Conclusions and Recommendations Section, continued
would probably move elsewhere. The extent of outmigration would likely be limited due to the economic costs associated with relocation, age considerations, and many residents' long-term attachments to the area. However, a number of area residents indicated that while they would find it difficult to relocate, they would actively encourage their children to live elsewhere. Several informants suggested that they did not plan to have their children continue with farming operations, even though, in some instances, the farming tradition has persisted in the family for several generations. Thus, local population declines may be exacerbated due to both outmigration and a reduced tendency for younger persons to remain in or return to the area.
This research has documented high levels of concern among Boyd County residents about the potential for environmental contamination effects, health and safety risks, and potential economic effects from stigmatization associated with the presence of a radioactive waste disposal facility. Such concerns would likely be magnified in the short term if the facility is built and operated. In the long term, the intensity of such concerns would probably decline in the absence of accidents or leakage of radioactive materials. Although area residents would not quickly forget the tensions and social conflicts associated with the project siting process, risk perceptions and associated stress levels would tend to moderate if activities and events involving the facility remained "normal" over an extended time period. In this instance, familiarity would breed complacency.
229
However, significant accidents or facility problems with waste isolation would likely cause a substantial amplification of risk concerns, (see Freudenberg, 1992a; Kasperson et al, 1988). Under such circumstances, negative reactions to the facility would quickly intensify, particularly among those who are currently sensitized to the potential for waste processing accidents and facility failure, and who already anticipate storage problems. A serious containment failure or a series of problems and accidents would likely result in increased social conflict and controversy and active local efforts to force facility closure. Stigma effects associated with such events would increase the probability of property value declines. Other probable consequences would include heightened stress levels among area residents and increased rates of outmigration (see Edelstein, 1988; Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1992).
On a more positive note, should the facility proceed to construction, some residents of Boyd County, and the Butte area in particular, will feel that their support for and faith in the project has been justified, even in the face of continuing hostility and animosity from project opponents. Some of them may even obtain employment related to the facility construction or operation. Businessmen, especially those operating near Butte, will undoubtedly see some increase in business, at least through the construction phase.
Additionally, several taxing entities will become the beneficiaries of what they perceive to be the largess of the
230
Compact Commission. The Butte school system would undoubtedly be a major recipient of badly needed school funding, providing a beneficial economic lift. Other county agencies will receive increased funding as well, allowing local facilities and services to be upgraded over the period of facility operations.
Recommendations
Although it is probably inevitable that efforts to site a low-level nuclear waste facility will generate risk perceptions and some degree of local opposition, the siting process pursued in the case of the proposed Boyd County LLNW facility has caused major social upheavals and extreme levels of conflict and opposition. Several factors appear to be at least partially responsible for the problems and policy failures which are evident. Although the siting process has evolved too far to resolve most of the difficulties which have emerged in Boyd County, the lessons learned in this case should provide guidance for any future efforts.
To a substantial degree, the hostile reactions of Boyd County residents to the LLNW proposal can be linked to beliefs that the health, safety and quality of life of local residents are of little concern to those responsible for planning, licensing, constructing or operating the facility. Many locals are convinced that the proposed facility property fails to satisfy licensing requirements due to hydrological and geological conditions. They are also convinced that the decision to develop the facility at that site is already so firmly entrenched that site developers will make every effort to ignore or hide evidence which might disqualify the site.
231
Such beliefs are not surprising given that consideration of alternative facility locations was discontinued fairly early in the site evaluation process before much of the necessary data on site conditions had been collected or analyzed.* Many believe that the site choice was based on politics, not science (cf. Kaufman and Moorer, 1991). Opposition to proposals for toxic and hazardous facilities is likely to be less widespread when the siting process includes full consideration of several alternative locations. Under such circumstances the economic and political costs of disqualifying an inappropriate site are less severe than when all efforts focus on only one location. In addition, local residents are more likely to believe that the site selection process is based on scientific criteria rather than expediency (see Kunreuther et al, 1992). In contrast the Central Interstate Compact Commission and US Ecology chose not to actively pursue investigation of several candidate sites through the entire licensing process. This exacerbated local distrust of site evaluation efforts and those responsible for conducting them.
An additional lesson learned from other cases involving hazardous facility siting involves the role of public involvement activities and processes. Early discussions of the possibility of locating the LLNW facility in Boyd County allegedly involved only a small handful of local elected officials and political leaders
* Candidate sites in Nebraska for the LLNW facility initially included locations in Nemaha and Nuckolls counties as well as Boyd county. However, consideration of siting the facility in those other areas was abandoned in 1989.
232
before there was any dissemination of information to the public. This caused many residents to believe that a deal had been made "behind their backs." The fact that several of those who were originally identified as local liaisons in discussions about the LLNW project were closely identified with the recent school consolidation controversy simply reinforced residents' suspicions about the proposal, particularly when some of those same individuals were appointed to the local monitoring committee.
Several public information meetings held in Boyd County also failed to convince many local residents that the project might be acceptable, and many were angered by meeting formats which they believe precluded any legitimate opportunities for them to express their views, ask questions, or receive meaningful, answers to their questions. Provision of funding to a local organization supportive of the LLNW facility and contentious relations between the Boyd County Monitoring Committee and representatives of the Central Interstate Compact Commission, US Ecology and the Nebraska Department of Environmental Control have simply reinforced local beliefs that those responsible for siting the facility have little, if any, interest in local views, concerns or preferences. While early implementation of meaningful public involvement structures allowing a degree of local input into siting decisions can facilitate acceptance of hazardous facilities (Kunreauther et ale, 1992), such efforts have not been pursued effectively in Boyd County.
Just as many Boyd County residents believe that they have been
233
effectively shut out of the siting process, they feel that US Ecology has not dealt truthfully with them. The major issue that set the stage for widespread distrust involves many locals' understanding that, if they allowed US Ecology to study the site for a year and if they found the project unacceptable, they would be allowed to withdraw from consideration. These residents believe that they kept their side of the bargain but that US Ecology did not keep theirs. This perception by local residents of deception and deceit on the part of US Ecology only adds to the general level of distrust and provides justification for disbelieving all project information provided by US Ecology and for rejecting the project.
The issue of compensation is also linked to the Boyd County response to the LLNW proposal. Under some circumstances the provision of financial compensation or other incentives can facilitate local acceptance of hazardous facilities. However, rather than encouraging facility acceptance, the compensation and incentive programs developed for the proposed LLNW facility have added fuel to the local controversy about the proposal. The allocation formula for community improvement funds is viewed by many residents outside of the Butte area as arbitrary and inequitable. After all, they reason, the risks associated with the facility would affect residents of other areas as well, not just those living in Butte.*
*Some proponents believe that because they helped further US Ecology's efforts, they arid their community deserve the lion's share of the benefits, arid that those who have actively opposed the project deserve nothing.
234
Financially stressed areas such as Boyd County would seem likely to react favorably to funding allocations that would significantly benefit the county as a whole and the individual villages within it. Had the compensation program provided for more equal allocations across local jurisdictions, reactions might have been less negative. Instead, the provision of funds associated with the LLNW facility has simply exacerbated pre-existing tensions and competitiveness between Butte and other communities in the county and reinforced local beliefs that the financial incentives represent nothing more than "bribe money”.
At this point in the process, there appears to be little, other than halting the process and starting over from the beginning, that might be done to resolve the social disruption that has occurred in response to the LLNW proposal. The tensions experienced during the last several years and the negative views that most residents hold regarding the entire siting process suggest that it would not be possible to secure widespread support for or acceptance of a LLNW facility. This would be the case even if a new site in Boyd County were identified or different firms were assigned the responsibility of constructing and operating the facility. However, if the facility is eventually built in Boyd County it will be important to implement mitigation programs to minimize any additional disruptions that might occur; and, in order to provide effective mitigation, it will be necessary to carefully monitor existing social conditions and sentiments.
To avoid overloading of local infrastructure and to reduce the
235
potential for conflict between facility workers and local residents, temporary on-site housing facilities should be provided during the project construction phase. A monitoring program should be implemented to track potential impacts on local and county services, and mechanisms should be established to direct funding to those programs and areas which experience increased demands and/or costs. Because adverse social and economic impacts would potentially involve the entire county, the formula for allocation of community development funds should be revised in a manner that would more evenly distribute funding across local jurisdictions and other units of government.
In addition, there is a need for a long-term commitment to providing for locally-controlled monitoring of site operations and environmental conditions. This would help to alleviate suspicions about the integrity of facility operations and environmental monitoring programs. A local monitoring committee should be established on a permanent basis, with sufficient funding and authority to allow it to hire qualified professionals to pursue independent site inspections and testing procedures. Furthermore, there should be regular public meetings involving the committee and representatives of facility management to provide information and answer questions regarding facility operations and site conditions. Provision of such local review and oversight capacity, along with efforts to develop more cooperative relations between such a committee and those responsible for facility management, would provide an important step toward increased levels of trust in the
236
integrity of responsible authorities.
Finally, regardless of whether or not the facility is built, there is a need to implement programs which might alleviate some of the local hostilities and antagonisms that have arisen due to the LLNW issue. At this point in time the social costs attached to the proposed facility have been borne by Boyd County residents on both sides of the debate. These hidden, and generally externalized, costs need to be returned to those agencies and organizations which generated them. The people of Boyd County should not bear these social costs alone.
Although some individuals may never be able to overcome their animosities toward some area residents, a broad-based conflict resolution program could help many to establish more supportive ties with those who adopted opposing positions regarding the LLNW facility. Because hostilities are deeply seated, such a program would require a substantial commitment of professional personnel, time, and funding. However, unless such a commitment is made it would seem highly likely that at least a full generation of Boyd County residents will never be able to reestablish the level of social cohesion needed to collectively confront community needs and problems.
The problems of local opposition, distrust, risk perceptions, and conflict experienced during the attempt to locate a LLNW facility in Boyd County resemble those encountered by the federal government in its attempts to site a high-level nuclear waste repository. Speaking of the difficulties the federal government
237
had encountered in siting a high-level waste facility, Gervers notes:
State governments and possibly Indian tribes might have been willing to accept a repository within their borders if the site selection process was demonstrably fair, if the technical program was credible, if the consultative process was open and cooperative, and if the site selection program avoided political influence (1987:18).
Likewise, Boyd County might have been willing to accept the LLNW facility and considerable disruption and social costs might have been avoided had Gervers' advice been followed. The failure to do so has generated enormous problems not only for those attempting to site the facility, but also for the residents of Boyd County. In attempting to redress the situation which has emerged during the past several years, it must be remembered that the current problems facing Boyd County were not created by those who live there.
338