RONALD REAGAN, THE END OF THE COLD WAR,
AND THE REVISION OF HISTORY:
EXORCISING THE VIETNAM DEMON
One sure way to rile the feathers of a liberal is to suggest that Ronald Reagan 'won' the Cold War. For
whatever reason, that side of the political aisle in the United States seems so unabashedly reviled by Mr.
Reagan that they are completely unable to reconcile world events with their belief structure. Were he in a
position to comment on the matter, there is little doubt that Ronald Reagan would be quick to attest to the
fact that whatever he accomplished, or whatever we accomplished, or whatever was accomplished, as a
result of his watch was done on the shoulders of those who went before him. It is not necessary to
engrandize Reagan on such matters. As he himself asserted, history will be the adjudicator of his
achievements.
In time, the impact of the Reagan Administration on the outcome of the Cold War, as with other
aspects of his Presidency, will receive its just place in the annals of American history. I have no doubt
what that verdict will ultimately be. Presidents have regularly suffered some reduction in the wake of their
service, only to be heralded in time, from the proper perspective of historical developments. So let it be
with Reagan.
And yet, it should be suggested that had Reagan not been able to achieve election in 1980 -- had Carter
somehow won re-election -- had that been followed by, for instance, a Mondale Presidency in 1984 and
perhaps 1988 -- what occurred in the Soviet empire at the close of the decade would have been somewhat
different. That is not to suggest that there were not internal contradictions at work in the Soviet Union
which ultimately would have brought about an inevitable demise. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan, Containment, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brezhnev's disasterous military
build-up (in many minds a direct result of the events of October 1962), and more, all played important
contributing parts in the events as they played themselves out. But without the rebuilding of our military
under Reagan, without the Strategic Defense Initiative, without the proactive posture toward undermining
Soviet surrogate regimes in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, and elsewhere -- all of which would
have been quite different under the alternative administrative policies -- the implosion of the U.S.S.R.
would not have taken place as soon as it did or as it did at the end of the 1980's. Indeed, had the U.S. not
prospered as it did in the 80's -- and largely since then, in sharp contrast to what had gone before -- the
Kremlin's lease on life might have been extended indefinitely.
Mikhail Gorbachev is popularly credited with having had much to do with the direction events took in
Russia, and that is no doubt a valid suggestion. However, it is altogether possible that Gorbachev's
ascension to power was in many ways tied to, even a result of, Soviet response to Reagan and what he was
doing. In reality, it is only in retrospect that Gorbachev can be extended such credit. There was no idea in
his mind that events would proceed as they did from his policies. Had he, or his circle, been able to foresee
the inevitable result of lifting the lid, it is extremely questionable that they would have proceeded as they
did.
What can be said with certitude is that the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the capability the
United States exhibited in Desert Storm -- itself largely attributable to the success of the Reagan military
build-up -- reinvigorated the American military, and, in truth, the entire American psyche. As surely as
we suffered long agony over the course of events in Vietnam -- and, for that matter, Korea -- neither of
those 'incidents' was precisely what common wisdom seems to hold regarding them. It is still taken as a
matter of simple truth that we 'lost' the Vietnam War. But such an assessment has to be reconsidered
-- and from a variety of perspectives.
At the very least, it must be considered that if we are to continue to view Vietnam as a 'loss,' it is only
in the sense of a battle that was lost in the course of a greater victory in the war. The defeat of communism
that the outcome of the Cold War has made reality was, after all, the larger objective of our involvement
in Vietnam, as it was in all the varied forays of the struggle, under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon,
and even perhaps LBJ and Carter. That must be considerable solace to those who lost loved ones in the
conflict, and for those who gave their lives in the war. That sacrifice is honored by the eventual outcome
of the larger struggle.
At least as important is the consideration which must be given to the prospect that, while it might have
been ill-defined or ill-described to the nation (a fault which may lay at the feet as much of the media as to
the policy makers who were not as clear as they perhaps should have been), the objective of our
involvement in Vietnam was not 'victory' in any simple and immediate sense. Like Korea, it might be
better considered to have been a 'line drawn in the sand.' The nation was, in effect, saying to the cancer of
communism, that it had reached its limit, and that further extension would not be permitted. After all,
though Indochina 'fell,' the 'dominoes' stopped falling at that line. The advance in Korea can be similarly
argued. Korea was like a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan, and, in like manner, it might be suggested
that the real immediate objective was to stop communism from reaching there -- a prospect which was not
entirely an inplausibility even into the middle 1950's. Thus, in a second sense, both Vietnam and Korea
can be held to have been genuine victories.
We should not overlook the realities of the situation in Vietnam, either, and they seem to have been
forgotten, if they have ever been very widely understood. While it may be anathema in some circles, it is
altogether correct to say that the conclusion of the war in Vietnam was the one that we were prepared to
suffer -- at least at the leadership echelons of our society. It is no exaggeration to claim that we could, in
fact, have 'won' -- in the very literal sense -- in Vietnam.
There were real concerns that a broader war would have brought Soviet intervention (or Chinese). This
does reach levels of curious reasoning. We were not prepared to undertake some military actions because
we feared such a result. American pilots were prohibited -- and some punished for transgressing the edict
-- from taking out anti-aircraft installations because the Russians at least in part manning them might
have been killed and that would have brought greater Russian involvement in the war. But, if it was
Russians who were shooting at our men -- and, in many cases bringing them down and costing them their
lives -- they were already involved to a very substantive level. Of course, it is perhaps only in hindsight
that we can comfortably -- from a distance of decades -- suspect that the Soviets would not have been
willing to go to the mat over Vietnam, had it come down to that.
The possibility that the objective of a limited sense of victory was really in the minds of policy makers
suggested above does hold considerable credence. We could have, for example, taken out the dyke system
around Hanoi and flooded the city -- with tremendous loss of life there -- and undoubtedly altered the
course of events in Vietnam, even if a simple clear 'victory' was not the design. It is, however, such
realities that have given rise to the practical argument that if we are not prepared to fight to win, we
should not be fighting in the first place. That is a large price to ask of the men who put their lives on the
line -- unless the objective is a strategic or tactical one, such as drawing the line in the sand as part of a
larger struggle.
It also seems not to be very widely understood, either, that we were, at the end of the Johnson
Administration at the point of literal triumph in the war. Had LBJ, or more practically Nixon, been
determined to pursue a genuine military triumph, we had the prospect of that presented to us. Ironically,
however, it was the event that put us in that position that also probably tipped the scale against it
occurring.
When the Viet Cong pulled out all the stops in the Tet Offensive, the American people, weary of the
war and the losses we were suffering in it, having been told that victory was at hand for so long, were
given many have taken to be a reality check. What we got was a 'credibillity gap.' After Tet, it seemed to
be only a matter of time before the citizenry would force a conclusion of our involvement -- or, at least, a
cessation of it.
The actual result of Tet, however, was something quite different. It may not have looked so good on
television, but the Tet Offensive was a disaster for the communists. American forces wiped out the rather
ill-conceived forces engaged in the assault (of course, 'ill-conceived' is a relative term for in their disaster
were the seeds of our loss of will to continue).
By the end of Tet, the Viet Cong had been literally eliminated, their blood spilled to exhaustion of their
forces in the offensive. Following it, the fighting changed totally. With the Viet Cong of the South gone,
the fight had to be carried by forces from the North, which had been supportive (as well as active) in the
fighting to that juncture. That reinforces efforts, particularly by the Nixon Administration, to curtail
supply lines from the North -- as in the attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail including the forays into Laos
and Cambodia which brought such disdain on them from many. 'Communist' forces fighting Americans in
South Vietnam after Tet were almost completely North Vietnamese regulars and irregulars who had been
sent south to infiltrate and operate.
Now, a determination at this point to launch an invasion of North Vietnam would have 'won' the war
for us in the literal sense. Had we, for instance, flooded Hanoi and sent forces up the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
up the panhandle, and directly at Hanoi, the North Vietnamese would have had no choice but to pull back
their strength deployed in the South to attempt to defend the 'homeland.' It would also have altered the
tactics of battle, turning the conflict into a frontal conflict instead of a guerrilla one in the South. That is
also a fight we would have readily been able to 'win.' At least, the problem of guerrilla warfare in the
South would have been almost completely ended, even had we opted not to pursue total victory in North
Vietnam. Nixon was well aware of this situation, but the will of the people had by that time been
exhausted, as well, and he was faced with very little prospect of being able to pursue such a course. It
would have required a considerabel expenditure of political capital for Nixon -- who had not exactly
received an overwhelming mandate at the polls in 1968 --would have had tremendous difficulty pulling
off. It would have been a tought sell to the war-weary nation.
That leaves some questions unanswered, of course. It probably was not the kind of conflict we should
have been engaging in in the first place, especially if the real objective was the limited one suggested
earlier. We were not really engaging in the preservation of a viable nation-state -- or, in fact, in the quest
of building one. There was very little prospect of doing that in such an undeveloped peasant country.
Even MacArthur warned against our getting involved in a land war in Asia. There had to be real concerns
of Chinese intervention, especially given the chaotic state of affairs in the Peoples' Republic at the time.
And resisting that, had it occurred, would have required a mobilization that was probably not in the cards
for the American people at that time. And yet, had we been able to effect a withdrawal of northern forces
from the South and not pursued military victory in the North (which would undoubtedly have been
complicated by guerrilla resistance had it been successful), the Chinese would have been hard put to enter
the fray. North Vietnam would not have been threatened, although South Vietnam would have been
'saved.'
The point is not what we could or should have done, in any event. The issue is the widely held
mistaken perceptions about the course of events in Vietnam. Even since our renewed self-image with the
conclusion of the Cold War and the triumph of Desert Storm, there is a lingering misgiving about
Vietnam which is harbored by many in the United States. But it is a sense that we should shed, because it
is founded on misconception, and it is a sense we should shed ourselves of.
From whatever perspective we might want to look at the situation, it is far past due that we realize that
much of what we think about our involvement is Vietnam is erroneous. 'Claiming' victory now is not
rationalization as we deny the painful truth. Nor does it open the door to careless assessment of our
capabilities or shallow belief in some supposed mystical invincibility of our nation. Vietnam has led to
some important re-evaluations, some of which contributed mightily to our capacity to carry out Desert
Storm in the manner we were able to. There should be clear standards governing our committment of
American forces (although much of that sense does not seem to have penetrated the current
Administration in its wreckless abandon of deployment of U.S. troops). Undoubtedly, there is a real
understanding of such criterion at the highest levels of our military.
It is, however, important for Americans to understand that we did not 'loose' in Vietnam. Indeed, now
nearly a decade after the triumphant conclusion of the Cold War, we need to come to the realization that
the United States did in fact 'win' the war in Vietnam. It is crucial for our national purpose and self-
image.
And it's One, Two, Three,
What were we fightin' for?
I'll tell you -- we give a damn!
We won in Vietnam!
And it's Five, Six, Seven,
Make no mistake!
It is time that we all see
We fought for liberty!
Return to beginning of Spring 98 issue
