PEACE AND WAR EN COLOMBIA

Understanding the peace process initiated by the Colombian govemment with guerrillas forces inside the country; namely, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberafion Army (ELN), implies analyzing the current state of the conflict, its protagonists, and their role in Colombia's political, economic and social circumstances. Making the mistake of limiting this understanding to the emerging peace process alone, as is now the case, ignores the complexity of the war, which is at the very heart of these talks.

By CESE and  CIDEC

Despite the hopes for peace that have been sparked by a certain degree of rapprochement between the government and the country's more powerful guerrilla forces, which could lead to demobilization in a relatively short period of time, the number of kidnappings, including the kidnapping of children, has increased. Analysts say the major subversive groups are primarily to blame.

According to Fundación País Libre, 823 more kidnappings were committed in 1999 than in 1998. The guerrillas were responsible for 62.5 percent of these abductions. Ninety-three people were kidnapped for ransom between January 1 and February 10, 1999. Information from the government agency created to fight kidnapping indicates that 35 people are being held captive by the FARC, 18 by the ELN and two by the Jaime Bateman Cañon group

In southeast Colombia, the number of hectares planted in coca increased ten-fold between 1984 and 1998. The RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had military control of the zone during that period, practicing and exploiting this activity to finance their armed operations. This is still the case.

The national government and the Colombian armed forces vacated the Caguán region on November 7, 1998. This is an area twice the size of El Salvador. The FARC demanded that approximately 42 thousand square kilometers of territory in the region be demilitarized as a condition for initiating peace talks.

Official estimates indicate that 5,000 to 12,000 hectares of land the area are being used to grow coca. This illicit activity is the main source of income for local families

Most of the coca produced in the Caguán region is grown in the five municipal districts of the demilitarized zone. The United States Congress sees this as a threat to Us Colombia's anti-drug policy.

The  guerrillas first established their camps and areas of influence in settlement regions. These are remote parts of Colombia where the state exerts virtually no presence and communication routes and public utilities are nonexistent Extremely poor regions such as the Llanos Orientales (Eastern Plains) in 1960 or Urabá in the 1970s are examples. In these places, where dissent is common and living conditions are poor, the local population was receptive to subversive discourse and ideology.

Today, the guerrillas have other areas of influence and interest. Their armed fronts and mílitias have relocated in zones where most of the nation's economic activity takes place. The countryside and rural areas are no longer their prime objective and center of operations; they have moved into urban areas. The city of Barrancabermeja is an example. Home to the country's largest oil refinery, it is now divided between mílitias organized by the FARC and the ELN. According to a study by the Andes University, subversive groups were active in 10 percent of Colombia's provincial capitais in 1985; This figure is expected to increase to 94 percent by the end of the century

It stands to reason that the current dimensions of the conflict will be impossible to maintain solely on the basis of dissident masses who are willing to mobilize in protest against the government. Other means of funding will have to be found to support these subversive groups and to structure them as armies. This search is feasible only in areas with an attractive and prosperous economy, not in shanty towns or poverty-stricken neighborhoods. The People's Liberation Army - ELN, which disbanded in 1991, consolidated its strength and expanded during the banana boom in Uraba. ELN fronts operating in the Araucan oil zone were responsible for stabilizing the group economically. Currently the best armed of ELN and with the most operating capacity, they are the leastwílling to come to the bargaining table. The FARC's rise and predominance are due to revenue exacted through their control over zones where coca is grown and processed.

If poverty and social inequality were the justification for these groups in the beginning, today's armed conflict is the result of their influence in zones that are economically productive and through their control over zones where coca is grown and processed.

The guerrillas have an annual income estimated at somewhere between 600 and 700 million dollars. These figures point to money rather than ideology as the driving force behind the war today. It is no a
secret that most of this income comes from kidnapping, extortion and drug trafficking, all of which affect domestic and foreign private investment throughout the country. Colombia now classifies as one of the world's most dangerous nations. This has an enormously detrimental impact on the tourist industry and proposed plans for growth.

The national defeense budget now exceeds four tríllion pesos, money that might otherwise be spent to supply basic needs in health, education and housing. In its entirety, armed confiict in Colombia consumes more resources than any other item Approximately 2.5 billion dollars in war taxes had to be collected in 1990s alone.

Because the country's subversive groups are financially sound and growing, the government is compelled to invest more money as well. It is a cycle in which money fuels the war, which demands more and more money in retum. The Colombian economy and sectors in need of the state's presence are affected the most

Those who lead the FARC are conscious of their army´s economic and operational power and see it is a perfect weapon for exerting  political pressure on the government This is another area where their conception of the war has changed.

 In the beginning, popular support for the FARC was an incomparable political tool (in' 1984, an estimated 12 to 15 percent of the population were supporters). Now, this support has eroded (currently estimated at less than 4 percent) and they are forced to use their impressive military and economic strength. In short, the war has changed from a popular, ideological struggle for better social opportunities for all, to one that lacks the necessary grassroots support but is armed with financial and military might

This gives the idea that the earlier war, when people took up arms in order to be heard and demanded the minimum necessary for subsistence, has evolved into a conflict where 10 or 15 thousand men are seeking a series of concessions for their own benefit

Militarily and economically, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- FARC - are the strongest subversive group ever seen in Latin America. Recent events demonstrate their military capacity and ability to move personnel and equipment This year, a group of more than 800 guerrillas belonging to the FARC murdered 25 people and kidnapped another 5, in the wake of a 300 kilometer trek. This happened in Vigia del Fuerte in Antioquia province. The FARC have been holding 300 people hostage for more than six months; almost all are members of Colombia's armed forces. They are being used to pressure the government to pass permanent legislation on an exchange of prisoners.

Due to the nature of its movement, the National Liberation Army – ELN –depends heavily on support from the civilian population. In areas where the ELN exerts an influence, many of its men and womwn are active menbers of the comunity.

Massacres carried out by self-defense groups have weakened its ranks, causing serious damage and detriment to its operational capacity. Moreover, the death of its top leader, Fatherr Pérez, has caused intemal division and set off a power struggle among his possible successors.

Today, the ELN has only a handful of militarily powerful fronts in the oil zones of Arauca and Norte de Santander. Because of past errors and action by selfdefense groups, the others are weak and have few military options. Unlike the FARC, the ELN is more willing to talk peace and involve itself in a process of reciprocal concessions.

The Confederation of Colombian Self-defense groups – AUC - , lead by Carlos Castaño, claims to have  more than 20 fronts and between 4,000 and 5,000 mens in  arms. Militarily speaking, they have been successful in the province  of Chocó and Antioquia in the  regions of Urabá, in  Magdalena province, in Sucre and in  southern Cesar. In areas where they are stronger, these vigilante - style groups - or "paramilitary" forces as they are mistakenly called - oust the guerrillas by sending in contingents of armed men to carry out violent attacks. They are also tryirng to form new organizations in the southem provinces. Self-defense groups have advanced quickly and are very influential on the Caribbean coast, especially in Urabá, Córdoba, Magdalena and southern Cesar. They are also responsible for isoleted action in several areas of southern Colombia.

Although the self-defense movement has its roots in private vigilante groups created by drug traffickers, it denies any association with the drug trade. However, the Head of the Narcotics Police is certain such ties exist, but believes they are more recent and not as close or diversified as those of the guerrillas. As an example, he says the guerrilla attacks in Mapiripan, Meta and Miraflores, Guaviare in 1997 occurred precisely in areas with a flourishing coca economy.

According to the U.S. State Department part of the war beeween the guerrillas and the self-defense groups concems the drug trade, mainly a continuous struggle to control the corridor for illegal drugs and arrns in Colombia.

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