Contractual law becomes the 'fundamental norm,' "imposing itself upon us with the authority of
traditional experience," and the "society which results from this union" works to "impose uniform beliefs
and practices." The more sophisticated this system becomes, the more totally are social and religious life
intertwined. And the more complex the system of obligations becomes, the more we are dependent upon
an 'organ' of such obligation, the state. (25) Man requires powerful and durable bonds for him to live
together and this need rises with the level of organization of the society.(26)
     Durkheim argues a contrast between two sets of such societies, one where each individual is not strong
and is under indistinct uniform received rules put beyond 'the pale of decision' by the 'super-human'
authority imposing them, and the other, 'cooperative society' in which the individual is stronger and which
is conducive to personal initiative. Society develops along a continuum of these two currents from the
former to the latter in his judgment, never extinguishing the first as the last more segmented structure
evolves:

	" ... society learns to regard its members no longer as things over which it has rights,
	but as co-operators whom it cannot neglect and toward whom it owes duties."(27)

     And as this development occurs, a 'community of beliefs' supported by formalized structures takes form
which functions to prevent the individuals within its sphere from becoming "a jumble of juxtaposed
atoms" and unites members by more or less permanent ties.

     Discussing communal ritual in the context of the theory of totemism in his ELEMENTARY FORMS
OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE, Durkheim argues the utility of 'emblem:'

	"By expressing the social unity in a material form, it makes this most obvious
	of all, and for that very reason the use of emblematic symbols must have spread 
	quickly ... this idea should spontaneously arise out of the conditions of the 
	common life; for the emblem is not merely a convenient process for classifying 
	the sentiment society has of itself: it also serves to create this sentiment; it is one 
	of its constituent elements."(28)

     For communication to be real communion, it must be "a fusion of all particular sentiments into one
common sentiment," thus informing individuals of their harmonious union, and making them aware "of
their moral unity." Such 'collective representations' presuppose interaction and assist in the creation of
their association in a common mental state, and this must be accomplished through common movement:

	"When this homogeneity is once established and these movements have once
	taken a stereotyped form, they serve to symbolize the corresponding representations.
	But they symbolize them only because they have aided in forming them."(29)

     Without such symbols, there is but a precarious existence in social sentiment, and without repetition,
they fade and are extinguished. Their endurance makes them the more durable. Communal ritual as
systems of such symbols are needed to societal self-consciousness to be cultivated and continued. Since
they transcend both the individuals and their minds, and are given origin in social settings, the
representations of them in emanation from an object which is material is real for although they do not
actually arise out of the emblem with which they are associated, their origin is outside of and received by
the individual.(30)

     What occurs out of this is a phenomenon which might be termed sanctification. Common objects
through such collective representations become 'sacred.' The thoughts and beliefs which they convey do
not arise from qualities inherent within the object, though they emanate from it in the social process
which gives them that meaning and are received by the individual from outside. The ideal is very much
the reality in the 'social kingdom' and it is from this that the sacred character of objects is added or
superimposed upon them.(31) Religious force can only be understood "to be outside of the object in which
it resides," and "is only the sentiment inspired by the group in its members, but projected outside of the
consciousnesses that experience them, and objectified "(32):

	"The object serving as support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal
	superstructure, beneath which it disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the
	superstructure."(33)

With particular relevance to the civil form of sacredness looked to here, Durkheim expresses the
indivisibility of this sacred character of symbols by running it from the myths and ritual of the
traditionally 'religious' to a nation's flag, any part of which is as sacred in its representation as the
whole.(34) The intimate relationship between social structure and the structure of thought is an area to
which Durkheim has made an important contribution, though such argumentation is not unique or limited
to him, and can be found reflected in a host of other sources including Karl Mannheim, George Mead,
Ernest Cassiner, Edward Sapir, Robert Lowie, Talcott Parsons, and Freud, for example. More
contemporary sources also treat the issues of such socialization and acculturation, as well, and while it
may not generally specifically address religiousity in its comment, it does provide insight into social
construction. Of particular relevance in this geandre is discussion of the development of political reality,
for the processes are at least parallel.

     The process of socialization involves the internalization of attitudes, predispositions to respond in
certain ways to stimuli, which, if they do not predict behavior, do have a great impact on it. They function
as a perceptual screen or filter which colors responses to stimuli:



                                                                                                /
                                                                                              /
                                   STIMULUS     ---------------------->/-------------------------->     RESPONSE
                                                                                           /
                                                                                         /
                                                                            ATTITUDINAL
                                                                                   SCREEN

Attitudes become essential at the point at which external stimuli meet with internal processes, and require
interpretation. This alters the entire nature of communication. David Katz held that the attitudes we have
serve certain specific functions. He identified four types of these. (POQ 1960) Group pressures are an
example of the 'adjustment function.' Attitudes are held in order to acquire or achieve what we want or
avoid that which we do not want in the group environment. People adjust their behavior to abide by group
norms since they are cognizant of repercussions from disagreement or dissonance. Katz identified two
variations of an 'Ego-Defensive Function' as a second category. The Denial/Avoidance type involves
external threats and enables us to cope with situations which are beyond our control even though they are
important to us. Dangerous aspects of an environment may be repressed because recognition of them may
make it impossible to continue to exist in established patterns. Internal threats develop attitudes embedded
in an individual's character and are termed a 'Rationalization Function.' An example of this might be
racial prejudice out of inferiority feelings which an individual suffers under. Such attitudes may frequently
arise out of feelings of impotence. 'Value Expressive Function' attitudes serve as a declaration to the world
as to an individual's identity. Such attitudes may be expressed out of group ties without very much
foundational basis to them. And values which provide a frame of reference for sorting out and acquiring
knowledge are called by Katz  'Knowledge Function' attitudes, and may include stereotypical assessments.
They help us get along by 'making sense' of the world around us, but there is a cost/benefit aspect of, for
example, stereotypes, which may result in attitudinal adjustment as new information renders them
decreasingly functional.

     The components of attitudes, as broken down by psychology, are cognition consisting of beliefs or
factual information which an individual holds about an object, affection which are positive or negative
evaluations or judgments, and connotation as that part of an attitude which links beliefs and behavior.
Attitude clusters combine beliefs concerning political (or other) objects with affective values related to
them but according to weighted importance, which may be described in terms of any intrinsic importance
of the attitude to the individual's cluster -- salience -- and of the importance of that attitude in relationship
to others held by that person -- centrality.

     In either case, the belief system is an important part of attitude, and serves to link attitudes to other
ideas about the political world in systems of attitude clusters. Phillip Converse in discussing "The Nature
of Belief Systems" considers Constrained Attitude Systems for which it is functional for the individual to
filter out received information inconsistent with the belief system. Converse argues that it is the more
constrained which pat the greatest attention to politics, but it is also they who filter out the most. It simply
is not functional to allow in either information or new ideas which challenge the belief system. 



     Easton and Hess have taken the process of political socialization into "The Child's Political World"
(MWJPS  19;229) along the following lines:

			STIMULUS OF ENVIRONMENT AS CHILD  ----->


			INDIVIDUAL'S ATTITUDES AS CHILD          ----->


			INDIVIDUAL'S ATTITUDES AS ADULT        ----->


			BEHAVIOR AS ADULT                                        ----->


			BEHAVIOR TOWARD GOVERNMENT

     Political culture defines the complex of attitude clusters in belief systems held in common about
common objects which share a relationship with the political system. Such  politically relevant
predispositions are passed from one generation on through political socialization. Such attitudes, which
vary in degree as to extensiveness and intensiveness as well as temporally, are functional both for the
individual and for the political system, providing resources such as consent and loyalty for it to do what it
does, and producing legitimacy, equilibrium, and stability. Those political systems which possess weak
commonality of political culture are potentially subject  to trouble as it is the political culture which forms
the foundations which allow the government to govern. It, as well, provides benefits to the individual,
identifying that which is socially acceptable, giving the person a sense of identity, and performing, in the
process, an adjustment and knowledge function. And within that context, political symbols play a vital
role by providing concrete reassurance as the individual is secure in the knowledge that many believe
what they do. Political symbols are a rallying point which converts underlying attitudes into overt signs of
the culture as objects take on a political meaning exceeding any intrinsic qualities they  may possess.
Every culture  provides such symbols which are crucial in the political socialization process. This is
reminiscent of the practice once employed by Henry Ford involving the elaborate ceremony for employees
and their families who became naturalized and passed through a representation of a melting pot, entering
in their native garb and emerging in 'American ' dress carrying Old Glory. But some concern has been
expressed in recent years on this issue with such studies as Bloom's CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND and Hearsch's CULTURAL LITERACY which pose a danger that too many Americans are
becoming 'culturally illiterate' of the symbols which are necessary for maintenance of the political system.
And developments which purport to recognize a necessity for accepting and promulgating cultural
diversity ranging from multi-lingualism in schools, government, and voting may compound that problem.
Three paramount theories of political socialization were identified by Lane (ASR 1959) in his discussion
of the foundations of political belief. A Psychoanalytic theory based in Freud looks at the children's
dependence on the parent and makes the child a sensitive cue-taker. The child is purported to learn the
parents' political attitudes, and it is suggested that the child's attitude toward parents affects the developed
attitude it evolves toward government. It is argued that problems can ensue as a child attempts to 'behave'
per this experience and conflicts arise. And with a 'damaged' parental relationship, there may result low
levels of political interest, a tendency toward acceptance of high levels of authoritarianism, little critical
evaluation of leadership, and a rather pessimistic, even impotent, attitude in the maturing individual.
Pioget largely  informs a cognitive learning theory of acculturation. The child is thought to learn attitudes
whenever they are capable of doing so, and as they proceed through stages of development. An individual
can only learn political things with the advent of abstract reason accompanying the formal operations
stage as the individual matures from ego-centricity to community. To whatever extent any individual fails 
to pass beyond that stage, levels of  'infantile paralysis' to anomie can develop. An Observational  or
Social Learning theory of socialization is said by Lane to have achieved the widest acceptance. It involves
a form of conditioning as the child gets its attitudes through identification or reinforcement largely
through models.

     A study three decades ago by Jennings and Niemi (1965) involving interviews with high school
students and their parents examined the relative impact of various agents of socialization. The family was
found to be a stronger agent than the school. But the family was not seen as very active in molding
children as political actors. And since the school was found to be quite ineffective in socialization, it was
concluded that teenagers became 'political' largely through inertia. The assessment that it was self-
determination through the development of cognition (something that education may play a major role in
cultivating the skills for and which creates the basis for self-determination) has a great deal to do with
how we develop politically, was said to leave both family and school as largely ineffective as agents.

     Edgar Litt's attempt (ASR 1963) to trace connections between the types of civics books in schools of
various socio-economic categories and levels of political activity is of highly tenuous value amidst the
impact of myriad external events on political socialization. But some aspects of classroom activity may
have some importance. Almond and Verba in their CIVIC CULTURE have contended that what is
learned about political authority in the classroom may be translated into attitudes toward government so
that active participatory environment in the classroom may engender activist ideas of an individual's role
in governance. The influence of indirect and perhaps unintentional influences such as the flag, the pledge,
portraits of Washington and Lincoln, etc., have also been held to be important. Participation in extra-
curricular activities in school may also be important as such activity seems to serve to  engender status,
and therefore social trust and political efficacy.

     Jennings and Niemi plotted the relative impact of some of the agents of  political socialization:


Chart VI-I  AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION


The apparent lack of impact of family and school in socialization have a number of apparent explanations
which they offer. There is a pluralism of socialization forces at work and these vary in their direction and
their focus. Then, too, they suggest, there seems to be a rather 'laissez faire' approach which parents take
in the molding of their children  which "tends to create a vacuum to be filled, if at all, by other sources or
at other times."(36) They found great disparity on responses on various issues of social and political
importance and little recognition expressed by students of their parents' ideological orientation or position
on issues of import. External events were also found to impact greatly on the development of political
being and, in that same spirit, there was also found to be a substantive role of the self functioning in an
independent and mediating influence:

	"One of the reasons the political self can be so important is that many political 
	orientations are not firmly set until well into adulthood; and even then noticeable
	changes can occur. This means that attitudinal and behavioral transformations 
	readily occur in response to alterations in one's life space, the experiencing of 
	political events, and work-related learning as well as from the more conventional
	sources of home and school."(37)

But they do inculcate values and norms of behavior to young people.

     Easton and Hess were more specifically concerned with consideration of very young children in the
focus on childhood determinism, but that impact is seen as quite mediated in Jennings and Niemi by
additional learning experience as they mature. Cobb and Elder ( 1978) in looking at the impact of symbols
as the agents of socialization probably encompass both of these. They have suggested three dimensions of
political symbolism which are emotion, content, and importance. The strong emotional content and
attachment to such symbols central to the political order come early in life and are rather persevering, for
example.

     The debate is reflected in the contention in political science between what have been called the
'traditional' and 'revisionist' views of the American voter. The juxtaposed "Life-Cycle Effect' and
'Generational Hypothesis' are representative of the debate. A 'tunnel of causality' which attempts to
distinguish between political identity and vote has been offered to consider different factors at play in
affecting the vote, with proximity to the vote having weighted influence.

Chart VI-II Tunnel of Causality



     But the measurement of partisan identification can be a rather problematic matter which requires the
utilization of a continuum of intensity of identification. Further, it is not very clear that issue voting is
either very important on its own or that it is reflective of much more than partisan perceptual screening.
Carmine and Stinson have differentiated between 'easy issues' and 'hard issues'  in an attempt to further
explain the dilemna, and the model which Anthony Downs developed, ( 1957 ) honed by Gordon
Tollock(1968) and Reicher and Orschick (1968) regarding vote choice and turnout can be utilized toward
understanding the process of political socialization.

     This economic theory of voting attempts to consider the effect of marginal cost and benefit of the vote,
such that

			R     =     P     +     B     -     C     +     D

where partisanship as a long-term factor is mitigated by more short-run benefits and costs perceived, as
well as by the socialized sense of civic responsibility or duty. Since, it is argued, the benefits cannot likely
outweigh the costs, which include the cost of information, the additional factor of duty is of crucial
importance.

     This additional component of civic duty has been developed into much more sophisticated models of
political behavior. A simplified form of that proposed by Page and Jones (APSR 1979) includes multiple
and reciprocal effects, not one-way causalities:

Chart VI-III  Influences On Vote Choice


The trend seems to have been toward somewhat of a mediation of the traditional assessment in favor of a
somewhat more revisionist viewpoint of the American voter with a recognition of a complex system of
causal factors, but with a general agreement on elections as by and large retrospective.
     In a study reported in the American Political Science Review in 1989, Straite, Parrish, Elder, and Ford
have taken the concept of civic duty to the level of an attempt to delineate and measure what they term
'civic competence.' Although their emphasis is on voting, they believe the theory equally applicable to
other varieties of political participation. Largely age-related, they are arguing for a broader understanding
of that idea which considers the effects of it on other variables. Also important in this model is the concept
of political learning. The theory elaborated:
	" ... of life span civic development assumes that political participation
	in its various forms is social behavior based on accepted knowledge 
	and dispositions, shaped and maintained by a variety of material, 
	purposive, and social rewards. It therefore suggests a broader range
	of incentives for political participation than those implied by rational
	choice theory ... " (38)
expanding consideration beyond the "exclusively instrumental" to those factors which are "expressive of
symbolic, in character."  The central concept to the theory is that of civic competence which "is defined as
knowledge and habits of knowledge acquisition relevant to politics."(39)  The greater the level of such
competence a person possesses, the better able they will be to understand the process, make
'discriminating judgments,' and therefore, their degree of participation is likely to rise. Its acquisition,
again, is age related but in a manner which leads them to discuss 'age-related variables.' A representation
of their causal model gives some indication of the scope of the theory:
Chart VI-IV  Causal Model of Voting Participation Showing All Age-Related Paths (40)


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