It is von Mises' argument that the problems such policy seeks to address are actually aggravated by
them, the response to which crises is more intervention. Thus he holds that the Depression, far from
demonstrating the flaws and weaknesses of the capitalist system, was, in fact, resultant of such
interventionist initiatives:

	"Depression is the aftermath of credit expansion; mass unemployment prolonged 	
	year after year is the inextricable effect of attempts to keep wage rates above the
	level which the unhampered market would have fixed. All those evils which the
	progressives interpret as evidence of the failure of capitalism are the necessary
	outcome of allegedly social interference with the market."(2)

It is important to understand that without economic freedom, there can be no maintenance of political
freedom, the latter being corollary to the former. But the real problem lies in the poverty of economic
philosophy:

	" There are no means by which the height of wage rates and the general standard
	of living can be raised other than by accelerating the increases of capital as compared
	with population. The only means to raise wage rates permanently ... is to raise the 
	productivity of the industrial effort by increasing the per-head of capital invested."(3)

Government, he says, can only maintain an institutional order which is conducive to the accumulation of
capital so that the technological methods of production may be improved, and this can only be
accomplished by making sure that impediments to that do not occur. Exactly the opposite of that is the
methodology of the varied 'socialist' strains which chastise the 'anarchy of production' as anything but 'the
ballet of the market.'

     The Keynesian dilemna is that in its drive to raise aggregate demand, without increasing capital
resources available to fuel production and indeed by drawing away from it with the opposing result, is
simply a policy of inflation:

	"What those allegedly planning for freedom do not comprehend is that the market
	with its prices is the steering mechanism of the free enterprise system. Flexibility of 
	commodity prices, wage rates and interest rates is instrumental in adapting production                
	to the changing conditions and needs of the consumers and is discarding backward
	technological methods."(4)   

Should the market not be permitted to effect this, it will of necessity have to be achieved by coercion.

     An essential characteristic of capitalism is precisely the inequality of wealth and income which the
'progressives' object to. Eliminating profit "renders production rigid and abolishes the consumers'
sovereignty,"(5) since producers/entrepreneurs will not be able to determine consumer wants. Markets
force them to be responsible to consumers. The idea that markets harm the interests of the vast majority
for the benefit of the few violates the very engine of the rise in the standard of living of all which
accompanies capitalist profit. What is advocated is not allowing "soulless mechanical forces to operate,"
but providing that "individuals choose how they want to cooperate in the social division of labor" so that
this can work to "determine what the entrepreneurs should produce."(6) The elimination of profit creates
poverty for all.(7)

     This comes down to the rejection of "the individual's discretion to choose and to act,"(8) a denial of the
"supremacy of the buying public:"(9) 

	"They distrust the  populace and consider the State ... as the God-sent guardian
	of the wretched underlings."(10)

     The difference in the vision of man could not be clearer. But there has also been, in this regard, a
definitive semantic inversion. Regimentation to unconditional obedience to central control as the way to
make people free has become the contemporary  arrogation of the appellation liberal (or progressive and
democratic). (11)  Anti-liberalism has become liberalism. In fact, where markets produce property:

	" ... it is implied that ... [these] ... are achievements of a paternal government. 
	The incomes of the individual citizens are viewed as handouts graciously
	bestowed upon them by a benevolent bureaucracy."(12)

The very idea that people can know or pursue their own interests is not only dismissed, but, in fact,
deemed harmful as not coincident but in contravention of the whole,(13) because humans are fallible and
do not know their own interests. Politicians whose programs fuel government largess and largeness are
contributing in a positive way to the general welfare and anyone objecting to such policy is negative so
that markets and related phenomena are negative.

     Mises would remind us of that older vision of classical liberalism:

	"There is nothing axiomatic or mysterious in the operation of the market.
	The only forces determining the continually fluctuating state of the market
	are the value judgments of the various individuals and their actions as 
	directed by those value judgments. The ultimate factor in the market is the
	striving of each man to satisfy his needs and wants in the best possible way.
	Supremacy of the market is tantamount to the supremacy of the consumers."(14)

There is an inherent assumption of rationality in "the ballot of the market [which] elevates"(15) and it is
an 'election' that is daily operative and correcting. In capitalism, "profit is a product of the mind"(16) and
is very  much "a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon:"(17)

	"There is no other standard of what is morally good and morally bad than
	the effects produced by conduct upon social cooperation."(18)

     This is a contention over precisely what it is that constitutes "the spirit of our age."(19) For Ferdinand
LaSalle "the state is God" (20) and for Keynesians, the General Theory was the 'revelation.'(21) Indeed,
the Keynesian 'miracle' turned stones into bread. Argues Mises:

	"All their passionate praises of the super-eminence of government action
	is merely a poor disguise for the individual interventionist's self-deification.
	The Great God State is great only because it is expected to do ... what the ...
	interventionist wants ..."(22)
But, the stones do not turn into bread.
     The choice between markets and planning involves an implicit choice "between all the social
institutions which are the necessary accompaniment of each of these systems, its 'superstructure,' as Marx 
said,"(23) and that must entail obviously the choice between the alternative visions or spirits. Thus, what
we may have is in fact a contest for the soul; in reality, competing civil religions, in effect. Hayek
emphasized the point in THE ROAD TO SERFDOM in 1944. Economic control cannot be separated from
the other sectors of human life. The means must be controlled for all our ends. In 1959, he went further in
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY. Liberty must be viewed as "the rule of laws and not of men." His
wish is an analysis of all foundations in constitutional and legal terms of a 'commonwealth of free
citizens.' There is a contrast between the social and political organization of the two schemes, one of
representative government grounded on legality and the other authoritarian discretionary power. The
constitution of liberty is also the constitution of religion.

     Mises is somewhat critical of  Hayek's attempt to distinguish between socialism and the welfare state
which might be compatible with liberty to some extent. His is a weighty argument to the contrary. But
neither is Mises bereft of problems or even contradictions. It is, for example, his contention that the
dichotomous system he describes might appropriately be described in terms of "the clash of two
orthodoxies: the Bismarck orthodoxy versus the Jefferson orthodoxy."(24) That is a difficult statement to
reconcile with the argument he poses for 'bigness'  versus 'smallness,' or the general temperment of his 
work toward industrial society. He builds a considerable case against Physiocracy, as well. And the point
of the relationship between political, economic, and social orders in society compounds that dilemna;
between theory and structure, form and substance.

     Nor, it might be suggested, can there be grounds for an utter and absolute rejection of all 'planning.' Is
all planning inherently bad? Might there not be a distinction made between local and state versus federal
planning? And what of the provision of the requisite infrastructure? Even if that were accomplished
through privatization schemes, there is obviously more than a grain of planning involved. Mises, having
posed his case in the most absolutely logical terms may be effectively and realistically arguing for the
rolling back of the trend down the slippery slope. Ronald Reagan may perhaps typify this sense. His
'laissez faire' encompassed not only supply side  but a tremendous (and arguably successful) command
economy in the defense budget.

     And it is not always altogether absolutely clear that one of Mises' biggest nemeses, inflationary credit
expansion, is not argued with a certain degree of qualification. He repeatedly infers that there are
possibilities that such expansion need not be seen as inherently inflationary. If, for example, it was
employed such that it was conducive to wealth creation, it would not be so. In that event, it could be quite
useful. If we take the economic identity MV = PQ, the point is made quite clear. An increase in either
money supply or the velocity of its circulation must result in either an increase in the general price level or
the quantity of production, or some combination thereof.

     Mises is quite important, however, for this discussion in a number of ways. He not only elaborates the
'spirit' of capitalism but as well that opposing spirit, and he articulates a substantive linkage between such
spirit and the various institutional frameworks which must accompany, formal and informal, and, in
doing so, confers an element of religiousity to each of the orthodoxies, however we might identify them,
and then contributes substantially to the consideration  of the constitution of the civil religion under
examination here.

     Of more recent vintage, but equally relevant, is the conflict of visions which Thomas Sowell has
elaborated. At first stroke, Sowell's patterns of constrained and unconstrained visions may seem to strike a
rather different cord, perhaps one somewhat at odds with the work others have done. In fact, however, his
schema really defines and polishes the dichotomous spirits in a manner even more amenable to this
investigation. That we proceed in our reasoning processes from established premises which effectively
serve us as  maps, or that such visions are the basis for whatever theories we construct  in what has been
described  as pre-analytic cognitive acts by Joseph Schumpeter (25) is hardly earth-shattering news, but
comprehending their role in our existence is a crucial matter. Whatever level of sophistication any
particular vision may consist in, they are simpler than reality. Bombarded endlessly with innumerable bits
of data, they serve as a lens through which we can process and sort and classify the inundation of data. Of
course, the problem inherent in that 'model' character is how it diverges from reality. What has been left
out of any such configuration may be either negligible or shattering to its success or utility. They are
fundamentally 'a sense of causation'   which must stand the test of verification to survive. But they guide
us in our endless pursuits and are at the foundation of the multitude of competing and conflicting objects
which fill and form the world.

     Long after he had articulated his theory of public philosophy, Walter Lippman characterized this
'vision' phenomenon:

"At the core of every moral code there is a picture of human nature,
	a map of the universe, and a version of history. To human nature
	(of the sort conceived), in a universe (of the kind imagined), after 
	a history (so understood), the rules of the code apply." (Pub Op 1965 p 80)

     As such, we will find a substantial catalogue of variation on this theme which will run to this article
being interpreted as a paradigm, an invention, perhaps even a subconscious or super-ego, but also as a
civil religion. Consequently, says Sowell, "social visions differ in their basic conceptions of the nature of
man." (26) And in Sowell, the locus of this distinction revolves around "the capacities and limitations of
man" so that he argues a fundamental dichotomy of two visions, constrained and unconstrained. His
odyssey through the 'ideological origins of political struggles' pursues that pattern, not toward a
conclusion of the old left vs right, for his exercise debunks that weak fallacy, but on a purpose of
demonstrating the eventualities which lawfully follow from the premises held.

     The constrained vision for Sowell is approximated by Adam Smith's characterization of self-interested
man:

	"Instead of regarding man's nature as something that could or should be changed,
	Smith attempted to determine how the moral and social benefits desired could be
	produced in the most efficient way, within that constraint." (27)

He observes Burke's perspective of "a radical infirmity in all human contrivances" and Hamilton's view
that:

	"It is the lot of all human institutions, even those of the most perfect kind,
	to have defects as well as excellences -- ill as well as good properties.
	This results from the imperfection of the Institution, Man,"(28)

as representative of the constrained vision. The pursuit of self-interest operating in a context of free
exchange with trade-offs were the 'most efficient' method of establishing moral and social cohesion.

     In contrast to this, he launches his delineation of the unconstrained vision with a discussion of William
Godwin's view that "man's understanding and disposition were capable of intentionally creating social
benefits."(29) The 'essence of virtue' was acting with the intent of producing social benefits. Development
of 'a higher sense of social duty' rather than incentives of reward or punishment were central to this
"unconstrained vision of the yet untapped moral potential of human beings."(30) For Godwin, man was
'perfectible' which Sowell explains means "continually improvable rather than capable of actually
reaching absolute perfection."(31) He makes reference to Condorcet's objection to Locke's assertions that
"dared to set a limit to human understanding."(32) As a mathematician, for him perfectibility was "a
never-ending asymptotic approach to a mathematical limit."(33)

     The grouping of Paine, Rousseau, Mill, Malthus, and the French Revolution as in the unconstrained
vision, contrasted with Burke and the American Revolution as in the constrained class (34) , may seem at
least problematic. Where Hamilton wanted trade-offs, Robespierre sought solutions, and Condorcet
condemned Montesquieu's system, preferring the General Will.

     The Framers, suggests Sowell, did not believe that anyone could be entrusted with power. The checks
and balances of the Constitutional regime in the United States reflect this thinking. As Hamilton wrote in
the Federalist Papers:

	"It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary
	to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the 
	greatest of all reflections of human nature?"(35)

and he continued:
	"Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will
	not conform to the dictates of reason and justice with out constraint." (36)
     In the unconstrained vision, institutions were the problem, not the nature of man, where the solution is
better policies. It makes for what may seem to be strange bedfellows: Galbraith, Earl Warren, Ronald
Dworkin, and Paine, Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, the Fabians, etc. The same applies for the opposite
tradition encompassing Hobbes and Hegel, Holmes, Friedman, and Burke. And to explain what seems on
the surface to be basically contradictory, Sowell proceeds to follow through to the differing conclusions
following on those visions on a wide range of issues.
     Constraint will of necessity increase with time, as people become relatively less knowledgeable even
while gaining in absolute levels of cognition due to the accelerated pace of the available data base and the
increasing specificity of divisions of labor. Hence, while unconstrained vision proffers the more elite
surrogate decision-maker, the market orientation of the constrained view suggests with its loci of
discretion dispersed, a more 'free' option. This latter, however, certainly rests more firmly on such notions
as republican virtue and civil religion while the nature of the former, even where such constructs can be
most useful, would be to undermine or challenge these structures, unconsciously or otherwise. (37) This
may in fact be at the crux of the so-called 'culture war' emergent in our society.

     The unconstrained vision of contemporary 'liberalism,' atomism and anomie, the undermining of
private property and markets, the displacement of original intent and natural for judicial activism,
emphasis on government sanctioned control and redistribution also fundamentally forms the substance of
the argument in Bellah's broken covenant. An extension of this vision runs to indications that the tradition
of civil religion must be attacked and dispelled. Bellah's broken covenant then is, in reality, breaking the
covenant by its expression and fulfillment. And that, after all, is the substance of Clinton's 'new covenant'
or 'new social compact.'

     The political left for Sowell is certainly at home in the unconstrained vision while the constrained
vision does not rest well among libertarians:

	"In the constrained vision, the individual is allowed great freedom precisely in order
	to serve social ends -- which may be no part of the individual's purposes. Property
	rights, for example, are justified within the constrained vision not by any morally superior 
	claims of the individual over society, but precisely by claims for the efficiency and 
	expediency of making social decisions through the systemic incentives of market
	processes rather than by central planning."(38)

In the words of Milton Friedman:

	"A society that puts equality -- in the sense of equality of outcomes -- ahead of freedom
	will end up with neither equality or freedom. The use of force to achieve equality will destroy 
	freedom, and the force, introduced for good purposes, will end up in the hands of people
	who will use it to promote their own interests."(39)

The implications of application of the dichotomous visions Sowell articulates are crucial to consider in
reaching for his point.

     The author continues:

	"To those with the unconstrained vision, to say that people are innately equal,
	but that vast differences in economic and social results exist, and that privileges
	are both taken for granted and repaid only in arrogance, is to say that existing
	society is intolerably unjust and must be changed,"(40)

and he juxtaposes:                                                                                                                                             

	" ... the distinction of knowledge and reason is vastly more unequal in the 
	unconstrained vision, because its definition of knowledge and reason as 
	articulated information and syllogistic rationality puts them much more in
	the province of the intellectual elite. But the cultural conception of knowledge
	in the constrained vision makes it far more widely diffused, and the systemic
	logic of cultural evolution and survival in competition dwarfs to insignificance
	the special logical talent of the intellectual elites."(41)

     For this examination of civil religion, the issue of criminality provides what is a fundamental
distinction between the two visions. Human nature for the constrained viewpoint is repulsed by crime "as
a product of social conditioning -- a sense of general morality, personal honor, and humane feelings, all
cultivated by the many traditions and institutions of society," as for example, civil religion. But human
nature by the alternative reckoning has its aversion to crime undermined through the injustice in
society.(42)

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