a
general shift in voting patterns across the country elected McKinley, through 1928, the
Republican candidates were triumphant.
As such writers as Woodward have pointed out, this did not include the defection or
exclusion of black voters except as Jim Crow was established. That was not accomplished
until into the Twenties finally, and was almost exclusively due to exclusion rather than
defection from Republican ranks. Voting patterns otherwise, across the nation, reflect an
overall shifting of votes to the GOP, many of which had gravitated toward the Democrats
before that. Even past Populist voting groups especially in the Midwest and West shifted
in their voting patterns.
A new political focus, the Progressives, also emeged as this system evolved. While Wilson
drew much support from voters sympathetic to its agenda, by 1920, these voters were
voting Republican in large numbers. Though in 1924, La Follette collected a large vote,
Hoover won great support from them the following year. This group would be one of the
major ones to shift their support to the Democrats in 1932 and help elect FDR.
THE NEW DEAL COALITION
The realignment of a political majority behind Roosevelt in 1932 had much to do,
obviously, with the economic crisis in the nation, but this alignment was never either as
deep or as solid as it is usually touted as having been. Roosevelt won re-election handily in
1936, but his level of support began to fade through the forties. Had it not been for the
war, there is great question that FDR would have been able to win a third and fourth term.
And if he had not run in 1940 and 1944, as he well might not have had it not been for the
war, it is doubtful that a Democrat could have won these elections at all. By 1948,
Truman was able to barely eek out a questionable win, but only because of substantive
extra party candidacies picking up votes which would have probably gone to Dewey, if
only on the basis of being against Truman. Indeed, one of the reasons Truman won was
his win in California where many voters, having heard that the election was settled with a
Dewey victory, did not vote.
Eisenhower won the next two elections for the Republicans, and, in 1960, Kennedy
slipped by Nixon based on some very suspect turns of events. There is 'grave' question that
JFK actually carried Illinois or Texas. He won in Hawaii by literally a handful of votes.
Kennedy also got the Alabama electoral vote, even though he got few actual votes there,
when the state party decided to support him. The popular vote in Alabama has been
counted ever since as part of both Kennedy's total and as a vote for an 'independent' slate
around the third party campaign of Strom Thurmond, whose votes in other southern states
came at Nixon's expense. Although Kennedy 'won,' it is not likely that he actually won.
1964 represents another peculiar twist of electoral fate. The LBJ landslide was in large
measure a result of national shock and empathy on the Kennedy assassination. Had
Kennedy been the candidate, it is dubious that he could have achieved re-election against
any Republican, including Goldwater, even given the political snow job that was pulled on
the nation against the 'radical' and 'wreckless' Arizona Senator. (For analysis of this point,
see eJPS, Volume I Number 1 Election)
WAITING FOR GODOT
Fixated on the vision of realignment social scientists thought they saw in the New Deal
coalition, they have spent the last party system looking for the next realignment. When it
failed to materialize as they thought it would, they began to discount alignment theory in
general. Waiting for what they wanted to see turned into seeing dealignment grounded in
candidate centered campaigns and then to rejecting the theory almost in its entirety. This
redefinition practice has become all too commonplace for politicos who do not like the
results their research or observations produce.
The sixth party system began on schedule with the election of 1968 in which Nixon held
on to win despite the Wallace candidacy pulling enough votes from him to almost elect
Humphrey. The candidate centered campaigns did help Congress remain under Democrat
control, but not without severe efforts that impacted the Presidential races, as well.
Unhappy with a Republican Nixon in the White House curtailing spending excessees, they
drove him from office on pretenses that amounted to a virtual coup. In his demise, they
were able to outlaw impoundment, 'fix' campaign spending to their benefit, greatly
increase their seats in the Congress elected in 1974, and put Carter in the White House in
1976.
Republicans won all the other Presidential contests of the sixth party system until the
Perot campaigns of 1992 and 1996 drew adequate support from them to allow Clinton to
advance as pretender to the throne. One of the results of that, however, was to finally tip
the scale and elect Republican control of the Congress in 1994. But with the weakened
Perot position current, it is unlikely that they will be able to do that in the final round of
the sixth party system in 2000.
1998
Coming before that, however, will, of course, be the off-year Congressional races next
year. As with past cycles, what happens in those is likely to foreshadow some aspects of
the upcoming cycle. And unless Democrats are able to pull off a repeat performance of the
shell game they ran in 1996 which cut slightly into the Republican control of the House, it
is likely that there will be GOP gains in both houses in 1998. (For an examination of the
1994 and 1996 races, see Snow Job in the first issue of eJPS).
Seats which had been held by Republicans in the West stand the best chance of being
retaken. But there were narrow races that GOP incumbents lost in other sections of the
nation, as well, which they have a good liklihood of recapturing. And on recent trends
alone, they could well pick up several Southern seats, too. A twenty seat advance in the
House is probably a conservative estimate, but there are also chances for them to pick up
perhaps half a dozen Senate seats in addition to those -- Illinois, Ohio, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Wisconsin seem most vulnerable, but the prospects in California,
Washington, Kentucky, South Dakota, Vermont, Florida, Louisiana, Arkansas, and even
Nebraska, New Jersey, and New Mexico are not altogether to be overlooked. All the
Republican seats up for Senate re-election are not guaranteed, but it might be possible for
the GOP to enter 1999 with close to a two-thirds majority in the upper house. And they
may have as many as 240 or more seats in the House of Representatives. Similar gains
should be considered plausible for 2000. That Republican majority will be well positioned
to persevere into the next party system cycle.
With prospects good that a Republican will win the Presidency in 2000, there is also the
prospect that an incumbent Republican would be seeking re-election in the first
Presidential election of the new party cycle -- the first time ever that any incumbent would
be seeking a second term at the start of a new party system.
THE TRANSIENT STABILITY OF
THE DEMOCRAT AND REPUBLICAN TRADITIONS
Passing the analysis across so many elections as has been done here does have its
difficulties. The nation is certainly much different today than it was when, for example,
Jefferson or even FDR won election. The institutional Republican party did not even exist
when the apparent tendency described earlier of long term advantage began. Nor should it
be forgotten that both parties occupy what has been called a 'big tent.' On the other hand,
the size of the Democrat tent has shrunk in recent years, as 'moderate' Democrats have
suffered at the polls.
Nevertheless, there are some consistencies which cross even formal institutional lines in
searching through that chronology. There almost seem to be perenniel constituencies and
policy orientations which run throughout our history between the two contending top
party apparati. For example, Democrats seem much more closely identified with finance
capital, while the other side has consistantly been more associated with industrial capital.
(Although there appears no current prospect of much alteration of labor alliance with the
Democrats, unions have not always been so tightly bound to them).
As far as policy and ideology go, while it is popular to portray Democrats as at one time
virtually anti-government whereas today the tendency seems to lean the other way, that is
not as simple or clear as it might seem. Jackson, for instance, usually depicted in those
terms was scarcely so anti-authoritarian. His Democracy used government to promote
finance capital, slavery, Indian removal, and the like. Republicans also seem much more
closely identified over the entire span of American history with a strong and cutting edge
military. There is also a very strong tradition of anti-technology that runs through
Democrat Party history, while the opposite is true of the GOP and its forerunners. In fact,
the Democrats have a tradition that might well be described as Malthusian, while their
opposition has consistantly been pro-growth. Such characteristics are maintained today, as
is the Democrat fixation on group rights and ethnic categorization in comparison to
Republican attention to individual rights. It has been the Democrat tradition to promote
and maintain first slavery, then Jim Crow, and in the current setting emphasis on group
identities over individual rights.
It is also quite impossible to equate the 'protectionism' of the19th century (a regular
characteristic of early Republicans and their predecessors) with the brand of policies, or
their rationale, which marks much of the Democrats today. So that sometimes referenced
policy switch simply does not work with validity.
THE IMPACT OF THIRD PARTY CAMPAIGNS
ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
It is not suggested that there has been a conscious design by political forces to pose third
party candidacies as a regular means of handicapping Republican chances at the polls. And
yet, the reality is that this is precisely what the outcome of such campaigns has been from
back even before Van Buren nearly put Cass in the White House to Perot's antics of recent
vintage. Democrats have also been aided in political victory by 'crisis.' That may help
account for their orientation to finding and pushing crisis mentality -- and government
intervention as the 'solution.' Without the Depression (which was at least prolonged if not
fostered by governmental intervention, contrary to popular mythology), Roosevelt would
not have won at all, let alone repeatedly. Nor would he have likely even run, let alone
won, third and fourth terms without WWII. Kennedy was aided in his election by the
ficticious 'missile gap,' and the primary reason LBJ won in 1964 was the Kennedy
assassination (which should by no means be taken to be an advocacy of Oliver Stone's LBJ
movie involvment theory). Watergate proved a strong medicine that put Jimmy Carter in
power, and the crux of Clinton's campaign rhetoric was around a mutitude of crises,
including homelessness, the mythical 'worst economy in fifty years,' and
health care for instance. Indeed, had it not been for such crises and third party campaigns,
it is possible to look at the party systems as a tapestry drapped over an almost never-
ending Republican Presidency (that includes their forerunners such as the Whigs).
THE NEXT PARTY SYSTEM
It appears that the seventh party system of our shifting system of alignments will be
ushered in on schedule with the next century as one that is marked by Republican
hegemony. That is not to prophecy GOP Presidential victories through the year 2036.
It would appear, however, that while Republicans may not have a lock on power into the
foreseeable future, both the Presidency and the Congress will tend to be Republican
institutions, by and large, for some time. Much of that will depend, of course, on policy
pursuits, initiatives, and agendas through the next party system. Unless the Democrats can
shake themselves loose from the fixation on governmental solutions and largeness and
largess, their prospects, even against a Republican institution that is hardly libertarian --
though it appears to be much more so of that character than the Democrats -- they will
face diminishing marginal returns on their investment of campaign effort and dollars.
Governance is a powerful addictive, of course, but there is also much to indicate that the
progressive era has been left on the dust bin of history.
By the time of the next party system evolution about 2040, the United States will be a
much different country than it is today. That is no revelation. We seem to be undergoing a
'darkening of America' so that by the middle of the next century, America may be a
predominately 'colored' country, with black and Hispanic Americans constituting a near
majority. If the Democrat transient consistency of fixation on such factors persists, and if
what has been a seeming tendency of such 'groups' to be amenable to governance as their
recourse, an eighth party system might significantly alter the course of history depticted
here. But not only is that looking too far ahead, it is based on assumptions which are very
tenuous. The Republican hegemony of the seventh system is going to find itself 'darkening'
as well, although it will likely be a less overt process than that marking the other side of
the aisle.
At the end of one of his tales, Poe mused over who would be the President in 2048. It is
not anymore certain who that might be now than it was then. However, this survey might
conclude that it may well be a 'conservative' (by today's usage of the term although it is
much more appropriate, perhaps, to say 'classical liberal') woman of color who is a
Republican! We would be even more assured of the accuracy of our projection if we
limited ourselves to an ideological profile.
Return to beginning of eJPSGo to beginning of Winter 1998 IssueContinue
