I.   THE AMERICAN CONTEXT  -- OUR ELAN VITALE

     Recent events and trends domestically and around the world herald profound challenges and
opportunities for the American experiment with republican government and, as such, represent similarly
challenging opportunities for political science. The unraveling of the Soviet bloc is a major part of that
dilemna. Not only has it created a window of opportunity for the political, social, and economic forms we
have ostensibly sought to propagate in contradistinction to that fallen system, one that has allegedly
developed out of our efforts, but many of the forces which have been unleashed by that collapse --
witnessed most graphically from Yugoslavia to the Commonwealth of Independent States -- and have left
vast populations embroiled in long-festering bloody conflict over ethnicity and related divisions also
seethe if somewhat below the surface as threatening our community, as well.

     For it is not altogether settled that the posture this nation has come to occupy, perhaps almost by
default -- to be interpreted in terms of our economic well-being -- is all that secure.  Such prospects could
only serve to aggravate the potential cleavages, the cracks of which fault through our community. The fact
that our present status was made possible through rampaging debt which may pound away at the
foundations of  our house, is further complicated by the building surf of Third World indebtedness and a
swelling tidal wave of global underdevelopment as we are simultaneously increasingly and inevitably
locked into a globalizing economic structure. Our own geometrically progressing public sector with its
drain on the economic trough and stampeding psychology of dependency yet further erodes the
foundations we rest upon, perhaps even contributing to a breakdown of the general will. And a discipline
scarcely capable of coming to grips with the calculus all that entails may further still be lined with faults
arising out of questions of analytic and methodological and philosophical inadequacies, rendering our
supposed prowess impotent to much too great a degree in the face of such rising tumult.

     The prolonged emphasis on the positive and strictly  'rational' which seems to have increasingly held
hegemony in political science may cede little room to such considerations. As David Kertzer has written:  

	"In this view, there is little room for ritual in politics, for rites are the products
	of passion, not reasoned reflection. People must be freed from their 'irrational
	obsessions.''(1)    

     It is unlikely that there can be politics without symbols. Recognition of that is equally vital to
politicians and political scientists, and downplaying the rationalist basis accomplishes little. Again to
sight Kertzer:

	"Political allegiances flow not from culture-free judgment but from symbolically
	nourished conceptions of the order of the universe."(2)  

     Certainly, that does not preclude the capacity for critical faculties. Nor does it render us 'slaves' of any
dominant symbolic system. Clearly, a variety of such considerations can shed important light on the
nature of political life, for while we are not 'zombies' in the one sense, neither is it adequate to view
politics as little more than the product and process of sundry groups of material interest competing for
tangible rewards and resources. The framework within which such controversies are acted out is one
which cannot be dismissed or ignored. It may, in fact, be posing a growing threat to our 'exceptional'
status. 

     Despite a growing literature in the area of civil religion, and one itself  charged with some faction, and
even if the construct should perhaps be taken more precisely as a hybrid topic within political cultural
studies, there has been no comprehensive effort toward construction of an anatomy of this corpus. Neither
have the myriad piecemeal analyses done the concept justice, either on its own merits, from the standpoint
of its placement among the tools of the discipline, nor in respect to its potential for addressing the sorts of
problems outlined at the outset here.

     While some may view what has been identified as civil religion as a rather widely situated phenomena
across cultures, others have viewed the American construct as itself somewhat unique. It is probably both.
Indeed, it may be possessed of faculties which may militate a greater emphasis on the 'religion' portion of 
the term than on the 'civil.'  Consideration proposed here, largely fixated on the latter notion of the
uniqueness of the American model, is critical, quite possibly in reflecting, even aggravating, the deep
fissures which mark our society. To the extent that such implications for cohesion and cleavage may be
quite profound, and to the extent that it can be identified as such, the conceptualization may exhibit a
usefulness as a mechanism which can establish it as something more than a merely interesting analysis.

     This may not represent any trailblazing effort or theoretical breakthrough. Most of the work has been
done already. It does entail, however, a 'pulling together.'  There is, though, another aspect of the project
which is important,  and that is its resistance to 'define-down' or deconstruct the system by redefining our
civil religion.  In Asad, religion must be more than symbols, must stand for something beyond the
received rituals.( 3 ) He takes Geertz to task on this issue. (4 ) Geertz, on the other hand, may not mean
just that, but just that may be more the case than imagined, especially given the constraints of  'western'
perceptions of  'religion.'  Of course, the something beyond our civil religion may simply be the
cohesiveness of the nation and culture,  but that may, too, be more than it seems, and certainly  implies
much more, even as the civic faith plays an important supportive function to such cohesiveness.  What,
after all, is the purpose of order,  a central teleological focus of religion? And the ideology, belief
structure, theology of our civil religion, often rift with debate if not division, may be implied in the
symbolic superstructure. This may be accomplished in noncognitive ways, and such debate must be
resolved with such implication. In this regard, the project may proffer some observations of some
significance, if only in the realm of belief's predication on ritual in the noncognitive transmissions
entailed, even to the extent of  the meaning of representation as existent forms of representativeness,
otherwise described as symbolic acts or ritual. There is also a danger in the philosophical arena which
consideration of the American civil religion demands must be addressed, and that involves the matter of
civil religion and state worship. Although Gordon Wood argues that the constitutional  system was a
mechanical  structure imposed in place of an organic one, whether that is still the case, was it ever, is by
no means certain. The 'grafting' may have been so successful that the system introduced may have become
'organic.' In any event, the community engendered cannot be properly understood through a reductionism
fixated on rights-based orientation alone, or even primarily, as has seemed to become the central concern
of recent positivist and historicist analysis. If such rights do not flow from the community, it is critical in
their guarantee and exercise. The danger is particularly current given some manifestations within our
society but especially in the context of both the 20th century generally and recent developments
concerning the 'liberal democrats' among others in Russia (as well as similar phenomena elsewhere on the
continent). Notions of the state's supremacy over the individual and individual utility to the state must
involve some commentary on the essence and political economy of corporatism and fascism, as well as the
interrelationship and/or contraposing of liberalism, corporatism, fascism, socialism, and state religion  as
juxtaposed to civil religion, and particularly the American form of it. This is a complex area of
exploration, but one which demands assessment.

     This examination clearly delineates the existence of an American civil religion. In respects
complementary, it also transcends institutional religion. The analysis portrays both the skeletal structure
of the invention, and the anatomical substance mutually inter-connected with it. The construct is an
essential element of legitimation in our culture. Its spirit animates American society. In some ways, the
analytic methodology utilized is a 'soft' Hegelianism. Importantly, however, there is no 'end' or 'telos'
conclusion, though there is a lawful process involved. The geist is a 'kinder and gentler' one, too.
Although alienation may be a constant, it is transcendable through the 'rediscovery' of the 'essence of our
fathers, ' much in the manner of the 'field theory' of Liebniz.  It may thereby be the key to unlocking
human potential, thus posing a solution to the development of anomie among individuals in the
fulfillment of our community. The 'science' involved also illuminates the parallels between the American
'process' and the 'being' it discloses, linking both to the categorical imperative which closes the circle. The
American faith encompasses the willful effort to recreate toward human ascension to its own apotheosis,
certainly not in any sense that 'men are angels,' but in the sense that while certain impulses must be
constrained, it is of such constraint that the spirit may be the more unbridled. 

     The civic faith draws together a number of strings, effectively resolving a fundamental dichotomy
between both 'real' and 'ideal' and mind and body. If it represents a sort of 'soft Hegelianism,' it might also
be said to represent a 'soft Thomism.' In the construct, the law is supreme but it must also cohere with
higher law, and can in fact be altered or improved. Thus, it may be said that such law and order reflects
the Thomist 'great chain of being' as a source of legitimation. It also recognizes the importance of the
individual. Far from a static state, it appreciates the rationality of the citizen in striving through reason
toward the natural law. In some respects, much as with Aquinas, there is a democratizing element here
perhaps resembling the stepping forth from Plato's cave. Further, there is a degree of transcending the
separation of 'church' and state in important ways.

     There are problems with the concept of a city on a hill and a chosen  people, not the least of which has
to be the entire conception of chosenness against the historical backdrop of the treatment meted out, for
instance, to the native inhabitants of the 'promised land' or to those kidnapped into the system of forced
labor which has sullied and stigmatized our society for so long.  But that may also too conceptually restrict
the idea of 'promised land' -- as with the notions of perfection and God as examined here, this 'promise' is
also a process -- an horizon -- for the essence of that promise has always been that progress is our most
important product. The process, after all, provided the wherewithall for the undoing of such enigma. This
'process' is a dynamic 'elan vitale,' an intellecky without a telos, out of which a dynamic religio-morality is
founded. This elan vitale is an interpretation which allows us to attach our 'effective historical
consciousness' to our culture toward sustaining the vitality of the community. This does not undo the
space-time continuum. Such reductionist interpretation suffers under a dualism which the 'dura' of the
process transcends, as the pleasure machine does not allow us to actually experience Paris.  Only
intuitively experiencing it permits that. We cannot 'get it'  'perfectly' even with that; but the process is
what matters. As each generation  -- indeed, each individual -- must achieve that for themselves, the geist
of our civil religion is the elan vitale of our community. Through it, we come to comprehend Donne's
association -- and Carey's. It identifies the mystic mechanics by which each of us come to the renewal of
the act by which we "pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."




II.  THE FUNCTION OF CIVIL RELIGION

     There are at least four non-mutually exclusive areas of consideration which are worthy of exploration.
The scope of  this research is contemplation of each of this interrelated set of questions: 

	1) Religiousity of the construct
	2) Substance of the construct
	3) Performance in the American context
	4) Importance as an analytic tool.

     The first area of inquiry is important from a number of perspectives. The use of the term 'religion'
presents some problems with the construct which have to be dealt with. It may be that the current usage is
a catchy catch-all phraseology with little depth. The concept varies widely -- and actually in quite
contradictory presentation -- in the literature in its application. On the other hand, anthropologically
speaking, the creation and usage of the concept may contain a western bias in reference to the definition of
religion., one which cognizance of actually may afford the theme a much broader basis for its application.
It is absolutely critical that the discussion of civil religion in America  be informed by framing it within a
consideration of the constitution of religion. It will be useful to explore somewhat the source of the
concept itself, too.

     The concept civil religion may have developed out of Rousseau -- it certainly was utilized by him and
conforms nicely with his usage of the General Will. It may have a hundred fathers. The argument of some
of these may be pertinent. The title of this project is taken from Tocqueville, which clearly suggests some
relevancy on his part. The subtitle is from Anthony Wallace and he provides the vehicle for  this attempt
to reconstruct the invention here. And for this effort, Durkheim would seem to be a reasonable place to
look, though various others have also addressed the question.

     Among those who in the discourse offer relevant commentary, Anthony Wallace has constructed a
schema which is to be the locus of this paper in many respects. His methodology of 'minimal units of
religious behavior' provides the framework to be utilized to investigate the substance of the construct.
From his basic work in this effort, this research is intended  as a modest attempt at filling in an anatomy
of American civil religion. 

     As indicated at the onset, there are a complex set of problems within which to evaluate the
performance of the construct under scrutiny. Most critical, arguably, may be its value as a social glue. But
just as  political culture has been found to exist on  quite diverse levels, the cohesive potential of civil
religion may not be all it might be supposed to be, either. Nevertheless, its role in the American complex,
and beyond -- its relevance to the American culture and dilemna -- is important, especially given the
emphasis that has been placed on functionality in analysis.  And this latter  point serves to point up a
fourth notion to be scrutinized here. We might look to the usefulness of civil religion in serving to address
such problems; to its importance as an analytic instrument. And this discussion must attempt to bridge the
gap between symbolism and substance.

     The primary methodology to be employed for this research project involves substantial surveillance of
relevant literature toward fleshing in the various minimal units of religious behavior as set forth in
Wallace. As indicated, there are some preliminary steps which must be completed regarding the
constitution of religiousity prior to treatment of the American construct. Ancillary concerns as to its
performance and utility in analysis also flow from that locus of treatment.

     Initially, it is proposed that examination be undertaken of the validity and value of the civil religion
invention as a service of community in America (in both the singular and plural or collective senses). It is
anticipated that such a process must address the character of the American context, an assessment built
around the kinds of dilemna addressed here at the outset. The function of civil religion in such an
environment must be articulated and some sense of the relationship of invention to community will have
to be addressed. There should further be some extensive delineation of the breadth  of the debate on
American civil religion and this ought to be followed by the consideration of the religiousity of the
construct itself.

     The second phase of the project probably should include an addressing of such critical analysis of
religion as that offered by Freud and Marx. Not only do questions of illusion and social control seem
cogent and vital, but they will undoubtedly inform the inquiry into this American invention in valuable
ways. However, while acknowledgment of such criticism  may in itself prove useful, it is expected that this
will principally provide a stepping stone to the perhaps more central explanation, proceeding from
Durkheim  to Wallace, of the basic schema of minimal units. This is not by any means to denigrate belief,
symbol, or ritual, for the essential nature of invention to community may mediate even the use of  'opiates'
and 'window-dressing,'  Comment may be warranted on the space between objectives and realization as
well as rhetoric and performance, but the functional nature of invention constructs probably precludes the
absence of such critical appraisals. 

     All  of that may essentially form foundation, for it is the rudimentary base requisite for the central
effort of fleshing-in the anatomy of the invention which is to be the third and primary phase of the project
undertaken here. Wallace has identified some thirteen categories of behavior which in any social system
are combined into some pattern that is identifiable as 'religion.' These, taken within some context of
supernatural premise are, in his words, "always found in association with one another and which are the
substance of religion itself," (1) although the 'supernatural premise'  may prove to be somewhat
problematic in the greater scheme of 'religiousity' beyond the rather esoteric realm encompassed in the
notion of Association. These minimal units, variously organized, are further categorized by Wallace, and
some attention will be laid to such characterization, but the 'empirical' test is the assignment of features
which may be set in the culture to these 'minimal units of religious behavior,' as follows: 

	Prayer: Addressing the Supernatural
	Music: Dancing, Singing, and Playing Instruments
	Physiological Exercise: The  Physical Manipulation of Psychological State
	Exhortation: Addressing Another Human Being
	Reciting the Code: Mythology, Morality, and Other Aspects of the Belief  System
	Simulation: Imitating Things
	Mana: Touching Things
	Taboo: Not Touching Things
	Feasts: Eating and Drinking
	Sacrifice: Immolation, Offerings, and Fees
	Congregation: Procession, Meetings, and Convocation
	Inspiration
	Symbolic Manufacture and Use of Symbolic Objects.

     As these units are organized into more complex set sequences he terms rituals,  these in turn are
rendered meaning through the rationalization of ritual by a belief system and values, composed of a
cosmology, including pantheon, myth, and substantive beliefs. These complexes are further structured into
often competing combinations of cult institutions, the entire set of which constitutes the religion (or
religions) of a society or culture. This is not mere reductionism. It is the substantive character that is
crucial. The fundamental pattern will be utilized to identify American civil religion. Sundry observations
as to the invention may be deducible from the analysis concerning it relevance for our society and nation,
as well as the discipline, as previously referenced.*

     While the special emphasis of this inquiry is to the contemporary phenomena, some thought must be
given to both the genealogy of the specimen and to such individuals essential to its composition.  The
individual rationality of Kant's Enlightenment is one more area of pertinence, perhaps, in dissecting the
specimen. Further, Lipset's notion of democracy as a good society in operation is another, which must be
viewed in part in terms of  jacobinism or Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism in contrast to other
conceptions of social, political, and economic activity. So, also, may be his concept of the pendulum swing
between equality and achievement, and Bellah's (and others') 'languages.' Nor is the construct itself to be
limited to anything like a secular religion of humanity, which J.S. Mill or modern 'liberals' might
promulgate. There are serious questions raised as to the commentary of such as Hartz and Diggins in this
respect. And property rights are an essential aspect of individualism in this context.

     The 'fleshing-in' project is not intended to 'elevate' the civil religion construct so much as to clarify the
mechanism as a societal and analytic tool in a variety of ways, not the least of which may be of utility in
the cacophony of languages, the  pitch of which has been termed by some as cultural civil war.

     In a recent examination of political economy in the United States during the ante-bellum period,
William  Earl Weeks (2) has provided some commentary on the 'theology' of America in a discussion
centering around foreign relations during the 'middle period.'  Curiously absent from the discussion are
some of the most important names of those, like Henry Carey, so significant in the political economy of
that time.  Nevertheless, in spite of the lapses, the article does pose some important points for this
undertaking. While he begins with questionable comments concerning the distinction between
nationalism and imperialism, he quickly settles into an explanation of the development of the American
national spirit out of the effort to forge colonial unity for economic advantage. He sights a body of
literature which "collectively ... suggests that union is the first principle of American nationalism."(3)
Even prior to the revolutionary period, the advantages had been perceived, but:

	"... adoption of the Constitution proved the essential precondition 
	for the development of a durable American nationalism and American
	imperialism by establishing the strong central government needed
	for lasting union and empire." (4)

     There are clearly some problems with his usage. His virtual equation of nationalism with imperialism
culminates in the suggestion that nations are in fact "a form of internal imperialism insofar as they
presume to establish a uniform central authority over all groups and individuals, willing or not, within
their domain." (5)  The terms may have once been interchangeable, but contemporary connotations have
altered that situation. Weeks references both Franklin's "The Quest for Security and the Dream of Empire"
and "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind" (6) as indicative of this, and of an early
formulation of Manifest Destiny. Although later he acknowledges a number of differing manifest
destinies, (7) this is still a rather loose utilization of the terminology. Clearly, what Franklin envisioned
was decidedly different from that represented by either Tucker and Hendrickson in describing Jefferson's
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY  or May's SOUTHERN DREAM OF A CARIBBEAN EMPIRE. There is a
definitive distinction between development and looting which his analysis seems to disregard. This,
indeed, may suggest that his view is hamstrung by notions of wealth limitation which preclude any such
understanding of the differentiation. This difference is apparent in comparing the 'evil empire' of Soviet
domination to the American republic or British 'subjects' to American 'citizens.'

     Weeks' observation that:

	"The establishment of a centralized government ... symbolized ... recognition 
	that a union based solely on the transient foundations of mutual interest or 
	common danger could not long endure ... [and] evidences that the survival
	of the republic required the not-so-invisible hand of a national economic 
	structure and a central government with the requisite 'energy and efficiency'
	to repel external threats and to quell internal uprisings. Ratification of the
	Constitution spelled the movement away from voluntary union of independent
	states and towards the establishment of a permanent nation-state that its
	founders understood would be well positioned to play a key role in the world
	state system and economy," (8)

as fraught with problematic intricacies as it is, pretty well establishes the parameters of the distinction.
And, although he goes to the extent of citing in the effort of the Framers an intent to create a new world
economic order of trade and commerce, he cannot seem to fathom divergence on this score between such
as Adams and Jackson, for he recognizes the necessary role for a navy that is able to be supportive of such
aims without any contrast between the 'navies' of these two, or their cohorts. (9)

     There was for these Americans an 'ideology of commerce' which was a 'basic principle' of the effort of
America to 'spread its revolution':                                     

	"It may be that the United States's most enduring export  has been 
	a new world order based on the principles of liberal capitalism." (10)

There was "an explosion of entrepreneurial power" which created a social transformation fostered by
American "celebration of commerce," and this was what Gordon Wood characterized as the real
'radicalism of the American revolution.' (11) Weeks identifies this as the 'American way of life' which
represented:

	" ... a radical transformation of the relationships that bound people together. 
	The market-place, the primary means of this transformation, disdaining tradition,
	rank, ancestry, race, and cultural differences and functioned as the only reliable
	measure of value. Americans aimed not just to trade with the world but to transform
	it in ways congenial to their notions of modernity and progress. In their technology,
	in their economic system, in their notions of popular government, in their system 
	of law, Americans functioned as self-confident bearers of a revolutionary ideology..." (12)

     That he equates this with imperialism of a sort does injustice to the concepts of the nation, capitalism,
and the American quest. It does not alter his fundamental point, though, which brings him to brand
Quincy Adams as one of America's great 'theologians' for his emphasis on the importance and even right
of commerce. Lincoln, too, holds an exhalted place:

	" ...American nationalism could not exist in the popular mind without
	a mythological narrative to lend coherence and direction to the national
	endeavor." (13)

He also attributes the degree of success of this American effort to:

	"The existence of a widespread faith in God and in the providential destiny
	of the American people [which] lent a messianic dimension to the establishment
	of a national identity and national allegiance." (14)

And this "special relationship of the American people to the Deity placed both the nation and empire on a
foundation of divine right and divine mission ... ' (15)

     Weeks also argues that warfare has been a crucial factor "in the formation of American nationality":

	"On the 'sacred ground' of battle Americans became related by blood,
	overcoming class, racial, and now, gender differences to achieve the
	commonality seemingly precluded by the nation's diverse origins.
	Every victory in battle reconfirms America's covenant with God ..." (16)

And while he sounds some discordant notes such as the damage to this done by Vietnam, his argument at
base is of:

	"The construction of a ... mythology ... [that would] point to the way
	in which American nationalism conforms to Benedict Anderson's 
	definition of nationalism as 'an imagined community' in which members
	share 'an image of communion' ..," (17)

and thus goes well beyond what is required to satisfy the definition of  'religion' which Durkheim and
Malinowski developed to circumvent the limitations of western bias in identifying such cultural
phenomena.

Continue