The extent of this internalization will depend upon the point to which the satisfaction of one group
rests on the suppression of another, and a "narcissistic satisfaction" will develop in those cultures where
that has been diminished, and this allows these to look condescendingly down upon the rest where the
shared benefits of culture have reduced "discord and enmity" among cultural units, or where
internalization has progressed to a level making it possible:

"This identification of the suppressed classes with the class who rules and exploits
them is, however, only part of a larger whole. For ... the suppressed classes can be
emotionally attached to their masters; in spite of their hostility to them they may see
in them their ideals ..."(63)

This narcissistic satisfaction is achieved through the religion of a culture. As we formed civilization to
make communal life possible through the structuring of defense against nature, religion is the primary
mechanism by which we overcome 'discordancies' and animosities through "the great common task of
preserving itself against superior power of nature."(64) Freud contends that most civilizations accomplish
this by similar means. The 'terror' which all men face is mastered in the same manner as the child
develops its relation to its parents:

"In the same way, a man makes the forces of nature not simply into persons with whom
he can associate as he would with his equals ... but he gives them the character of a
father. He turns them into gods ..."(65)

This 'infantile prototype' becomes, as the gods become 'withdrawn,' a placement of them in the domain
of morality, and:

"Life in this world serves a higher purpose ... [which] signifies a perfecting of man's
nature ... Everything that happens in this world is an expression of the intentions of
an intelligence superior to us, which in the end ... orders everything for the best ..."(66)

The special Providence guiding us reconciles the terror and obliterates injustice even if in life after
death, and each civilization, in the quest for its reward, develops a perception of itself as a Chosen People
of its deity. These ideas

" ... are prized as the most precious possession of civilization, as the most precious
things it has to offer its participants."(67)

We are, for Freud, incapable of existence "without the consolation of the religious illusion"(68) so long
as we adhere to it in our infantile state. Inevitably, the illusion must become apparent, and the entire
system based upon it must necessarily collapse around us. (69) And yet, the demise of this neurosis does
not pose an insurmountable dilemna. His purpose is to point out this necessary step forward and through
recognition of our real position in the world and attachment to scientific knowledge in place of that
illusion, the path to be followed:

"By withdrawing their expectations from the other world and concentrating all
their liberated energies into their life on earth, they will probably succeed in
achieving a state of things in which life becomes tolerable for everyone and
civilization no longer oppressive to anyone."(70)

Acknowledging the promise of Freudian 'salvation' from illusion, there is much in his system which
runs headlong into much of the tradition of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam especially, even as it coheres
with some of their historical reality. And as problematic as it is in those cases, its relevance in respect to
our civil religion is even more of a dilemna for its assertions, even as it offers us insights into some of the
debate which has been entered into. As the former must at this juncture be left for the most part to fend for
themselves, the latter is critical for comment here.

The Freudian preference is to leave the matter of God completely aside, and to "honestly admit the
purely human origin of all the regulations."(71) Were people to come to comprehend their interest served
by such precepts devoid of their mythical sanction, the "instead of aiming at their abolition, would aim
only at their improvement."(72) But the pathological character of these constraints could hardly be viewed
as any more positive however they were internalized, at least as he constructs them. Furthermore, on
Adam Smith, the greater self interest of all is only served by the unfettered pursuit each of his own
interests, from whatever source their perception stems. Still, Freud's preference takes on some semblance
of the Associational construct in such as Henry Carey, though he could never subscribe to the premise that
human labor must be coerced from lazy men as Freud does. Divine sanction merely reinforces what the
masses of people inherently know.

In fact, in Freud's assessment, as man as "weak and sinful," corrupted and fallen, it would seem that
his preference in a rationally based system keyed to science that may be illusion but not delusion is pretty
well precluded. He has locked humanity out of the salvation he desires by his characterization of the
nature of man. Nor can we be assured in his system that the rationally based scientific salvation is any less
of a delusion than what he finds so undesirable. Though he seems quite aware that state of scientific
knowledge at any point will not be perfection, he seems to treat it as such without realizing that perfection
is a dynamic process and not a static state. In any event, whatever state prevails inevitably will be
superseded. It is also open to the pitfall of 'falsifiability' so well articulated by Popper.

But the crux of the problem with Freud ties in his interpretation of the purpose of order in society. his
objective out of order is control whereas the goal is more properly viewed as the basis for freeing the
energy of humanity for development. It is also rather difficult to accept the basis of his weltanschauung as
premised on either mothers' fears or the primeval father. Though such may be a part of the formative
process, they are not the only feasible explanations. The fact that he seems so hell-bent on establishing an
evidentiary grounding for his atheism must also be held suspect. It almost seems as if he has an ax to
grind in this respect. The old adage that if there is no God, the fact that adherence to his prescriptions will
have done no harm, but only served humanity positively in the end is worth contemplation, however. It is
equally difficult to fathom just how he could be so absolutely convinced that some of our predecessors had
devised solutions to the riddles of the universe. Can his typification of ancestors as 'wretched, ignorant,
and downtrodden' be taken as completely valid? The interpretation that man must come to face his
'insignificance or impotence in the face of the universe' is a problem as well. Are we to accept this on
faith? That is not to deny any possibility that religion may have or yet may serve any good purpose, but it
is also difficult to deny that, even if we have a long way to go, we've 'come a long way, baby.'

Even if one were to accept Freud's critique of religion as generally valid, it would be a leap to apply his
criticisms to civil religion, which attached as it must be to some sinews of dominant established religions,
lacks most of the illusory traits he takes such exception to even as it would seem to cohere in great degree
to much of the character of his preferred path to salvation. His 'proof' to the contrary notwithstanding, one
must cast a leery eye on assertions in Freud that we are each 'an enemy of civilization' or that we "feel as a
heavy burden the sacrifices which civilization expects."(73) He also puts some emphasis on an objective
of culture "not only at effecting a certain distribution of wealth but at maintaining that distribution."(74)
There would seem to be here a clear prescription of governance action that is highly problematic. His
state, as entered before, may have the function of control through coercion, but that is not the only
plausible theory of the state.

Nor is it necessarily to be accepted that man and the masses possess any absolute aversion to labor such
that work must be coerced. An alternative view that man is what he becomes through his creations belies
that even if exceptions to that may be found. In fact, one of the problems of society and governance may
be in the extent to which they act to block such realization. The entire vision of limited government, if it
does not quite reach to Rousseau, is directly aimed at such theory. Thus, the assertion that his "recognition
that every civilization rests on a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct."(75) must be held
extremely tenuous. There is almost what could be termed an anti-capitalist bias that runs covertly through
Freud. The very notion that culture has always been based on the ascendancy of one group dependent on
the suppression of another is ill-informed as to the wealth creation and indeed, leveling, nature of that
system. Not that there are not disparities of wealth, but that all have been raised by its functioning, and
that the accumulation of capital is the engine of further creation and leveling. It would be folly to deny
some sentiments of exceptionalism in such cultures, although equating them as condescension is quite a
stretch. What was true for Rome of in 19th century England need not be so valid in America. To make it
narcissistic is baseless.

One can see in some of the alternative explanations of American civil religion (as opposed to that
depicted here), a role as mediator of the defects and evils of civilization, but that is precisely where such
fail the test. What the model looked to here effects is not an infantile personification of the forces of
nature toward the establishment of a relation aimed ultimately at control, but rather a rising of individuals
in a virtual apotheosis, and one which itself is the foundation for allaying fears and fulfilling justice. It
may be that "where questions of religion are concerned, people are guilty of every possible sort of
dishonesty and intellectual misdemeanor,"(76) and that the religious beliefs thereon based "are
insusceptible of proof,"(77) but if that identifies Bellah's civil religion, it is not in accord with this one.
Indeed, that of Bellah may be an intellectual felony. Elsewhere, Freud has constructed (CIVILIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS) (78) an argument as to the origin of guilt, and this is of particular
significance for that other 'civil religion.' The super ego conscience he identifies is one especially tuned to
the development, not only of guilt but of the 'victimization' of segments of the population which is of
special note therein, and a theme to be returned to later.

In Freud's identification of three reasons or rationalizations for belief in religious 'truths,' (79) he
overlooks a fourth altogether. The fairy tales of the illusions of a religion may not be that at all -- they may
simply be true! (Or possessed of a substantive element of truth). What has been identified here as a
'categorical imperative' (in an upcoming part of this discussion) toward performance of that which is
necessary for human existence and advance is not arrogance if it has validity. The entire scheme of Freud,
from his pronouncements as to the necessity of coerced labor, to his description of wealth as extracted,
suffers, too, from a poverty of philosophy in regard to economics, and that may be its fatal flaw. Were it
not for that apparent shortcoming, he might be able to recognize just how he is locked out of his salvation.
Indeed, this key might unlock the cage. While Freud may be seen to have some degree of intersection with
the Marxian system, and indeed they share some of the same problems (not denying all usefulness to the
Marxian system, either), that methodology has enough of its own. But much as with Freud, even beyond
the premise in Marx and in socialism generally as to the nature of man, it affords considerable
commentary with respect to our examined specimen.

Although it is so not so much the case as regards other breeds of socialism, there is a sort of Catch-22
barrier that can baffle Marxian interpretations, 'locking' out in a way similar to Freud, his prescriptive
formulizations. Historical and economic determinism even at the ultimate stages of capitalist development
where its inherent flaws have undermined its viability faces the dilemna of just how the leap of socialist
transition is to be achieved. There is a real question as to whether a 'spontaneous combustion' by the
proletariat at the conjunctural crisis can occur without the leadership necessary; something which may
arguably be precluded by the deterministic limitations placed on pre-socialist man in bourgeois society.
There has been discussion of the role of the intelligensia, of a vanguard cadre, and the like, in the effort to
resolve the question. Like Freud's future scientific human freed of his delusions, the capacity of the new
socialist man in Marx is great, but perhaps blocked from realization. That leaves open, too, the question
as to what happens to the frustrated revolution. There could result implosion, bread-down and chaos, or
any number of other scenario, not including revolution.

Of much more direct concern for the current topic, however, are the diagnostic difficulties in Marx, not
the least of which is this view of man as an oppressed, but nonetheless, not very 'elevated' beast of burden,
locked into a generally quite unpleasant existence of subsistence and class conflict. The tenets of Marxism
are well-enough established so as not to require a detailed recantation of great length. Of particular
relevance for comparative analysis of religious belief has to be the notion that "religion is the opiate of the
masses." It is a means of capitalist social control over the downtrodden proletariat, not unlike other
mechanisms of such control described in THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE. It
is unlikely that Marx would look very positively on the civil religion construct, viewing it similarly. Of
course, on other views, those aspects which Marx would look at most dimly are precisely the strength of
civil religion. Its role in securing order would be foremost in this regard. It is, however, in the
Marxian(and socialist generally) conceptualization concerning wealth that both the diagnosis and the
patient are the most poorly conceived. Furthermore, the system to be treated proffers the best response to
the misdiagnosis. And this is so much the case that the practitioners of socialist analysis must be held
accountable for malfeasance (if not malpractice). The failure of communist ideology resides in this
dilemna precisely.
As regards this poverty of philosophy in the economics of Marxian and socialism, it is the very
criterion which lie at the philosophical base of American capitalism, our political culture and civil
religion, that is demonstrative of just how impoverished that system is. Not originating with Marx, though
often attributed to him, is the idea that the value anything possesses is the labor that went into its
production. But this labor theory of value is clearly and increasingly inadequate as the specialization of
labor becomes even more refined. With such increasing sophistication of the division of labor, it is
necessary to consider the role that each element in the production process entails. A 'worker' can only
receive what their marginal revenue product is, as each aspect of the productive process must also be
weighed. Capital resource employment must be seen as similarly possessing a claim to wealth created
commensurate with its engagement in the process, and recognizing the part the investment of capital to
employ that resource required. On that rests its claim on a marginal share, as a return on investment.
Contrary to the socialist assessment, on the labor theory of value, the worker in receipt of his marginal
return is not expropriated of any 'surplus value' of his labor, for it is not that labor alone from which flows
the value. The advance of technology only serves to increase the specialization of labor. It is the sole basis
for enhanced productivity upon which wage increases can rest because of enhanced wealth creation. But
it, as well, demands increased capital resource employment. On this theory of labor power, the entire
socialist conception of wealth (and its demand for redistribution) is demonstrably inadequate. In reality, it
is only through the accumulation of capital out of 'profit' that enables levels of investment of this social
surplus to generate expanding wealth creation. In economics, operations theory graphically displays, in
the inter-relationships of marginal cost, marginal revenue, demand, and average total cost, the destructive
impact of the expropriation by government of social surplus or profit on the creation of wealth. Consider,
for example, the impact of an increase in costs due to some form of governmental intervention (from
regulatory to tax policy). Given that a competitive must be breaking even in the long run -- that is,
making a normal profit -- these factors can be graphed as follows:

Chart VII-II Operations Theory Graphing of Competitive Firm/At Normal Profit

With even a rather small increase in costs to the firm, the graph will be altered along the following
manner, with a lower profit picture --that is, with something less than normal profit -- so that it now takes
the form:

Chart VII-III Operations Theory Graphing of Competitive Firm/Less Than Normal Profit

Whereas in this instance, the firm was operating at breakeven point with normal profit, the increased
operating expense resulting from the change in public policy has not only increased price and decreased
demand resulting in diminished production and employment , but has moved the firm below break-even
levels. It may in fact approach shut-down levels over the short run or face going out of business in the
long run (or be precluded from entering). Its position is now of questionable viability. Reduced demand
will necessitate reduced productive levels which means reduction in workforce and the elimination of any
possibility of technological upgrade. The impact beyond the firm is to cause higher prices in an economy
with more unemployment and less income. There are actually several devices in elementary economics
which make this point most emphatically. And it is along these lines of economic reasoning that Hayek
was able to build his argument that collectivization paves THE ROAD TO SERFDOM.*

The Marxian conceptualization of alienation is similarly flawed. Marx in any event presents a rather
schizophrenic perspective on the alienation question. In different contexts, workers are portrayed as
alienated from the productive process itself, from the final product, from the surplus value ostensibly
expropriated, or generally from the society built upon such productive processes. Alienation is more
appropriately perceived as resultant of an increasing level of anomie arising our of the atomization of
labor in an increasingly collectivized setting framed by governmental interventionism with increasing
control and increasing dependency. If the point of this little excursion into economic reasoning is not
apparent, it will become increasingly clear as this examination proceeds, but from the standpoint of civil
religion, the entire scope of socialist humanism and its apparent worship of man in secular humanism is
similarly problematic. The actual object of 'worship' increasingly becomes the collective entity that
exercises control over an increasingly pitiful populace blocked from the development of its potential by
having the foundations of wealth creation ameliorated.

'Marxism' itself may be viewed as a religion, in the sense of Freud's illusion, stricken by Popper's
falsification dilemna. It certainly was that sort of situation which prevailed in the Soviet Union, with the
inevitable consequences. The people at the end of their ropes became the people with a rope. Indeed, the
'religion' of Marx in this context is but one manifestation of the phenomenon of the establishment of the
State as God which typifies and condemns the collectivist structure in whatever form, and merely (though
perhaps most apparently) corporatist/fascist structurings. Concomitant with this collectivist quagmire is
the internalization of controls theory identified by Wilhelm Reich in his MASS PSYCHOLOGY OF
FASCISM melding of Freud and Marx. What is juxtaposed out of this discussion of comparative analysis
of religious thought is the opposing themes of individual rational choice (as with von Mises, et al) and
collectivism (as with Marx, et al) as an intermediary step in this analysis between the social construction
of religion and the examination of the construction and constitution of the American civil religion.

________________________________________________________________________________
*This is not to say that there are not problems in the functioning of markets. Briener (Pol Theory Feb
95:25-46) for example has summarized some of the objections on failure of marginal utility theory,
rationality, and power questions. But to suggest that some collective entity might function more efficiently
is without basis. The arguments he poses are skewed toward collective planning, command, and control,
and are predisposed to justify bureaucratic actions. 'Supply side' offers some mitigation of his expressed
concerns, which are in any event based on extremely hard and closed interpretations, and does so without
the sacrifice of the benefits accrued from market function. Furthermore, his suppositions at times are even
quite wrong, as for example, where early in the article he assumes a concept of resources that are
absolutely and not comparatively finite and wealth that is fixed(27) and that firms can maximize profit
when in fact normal profit is the best that can be anticipated in competitive markets, and his inability to
comprehend how MR = MC at profit maximization, (28) not including the idea of normal profit in his
analysis at all. Briener is correct perhaps in his argument that what Weber was structuring was a new
political economy(43) -- he was justifying bureaucratic planning, but that would carry all the baggage of
collectivist economies with it. It is possible to argue a valid and valuable role for 'agency' far short of this,
as, for instance, supply side does, taking into account the existence of market failures. Nor can the
inevitability of bureaucracy in modern mass society be overlooked. Yet, that need not imply its elevation
to levels of operational control over society as it seems to in Weberian thinking.

(These notations indicate the page numbers in this particular article)

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