V. THE CONSTITUTION OF RELIGION

     There has been considerable attention paid to this construct that has been termed civil religion, but if
only because many of the people who would have to be taken to be adherents to the phenomenon will also
be members of established denominational religions,  most of which would conclude real problems with
any suggestion of a dual religiousity, the effort must be undertaken toward determination as to the validity
of the utilization of the concept itself. It should be noted that if denominations would insist on exclusivity
of membership, there does not seem to be any reason for the question to run the other way. One need not
be less a Catholic or Jew or Baptist to be a practitioner of the civil religion. In fact, in some respects, what
it constitutes is a complementary entity to denominational adherence even as it serves the function of
binding the individual members of varied religious groups together. And yet, having said that, it need not
follow that the civil religion does not constitute genuine religiousity in and of itself, though it may draw
for its sustenance some degree of nourishment from additional affiliation. However, to hold such
assertions with any validity, it must be firmly established that the invention can, in fact, be really thought
of as 'religion' per se. After all, nomenclature can be bandied about in ways which can be misconstrued,
and terminology can lend strength to conceptualizations when such credence is ill-founded.  In the effort
to clarify that issue, some basis must be found for determining whether the concept can in fact be taken so
seriously, or if what we are dealing with here is perhaps better understood metaphorically alone and really
consists of hybrid aspect of political culture. The comparative analysis of religion offers a number of
methodologies for attempting to do that, but must rely heavily on the definition of religion. That question
poses some problems which have been addressed by Robert Oden in his discussions and teaching of
comparative religion. 

     Oden's initial concern revolves around this matter of the definition of religion, and although, as we
shall see, his response does leave open some questions as to its applicability, his approach does give some
foundation for inclusion of this civil phenomenon as actual religion. Oden finds that most definitions of
religion turn out to be inadequate in that they are either too precise or too imprecise. An example of a
common definition in use in the 19th century is that it consists in faith in God. That presents problems
because the idea of faith is a very western term which St Paul, Luther, or Calvin would be comfortable
with, but which many religions would take some exemption to. It is too precise, working well for most
monotheisms. If it, therefore, leaves aside much that is certainly religious, the definition cannot stand as
adequate. In fact, it may not be altogether clear that Christianity must be taken as so definitely
monotheistic. It may be misinterpretation to call the inclusion of angels or saints as qualification of that,
but in comparative analysis it becomes at least a serious question. The problem may extend beyond
consideration of saints and angels to views of Mary, the mother of Jesus, and to the matter of the nature of
the Trinity itself. American civil religion will pose even more of a question for that issue. That definition
leaves out all the polytheistic religions as well as those of no divine entity such as at least early Buddhism,
but Paul Tillich's definition of religion as 'ultimate concern' fails on the basis of being too imprecise, even
as it does have some merit.  For many religions it is true that  life centers around objects of ultimate
concern, but this definition does not go very far in explication of religious architecture or ritual, nor does
it differentiate very well religions from other ultimate concerns. Oden's variation on Penner's suggestion 

	"Religion is a communication system that is constituted by supernatural beings
	and is related to specific patterns of behavior," (Tape One of Comparative Religion
	course from The Teaching Company)

while he accepts it as far more useful, nevertheless has serious flaws, as the examination will demonstrate.
However, it is certainly of some utility for civil religion. It does leave open the matter of secular
humanism or communism as religious systems, and, at least to some, at least the first of these has a
relationship with American civil religion. The Penner/Oden defining does seem to reach to include
Buddhism with its clearly supernatural  or atypical forces present. Those religions which insist that they
are aritualistic, in their stereotypical aritualism are ritualistic, such as some American Protestantism
which is aritualistically ritualistic.

     In addition, religion is much too inextricably bound up with too many other aspects of human endeavor
and, especially in the instance of the specimen under scrutiny here, is an indispensable element of society
for it to go uninvestigated. What Oden poses is comparative analysis through reviewing patterns of
similarity and difference among religions, patterns which our civil religion can be assessed by. His
rationalization of religious study proves quite relevant to this construct. The methodology undertaken  is
to compare religions on four basic elements, Cosmologies, Religious Heroes, Theodicy or Divine Justice,
and Religious Ritual and Community. This approach, while it includes aspects which prove to be
necessary but not sufficient for adjudging the religiousity of  the civil invention does succeed in raising the
matter such that further examination is imperative. Oden's application of these categories to various
religious phenomena, though not entered into discussion here, does afford us the basis for attempting to
bring them to bear on this consideration. Oden sights Eliade looking initially to cosmology in studying
religion, not giving it genetic priority on any assumption that cosmologies cause any of the other aspects
of religion, but giving them analytic priority as a useful tool. Cosmologies can be described as 'spiritual
compasses' or 'blueprints of the world' perhaps laying out for believers just how the world is organized, so
that deities may be called upon to deal with problems and prevent spiritual crisis. They often reach to
explanation of where the universe comes from and can often be found in religious architecture.

     In this regard, the predominance of Greek and Roman architectural style used early on in the design of
public buildings in Washington, D.C., a practice not lost  when it came to state structure subsequently,
can be  seen to be a reflection of the Framers interest in and indeed dedication to the classical works and
democratic republican forms of that antiquity. This may explain the origins of the universe, but it does
attribute considerably to the origins of the Republic, at least in the Framers minds. The principal
structures in that tradition are the Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court building, and the
memorial structures recognizing Washington, Lincoln, and Jefferson, and they are laid out in the pattern
of a cross, with, symbolically, Arlington 'over the river.' Now, it might be possible to conclude a great deal
from this, and while one could read  too much into it, it would also be easy to take it too lightly. The
central position in the pattern of the obelisk of the Washington Monument undoubtedly harkens back to
ancient Egypt. Some of the Framers were connected to Masonic circles. At least, the obelisk form elevates
the pyramid  at its top, and the pyramid represented a great deal to the Egyptians of how the universe
looked, both as a replication of the earth to help us have bearings of the world with four points (of course,
the cross has four points, too), and as a reflection of the daily trek of the sun, going down each day (over
Arlington in fact) in a symbolic 'death,' but always returning again, maybe envisioning an afterlife as it
did in Egypt. The fact that the layout was not established in one sweep, but built up over many decades
probably lends more to the possibilities than it detracts from them (though the general design was laid out
by Banneker in the beginning). This was a conscious, intentional rendering by not only the Framers, but
their posterity, generations after them. That Egyptian connection and the fact that they were building a
new city in the wilderness along the river and oriented to the sun may conjure up recollections of
Akhenaton who did just that and possibly under the influence of Joseph and the Hebrew tradition. Oden
has referenced the Jewish cosmology extensively, and a good deal of it relates to the American context.
Creation is called 'good' in the Book of Genesis, and this contributes to the tradition that we, as created
matter, are inherently and basically good, even if, as in Judaism, we seem to have a special propensity to
foul things up, and, as our own free well, to actually do wrong. Perhaps the chief sin of the Pentateuch
was the effort to circumvent the gap between God and humanity. Our ambitions to divinity lead to trouble.
They are regularly founded on our good intentions, but our good though 'fallen' character, as well. And
what, if not that, was the Madisonian argument for the checks and balances of divided government. The
God of Israel conveyed the special blessings he offered to humanity through working through his 'chosen
people,' a theme that rings very strong through the American tradition, and Oden emphasizes that the
"mediating category in Jewish cosmological thought, which allows the divine/human chasm to be bridged,
is an emphasis on the communal group ..." (Tape 2) It was not the individual, although in Judaism and
American heritages the individual regularly plays a vital role, though always in associational context with
the group. We have here, of course arguably, a considerable statement of much of the American 'theology'
or cosmology expressed in architecture. And the 'individual' element is what the second category in
Oden's methodology is about, the religious hero.
     A series of answers have been given to the question of the origins and persistence of religion. Oden
identifies these as religion and history, religion as immature science, religion and the unconscious, and
religion and society. He does not believe there is a key to unlocking the mystery of man's religion. While
all four do contribute something to the study, there is no  'double helix model' for religious explanation,
nor can there be. Religion and man are simply too complex for that. The study of religion and history,
euhemerism, primarily rests upon the search of the exploits of exceptional individuals which were
exaggerated and hyperbolized over time so that the collection of stories of their deeds led to these mortal
and ordinary but special people becoming supernatural people. This mode of analysis is complicated by
the absolute inability to test antiquity and by the problem of explaining just how the stories became
transformed into the complex religious systems they became. That religions are commonly held to the
belief that religious data is to be read literally, that they seek to explain the physical aspects of the world,
is burdened by the fact that they fall short simply because they did not know enough. Hence, religion can
be described as immature science, for like science, they attempt to explain the real world, but unlike it,
they lacked the capacity for achieving that goal. Much religious data does, indeed, refer to such things. It
is difficult, however, to justify the conclusion that ancient peoples were any less clever, logical, or rational
than we are. Their systems are no less sophisticated or complex than those of modern science.  Further,
the assumption that such religious data is to be interpreted literally and not symbolically seems flawed.
We don't do it about world literature, so why should it be so regarding religious texts. Another difficulty
with this approach rests on the faulty basis that religion and science are both attempts to do the same
thing. Oden suggests that since we accept both; that religious and scientific explanation are about different
things. They perform different functions, possessing some symmetry, but also disparate aims ultimately.
There are also psychological explanations for religions fundamentally tracing religious behavior to the
unconscious. Humans have a need to be religious on this version  -- the deep-seeded instinctive needs we
all have on Freud, for example. These drives cannot be acted on all the time, whether they be sexual or the
death wish, without resultant chaos. That is where dreams and religion step in, allowing us to do in
narrative or imagination what we cannot do in fact. They allow an expression of a need in such a way as
not to harm or threaten society, thus providing a necessary balance. This explains the strength and
perseverance of religion. Oden excepts, however, that the concept of the human unconscious is not very
old or developed, especially in relation to the phenomenon of religion it seeks to explain. The difficulty
with his exception, though, is the inherent assumption it bears that knowledge of the cause would be
required for it to have operated. The nascent stage of a somewhat dubious construct may be a problem, but
that does not deny its validity. It is, on the other hand, very often difficult to falsify such constructs,
rendering them to the level of dogma, not science, and calling into question their usefulness.



     The group equivalent of this individual phenomenon is the mode of analysis of religion and society .
The needs which human beings all have which are most important are not individual but social needs, and
these are most importantly generative of religion. We have a need to establish group identities for
ourselves without which society cannot survive. The associational characteristic looks to religion as the
key glue or cement for concerted action. Emile Durkheim is chiefly responsible for this approach, upon
which something more will be said latter in this discussion. In regard to this mode, however, there are
difficulties which present themselves.  For example, much religious data is full of very anti-social
behavior, and this explanation may have trouble dealing with such. Of course, it might be suggested that
this is precisely the point. We learn by this means, not only proscribed behavior, but the rational for its
prohibitions if only in terms of the problematic impact it poses. This pattern also assumes a degree of
isomorphic relationship between religion and society which Oden finds problems with, lighting examples
of where it broke down.  Certain kinds of society should hypothetically produce certain kinds of religions,
and that does not lawfully follow in the world of  example. While his point is perhaps well taken, it does
not preclude other sources of religious forms. A monotheism, for instance, may have been prescribed, by
coercion or some other means, for a particular society in place of its 'natural' religion. Evans Pritchard has
held that while it might be logical for societies with a royalty to be monotheistic  but not those lacking any
political model for a supreme being when in fact that is precisely what is found. The problem with this
assessment of social structure as the basis for religious formation runs the same risk just enumerated, that
of  imposition, and this is increasingly a difficulty given the 'shrinking' character of global society. This
exercise turns later, though briefly, to Swanson's effort in this regard.
     But Oden's central point is not whether any of these possess utility for such analysis. To a certain
extent, they all do, but there is no absolute key. It is more important to be content with description  rather
than seeking such explanation. For the purpose of this examination, however, it can be quite useful to look
to such modes of analysis where they provide such description. It may even be that there are instances
where they may be indicative of some substantive explicative characteristic.

     As with cosmology, the phenomenon of religious heroes is quite susceptible to application to the
American faith. Given Oden's point that the exploits of such personages at some point in antiquity became
hyperbolized over the ages, it would seem likely that the relative nascent stage of development of this
'religion' would dictate a rather undeveloped version of hyperbolization. Not only is that the case, but the
reality of some level of such exaggeration may be somewhat surprising. We do possess a considerable
number of such myths.

     It is crucial to understand that, at least in this context, the term myth must not be taken to mean things
which do accord with fact and reality. A myth is quite simply a story developed through tradition about
persons who possessed or performed extraordinalities. Such myths are often found giving accounts of
some extraordinary feat. They very frequently attest to rather unusual circumstances of birth. This, in fact,
would appear to be the basis of the archetypal American myth. By this is meant the rather extensive litany
of what have been termed 'Horatio Alger' stories. Not surprisingly in a tradition grounded on a conviction
toward limited government, such stories are even more frequently about the nonpolitical figure, though we
certainly have a plethora of political ones. By way of illustration, some of the more common ones can be
sighted. These would include Washington's cherry tree tale and his tossing of the dollar across the
Potomac. Valley Forge and the success after having crossed the Delaware are but two events which typify
the entire revolutionary experience, which is itself very much a David and Goliath tale. The 'log cabin'
origin or birth of men who through extraordinary effort rose to great accomplishment is a common theme.
Abraham Lincoln no doubt comes to mind first, but that sort of story was in common usage at least as
early as the campaign of William Henry Harrison. It probably applies equally as well to  Jackson, too. 
Among non-political 'heroes,' it is almost too wide-spread to bother documenting. Andrew Carnegie
would be a prime instance, but it has become almost cliché in its permeation of our tradition.  We can find
it as recently as the 1992 Presidential election campaign being trumpeted  in behalf of Clinton, but better
examples would probably be Truman and Nixon. In the case of some such as Eisenhower, it was the very
special accomplishments  which brought  the 'hero' to office. America, it is held, is the kind of place in
which any kid can, alternatively, grow up to be President or a millionaire. That is, in fact, probably a
central tenet of the faith. If the instances of such exemplars are statistically rare, there is a more
substantial  basis for its applicability in the social mobility that affords great numbers the hope (and
fulfillment) of rising to at least a modicum of comfort and attainment. This is also apparently a
widespread image of America beyond our shores and has formed one of the bases for a good deal of 
immigration. This is the 'land of opportunity.' It probably dates back to colonial days, found clear
expression in Franklin's life and his writings which abound with such adages, and commonly is verbalized
in such wide-spread acceptance of truisms such as 'if you build a better mouse-trap, the world will beat a
path to your door.' The degree of  veracity the notion contains, however, is probably less important than
the general acceptance it holds. This, again, is undoubtedly the archetypal American myth.

     Oden proffers a rites of passage scheme in which

	"One way to look at religious heroes is to look at their stories against a template
	of a scheme that was originally formulated for the analysis of a religious ritual,
	the rites of passage scheme."(tape 5)

There are three general stages to this transition, a preliminal or pre-threshold stage that is characterized
by immaturity and perhaps ignorance, a middle step in the process which is the threshold and is marked
by tests or trials, perhaps a confused identity, and an imparting of some 'secret' knowledge, and finally  a 
more or less formalized elevation of the hero to the post-threshold stage. Oden looks to Gilgemesh, Moses,
Jesus, Krishna, and Buddha as exemplary of this. Mohammed certainly fills the bill, as well. In our case,
probably Lincoln would be the ideal example. He follows the scheme, coming from the unschooled
frontier,  passing through a trial period in which he was never very successful as a Whig politician, and
apparently went through a period of considerable soul-searching  before joining the new Republican Party,
and being elevated to the stature of hero with the war and his assassination. His trials can be seen to
include the great debates with Douglas, and his accomplishment of extraordinary achievement, which in
reality far surpass the legend, at least popularly, include 'saving' the Union and Emancipation. Martin
Luther King, Jr., must be seen as similarly having reached something of this stature through a rite of
passage, as well. To greater or lesser extents, so, too, could any number of others, from Andrew Carnegie
in business to Eisenhower in more contemporary times. The depiction of some semblance of such a rite
may be one of the mechanisms which have propelled people on the  road to the White House, as perhaps
the PT 109 did with Kennedy. (In this regard, it may be that Bush missed out on a great opportunity by
the fact that his war-time experiences were never touted to such a degree). Such heroes  need possess a
claim to 'divinity,' although they may have something of a special channel of communication or other link
with the 'supernatural.' (For JFK, it may have been money).

     An additional component of Oden's system of comparative analysis is the question of divine justice.
The reconciliation of the existence of human suffering and injustice with the existence of a supernatural
power or deity with some characterization of omnipotence and benevolence poses Oden's theodicy
'dilemna.' He argues that there are five ways in which religions have sought to solve this problem:

	1) Rejection of the existence of such deities
	2) The existence of other malignant forms in addition to the deities
	3) The contention that everyone is guilty, and from that, that there is only apparently
	     innocent suffering (as with original sin)
	4) Viewing suffering and injustice as educative
	5) The consideration of suffering as a temporary thing to be resolved by some means,
	     perhaps in the world to come, an afterlife or a better future. (tape 6)
     The Book of Job can easily be viewed in this light, of course, and the American civil religion has
utilized several of these 'solutions' to the question. For Jefferson, the rejection of any active deity would
appear to apply, but more generally, other approaches have been more typical. If we are to believe the
impact of Puritanism, in particular, but even beyond that, the idea that everyone is guilty and so there is
no innocent suffering should find wide acceptance, and that would seem to be the case, although some
political elements have taken this to new extremes in constructing an agenda through government aims at
redressing the harm done to the innocent victims by the guilty -- which would be those who have
ostensibly benefited the most. This contorted version is quite akin to Bellah's model of civil religion, and
to his 'good society.' There  have also been instances of prolonged adherence to the malignant forces
explanation. Whatever the real threat from the 'communist menace' may have been, it clearly fits into that
schema. And yet, there are also important powerful strains of the educative and temporary arguments in
our theology, as well. It might be argued, in fact, that these are predominant. One of the key elements of
American thinking has long been that there is a solution to every problem, and hence, it is possible to
learn a solution, or invent one, making the 'temporary' more current than in the afterlife.
     A significant role in religious behavior is that played by ritual. They mark people as they progress
through various stages of a religious life and, in the process, remind them that they belong to a distinct
religious group. Ritual can actually function to create religious people out of nonreligious ones. As such,
they are a crucial component of the community-engendering  characteristic of religion, providing an
identity which distinguishes its adherents from 'others' who are often denigrated, if only by exclusion. It
often seems as if  Americans look down on ritual as unnecessary. We frequently hear of things having
been 'merely' ritualistic. Certainly outside of America they carry great significance, and they actually do in
the United States, too. There are an endless stream of rituals which permeate American life. Many of
these are political such as Inaugural events, not only for Presidents, but for governors and mayors. The
bestowing of the mantle of power on Dennis Archer as Mayor of Detroit in 1994 is an extreme case. 
Some Presidents have sought to typify their tenures by deliberate efforts to run against ritual and symbol.
Kennedy would not wear the top hat, and Carter walked the parade route. Such conduct is itself ritualistic,
but the attempt to disparage ritual may overlook its vital significance.
     The business of the Congress is another extreme example of the degree to which official governmental
operations are steeped in ritual in this country. And they all serve as important parts of our civil religion.
One function such ritual plays is to bestow both elements of mana and taboo upon those receiving the
mantle of leadership. We also have ritualized the naturalization of new citizens in this country in ways
that will be found no where else. It would actually be quite impossible to find such elevation of citizenship
anywhere else, which would be fitting for the anointing of new members of the 'chosen people.' The ritual
singing of the national anthem, though less unique, is but one of the more obvious such ceremonies which
typify American life and faith. In point of fact, the ritualized act of placing the mantle of officialdom  is
probably an important behavior for a republic, as it sets those special few slightly apart from the rest of us,
an essential element in a society of citizens to a large degree convinced of some fundamental equality
among us. Ritual in America is not limited to the political realm, however. Some three decades ago, a
uniquely American manifestation of this sort was documented in the publication of  THE AMERICAN
WAY OF DEATH. Ritual and symbol play an indispensable part in the transformation of any group into a
community.

     This methodology which Oden has utilized does have some shortcomings. As others have argued, such
models often contain a 'western' bias and preclude that which many societies would consider  or  what
should be considered 'religious' from such consideration. That qualification will be examined more fully,
but on the basis that his criterion is a critical test of religiousity, it seems clear that the appellation civil
religion may be a more meaningful invention than much usage of the term has signified. The construct of
this American faith is in substantive accord with his constitution of religion.
     As regards the problem of 'dual' religiousity, the Catholic catechism offers some comments of some
import. (CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1995) Observing that "All men are called to the
same end: God himself," it sees  " ... a certain resemblance between the union of the divine persons and
the fraternity that men are to establish among themselves..." (1)  Contending that  "the human person
needs to live in society," it says that "Society is not for him an extraneous addition but a requirement of
his nature." Importantly, it is "Through the exchange with others, mutual service and dialogue with his
brethren, [that] man develops his potential ..." (2) The group of persons which constitutes this society 
binds them together "organically by a principle of unity" which establishes each man "as an 'heir' and [he]
receives certain 'talents' that enrich his identity and whose fruits he must develop." (3) Accordingly, "He
rightly owes loyalty to the communities of which he is part and respect to those in authority who have
charge of the common good," (4) although in degrees by which such communities are dedicated to "the
human person ... [as] the subject and the end of all social institutions."(5) Some societies and institutions
more directly correspond to the nature of man and as they "promote the participation of the greatest
number in the life of a society" in relation to both "economic and social goals," they must be encouraged:

	"This "socialization" also expresses the natural tendency for human beings
	to associate with one another for the sake of attaining objectives that exceed
	individual capacities. It develops the qualities of the person, especially the sense 
	of initiative and responsibility, and helps guarantee his rights." (6)

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