Post Conviction Relief
One point needs to be made that casts a distinct shadow over the continued presence of Teddy on Arizona's Death Row. Namely, the denial of post-conviction relief by Judge H. Stewart Bradshaw. The argument runs thus, and is frighteningly simple:
Judge Bradshaw presided over the original trial in Yuma when Robinson, Mathers and Teddy were convicted and it was he who imposed the sentence of death on all three.
As is usual in most trials where a death sentence is passed, a direct appeal was lodged (1990) and the conviction and sentence were affirmed for Teddy, whilst for Mathers the judgement was reversed and he was acquitted. Following this decision, Teddy made a petition (1991) for post-conviction relief. The consideration of the matter was set before, once again, Judge H. Stewart Bradshaw.
Judge Bradshaw was troubled by the fact that Mathers had been acquitted but that Teddy remained under sentence of death. He said at this time that it was true "that this court, at sentencing, viewed Mathers as the triggerman". He followed this very clear statement with another: "it is also true that he [Mathers] is now free while the two defendants who probably did not, physically, kill anyone are on death row".
The rest of Bradshaw's findings at this stage included:
"The court has a difficult task in finding any evidence linking [Teddy] to the crime"
"We know that [Teddy] was in Yuma ... [but] No-one ... placed him in the house"
"To this court's view this may present a colorable claim for relief at some point in time"
Bradshaw judged that those findings, which in the first appeal had freed Mathers of any blame, in turn exculpated Teddy. And yet, even at that point, he seemed unable to make the final conclusion: ultimately Judge Bradshaw denied post-conviction relief.
Why?
A medical evaluation conducted in 1997 discovered that in 1990 - after the original trial decision - Bradshaw suffered an hypoxia episode, equivalent to an extreme bout of pnuemonia. It was the finding of this evaluation, and a subsequent nueropsychological report, that the hypoxia caused brain damage and that higher-level cognitive functioning had become impaired. This condition has affected the Judge's ability to assess meaning from complex information processes, which is, of course, an essential element in his position in a court of law. The most telling point in this respect is the evidence above, where he exculpates both Mathers and Teddy and yet is unable to apply the same conclusion to both.
When the post-conviction relief was denied there is no way that the Court could have known that the Judge was impaired and incapable of providing adequate direction in his findings. Teddy's appeals had been made infront of a Judge who is not able to understand what is expected of him. Unfortunately, Bradshaw's decision at that time has coloured subsequent appeals by becoming a main point of reference. It is palpably unfair.
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