In Association/Unity, we treat people as equals not by removing all inequality, but only that which
inhibits productive human endeavor. That is justice. And if we subscribe to Rawls' prioritization, then
some such system of capitalism is required, not a theory of fair shares of economic resources (unless that
is what it means) or special guarantee of 'standard' political and civil rights commonly acknowledged in
liberal society. The difference principle not only diminishes expansive capacity by redistributing social
surplus decapitating it, but will effectively prove injurious to the least well off among us because to
whatever extent constant redistribution must be effected to overcome the natural inadequacies which
pattern inequality, they will constantly be falling back toward that proportion, but with growth
circumscribed, at lower levels. Nor would we desire, from behind the veil of ignorance, the arrangement
he proposes of adopting his principles from the original position, but rather an attachment to each
according to his ability to contribute to maximized wealth generation. His redistributive justice turns out
not to be just at all, but even detrimental to the human condition. Rawls seems to fall into a similar trap as
both Bellah and Lipset (among others) in the contention that there is a tension between equality and
achievement, the latter somehow resting on the former. Theirs is a 'misplace modifier' of society. Actually,
they are two sides of the same coin, and in fact, without achievement there is no equality, or rather,
achievement enhances equality. It is thus that capitalism can be seen as both the great liberator and the
great leveler. The 'liberal' perspective that equality is prior to and in a tension with achievement
effectively precludes both. This is a real poverty of the philosophy.

Rawls seems to trip up, too, just as the utilitarians seemed to do, not only in the differentiation of social
primary goods and natural primary goods, but more importantly probably, in his view that goods (rights)
come from institutions, not vice versa as with Carey, et al, and the Declaration. The social contract indeed
adds little to Rawls' case, but this is so primarily because self-centered self-interest is held to be the basis
of the contract emergent of the original position. People are struck as discrete particulars due to the
Rawlsian perspective by which they put themselves in each other's shoes. So neither it not the intuitive
argument provide much support. And the argument in Kymlicka does not say much as to the agency of
individuals to exercise choices. Certainly, both Rawls and Dworkin suggest choice is made, as from the
original position. But they even here conclude almost that there is but one choice to be made. There is also
a supposed choice considered as when an individual opts for tennis or surfing. But this is a rather
constrained choice also. It does not speak to the free exercise of choice to contribute to meeting the
necessities of human existence. The programmatic approach taken further inhibits choice by limiting
growth, closing out possible options individuals might make. If they arguably hold to some notion of free
will, it means little if for these sorts of reasons no choice is possible, of if, policy tolerates or encourages
accepted or acquired intelligence deficiency syndrome. Capitalism does not exploit those tendered by
chance deficient in either category of primary goods, but instead it permits the economic basis for
alleviating such deficiencies, unless the definition of 'exploitation' is limited to 'use towards an end' which
would defeat the entire purpose of the consideration. In any event, there is nothing fundamentally wrong
with 'more' income. After all, it is the basis for both the consumption and investment which allows for
growth and development. Currently, there is a debate as to the merits of a capital gains tax cut that relates
here. In much the same fashion as the Laffer Curve operates, historically such reductions have resulted in
greater revenue accruing from the reduced rate of taxation, while increases in the rate have effected
diminished proceeds.

Whether or not there exists a claim or entitlement to compensation for disadvantage, something Daniel
Raymond also acknowledged, it must be premised upon the inability to abrogate social disadvantage, but
to extend that to 'choices' that are not contributory is not only absurd, but destructive and injurious.
Dworkin attempts to deal with Rawls' inability to deal with compensation for choices made (57), but does
not seem to come to grips at all with the question of how to afford even legitimate such claims at the
necessary level. There is also a problem relative to Dworkin's auction(58). Needs do change and, after all,
what is wrong with wanting 'more' anyway? -- unless it is simply a desire for more than others have. The
'envy test' seems to speak to this, but only in a very limited sense(59). His insurance/income tax scheme
does not do much better in dealing with objections to Rawls' ideas. It may be a 'slavery of the talented,' but
as it might have the same impact as Rawls on wealth creation, it would likewise fit Henry Carey's
definition of slavery.

As far as Carey is concerned, slavery meant something more than involuntary servitude. He argued for
an end to the larger world system of slavery imposed (particularly by Britain) through policy of looting,
depressed labor value, and denial of mechanization. (60) This could only be accomplished by raising the
value of labor through machinery in industry (what we today refer to as technology transfer). In his
ESSAY ON THE RATE OF WAGES (1875), he argued that laissez faire worked to depress those rates,
impoverish the masses and create tension between the classes in society. It was his contention that poor
laws and other meager redistributive efforts created the 'temptation of idleness' and "teach people that they
can be supported without labor,"(61) and since:

"Upon capital depends production; upon production depends wages. Where
production is small, wages cannot be otherwise than low.
If capital increases more rapidly than population, the ratio of production, or
revenue, to population, will increase, and wages will rise ..." (62)

For Carey, that defined the purpose of government -- it was to effect exactly that. Given unavoidable
inequities, it must answer the need to maximize utilization of resources to enhance the distribution of
wealth available. This would be accomplished as greater national wealth created greater investment and
consumption which thereby enhanced wealth more and would raise the general level potential of all.

Of all the many sources referenced in Kymlicka, probably Connolly comes the closest to hitting the
nail on the head in this regard (63) :

"The welfare state needs a growing economy to support its redistibutive programmes,
but the structure of the economy is such that growth can only be secured by policies
inconsistent with the principles of justice that underlie those welfare programmes."(64)

It must be suggested, however, that Kymlicka seems to misinterpret this at that juncture. He sees the
necessity of reform beyond what Rawls and Dworkin prescribe for such liberalism does not challenge the
'civilization of productivity' which in his estimation has actually heightened inequalities or exploitation.
(65) In that view, capitalism is very much exploitative and requires fundamental restructuring. It is
suggested that what Rawls offers is really merely an apology or rationalization for the welfare state or
social democracy. But such variations on capitalism have not only not stopped poverty and exploitation,
but have increased it by among other things creating a 'feminization of poverty."(66) As valid as such
observations would seem to be, the prescription hinted at of even more substantial doses of the same
medicine to do such things as redefine roles and the like bring to mind Hayek's warning of the
impoverishment of the masses, but also Carey's commentary regarding slavery.

But Hayek might construe similar results out of Carey. That is not the case at all. Like Hartz, Carey
warns of just such serfdom developing out of laissez faire. But something has already been addressed here
to the libertarian perspective. It recognizes legitimate exercise of self-interest or discrete particulars and
entitlement to property rights for their own sake. But for Carey, et al, these do not exist. That
conceptualization also casts doubt on any support of the free agency of human beings, as well. It further
delineates only government per se but the Association principle more generally. In doing so, the effect is
to sanction the sort of British free trade system of exploitation onto slavery which can infect an ostensibly
'capitalist' system. Considerable expression has already been addressed to the problem which arises as to
the legitimacy and justice of such acquisition. My objection arises out of the utilization made of such
acquisition. To the degree that it is not devoted in its potential capacity to enhancement of labor and
production, it fails the needs test. And given the former, it reeks havoc on the latter by being injurious.
Peshine Smith for one offered a counter argument to Nozick's nearly absolute right of disposal. Wilt
Charmberlain's acquisition of property is fair enough and done without coercion by choice, but his right to
disposal is delimited by the moral economy necessities of the human species. Kymlicka's quotation of the
first sentence of Nozick's 1974 book that "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group
may do to them ..."is quite revealing. If we take individuals as ends in themselves and not means, there
may be a mandated strong theory of rights, but exactly which rights would this be? They cannot be merely
civil rights for they would be quite empty if we exercised political power over an empty plate or purse.
That may be also one of the flaws inherent in Hartz' analysis of American liberalism. Nor can they be
merely economic property rights for these would be quite empty as well, as would our plates and purses
were we devoid of political power. Cleaver's right is indeed for individuals as an end, but there's the rub.
Not only can one not reach the ends except for the means, but they are of necessity not separate entities at
all. Much has been made of a dualism that runs through and weakens Kant and this divorce may be just
such a situation. Human dignity comes as all our identity in Liebniz from our contribution and it is our
contribution which provides our sustenance. The law of human existence and advancement is such, and
contrary to Nozick, there are not rights, there is no freedom, without the law.

Discretely particularistic 'self-ownership' monadism admits no outside claim to the product of our own
labor, but these are means, not ends -- they only become processed of value in their societal context of
usage, and there is no such product or value that is solely one's own, anyway. Although of a variation on
the theme, the faith of the goodness of people, or at least the potential for it, is something denied in all
these systems of ego states. While it seems quite certain that exploitation does indeed and has clearly been
an aspect of the human situation found in association with 'capitalism,' there is no necessity of seeing it as
an inherent characteristic of such social order. However we might define exploitation, though it may be
arguable that not only is exploitation a malignancy which may infect capitalism, it need not lawfully
attach to it or flow of it. And contrary to Marx, unfettered capitalism (not laissez faire) may contain the
seeds of its own salvation. There is thus a certain sense in which capitalism may be viewed as not only the
great leveler, but of that, also the great liberator.

It cannot be supposed in such a context as this that one has treated all possible questions or dealt with
very many in great detail. Reductionism is, in any event, very much part of the problem. What has been
posed here are a number of critical problems which have risen in the analysis as well as an alternative
vision. There does seem to be a crucial aspect of commensurabiltity of at least the ultimate ramifications
of much of these varied philosophies. To the extent that they diminish association, unity, capital
formation, development, or wealth, as they invariably do, given the world on the edge of sustenance, they
pose the potential of extracting a considerable pound of human flesh.

Richard Hofstader, in his AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, quotes Lincoln (with whom Carey,
Smith, and Raymond had a substantive relationship) regarding the character of the Civil War as:
" ... a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of a government
whose leading objective is to elevate the condition of man -- to lift artificial weights
from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all; to afford for all an
unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life ..." (67)

If that echoes the sentiments of Eldridge Cleaver and Dr. King, it also was addressed by Carey. In his
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Vol III), his approach of public energy to promote capitalism
that enhances equality and liberates humanity through capital expansion is expressed in his proposal for:

"the establishment of the great democratic principle, that every man is, equally with
his neighbor, entitled to perfect security of person and property, and equally bound
to contribute for its maintenance, in proportion to his interest."(68)

Writing in Cohen and Hill's AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, Robert Lively reviews the
American System of Henry Carey:

"Close analysis ... has suggested a thesis that appears to invite a new view of
American capitalism in its formative years ... There, the elected public official
replaced the individual enterprizer as the key figure in the release of capitalist
energy; the public treasury, rather than private saving, became the major source
of venture capital ... 'Mixed' enterprize was the customary organization of
important innovations, and government everywhere undertook the role put on
it by the people, that of planner, promoter, investor, and regulator." (69)

While it may be the case that "No scholar has yet attempted a general description of an America so
dependent on its public authorities," (70) he suggests that some like Louis Hartz have looked beyond the
national role in such activity to stand "united in the belief that the activities of state and local government
were of crucial importance in the stimulation of enterprise in the United States."(71)

Whether national or local, Hartz has argued that there has been a bias he termed distortion which he
has called the 'laissez faire cliche' in traditional analysis. Lively contends that their enthusiasm to
dethrone 'King laissez faire' about such public action "outreached their evidence," however. And yet, such
analysis was, in the minds of such researchers, limited by public purse string constraints and was a
positive state function which was "an initial, developmental one" (72) compounded by the prevalence of
"persistent faith in mercantilist theory" (73) and was marked by a "shrinking public ambition" that faded
before full-blown laissez faire ideology emergent after the Civil War. And yet, it is Lively's view that there
is substantial evidence, notably with regard to fostering railroad construction, of a spirit of public role in
sponsoring enterprise, which connects the 'Hamiltonian dream' with modern mixed economic pursuit,
ranging in his perception from Keynesianism to the RFC and TVA.(74) Substantive as the point may be,
it is necessary that it not be misspecified, as Lively clearly does. Although it might be possible to include
such measures as the RFC and TVA from the New Deal period under such parameters of 'public energy,'
most of its policy initiatives could hardly be so considered -- while generally the Arsenal of Democracy
would certainly be, the demand-side nature of Keynesianism could not be. In the same volume, Carter
Goodrich looks to the case of internal improvements arguing that the transition of the United States from
underdeveloped status if it did not involve massive economic planning strategies neither did it occur "in a
fit of absence of mind:"

"Many of the great debates in political issues have turned on what would today
be described as development policy. Hamilton's Report on Manufactures is an
obvious case in point." (75)

He sees similarities to Hamilton's general plan in developing countries today. But he also sees in the
promotion of internal improvements, even given the level of public sponsorship, only a level that
conforms with the overall industrialization of the country. Forest Hill adds an examination of government
policy in support of science which echoes the theme of "shrinking public ambition"(76) and Hammond
expresses a more potent view of government sanction with regard to the Second National Bank which he
insists Jackson only opposed out of his opposition to such federal power, (77) a quite naive position.
When the volume's debate turns to international trade and protection, clearly an area with immense
implication regarding public energy, Stanley Cohen does not diminish the importance of that there. What
he does manage to do is to place that immediate issue of protection in a larger context. He places Carey
and advocacy of manufacturing industries against an array of New England commercial, financial,
mercantile, and industrial interests allied with southern cotton and slave interests, and railroad
monopolists (78). For him, Carey assumes a much too united stance of that alliance in an effort at
protection at variance with that of those supposed allies bent on using such instruments as well as those of
banking and currency control in furtherance of a monopoly of such interests (79). The money and
manufacturing monopoly sought by New England according to Carey needed low tariffs "to ruin domestic
competition and to obtain cheap foreign raw materials to aid [them]."(80)

The key question goes directly to the substance of the American System program generally and to
Carey's political economy. It is much greater than agency for specific interests. By this point, the issue as
to the breadth and depth of public or governmental activity level which might be seen as diminished by
fiscal limitations against the growing scope of the business leviathan, is largely left unaddressed. Hartz'
laissez faire clich� seems to have subsumed a modicum of such energy which is almost ancillary as it has
reached near hegemonic proportions, almost as if any governmental role has been deluged by the flood of
capital and development that has occurred. It is certain that the policy design of Hamilton and later the
Whigs seem comparatively small, but then their initiatives appear of much more consequence in the more
delimited economic environs they operated within. And the question has been raised as to the degree of
impact of such policies had in spurring the economy in the period after the Constitution and even moreso
in the post-Civil War setting. But it might be the case that Hamilton, the Whigs, Carey, and Lincoln
actually effected much more in terms of a developmental impact than has been widely acknowledged or
recognized, and that they, in fact, had even greater ambitions than they were able to implement. It is also
possible that their substantial efforts in the context of their times merely appear less significant in the
shadow of the industrial colossus they, in fact, spawned; that, in retrospect, what was actually a Niagara
just appears by those standards to have been mere pump-priming.

Lincoln, of course, pursued the war effort to salvage the Union. He did much more. His success made
concrete the scale of economy which would be necessary for what developed to have taken place, as if a
critical mass for explosive growth had been structured. If we assume that the war disrupted the country to
a degree that such efforts could not have led to what happened, it may be that our view of the impact is not
far-sighted enough. If emancipation did not fulfill its potential, that is no doubt in part the case due to
termination of embryonic forms. The military innovation efforts of iron and steam ships, and associated
primary industry, railroad and telegraph impetus, the expansion that grew out of the Homestead Act and
setting up of the Department of Agriculture, the creation of the basis for schools and universities, the push
for new energy and motive forces, the initiatives for international alliances and trade ranging from
Mexico to Russia to Japan and China, and more, are but the tip of the Lincoln iceberg. And Carey was a
vital instrument in all of this.

Of more contemporary relevance of similar phenomena would be the larger, long-term effects of the
St. Lawrence Seaway completion, the construction of the interstate highway system, NASA, Atoms for
Peace, military advances and their non-military applications such as jet aircraft, the human potential freed
up eventually out of the spark ignited by the Supreme Court and other executive actions regarding civil
rights, and a great deal more of the quiet, unheralded 'American System' of the Eisenhower years. Rather
than any 'mixed' economy, that may actually be more like a revival of Carey's American System. In
modern jargon, it would be probably termed 'supply-side,' but then, too, would not only Reagan's tax cut,
military build-up, and SDI, but JFK's tax cut, military build-up, space program, and accelerated
investment tax credits.

Such programmatic perspective is very much at the core of Carey's philosophy. Ralph Henry Gabriel
wrote in his THE COURSE OF AMERICAN THOUGHT that:

"Economic national planning ... we may be proud to call the American System,
for it is the only one ever devised the tendency of which was the elevating
while equalizing the condition of men throughout the world. Such is the true
mission of the United States." (81)

Whether it would be appropriate to term it 'planning' is probably arguable, but that notion of the Republic
as a beacon survives today as an important characteristic of our political culture. The 'City on a Hill' was
not an uncommon rhetoric dating back to the Awakening in this country. It goes even deeper. It was a
Renaissance theme brought over with the earliest settlers, and one which can be identified in both Plato
and St. Augustine, the latter so much so that, despite the divergencies of the result from the idea, the
Spanish were prompted to name their first settlement in North America after him -- it will be re-
emphasized that this is not per se a part of the English American experience! The central features of the
American System, running from Hamilton to Adams to Clay to Carey encompassed just such a notion of
government as a key element in catalyzing the economy to development. There was to be a national bank
of some variation on Hamilton's original one, through it credit was to be created and directed to foster
primarily manufacturing but economic growth and development generally. There were to be initiatives in
education and internal improvements and promotion of a strong military as a key aspect of broad policies
of protection. And, in a spirit that reflects the liberating character of the analysis, the institution of slavery
was to be limited. Carey's politics undoubtedly reinforced his commitment here -- he was quite active in
Whig and then Republican circles -- but the young Carey seems to have been enmeshed in it not only from
his father Matthew but under the tutelage of schooling at the feet of the 'master,' Benjamin Franklin, in
his home in the Carey family hometown of Philadelphia. (82)

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