XVI  DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

     Alexis de Tocqueville had to "confess that in America ... [he] saw more than America; ... [he saw] the
image of America itself." (1) Never actually out of fashion, his major work has risen over the last two
decades or so to nearly an apotheosis of its own. It may be taking its place among the great texts in the
classics of political philosophy if not in our 'sacred' scripture. While it is hardly a completely objective
view (he was somewhat a 'Whig,' an aristocrat, a social scientist trained to  a level in theory of the highest
attributes of the discipline of his time), and he provides somewhat of a polemic primer bent on perhaps
converting the French people to the spirit of America, and although his academic rigor suffers slightly in
the apparently faulty usage of terminology such as democracy differently at separate points in divergent
contexts, it is a crucial examination of that faith. He had gone to Zion. He had visited the Promised Land.
And he now came down off the Sinai to set forth the 'Law.' Like the Prophet Muhammed perhaps too, he
had been taken up from Jerusalem and permitted to see the New Jerusalem. It represents a valuable
element litmus test of that faith even as it is in that kind of spirit he wrote.

     Tocqueville begins with a catalogue tracing the roots and substance of the culture of the American
Union which is not altogether unlike that presented here. He concludes his commentary on this by
asserting that this civilization:

	" ... is the result of two distinct elements, which in other places have been 
	in frequent disagreement, but which the Americans have succeeded in
	incorporating to some extent one with the other and combining admirably.
	I am alluding to the spirit of religion and the spirit of liberty." (2)

The two are interlocked in a mutually supportive regard such that:

	"Religion perceives that civil liberty affords a noble exercise to the faculties
	of man and that the political world is a field prepared by the Creator for the
	efforts of mind. Free and powerful in its own sphere ... religion never more 
	surely establishes its empire than when it reigns in the hearts of men ..." (3)

and, discernibly distinct, but rather complimentary than opposite:

	"Liberty regards religion as its companion in all its battles and its triumphs,
	as the cradle of its infancy and the divine source of its claims. It considers
	religion as the safeguard of morality, and morality as the best security of law
	and the surest pledge of the duration of freedom." (4)

     The separation of powers, both among the branches of the national government and within the federal
system provides a decentralization in communities which in a font for public virtue:

	"In no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions for the 
	common weal." (5)

     The political advantage there accorded has fashioned an unparalleled infrastructure, from schools to
roads, and intertwines "a kind of selfishness that he interests himself in the welfare of his country" (6)
analogous to familial ties with a valuable pride in the nation to which each contributes in its success. This
dispersal of power is a bastion against both tyranny and the mob (7). The structure, moreover, blocks the
tyranny  of the interests which multiply under such a massive scale as the nation spans and reinforces the
vigilance required to prevent abuse but which 'exceeds the power of man' (8). What is more, he
underscores the wisdom, if not genius, of such democratization and dispersal:

	"However enlightened and skillful a central power may be, it cannot of itself
	embrace all the details of the life of a great nation." (9)

     At the time the author was writing, judicial review could hardly be said to have been very firmly
established, but among the practices he describes as 'most favorable to liberty and to public order' in the
functioning of the judicial power was what at the time was termed judicial superintendency. Tocqueville:

	"Within these limits of power vested in the American courts of justice of pronouncing
	a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of the most powerful barriers that have ever
	been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies." (10)

     The federal constitution and system in its character of limits functions to deliver into the hands of the
people the basis of intellectual activity and exchange for "rapid and energetic circulation of ideas" which
fuels "the increase of knowledge and the advance of civilization" releasing "the rays of human genius"
(11). This federal republic is conducive to community engrandizement:

	"It is incontestably true that the tastes and the habits of republican government 
	in the United States were first created in the townships and the provincial assemblies.
	In a small state ... where cutting a canal or laying down a road is a great political
	question, when the state has no army to pay or wars to carry on, and where much
	wealth or much honor cannot be given to the rulers, no form of government can be 
	more natural or more appropriate than a republic. But it is this same republican spirit,
	it is these manners and customs of a free people, which have been created and nurtured
	in the different states, that must be afterwards applied to the country at large. The public
	spirit of the Union is ... nothing more than an aggregate or summary of the patriotic
	zeal of the separate provinces." (12)
 
    Attachment to locality provides a 'common store' transferred nationally to patriotism, increasing
prosperity, liberty in affairs, and 'causing measures of improvement to be adopted.' And, almost in echo of
Milton, the impact of liberty of speech and press has produced a proliferation of media which is
'conducive to public order,' educative, and assists in the phenomenon that "perpetually brings new men to
the conduct of public affairs" (13). It also cultivates new ideas and their spread. Although it is true that
some of the 'strengths' of the American Union he investigated are less than valid today, such as the
absence of a central domineering capital city, no great wars or financial crises, etc., which he referenced
as in support of the maintenance of the republic, he collectively grouped a wide range of factors, many as
valid today as then, into 'three heads:'

	"I.   The peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed 
	        the Americans.
	  II.  Their laws.
	  III. The manner and customs of the people." (14)

The aforementioned comprise much of the substance of these groupings. By customs, he says he is
referring "to the mass of those ideas which constitute their character or mind," comprising the "moral and
intellectual condition of the people" (15). These, which he terms 'habits of the heart,' have a great
religious bend:

	"Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it 
	must be regarded as the first of their political institutions; for it does not impact
	on taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of it." (16)

     Even as these Americans were "one of the freest and most enlightened nations in the world,"
Tocqueville attests that:

	"On my arrival in the United States, the religious part of the country was the first
	thing that struck my attention ... " (17)

and it was these 'mystic chords of memory' which constitute the faith of this people and which will support
its maintenance, functioning very much as the legitimator of the American order. In his insightfulness, he
was also prescient in his observation of the dilemnas stalking the American Union. If his experience told
him that slavery would long trouble the nation, for example, his is nearly a premonition of the Civil War
and much that is of more contemporary issue. Not very optimistic as to black and white ever living
together in harmony in any nation, there is an acknowledgment that possibly the "emancipated may learn
the art of being free" (18). As condescending as this may sound, and as pessimistic as he obviously is,
without overlooking his (and our own) obvious problem on the race issue, we should probably not forget
that this was the early 19th century. In actuality, his comments range into wonder as to such peculiar
treatment of such obviously shallow or empty bases. However, in spite of the problems, and they are clear
and deep-seeded, Tocqueville was quite in error in his sense that white people and black people could
never live together in the same country. We do! And the commonalties, even similarities, far outweigh the
differences, even if we often fixate on distinction over likeness. In fact, though, a great deal in Tocqueville
is very prophetic. So much is this the case that one might be tempted, in a discussion of our civic religion,
to accord him the position of 'prophet,' in the sense almost as those of ancient Israel, perhaps. Where he is
perhaps the most prophetic in that sense involves his frequent commentaries on the dangers which
republics face. These are invariably not prediction, but rather take the form of warnings.

     Having directed considerable discussion to the system of checks and balances structured into the
federal system of divided government, a significant portion of the concluding section of his work is
wrapped up in such caveat. The citizenry become more equal become less powerful in that state, and
against such diffusion, the national authority, in part almost as if filling a vacuum, in part in
compensation for feelings among the public of inadequacy and impotence, in part in response to crisis
such as war or economic chaos, in what is a most natural fulfillment of its propensities, becomes more and
more powerful and concentrated onto despotism:

	"As the conditions of men become equal among a people, individuals seem of 
	less and society of greater importance; or rather every citizen, being assimilated
	to all the rest, is lost in the crowd, and nothing stands conspicuous but the great
	and imposing image of the people at large ... They are willing to acknowledge that
	the power which represents the community has far more information and wisdom
	than any of the members of the community; and that it is the duty, as well as the
	right, of that power to guide as well as govern each private citizen." (19)

     Central authority tends to encourage the principle of equality as it works to secure its own influence,
and:

	"In like manner it may be said that every central government worships uniformity ..." (20)

     For Tocqueville, there is no prototype for the 'species of oppression' menacing republics:

	" ... the old words despotism and tyranny are inappropriate: the thing itself is new,
	and since I cannot name, I cannot define it." (21)

      The description he produces is one where "no member of the community has much power or much
wealth." On the individual level, it approaches anomie out of alienation, where:

	"... an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly endeavouring
	to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives.  Each of 
	them, living apart, is as a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his 
	private friends constitute to him the whole of mankind. As for the rest of his fellow
	citizens, he is close to them, but does not see them; he touches them, but he does
	not feel them; he exists only in himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still
	remain with him, he may be said at any rate to have lost his country." (22)

     Above these 'monads,' an 'immense and tutelary power' stands ready to take it 'upon itself' to 'secure
their gratifications and to watch over their fate.' It is an 'absolute' power seeking "to keep them in
perpetual childhood" (23). The free agency of men and their will is continually circumscribed until it 'robs
a man of all the uses of himself,' but it is acceptable to those men because the principle of equality has
prepared them for it. They even take it as benefit. And, having clutched each "in its powerful grasp and
fashioned him at will," the arm of the supreme power reaches out over the entire community:

	"It covers the surface of society with a network of small, complicated rules,
	minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most
	energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of 
	man is ... constantly restrained from acting." (24)


     Rather than destroying them, "it stupefies a people:'

	" ... till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and 
	industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd." (25)

     The people thus ensnared, "gradually losing their faculties for thinking, feeling, and acting for
themselves," are deprived of their humanity. They "are held to be unequal to the task," are rendered
hostile to forms and this functions to "retard and arrest them," as they simultaneously are lead "to despise
and undervalue the rights of private persons" (26). 

     And yet, Tocqueville is not prone to an absolute pessimism. There is remedy, and that resounds of the
limited constitutional regime of Madison, though he does not at this point explicitly say so (27):

	"Providence has not created mankind entirely independent or entirely free.
	It is true that around every man a fatal circle is traced beyond which he cannot
	pass; but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with
	man, so with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions
	of men from being equal, but it depends upon themselves whether the principle
	of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism,
	to prosperity or wretchedness." (28)

     His more general tenor at that point is very much a mirror image of his earlier commentary on the
same problems which face the American republican union (29). And, in this context, he almost exudes
with optimism. In regard to the 'spirit' that all this portends:

	"They hold that every man is born in possession of the right of self-government."

	"The majority of them believe that a man by following his own interest ... will be led
	to do what is just and good."

	"They have all a lively faith in the perfectibility of man."

	"They perceive that ... their own democratic institutions prosper, while those of other
	countries fail; hence they conceive a high opinion of their superiority and are not
	very remote from believing themselves to be a distinct species of mankind." (30)

	"The Americans contemplate this extraordinary progress with exultation ..." (31)

	[The republic in the United States is supreme, but] "Above it in the moral world are
	humanity, justice, and reason; and in the political world, vested rights." (32)

	[There is belief in a republican virtue with] a high value upon morality, respect [for] 
	religious belief, and acknowledge[ment of] the existence of rights ... a people ought
	to be moral, religious, and temperate in proportion as it is free." (33)

	"That Providence has given to every human being the degree of reason necessary
	to direct himself in the affairs that interest him exclusively is the grand maxim upon
	which civil and political society rests ..."(34)

	"They readily conclude that everything in the world may be explained, and the nothing
	in it transcends the limits of the understanding." (35)

	" ... the great object in our time is to raise the faculties of men ... " (36)

	"Whenever a law attempts to tutor those feelings in any particular manner,
	it seldom fails to weaken them; by attempting to add to their intensity it robs
	them of some of their elements, for they are never stronger than when left to
	themselves." (37)

Now, if that is all reminiscent of the previous discussion with respect to the constitution of the faith, it is
in reality more of an exact image. Nor should Tocqueville be read as impoverished of economy, as some
would contend (such as Thomas Bender in his Introduction to one edition). Quite to the contrary, there is
both a wealth of economy brimming over in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, and, indeed, it is the
handmaiden of the civil religion he portrays.

     Throughout his work, Tocqueville makes repeated reference to the concept of equality, and while at
points in the text this might be confused by an unwary eye with some form of leveling, that would be
diametrically opposed to his utilization of the term. As he begins one discussion of equality, he says that
the concept may bring several ideas to mind but that he takes it "as an example [of] the idea of human
perfectibility" (38). Furthermore, his notion of this is that delineated earlier in this paper as a vital
distinction philosophically and theologically:

	"Although man has many points of resemblance with the brutes, one trait is 
	peculiar to himself: he improves; they are incapable of improvement. Mankind
	could not fail to discover this difference from the beginning. The idea of
	perfectibility is therefore as old as the world; equality did not give birth to it, 
	but has imparted to it a new character." (39)

     Equality, then, in Tocqueville is largely a political term examining a claim to right of opportunity. But
it is not merely a right to obtain to equality:

	"When men [are] living in a democratic state of society ... they readily discover
	that they are not confined and fixed by any limits which force them to accept
	their present fortune. They all, therefore, conceive the idea of increasing it ...
	all attempt it, but all do not succeed in the same manner ... As natural inequality
	is very great, fortunes become unequal as soon as every man exerts all his
	faculties to get rich." (40)

Therefore, in such free and democratic communities, there are to be a considerable number of
considerable wealth. That is a product of 'equality' as he uses it. There is a restless ambition that brings
people to interest in 'labors of the mind' in which some excel and thus acquire 'fame, power, or wealth.'
Such production of wealth creates greater stability in the republic, and while it leads to formation of a new
aristocracy, it also reinforces equality.
   
    Having demonstrated that democratic government encourages manufacture and increases the size of the
class of people in manufacturing, Tocqueville argues further the extension of their impact. The
specialization of labor involved in mass production is accomplished with greater economy, hence lowering
the costs of production but increasing the laborer's productivity and potential wage, although the capital
required for the process involved will likely also be greater. The new aristocracy which may develop on
this comes about as the individuals in the productive process coalesce around different sides of what some
have called the class line.  The laborer, occupied with complete concentration and application to his role
in the process becomes affixed by the habits of his role. He not only becomes tied almost to the machine or
process as any other mechanical part of it, but may become permanently bound to that level of
development necessary for that function. This is possibly a degradation conducive to alienation he is
locked into. By the same token, the 'master' overseeing the process is "enlarged in proportion as that of the
former is narrowed." Each filling his own station and progressing in such direction sets at separate social
and economic standing, especially as equality develops lifting demand for commodities and extending and
exacerbating the situation. (41)


     Even as he is quick to add that such an aristocracy is of no resemblance to any before it, perhaps
approximating even that 'natural aristocracy' of merit in the Framers' language, however, Tocqueville does
apparently fail to see that rising technologies, productivities, and wages (42), and the general overall
advancing impact of the process on society at lest counters with the potential and even the means for
circumventing the direction he sees, much as Lincoln argued that there was no permanent class of
laborers in this country. He also seems to fall victim to the class conflict character of his reasoning which
fails in the increasing wages, potential, and leveling of the associational relationship between the two
'partners' in the process. The ambition argument he builds elsewhere also tends to ameliorate any dilatory
impacts and in fact structures society in the 'most confined and least dangerous' manner (43), as Henry
Carey used the term Association. He does specifically argue (44) that 'class' cannot develop as the term is
conceived, especially among the 'rich,' because each continues only to seek their own individual self
interest. This theory of manufacture raises the value of labor so that, hence, ambition will tend to work to
drive each to achievement, the result of this being increased equality. They also taken together function to
improve and they democratize the family (45) and contribute to the maintenance of good morals. (46)

     There is also a differentiation made between that which freedom and equality beget, the former being
an enlightened self-interested individual, while the individualism of the latter trends toward selfishness
(47). In the America he is writing about, there is a tendency lawfully for man to follow industry and for
public associations transcending the barriers of the social structure to develop (48). Furthermore, the
situation has facilitated social mobility (49). Since "a government can no more be competent to keep
alive" (50) and circulate the forces of such a system:

	"No sooner does a government attempt to go beyond its political sphere
	and to enter upon this new track than it exercises, even unintentionally, 
	an insupportable tyranny ..." (51)

The account is also a depiction, not only of the levels of great undertakings in the American Union (52),
but as well "the unnumerable multitude of small ones." (53)

     But the political economy in the text runs deeper still, from the economies of scale involved in 'uniting'
(54) to the contributory and supportive character of the specifics of the Constitution as  well as, in general,
the mutual interdependence of the diverse country (55), to the value and enlargement of the 'pleasures and
satisfactions' of men (56), the scale which leads to constant activity, and the resultant increase of scientific
invention and innovation. There is also a prolonged discussion in policy analysis of the usefulness of the
National Bank and the destructive, shallow, divisive, political panderings of the Jackson age, hardly
anything like the Schlesinger view of the Age of Jackson, though considerably more accurate. (57)
Tocqueville was no Luddite, to be sure.

     Interestingly, what this represents in theoretics is in Tocqueville a fundamental and deep analogous
substance to what might be termed a 'theology' of our faith; what was above termed the constitution of that
faith. Perhaps most relevant of all, he comments extensively on just that in his discussions. With that
foundation outlined out of Tocqueville of the constitution of our civic faith, and recollecting his
assessment of America as a very religious country (a view not a few foreign visitors and emigres have
expressed), his discourse on that religiousity can also be entered. Thomas Bender, in his Introduction to
the Modern Library College Edition would recall that the religious spirit Tocqueville found "was not
doctrinal or sectarian (58), but "a generally accepted and religiously inspired system of moral values."

     Bender identifies what Tocqueville found as the 'civil religion' of American sociologists, but which
"had been defined and given a name by Rousseau in the SOCIAL CONTRACT" (59):

	"American society in this view was unified by a civil religion comprising notions
	of God, a life to come, the reward of virtue and punishment of vice, and religious 
	tolerance ... [which] flowed alongside the established church." (60)


Continue