Periodically, if not incessantly, since the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, we have
heard rumblings about what we should have done there. They often come from those who
opposed the operation in the first place. Often, too, these are many of the people who
didn't like the war in Vietnam, at least after it became Nixon's War (many of them were
big supporters of the Johnson war fiasco prior to that, but suddenly decided that what LBJ
had started and screwed up was now the fault of Nixon and the Republicans).
Attempting to weed out opinions from what actually transpired is not an easy task, but it is
a requisite of useful consideration of the effort. Kuwait, a small nation, but one of the
world's largest producers of oil, had been occuppied by Iraqi forces. Whatever made them
think they could get away with doing that is largely irrelevant. US President George Bush
quickly set about building a coalition which included European and Middle Eastern nations
to mount an effort to put Saddam out of Kuwait. It is not surprising that he got Saudi
support because there were strong suspicions that Iraq might continue its drive and
occupy Saudi oil fields or even more of the peninsula, and perhaps down the Persian Gulf
coast to the Emigrates or Abu Dhabi. More of a surprise was Bush's success in pulling
Syria's Assad into the coalition. They even were able to operate under UN resolutions
calling for Iraq to quit Kuwait.
After building a military force of tremendous size and armament, which even surpassed
that which we had in Vietnam at the height of that conflict though it took only weeks to
put together, the allied forces marched into Iraq above Kuwait and crushed the Iraqi
forces with little resistance. It did help that we undertook a lengthy softening up bombing
campaign across the area before we went in.
The mandate of the alliance was to liberate Kuwait. It said nothing about anything else.
The forces went in, removed the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and left. There were some
stipulations to protect allied military forces operating in the area, including no fly zones
over Iraq and the like. General Scwartzkopf has expressed the opionion that we might
well have turned left when we got into Iraq and marched up to Baghdad. He is probably
correct in his assessment that there was little between our forces and the Iraqi capital at
the time. However, that option was not in the cards and probably would have been a bad
move on the part of the alliance. Since Saddam and Iraq have been seen as so troublesome
in the years since Desert Storm, there has been much speculation that we might have been
better off had we done more, and 'completed the job,' as so often we hear it stated. The
problem with that is multi-faceted, and should not be overlooked.
Any military undertaking should have basic components. It must have a clearly definable
objective, a strategy for success, and a plan for disengagement once the objective is met.
Pursuing military moves short of that is folly. The beauty of Desert Storm is that it had
each of those essential elements, and they were carried out to the letter.
The principal objection raised since Desert Storm involves the notion of turning left. We
certainly could have gotten well along the way to Baghdad before we would have
encountered much armed resistance. It is possible that many Iraqis would have greeted us
with open arms as liberators. But it is also certain that at some juncture, we would have
run into armed resistance from Iraqi troops. We might have found ourselves fighting door
to door combat for control of Baghdad. With resolve, we could have taken military
control over the city and the country in time, but it is likely that there would have been
some erosion of the alliance even from the point of the left turn. Nor is it a certainty that
Saddam would have been captured or killed, either quickly or in the long run. Recall the
difficulties experienced in taking Noriega prisoner, for example. Saddam may have been
able to leave the country. Possibly, he could have set up a base of operations in some part
of the country to wage protracted war against the occupying forces.
The costs of extending the operation would have been great. It would, of course, have
cost a great deal more in dollars, but would it have been worth the additional American
and allied (and even Iraqi) lives that would have had to be sacrificed to move in this
direction? Assuming that we could have succeeded in occupying the country, what would
we do then? And what consequences would there have been for an American governor
general over the conquered land? What resistance would be mounted? And that is just the
tip of the iceberg.
How long would we have been willing and able to sustain the occupation? Would we seek
to create a successor regime to Saddam before we pulled out? And what form would such
a regime take? Would it, for example, maintain existent Iraqi borders, or have divided the
country up into several new entities? What would have been the consequences of creating
a Kurdish state out of part of Iraq for Turkey and other neighboring countries and for our
relations with them?
We could have taken down the government and then just pulled out, of course. That
would have left a vacuum which would have had dire consequences for the people of Iraq.
And how would Iran, Syria, the Saudis, and other nations in the area have responded? We
might have found the area embroiled in civil war, or the larger states around Iraq pitted in
war among each other.
Any of these possibilities would have had dilatorious impact on the world's oil supply and
price, and a big jump in the world price of oil would have sent shock waves through the
world's economy. We would have felt them on a delayed basis, but it would have
decapitated the recovery from the recession that was going on, and probably have sparked
new waves of inflation, stagflation, and the like reminiscent of what took place in the
middle 1970's.
The thuggery of Saddam is unacceptable and even intolerable, but we cannot always effect
the leaders or events of others countries in the short term as we would have them,
especially not if we intend to do it militarily. And those who are quick to spout off about
what should have been would be wise to weigh their comments judiciously.
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