THE IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING
ON STATE AGGREGATE PARTISAN VOTE TOTALS
IN MICHIGAN ELECTIONS
TO THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1944 TO 1994
This examination looks at aggregate state partisan vote in Michigan for the US House of
Representatives over the last fifty years. Variations in that vote will reflect a number of variables, and the
exercise will attempt to identify some of these. Perhaps the most obvious is not one of particular interest
here. The decline in voting in off-year elections is a well-established phenomenon and will be commented
upon only sparingly. Of special interest will be influences which alter the aggregate vote of parties relative
to each other, and , perhaps related to that, the partisan division of the delegation. But primarily, the aim
here to seek evidence that there might be some relationship between those two cohering in proximity of
time to redistricting.
There have been since the crucial set of Supreme Court decisions thirty years ago, four sets of
redistricting in most states. The group of decisions include Baker v Carr, Reynolds v Sims, and Wesberry
v Sanders, but it was the latter 1964 case which bears the most directly on this consideration. The process
has become a complex ritual in American politics, the court edict now being carried out to exigent
extremes of effort, often involving judicial intercession. In Michigan, the alteration of congressional
district boundaries did not initially occur until 1964. An acceptable plan was not approved in time to be
effected before that. As a result, when Michigan gained an additional seat in Congress after the 1960
census, the state elected the 19th representative at large in 1962.
The subsequent two redistrictings went somewhat more smoothly for Michigan and despite the
inevitable partisan bickering were each in place for the first congressional election of each of the decades.
Political squabbling inevitably will intervene and such factors will be much more significant where
partisan power is more evenly divided, as has been the case in Michigan. Noble as the concept seems, it is
an obvious invitation to gerrymandering. Thus, 'smoothly' is a relative term -- the reapportioned districts
of the 70's and 80's were somewhat more readily achieved than those of the 60's or 90's.
For the 1990 census, a court approved and mandated plan led to wholesale reorganization of the state's
congressional districts for the first time. And yet, even given the massive revision of districts, any notion
that the redrawing took no cognizance of incumbency is belied by the fact that in 1992 there was little
incumbent failure at re-election in the state.
It is also true that the partisan division of the aggregate vote for Congress in Michigan has been
regularly rather close, indicative of a strong two party system in the state since the war. And, in nearly
70% of the years during this period, the Congressional delegation matched at least the direction of the
aggregate partisan vote division, if not the intensity. Democrats collected an aggregate majority in votes
16 times compared to having won delegation control just ten times. A Republican vote majority resulted in
GOP delegation control eight times and only in the last two elections has there been a Republican majority
vote resulting in a Democratic delegation. Overall, the period is quite equally divided, 14 Republican
delegations having been sent to Washington compared to 12 for Democrats.
From 1944 to 1977, there persisted a very even partisan vote division with only the elections of 1946
and 1964 showing significant variation from that. To whatever we might attribute the cause of the '64
aberration, it is obviously an anomaly. Probably public sentiment over the Kennedy assassination had as
much to do with it as anything else, but the massive shift in voting for House members and the delegation
was reversed exactly the following election, in almost a 'corrective' election. Democrats claimed 12 of the
19 seats in 1964, but their total returned to the level of 7 Democrats had held before that (except for the
additional 1962 at large seat they won) through the last half of the fifties and on until 1972. The
Democratic vote fell dramatically in 1946 compared to Republicans, related probably to the economic
conditions or Truman's unpopularity, but as in 1964, the extreme variation was corrected the following
campaign.
Democrats did not pull an aggregate vote plurality except a very small one in 1954 until 1958, but the
half a per cent plurality seems to have been indicative of the trend which would emerge after 1958. And
yet, other than in the two instances sighted above, the period 1954 to 1990 represented one of persistent
Democrat plurality in House races overall. Still, there were eight small such majorities before the
delegation shifted in control in 1974. It is also demonstrated that the Democratic plurality became and
continued to run at significantly higher levels starting in '76 and lasting until 1990. Even the drop that
occurred in representatives in 1990 may not be attributable to the small GOP edge, the first such plurality
in 20 years, although with 1994, a second consecutive and larger Republican aggregate majority did bring
a one seat net gain for them.
Prior to 1958, Republicans polled a majority of the aggregate vote in every election but one (1954), and
they maintained control of the state's delegation throughout that time frame. Democrats did pick up two
seats in 1954 only to loose them again at the following election as the GOP also regained the majority in
the popular vote. Democrat fortunes began to change with 1958. Between 58 and 84, they got more votes
across the state in each of the contests except '66 and '72. The Democratic proportion of the delegation
does not seem to have followed this change very closely. They did pick up the two seats again in 1958,
and have not dropped below that number (7seats) since. Democrats also gained a seat after the 1962 at-
large election with the addition of a seat for Michigan following the 1960 census and subsequent
reapportionment. And, although they held that additional seat, and added four more to take control of the
delegation in 1964, they lost all five of those seats, control of the delegation, and the aggregate vote
majority in 1966. Even as they held a firm plurality after that except for 1972, it was five elections (1974)
before they were able to effect control over the delegation again. The Democratic plurality reached an
apex of sorts of near 400000 votes in '76 and '78, but it wasn't until 1978 that their total number of seats
reached its maximum of 12. Even with 600000 more votes in '82, they could not add any more seats. In
1984, even with a continued plurality, Democrats actually lost a seat. While their edge in '84 was 200000
votes, that total was significantly lower than it had been in '82, or four years earlier ('78) when they
gained their 12th seat.
In recent years, aggregate vote totals have switched in favor of the Republicans, and while they have
not been large, at least compared to some of those mentioned above, they seem to be contributing to a
gradual weakening of Democratic control over the delegation, having lost two seats. However, even with
that, the number of seats held by Republicans has not increased much in net (they now have 7, up from 6
in '92), primarily due to Michigan's reapportionment losses, but their back to back popular vote majorities
in '92 and '94 are the first such Michigan election since '52 in which they won back to back aggregate
pluralities, having only been able to do so in '66, until 1992. Schedule 1 presents these aggregate tallies.
They are listed with significant events which would have impacted on the returns.
There was a substantive change in Michigan voting patterns for Congress which occurred during the
1960's. Even though Democrats consistently polled pluralities in these races, they did not achieve control
of the delegation until 1974. Other than for 1964, the size of that plurality was rather small (until the mid-
seventies). It is therefore not surprising that there was no great resultant shift in the composition of the
delegation. Further, the small margins were not definitive until 1976. Indeed, the '66 tally was an effective
'correction' of 1964, '68 negligible, '70 hardly convincing, and '72, along with Nixon's big landslide re-
election, fairly strong toward the GOP. Another factor in 1970 and 1972 was probably sentiment over the
emotional issue of school busing.
What took place in 1974 was a considerable reversal. Even with a small margin, the Democrats
literally reversed the direction of control of the delegation. The narrowness of that plurality is lawful
because of the turning out of incumbents entailed. Whatever the reasons involved, the advantages of
incumbency were substantial then, even if they were relatively weak compared to more recent times. 1976
is also the year of Carter's Democratic victory, but he did not win in Michigan! And the attribution of '74
to Watergate is a little disconcerting due to the thin majority Democrats collected. The period is also
marked by considerable economic uncertainty. The term stagflation was penned during this time, and it
sometimes is difficult to differentiate Democrats and Republicans on related issues. For example, while
Nixon was fond of impoundment, he also implemented wage and price controls, and presided over the
first vestiges of our long term flirtation with deficits out of the Great Society (though arguably more in
Congress' purse string powers).
The economy seems to have had something to do with the Congressional vote. That appears to have
contributed to the results in 1946 when Democratic fortunes were very poor. An incumbent Democratic
President probably had to share the blame for economic woes with fellow Democrats running for
Congress, even though by election time the economy had moved away from the relatively mild recession
of the previous year or so. There was quite a bit of unsettled feeling in the country arising in part from the
conversion from the wartime economy. A reversal of that is partially operative for 1958 when a
'Republican' recession apparently hurt its candidates for Congress. The President and his compatriots were
saddled with some of the blame even though Democrats had been in control at the other end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. Carter certainly did not help House Democratic office-seekers in 1978 or 1980 and
yet they actually picked up a seat in the state delegation. The 'Carter' recession, rightly or wrongly, may
have helped cost the GOP one of its seats in 1982, Reagan by then presiding over the situation and his
efforts just beginning to bear fruit. The economic good-times that followed and assisted Reagan to a huge
re-election victory in 1984, did reduce the Democratic plurality, but it still exceeded all but two such
margins from the pre-1974 period. Republicans also managed to take back a seat in the delegation in '84.
And, at least as far as the Michigan House delegation is concerned, the issue, despite the sluggish
economy in 1990, 1992, and 1994, was not 'the economy, stupid.' The Democratic margin fell to its lowest
level since 1974 and became a GOP advantage in '92 and '94, in which two elections Democrats lost one
seat each time (though possibly also in part due to reapportionment stripping Michigan of two House
seats).
But if it wasn't just the economy, what was it? Obviously, there are going to be local issues which
impact. Perhaps the clearest such case of that here could be the resurgent Michigan Democratic Party
under G. Mennen Williams through the 1950's as a major component of the reversal of Michigan House
voting. However, there also seems to be exhibited some relationship between the changes in vote or
delegations and redistricting.
Plotting the aggregate vote for both parties does demonstrate some marked changes in voting. The
aggregate Republican vote increased at a rather steady rate throughout the 1950's, but this rate of vote
change reached a virtual plateau during the 1960's and actually shows a slight overall downward slope
with the 1970's and even into the 80's. That was followed by a slight upward trend but only with 1992
does the GOP slope show indication of a steeper grade. What is more, the slope seems to be marked by
such alteration at the point that redistricting occurred. The Democratic plotting exhibits two segmented
slopes of approximately similar attitude separated by a flat or slightly diminishing one. Through the
1980's and especially into the 90's, that slope again flatten out with a slight decline. While the graphed
curves do seem to cohere somewhat to the points of redistricting, this is moreso the case with the GOP
vote than with that of the Democrats. Some of the peculiarities of the two slopes may be attributable to
Michigan's somewhat slowed rate of population growth over the period and especially in the 1970's. The
change in partisan delegation control from Republican to Democrat also coheres closely to the change in
the two party slopes at about the middle 70's when the Republican slope flattened and declined while the
Democratic one resumed its steeper advance. There is also some indication that for the Democrats that
slope has reversed itself from the middle 80's even as the Republican curve has only belatedly shown signs
of change and advance.
Both graphs show a change with 1964 toward flatness, and once again after 1972, although the big
Nixon landslide of that year might have effected a delay in the change. Similarly, both curves show
marked changes of their patterns after the 1982 redistricting, and hint at the possibility of a kink
occurring with the '92 redrawing of district borders.
Further evidence of some effect of redistricting can be seen in the pluralities through this half century
period. The slow advances of Democrat plurality occurrences became, throughout the 1960's a much less
definitive, even intermittent swing between the parties with generally rather small pluralities on both
sides. However, Democratic majorities became the rule after the 70's redistricting and if anything their
persistent strength was perhaps enhanced after 1982. A meager Democrat margin in 1990 was followed in
'92 by a rather minuscule GOP edge proceeding with the 1992 new districts, and it was one which
demonstrated slightly increased vitality in 1994. Thus, it would seem that the figures do suggest a degree
of relationship between redistricting and aggregate partisan vote totals in the state of Michigan. The
relationship of the redrawn districts and share of delegation is also responsive though to a lesser extent in
1974 and perhaps 1994, though it does not manifest itself in the 1960's or 80's redistrictings. Some of the
variation can be ascribed to alternative causation factors as earlier remarks attempted to demonstrate, but
it may be suggested that in at least six (with the jury still out on the 90's Democratic tallies) of the eight
cases, partisan slopes indicated change approximately at the points of redistricting.
TABLE I -- AGGREGATE PARTISAN VOTE RESPONSE TO REDISTRICTING
Democrat Republican
1964 flattens out down flattens upward
1972-4 resumes upward slope slopes slightly downward
1982 slopes down slope flattens slightly up
1992 slope declines slope accelerates upward
A range of variables impact on partisan aggregate vote totals for Michigan in House elections
throughout this 50 year span, not the least of which seems to be economic conditions. But there also
appears to be some indication that there have been alternations in aggregate partisan vote tallies, and to a
lesser extent, share of delegation strength, which may be related to the redrawing of district borders. And
yet, in only one case, that of 1974, did a dramatic change in representational levels occur, and it coheres
to a redistricting. It remains to be seen if the preliminary indications that another change will take place
on the heels of the 1992 and 1994 redistricting scheme in the state.
If nothing else, the Michigan case does offer some indication that the phenomenon should be looked to
in other states. Such an examination on a wider more rigorous scale could also look at the possibility of
some kind of 'reverse' coattail phenomenon. Perhaps more coincidental than lawful, the four Presidential
'landslides' which have been seen in American politics since redistricting began each proceeded on the
heels of such a redrawing of Congressional boundaries in 1964, 1972, and 1984. The potential for such an
occurrence in 1992 was decapitated by the abnormality of the election befuddled by Perot's presence.
Elections not in close proximity to redistricting have all been much closer contests. Redistricting may
contribute to enhanced electoral volatility.
A final observation can be entered regarding the 1970's redistricting. In Michigan, it produced a
significant shift in political fortunes, Democrats emerging with a newfound delegation control and
aggregate vote margin of plurality mandate which persisted into the 1980's, even given profound almost
countervailing pressures exhibited in the electorate. Much comment has been entered on this
phenomenon, but it should be noted that the electoral 'reforms' of the mid-70's, from the FEC to the
emergence and proliferation of PACs and their resultant impact on incumbency advantage may account
for a large part of that perseverance and it depth. With the changes in the make-up of the Congress in
1994, this could be indicative of a pronounced advantage for Republicans as, with control of the Congress,
they find it easier to raise war chests while the Democrats, including long-time incumbents, are finding it
much more difficult. There has also been a greatly heightened media partisanship exhibited throughout
that period. But even given the complex set of variables relevant to the issue, it is difficult to ignore the
apparent connection between aggregate partisan voting in Michigan and redistricting.
Whether what the data indicated can be construed as evidence that 'gerrymandering' has been effected
should be considered. It is lawful that aggregate partisan vote totals in a competitive state like Michigan
should show an increase over time for both parties. 'Rigging' a redistricting in favor of one party or the
other would certainly alter the rates of growth at minimum. The decline in the Democratic slope from
1964 to '72 might be indicative of a 'fix' for Republicans out of that redrawing. It could, however, merely
demonstrate a trend in the electorate, and there indeed was such a trend for the GOP and to the
disadvantage of Democrats after 1968 at least. It might also reflect retrospective evaluation of a party's
performance on, for example, economic issues. But it was popularly perceived that the redistricting of
1964 would favor Democrats. It did not.. A similar argument could be posed for the 1970's districts, as
well as those of the 80's. Actually, it would be possible to subdivide the periods marked on Charts 1 - 4
and show a mid-course alteration for Democrats during the 70's and the 80's, and for Republicans in all
three redistricting plans prior to the current one. Furthermore, the pre-1960's districts were firmly held to
favor Republicans, but the growth patterns of the Democratic vote is steeper than that for Republicans
prior to 1966. And yet, the distinct 'kinks' of the curves at 7 of the 8 reapportionment verticals probably
lends the idea of some impact a degree of credence worthy of further investigation. It should be correctly
perceived as less than a settled assertion.
It could also be contended that a gerrymander might effectively defeat a change in vote growth patterns
in respect to the strength of the parties in delegation strength. On that, it could be surmised that the pre-
1960's districts and the 60's boundaries favored the GOP while those of the 70's and 80's were Democratic
plans; the 90's districts seemingly affording a GOP advantage. The only real change in party strength over
the time frame scrutinized occurred in 1974, and it gave Democrats the upper hand. The first redistricting
should have favored Democrats on the basis that they were underrepresented in the House according to
their aggregate vote. It didn't. The new 70's districts, a Democratic plan, clearly did. The 1980's plan also
was a boon to Democrats who maintained control of the delegation even with falling numbers. And 50%
is hardly a good return on investment or effort here.
It would be useful to expand the examination not only to other states, but also to state redistricting, to
attempt to uncover evidence as to the efficacy of gerrymandering as well as the impact of redistricting on
aggregate vote. For Michigan, ostensibly 'Democratic' plans in the 60's, 70's, and 80's did not help them
as much as it might have been suggested or proffered that they would. It would be constructive to
compare the Michigan case to states in which Republican plans have prevailed, as well. Democratic
district engineering has not been an unqualified success, and the reasons reach beyond those considered
here. Part of the project has entailed the carving out of 'minority' districts by fiat if in no other way.
Constituency groups in the party have been obviously supportive of such measures. Even the extent to
which the exercise has been carried has not satisfied all of those constituencies, however. Loni Guanier
represents this group quite articulately. But in the larger picture, it may cost Democrats more than it
helps. In Michigan, the maintenance of two 'black' districts has meant that those return massive
Democratic pluralities which could be more 'efficiently' combined with alternative adjacent regions which
would create districts which would vote Democratic by smaller margins, but increase the chance of greater
party delegation numbers, although it would be less certain that the representatives elected from them
would be black. And the other marginal or Republican districts effectively reduce the punch of Democratic
organization in them, too. If GOP control of Congress persists after 1996, the opportunity cost entailed
may prove to be too great.
Redistricting has also had other counter-productive ramifications, from the standpoint of partisanship.
It has worked to 'sever' some of the connection of those elected from their constituencies given the shifting
boundaries. There are long-term representatives from Michigan whose districts are almost completely
different territory than they used to be. This may have helped make such elected representatives more
closely linked and dependent on 'new' constituencies such as lobbyists and political action committees.
Redrawing districts may also diminish coat-tail effects and thereby further reduce party solidarity and
strength. Michigan has had a host of districts which vote Democratic for Congress but return Republican
pluralities for the Presidency. While that may 'shore up' a Democratic base, it does little for party strength
or efficacy beyond that base, and, in fact, may serve to erode it over time.
SCHEDULE I -- AGGREGATE PARTISAN VOTING FOR US HOUSE IN MICHIGAN
Year DEMOCRAT PLURALITY REPUBLICAN Significant Events
Vote # Elected Vote # Elected
1944 1029 6 93-> 1126 11 WW2 conversion
1946 621 3 353-> 974 14 recession
1948 1022 5 2-> 1024 12 Truman election
1950 837 4 80-> 957 13 recession
1952 1316 5 141-> 1457 13 Ike elected
1954 1101 7 <-69 1032 11 Mich Dem/Wms
1956 1491 5 150-> 1641 13 Ike re-elected
1958 1192 7 <-138 1054 11 recession
1960 1642 7 <--76 1566 11 Kennedy election
1962 1378 8(1 at large) <--82 1296 11 Cuban Missile Crisis
1964 1770 12 <-481 1289 7 LBJ, redistricting
1966 1151 7 163-> 1314 12 'correction'
1968 1533 7 <-8 1525 12 Wallace campaign
1970 1312 7 <-71 1241 12 Nixon popularity, busing
1972 1536 7 186-> 1722 12 Nixon landslide
redistricting
1974 1450 11 <-89 1361 8 Watergate, PACs, FEC
1976 1898 11 <-395 1503 8 Carter elected
1978 1534 12 <-339 1195 7 recession
1980 1940 12 <-232 1708 7 Reagan elected
1982 1757 12 <-600 1157 6 recession, redistricting
1984 1861 11 <-206 1657 7 Reagan re-elected
1986 1343 11 <-366 977 7 Reagan popularity
big vote drop for both
1988 1763 11 <-226 1537 7 Bush elected
1990 1322 11 <-163 1159 7 Bush popularity
1992 1785 10 34-> 1819 6 Perot, recession,
redistricting
1994 1413 9 114-> 1527 7 Republican 'revolution'
1996 10 6
(1) all vote totals are rounded to the nearest 1000
(2) for 1962, the votes for the at-large seat were deleted from the aggregate totals
(3) in a number of races, there was no contest, only one major party candidate running.
All of these were re-election campaigns in what must be termed 'safe' districts.
An estimated vote was entered for these races, the estimate determined by
contests for that seat in other races in the district in proximity in time to it.
There were 12 such instances. In only one of these years, 1968, is it probable
that the closeness of the aggregate vote totals is such that the estimate could
have affected the relative party position in aggregate vote, but since that one
case involves Detroit's overwhelmingly Democratic west-side, it undoubtedly
is not such a factor.
REFERENCES
Asher, Herbert 1988. Presidential Elections and American Politics: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns
Since 1952, 4th Ed., Brooks Cole.
Broder, David 1972. The Party's Over, Harper Row.
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to US Elections, 2nd Ed., 1984. CQ Press.
Garand , James, Ed. 1995. "Legislative Redistricting in the 1980's and 1990's," American Politics
Quarterly, 23:2 (April 1995).
Jacobson, Gary 1987. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 2nd Ed. Scott Foresman.
Jacobson, Gary 1990. The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in House Elections,
1946-88, Westview.
News Election Service as reported in The World Almanac 1985-96, Pharos Books/ Scripps Howard.
Price, David 1984. Bringing Back the Parties, CQ Press.
Schlesinger, Joseph 1985. "The New American Party System," American Political Science Review,
79(4):1152-69.
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