This rather lengthy but nonetheless incomplete cataloguing is not meant to suggest that any of the
particulars is discrete, none necessarily mutually exclusive of the others. It is not really vital to attempt
any sort of hierarchy of rank among these strains, either. The evidence seems to be quite strong. It further
links up with the argumentation presented in this examination, exhibiting as it does so the tension which
this case portrays. All of this is by no means intended to obscure or neglect possible inadequacies of either
Lipset's or Bellah's system as they relate to our civil religion. A plethora of problematic anomalies present
themselves in the readings, all of which pose varying degrees of problems for the theories (or theory)
espoused by the authors. A number of exemplary instances of this should be illustrative, although it will
scarcely scratch the surface. While many of these fit especially either of the two systems, they all, by and
large, address both concurrently.

     In presenting the Puritan ethic argument as a basis for the development of achievement/success
orientation as in a rudimentary tension with egalitarian freedom, it is noteworthy that in the Northeast
where Puritanism might be said to have been at its strongest, land (and wealth) distribution was far more
egalitarian than elsewhere. Conversely, among the strongholds of the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians,
where the liberal tradition of egalitarian freedom was supposed to have dominated, the distribution of land
and wealth was the most unequal. It was also in such areas that slavery became so predominant. The
implication of this for general theory which relies heavily on what thus may be flawed points might be
substantial.

     But perhaps the major shortcoming in both NATION  and HABITS is the population sample upon
which they are drawn (Simons, Higham, Burtt, Shepperson, et al). The authors of the latter freely admit
that it was largely restricted to the white middle class. Indeed, they herald their conclusions as thus
representative of the 'dominant' American culture! That, in itself, may be more of a problem than merely
the delimitation of sample. Lipset is less cognizant of the limitation, but clearly does not offer an analysis
of a scientific sample cross-section of the population. In both instances, the paucity of such treatment is
particularly regrettable since the conclusion may be as applicable beyond the white population and the
middle class as they are for them. That would speak well for the analysis in terms of building a 
foundation for firmer paradigmatic status. Especially for Lipset, but as well for Bellah, those prospects
would be even more enhanced were it possible to demonstrate that the human condition  and character
they portray did not pre-date in any substantive way, the American experience. 

     Particularly in Lipset, it is held that the liberal tradition (as exemplified by the Jeffersonian
Democratic-Republicans), in seeking a broad popular political base, forged thereby a "national citizenship
and a national identity."(86) But he also contends that it was the success of the economy that made the
nation succeed. That contradiction is a problem, but additionally, it was not Jeffersonian traditions that 
fostered economic development. It did have a contributory part to the identity side, for in the military
weakness it created as a matter of policy, it contributed to the War of 1812 and the resultant sparks of a
nationalization often seen in it. But is also played a great role in fostering the forces that tore the country
apart in the Civil War. The policies they promulgated slowed development and were intended to do so,
although that is not quite the way in which Lipset portrays it. Even if he merely meant market forces when
refers to Jeffersonianism, as some seem to and which in some ways enhance his argument, that still does
not work, as been special point of in other parts of this essay.

     Even though a resolution of the conflict central to these analyses is central and there is reference to the
fundamental unity of these opposites, it  has been suggested here that the entire tension concept is a
problem. And this actuality may permeate the American psyche so much  that it renders the conflict into
consensus. It might  be the case that the ability of Ronald Reagan to put his finger on this is a major
aspect of his electoral and popular success. The point involves the notion that it is achievement that is the
path to equality -- that, in fact, capitalism is thereby the real great leveler through its enhanced wealth
generation.

     There is a moral imperative  -- a categorical imperative -- that is involved here, and it is one that
speaks to the issue of what political science should be all about. As a species we exist on a rather thin
margin and the mandate of the discipline needs to revolve around the policy pursuits requisite for
enhanced wealth creation toward a maximization of the potential living standard of the human race. In
this, both Lipset and Bellah fall short. Placing emphasis upon the notion of equality without tying it to the
conception of achievement is not only going to work against the latter, but the former, too, and will drive
the individual psyche toward disintegration of the idea of equality into the sort of anomie that Bellah so
fears.

     One reviewer (87) offers an important analysis in regard to Lipset, which may be just as valid for
Bellah:

	" ... Examining the idea that individual initiative built this nation, he records in detail
	the lucky survival of democracy in the first 40 years of its life ..."

     Luck probably had something to do with it and individual initiative certainly did, but what such
assessments seem to neglect is the self-conscious role of the government in 'promoting' capitalist
development, in the policies of Hamilton and then the American System, in that development and
survival.  It is also a crucial matter in the development of our judicial apparatus and infrastructure of
supportive law. It is a fact that reaches beyond that period, as well. Each of the great bursts of economic
energy in our history follow such governmental pursuit, from Lincoln to FDR's Arsenal of Democracy. It
is this that the authors' is, it is suggested here, conceptually unable to comprehend (Indeed, they certainly
do not seem to be alone in that respect).  Whether the long-term proclivity among a great many
Americans for creative individual expressiveness irrespective of what others might think, reaching back to
the days of the settlers, pioneers, and mountain men and cowboys, represents an anomaly which both
books in their stress on the sensitivity to others' opinions of us cannot explain is a further question.
Tocqueville's fear was that each American "may be shut up in the solitude of his own heart" seems to have
been a fear of both Lipset and Bellah, perhaps even something their work was intent on countering, but it
may represent something not only not as bad as they seem to think, but also a tradition that is as
particularly as core 'American' as their values -- an individualism quite different from that of these
authors, though perhaps somewhat a part of their medicine. The themes of other-directedness,
nervousness, and status-seeking, following from that, may represent little more than a rationalization of
propitiation grounded in an insecurity born of feelings of impotence. But the authors do not pursue that
direction which would be crucial for their ultimate aims of stable democracy and consensus language, and
might even force open the doors of competent political economy for them. 

     As Crick made much of in his review of Lipset, the ideology of liberalism lies deep within the system
under consideration here, but there is a contradiction that arises in this regard. If liberalism is taken to
mean faith in the individual to conduct his or her own affairs and therefore to mean 'democracy,' and
equality of opportunity, one can infer a potency that confers self-determination or free-will in each
individual, and yet a major thrust in both Lipset and Bellah as relates to individual consciousness is a
socio-historical determinism. Of course, what supposes itself to be contemporary liberalism has no
problem with this -- perceiving people increasingly as incapable of running their own lives as it proposes
to structure an ever-increasing paternalistic state to do it for them. A degree of both contradictions can be
read into both NATION and HABITS and it may thus represent an internal inconsistency that is a
grievous flaw. On the other hand, the fact that these writers seek consensus suggests that they see some
role for self-conscious intervention in society, and they do bounce around ideas of volunteerism and the
like., although their basic schema seems to leave man in a sort of Catch 22 plight here, with government
intervention being their apparent path to this end.

     To a great extent, Lipset and probably Bellah, too, suggest certain things of import as exemplars or
prototypes for others to pattern after (toward stable democracy or toward a consensus). They also mix
political equality and economic equality of opportunity with impunity. But as argued earlier on, their
political economic arguments are at best tenuous. And without the rudiments of that, no model will serve
the purpose they intend, whether that be stable democracy or consensus in society. Potency rising from
enhanced labor power is ultimately the only way to overcome the tower of Babel and confound the
confounding, either in these texts or in society generally. But, in the end, what they seem to suggest is a
warning (it may even be to portend a foreboding) of the ultimate culmination of what may seem to them to
be societal disintegration. It may be a despotism that threatens liberalism in their view, but it looms as a
far worse form of tyranny than that. Their proscription for countering the developments they fear is
ultimately not much more attractive, and may well have at least in their character been part of the
problem.

     NATION and HABITS may take different roads but to a common destination. In both systems, we are
apparently situated at different tables unable to converse with one another due to our linguistic barriers.
However, like the slaves being shipped on the Middle Passage with Kunta Kinta who pull together despite
different languages, both Lipset and Bellah may be suggesting the potential for something 'better.' As for
the theories themselves, the proliferation of research programs/paradigms' perspectives makes it useful to
consider their compatibility, or alternatively, their mutual exclusivity. And that has been the objective of
his part of this analysis. Both Lipset and Bellah may think that they are constructing a paradigm in the
sense of Kuhn I. That, of course, is not the case. In structural form, what they accomplish may be close to
protection of a research program core through belts of defensive argument. And yet, as they write, it
almost seems like an hermeneutic dance. In either event, the fending off of countervailing  arguments
leaves their theory (theories), at least in their estimation apparently, beyond reach. The response that one
of the Bellah cohorts, Sullivan, made in the Symposium, however, is somewhat more tolerant than a
simple "You can't touch this." The conversation he would like to think has been invoked must thus be
other than normal scientific problem-solving.

     The dialogue of Lipset and Bellah produces not only commensurability but in great measure synthesis.
In Almond's Cafe, their tables are joined as they order tea for two. Outside in the street, however, life goes
on. Perhaps later they will dance the hermeneutic circle while the orchestra plays their old school song,
the Viennese waltz. It will certainly not play Mozart here. But, 'even the orchestra is beautiful,' because
'life is a cabaret, old chum.'

     It may seem either prophecy or irony that the earlier generations of this nation chose the motto           
E Pluribus Unum. Appropriate as it was for the thirteen colonies whose leaders must all hang together or
they would hang separately, to paraphrase Franklin, it has become even more strikingly apropos through
the years. There is probably no more heterogeneous nation anywhere. But even across the cleavages of
nationalism and ethnicity, against which such divisions as what came to be known as the counter-culture
pale by comparison, there are cohesive forces which it is too weak to say are able to transcend them. We
are bound together in a plethora of manners by curious mix of devices. Even when all are doing different
things, we are very often doing them together. The Constitution and the law are unquestionably the most
fundamental of such unifying instruments. It may not be accidental that the effort by perhaps the least
assimilated element of our society for inclusion has come to be typified as the 'civil' rights movement.
This, as well as the civil religion, here argued as intricately linked, serve to bind us together. But the ties
that bind would also include language and the entire span of media uses of it. In good measure, in fact, it
is undoubtedly current expression of popular culture articulated by such media which define the changing
variations of American lifestyle. In a real sense, television, for good or ill, overcomes the picture of many
nations portrayed by such as Schlesinger. Almost to the contrary, the world resounds with echoes of the
'American way of life' in interpretations far beyond those even of 'the shot heard 'round the world,' which
on its own terms and merits still informs and inspires. The 'written' constitution has become the rule, as
has the nomenclature of the republic. Even those regimes which patently are not claim to be of such
tradition. Ho Chi Minh read from the Declaration of Independence at the inaugural of his 'republic,' and
students at Tienemen Square erected a replica of Lady Liberty. In many ways, our faith has come to the
stage of universalism, perhaps paradoxically becoming 'catholic' without ceasing to be 'protestant.'

     And yet, there may be an element within our nation which persists although it fundamental antimony
to this harbored faith. What poses in our contemporary period as 'liberalism' identifies this aspect. In
contradistinction to that harbored faith, it feeds on the cleavages, aggravating them through hyphenation
and group rights, espousing victimization and alienation conducive of anomie, and substituting
entitlements for rights. Its ideology thus rests upon a failed faith in man and where its opposing nature is
probably most clearly seen is in its political economy. At base, what is problematic is its absolutely limited
concept of wealth devoid of any real notion of wealth creation. Mankind is viewed as imprisoned in a cell
doubly locked by Malthusian and Aristotelian notions of limits from which there is no escape. For some
while, it has also been an ideology which was able to achieve and hold power within the United States,
and although that era of ascendancy seems to be on the want in recent years, its impact on the body politic
and institutional structure has been substantial. Nor has it been a force limited to one political party in the
Twentieth Century, or absent from the stage before that, though its current form would appear to have
gained much impetus with the Progressive Era. One reason for its prolonged period of power can be
identified in its association with what Lowie has termed hyper-liberalism and the concomitant notion that
as purse-strings mean power, the doling out of special entitlements to interests has worked to sustain and
secure positions of authority, especially in the legislative arena, complete with the accompanying
characteristic of corruption of the process. The fact that the 'liberal' agenda has, despite prolonged power,
never won more than piece-meal enactment may be a testimony to the resiliency of the protections against
factions built into the system by the wisdom of the Framers. Tocqueville explains this 'hold' and that,
compounded by an energetic citizenry so involved in industry and the pursuit of happiness that
information costs have precluded its awakening.  In some policy areas, the impact has been more
detrimental than others. This has been especially the case in some aspects of foreign relations. Robert
Packenhan, for example, in his book LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD: POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IDEAS IN FOREIGN AID AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (Princeton Univ Press 1973)
has described one of the flaws of our approach to foreign aid as premised on the notion that economic
growth takes simultaneously with political development. That correlation is a highly questionable one.
Aside from geopolitical concerns during the Cold War which were often used to justify the most counter-
productive, at least in terms of either of those forms of development, efforts at ostensibly 'promoting
democracy' without economic development have led to some serious miscalculations. Exactly the reverse
cause and effect relationship is, in fact, the course which  is indicated. That very point has been one of the
primary suggestions made repeatedly here. 

     There has been an heightened intensity of political debate and conflict in the United States over recent
decades. As discussed earlier in reference to the commentary of Katzmann and Tribe regarding Supreme
Court nominations, there is some evidence of a real cultural war being waged in our country. This can
clearly be observed in the mass media and it is manifest in the treatment of these nominations by the print
media, as alluded to here, just the amount of reporting to the process and nominees being sighted as being
rather enlightening. And in the diatribe which ensues, it is also quite apparent that the sides in the
controversy are, in fact, speaking different languages. They, indeed, talk passed one another, although it
may not be beyond the capacity of the citizenry to discern. For instance, the rhetoric of 'deficit reduction'
is such an item, such that we find claims of huge such cuts in spending which come down simply to
cutting expenditures even though in raw numbers (real and nominal) such spending increases. Similarly,
such expressions as 'grow the economy' and 'investing' have come to mean increases in governmental
revenue and intervention, when, in economic terms, such may actually retard economic growth and
development.  In the current milieu, Democrats complain about Republican tax breaks for the wealthy
which Republicans, perhaps more keenly aware of business operations, talk about as 'job creation.' And for
some time, the rhetoric of 'civil rights' has been used to describe various efforts at racially based
preferences, quite counter to what such terminology was used to express three decades ago. 

     As problematic as this cacophony can be for rational decision-making by government or the populace,
there could be a real danger for the wordsmiths if their language is maintained of a manner alien to
traditions of American civil culture and religion. It may truly have been the case that 'It's the economy,
stupid,' but, from its inception, as indicated here repeatedly, class war rhetoric has never found very fertile
ground in our tradition. (Nor was it, in fact, the economy, at least in the manner described). But positive
apathetics are not hapless sheep.



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