JKLF on nuclear tests

STATEMENT

 SOUTH ASIANSAGAINST NUKES


NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON

Background to INDIA-PAKISTAN nuclear tests


THE SCENARIO FOR NUCLEAR WAR 1999

By Eric Margolis, 8 Nov 1998

'14 June 1999. 0540hrs.'

`Kashmiri independence fighters, hotly pursued by Indian troops, slip across the Line of Control into the Pakistani portion of the strife-torn mountain state. Pakistani troops give the Islamic militants covering fire. Indian forces along the mountainous border return fire. An Indian general, invoking the right of hot pursuit, sends a brigade into Pakistani territory to follow the Kashmiri Mujihadin. Heavy Pakistani enfilading fire pins down the Indians. To extricate them, an Indian corps commander orders a division forward. It, too, is pinned down, suffering severe losses.

To relieve pressure on the trapped units, an Indian armored strike corps attacks the strategic Pakistani road junction at Sialkot, just south of Kashmir. A Pakistani armored division drives on Pathankot to cut off India's main road into the Vale of Kashmir. Opposing forces exchange heavy fire along the 1,000-mile Indo-Pakistani border from the Arabian Sea to Tibet. Both sides mobilize reserves. They launch air and missile attacks on one another's forward air bases and supply depots.

Pakistani air defense radars report a wave of Indian missiles heading for Pakistan's nuclear complex, and main air and missile bases in northern Punjab. Pakistan's Prime Minister has 2 minutes to either launch his nuclear-armed aircraft and missiles - or loose them. Almost fainting from the pressure, he orders launch. The reports, it turns out, were false. Too late. India launches a nuclear riposte. Most major cities in northern India, and all Pakistan's cities, are incinerated. Two million people die immediately; 100 million within weeks. A vast cloud of deadly radioactive dust begins to circle the globe: it will eventually cause millions of deaths in North America.' Fiction- yes, so far. But the border between old foes India and Pakistan remains the world's most dangerous place - and, with Korea's DMZ - the likeliest flash point for a nuclear war. Fighting between Indian and Pakistani troops on the Kashmir LOC has flared over recent months, right up to the Siachen Glacier on the Tibet border, where this writer went into battle with Pakistani commandos, at a near airless 22,000 ft, against elite Indian mountain troops. This week, senior Indian and Pakistani officials met in New Delhi for talks aimed at defusing tensions between the two great Asian nations. As always, talks failed to get beyond the 51-year old Kashmir dispute, the world's oldest ongoing international problem.

When British India was partitioned in 1947, the people of the princely state of Kashmir, of whom 80% were Muslim, were to vote whether to join India or Pakistan. Kashmir's Hindu Maharajah cancelled the referendum, opted to join India, and jailed Muslim leaders; 200,000 Muslims were massacred in the Poonch region. Pakistan sent a force of wild Pathan tribesmen into Kashmir. India airlifted tough Sikhs up to the capital. Srinagar. When fighting ended in January, 1949, India controlled two-thirds of Kashmir, Pakistan one third.

That year, the UN called for a supervised plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future. India refused. Subsequently, India and Pakistan fought two inconclusive wars over the beautiful mountainous state. Muslim Kashmiris long chaffed under Indian rule. In 1989, a spontaneous rebellion erupted against India's often brutal, corrupt, inefficient misrule. Scores of small guerrilla groups took to the hills, or fought in Kashmir's cities and towns. The Kashmiri `intifada,' which continues today, has taken some 60,000 lives, mostly Muslim civilians. India has 600,000 soldiers and paramilitary troops battling independence forces in Kashmir. In spite of this huge garrison - one Indian soldier for every 22 Kashmiris - the revolt continues at reduced intensity. Indian security forces are constantly accused by human rights groups of crimes against humanity: mass reprisals, gang rapes, murders, widespread torture, arson and religious humiliation designed to break the will of Muslims.

India accuses Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, of sustaining the intifada from bases in Azad Kashmir. Pakistan accuses India's intelligence agency, RAW, of inciting communal violence in Pakistan's southern Sindh province, and in Punjab. Both charges are true. India frequently threatens to attack Mujihadin bases in Azad Kashmir. Alarmingly, the chauvinist Hindu BJP party that dominates India's coalition government has sought to intimidate Pakistan over Kashmir by flexing its newly demonstrated nuclear power. India is estimated to have some 100 operational nuclear weapons, Pakistan about 30. India's strategy is to keep Kashmir an internal issue, crush resistance groups, and turn the Line of Control into a permanent international border. Pakistan has always sought to internationalize the issue, mobilize backing for the never-implemented UN plebiscite, and unite Kashmir to Pakistan. Islamabad has occasionally jailed Kashmiri nationalists who want total independence for their state - which would include much of what is today Pakistan's Northern Territories. Pakistan and India are incapable of bilaterally resolving Kashmir.

The acute threat of war over Kashmir between two nuclear powers - whose weapons are on hair-trigger alert - demands urgent international intervention over Kashmir, an issue that now affects the security and wellbeing of the entire planet.

A UN-supervised vote on Kashmir's future is the logical solution. Convincing New Delhi and Islamabad to accept the will of 13 million Kashmiris, however, will be excruciatingly difficult. Still, the world powers must force a settlement of this potential globe-threatening conflict before hot pursuit in Kashmir escalates to nuclear war.

Copyright Eric Margolis 1998, margolis@foreigncorrespondent.com


 

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL P-5 FOREIGN MINISTERS IN GENEVA ON 4 JUNE 1998,

NUCLEAR TESTS in INDIA and PAKISTAN

1Bearing in mind the responsibility of their countries for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Geneva on 4 June 1998 to coordinate their response to the grave situation created by the nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and then by Pakistan. The Ministers condemned these tests, expressed their deep concern about the danger to peace and stability in the region, and pledged to cooperate closely in urgent efforts to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race in the Subcontinent, to bolster the non- proliferation regime, and to encourage reconciliation and peaceful resolution of differences between India and Pakistan.

2The Ministers agreed that quick action is needed to arrest the further escalation of regional tensions stimulated by the recent nuclear tests. India and Pakistan should therefore stop all further such tests. They should refrain from the weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons, from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They should also halt provocative statements, refrain from any military movements that could be construed as threatening, and increase transparency in their actions. Direct communications between the parties could help to build confidence.

3To reinforce security and stability in the region and more widely, the Five strongly believe that India and Pakistan should adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Bank Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force. The Five also call upon India and Pakistan to participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other states in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement. The Five will seek firm commitments by India and Pakistan not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles. India and Pakistan should also confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and should undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.

4The Ministers agreed that the international non-proliferation regime must remain strong and effective despite the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. Their goal continues to be adherence by all countries, including India and Pakistan, to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it stands, without any modification. This Treaty is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding their recent nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapons states in accordance with the NPT.

5The Ministers concluded that the efforts to resolve disputes between India and Pakistan must be pursued with determination. The Ministers affirm their readiness to assist India and Pakistan, in a manner acceptable to both sides, in promoting reconciliation and cooperation. The Ministers pledged that they will actively encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions, through direct dialogue, that address the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, and to try to build confidence rather than seek confrontation. In that connection, the Ministers urged both parties to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocative acts.

6The Ministers also considered what actions the Five could take, individually or collectively, to foster peace and security in South Asia. They will encourage India and Pakistan to adopt practical measures to prevent an arms race. They confirmed their respective policies to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons. They also undertook to do all they could to facilitate a reduction of tensions between those states, and to provide assistance, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. They remain determined to fulfill their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.

7The Ministers viewed their meeting in Geneva as setting in motion a process aimed at strengthening peace and stability in South Asia, at encouraging restraint by India and Pakistan, at promoting the resolution of outstanding differences, and at bolstering the international non-proliferation regime. They will remain fully engaged in pursuing these goals, and will work actively to build broad support in the international community for the objectives they agreed today. ENDS


US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Press Conference on the Crisis in South Asia Palais des Nations, Geneva Switzerland, June 4, 1998

(As released by the Office of the spokesman U.S. Department of State)

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Good evening, and thank you for coming out at this late hour. We have just completed an extraordinary meeting to forge a unified strategy toward the crisis in South Asia. We met in this group today because, as the permanent members of the Security Council, we have an obligation to respond to what is clearly a threat to international peace and security. And, as the NPT nuclear weapons states, we have a responsibility to protect the non-proliferation regime. But this is not a challenge the nuclear powers can or will meet alone. In the coming weeks, we will be engaging with a broader group of non-proliferation leaders, including Japan and Germany and nations that have wisely foresworn the nuclear option. We are defending our principles here, not our privileges.

The whole world is asking India and Pakistan to stop, listen, and think. Don't rush to embrace what the rest of the planet is racing to leave behind. Don't assume you are the only countries on earth that are immune to miscalculation. There is no point worth making; no message worth sending; no interest worth securing; that can possibly justify the risk.

Our first purpose today was to send a coordinated message to India and Pakistan about what we, as outside powers, believe they must do to diminish the immediate risk of escalation. We have also called on India and Pakistan to take additional steps to avert an arms race and ease the tensions between them. They should sign the CTBT; refrain from deploying missiles; stop production of fissile material; formalize their pledge not to export dangerous weapons and technologies; and resume dialogue, including over Kashmir.

The second part of our message today is that we're prepared to help India and Pakistan maintain peace if they're prepared to do the right thing. We will each do our part to prevent destabilizing transfers of arms to South Asia. The United States is willing to share our expertise and our capability to help India and Pakistan monitor military activities and avoid miscalculations. We are all ready to assist them in settling differences and reducing tensions.

At the same time, a number of nations, including the United States, will maintain sanctions against India and Pakistan until the situation is resolved. The United States will also insist that no nation that disregards international norms become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

We each have a distinctive relationship with India and Pakistan, and we will each try to influence them in our own ways. What is vital is that no nation should look upon sanctions as a commercial opportunity. If some of us are willing to take the heat, others should not be rushing to take the contracts.

Finally, we affirmed our resolve today to shore up the global non-proliferation regime. We will not amend the NPT to accommodate India and Pakistan, for that would send a message that every nation is free to test its way into the nuclear club.

Clearly, these nations have had a nuclear weapons capability, and they will have one for the foreseeable future. What we're insisting is that they freeze that capability, and that they not deploy nuclear weapons or missiles. There are many things we want India and Pakistan to do, but we don't want to isolate these countries, or make them outcasts or pariahs. We must engage them. We must persuade and convince them that what the international community wants them to do, they should do, consistent with their legitimate security needs.

Let me close by saying that this is not a one-shot event. This group will remain seized with this issue. We will work together on next steps. We have no illusions that we will succeed overnight, but a process has begun and we're determined to see it through.

I am now ready to take your questions.

QUESTION: The communique and your statement raise a lot of questions. What if India and Pakistan ignore you and not only test again but deploy nuclear weapons? On the issue of Kashmir, is it enough to say, as the Chinese Foreign Minister just did, that the preference is for the two of them to solve this issue alone? They haven't been able to do it so far, and why aren't the Perm 5 offering their own mediation or doing something more specific to help in this regard?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Let me say that I think that clearly we have all wanted - had wanted to deter India and Pakistan from testing. And had done our very best - I think all of us - to try to have them desist. It would be my own sense that they might not have expected this kind of very widespread condemnation of what they have done. As I've said previously, what has happened in the last week is that whether we were at NATO, or the NATO-Russian foreign council, or the Euro-Atlantic partnership committee, or at the OAS, there has been general agreement of condemnation and telling, in very direct terms, what we believe India and Pakistan need to do. So there are over 80 countries that have made their views very clear. What I think is very important in the communique that has been issued today is that we have set forth a very unified and united message about what we are calling on India and Pakistan to do in order to have them stop testing and try to avert an arms race, and sign up to the CTBT and refrain from deploying missiles and stop production of fissile materials. Those are the major aspects of what we're asking them to do. I think we want to see how this message is received. It is, I think, a strong message from the permanent members of the Security Council, delivered loud and clear. And as I said, they better stop, look, and listen to what has happened. Should they take additional steps, I think there are other ways that the international community can deal with this.

The second part, on Kashmir. Let me say on that issue, I think there is no question that Kashmir has really been a very serious, long-running problem. In fact, in stepping into this room this time, I remembered that the first time I was introduced to this building was actually when I was 10 years old and came here with my father, who was the Czechoslovak representative to the original India-Pakistan commission to deal with Kashmir. He's dead and I'm old, and it's still going on. I think that the flashpoint aspect of the Kashmir issue is very serious. We made clear today, it's very important for India and Pakistan to deal with the Kashmir problem together; the best way is between them. But either the international community in some organizational forum, or each of us as outside powers, might have some suggestions to make. But clearly, it's very important that in the communique it was clear that Kashmir was an issue that needed to be discussed.

QUESTION: You said that you would bring other countries into the process, and you named a few. Did you agree here today on a meeting of the G-8 in London or elsewhere next week, and at what level?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: A plan had been announced earlier by Foreign Secretary Cook, and we expect that it will take place, on the 12th I guess is the date that's been agreed to, at the ministerial level. There were a number of ideas suggested about how to expand the group, and I sense that Foreign Secretary Cook is going to be looking into ways to do that as rapidly as possible. His meeting is the next one scheduled. I truly do think that you're going to see a series of different kinds of meetings taking place -- because there are a number of countries that want to be a part of this very strong statement about trying to reverse, or trying to have them stop, what has happened and not deploy and take the steps that I have mentioned. So there will be expansions of the group, and Robin Cook is going to be looking into different ways to do this.

QUESTION: India has said it's going to observe--it is observing a moratorium on nuclear testing, but it wants to join the CTBT. It is willing to enter into "no first use" agreement and so on. None of these have been reflected in the communique. India has also said it wishes to begin talks to enter the CTBT, and none of this appears to be in the communique either. Is it because you think these are not positive things? Or do you have some other reason?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The main point of the communique was to send, as the P-5, a very strong message to India and Pakistan. While people have heard about these ideas, what is needed now is to really solidify and codify some of these ideas. There was a sense that we needed to know more about India's bona fides in terms of following through on these ideas. The moratorium is a partial solution--especially when CTBT exists as a way to make sure that there are no additional tests. I think everybody was deeply troubled by the fact that India took these steps, and expects now to be quickly recognized as doing the right thing. We need to have proof of the right thing, and can't just take a country that willfully tested at its word.

QUESTION: I find it difficult to believe that three weeks ago, when all of this first happened, and before it happened, that either the Indian government or the Pakistani government would have been surprised at international condemnation. With that in mind, why not take this opportunity to surprise India and Pakistan and give them a reason not to test again--other than the fact that they're going to suffer the disapproval, the strong disapproval, of the Permanent 5 members? Why not give them a reason not to test?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: The best reason for them not to test is that it's not in their national interest to test. I think they are, if they have not discovered it already, they will be. There are those who believe that India first tested because it wanted to show its power, and to earn a certain amount of respect, and to gain security for its people. I think what has happened is that India has lost the respect of the international community. A nation that has the tradition of Gandhi, of non-violence, and of Jawaharlal Nehru, who had great moral authority throughout major portions of the Cold War--that good name of India has been lost. As far as making their people more secure, I think the people of India are less secure because of the test, because the Pakistanis immediately responded. And by the way, they are also less secure and have less authority than they had before. Nobody gains from an escalation of a nuclear arms race. Therefore the reason not to test is because they are less secure, and therefore it's not in their national interest.

Furthermore--I think there was very much of a general sense of agreement on this--is that the worst thing would be to reward these two countries for having broken what is now a well-established nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT and the CTBT. That is the word of the international community, overwhelmingly so, and they are outside the bounds of it and do not deserve to be rewarded in any way, shape, or form. They need to understand that it is in their national interest, and their security, and they have jeopardized that.

QUESTION: You said earlier that we're prepared to help them maintain peace. You then went on to say that we're ready to share capability and expertise. Can you elaborate on that, and refer to the sharing of intelligence information, which might be used as a confidence-building measure by both sides.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: There are a variety of confidence-building measures that we can advise on such as an improved hotline or risk-reduction-center concepts that could be used. There are ways that troop and equipment redeployments could be in less-threatening postures. That could be helpful. An "open skies" type of regime could allow the sides to monitor each other's military movements in key areas. There are also various relatively low-tech devices for monitoring the absence of activities in tense locations. Those are the kinds of expertise and capability that we would be willing to share.

QUESTION: Last time many of us were at this venue, it was for another hastily scheduled late-night meeting on the subject of weapons of mass destruction. At that time the question was Iraq. Could you assess the relative degree of harmony on tactics and strategy within the P-5 this time versus last time?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, it's really early in comparison to what we were doing that night. I opened my intervention by saying it was nice to see daylight outside, in contrast to our 2 a.m. meeting the last time. You've asked a very interesting question, because I was struck in this meeting by the unanimity of views about the necessity of delivering this tough message. I think--as my now long-time expertise of watching communiques being drafted--this was one that the experts worked on very hard, but there was a very cooperative spirit, and the communique shows it. There was general agreement on this subject. There are obviously some nuances, as you might well expect. But I think there was a marked difference in the two meetings. I hadn't thought about comparing the two of them in the way you have. But from a very positive standpoint, the P-5, what I found here is that it was--I'm very glad we had this meeting. The United States, we thought it was very important to have this meeting, and we were very glad that China was the coordinator. You know the P-5 chairmanship rotates month by month, and the Chinese were in the chair. We had worked very carefully in the days between--I've totally lost track of time--Luxembourg and this, not only with the Chinese but with the others. And there is a general sense, as I said in my statement, that the P-5 have a responsibility and that we have not just privileges but responsibilities, and I think those were very clearly exercised here today.

QUESTION: The communique urges the two countries not to proliferate their weapons of mass destruction. How urgent or critical a problem do you feel this is? Who would be the likely recipients of proliferation material from these countries?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Generally, in terms of trying to keep our non-proliferation goals, we want to make sure that the ability, technology, etc., does not spread. To take a hypothetical situation as to who might be recipients, I think Pakistan has already indicated that it does not have any plan to "pass on" what it has done. We just hope that the message from here is very strong about the fact that we don't want to see this kind of capability be transferred to any other country. And, by the way, the reason we are not into inducements here is because we don't want any other country to feel there is a benefit to having a nuclear weapons capability, that this is not the way to become part of a respected group, and that the transfer of technology will not bring them respect or security for their people.

QUESTION: When India and Pakistan in 1995 decided not to join the extended NPT, and two years ago decided not to sign the CTBT here--because they felt those treaties were discriminatory, or whatever--your diplomats, such as Ambassador Ledogar, and the diplomats of the other nuclear powers, and of NATO, told us here that there should be no concern that India and Pakistan would ever test because of the fact that there were so many signatory states to both treaties--CTBT and NPT. This now has proven to be a big miscalculation. Isn't it high time now for the P-5 to actually engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations here at the UN Conference--not only to de-escalate the situation in South Asia but also to prevent others like Iran and Arab countries from taking the same route?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I do not believe that having the NPT and CTBT, with as many signatories as both have, could in any shape or form be a mistake. It's very clear that establishing those regimes is very important, and it is always very hard to guard against countries that, for willful reasons, defy the international community. Obviously part of what has to happen--and we talked about this at the time of the renewal of the NPT was being negotiated--and obviously the whole role of the CTBT is to try to do whatever we can to have as many possibilities of arms control within our groupings. We are all working on that. The United States and Russia have been involved in Start II negotiations and the ratification process. We believe that we do have a responsibility to systematically lower the levels of weapons. And we will continue to do that. That has been the goal, and we will continue to do so. There are a variety of fora in which to do that. The CD here is one of them and one that we use, and that we believe has a very important role. The other aspect that we talked about was the importance of moving forward on the fissile-material cut-off. That is not only a part of the discussion that we had, and is part of the communique, but is very much something, some negotiations that we believe need to have more impetus to them.

QUESTION: You said that this agreement represents a united front with your counterparts in regards to the India-Pakistan crisis. However, there seems to be a lack of tough language on India and Pakistan--demanding that they do something a little stronger than discuss and make considerations. In light of this fact, how is this agreement a political trigger to bring them back from the brink of nuclear mayhem?

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think everyone can read this language from your own perspective. I happen to think that this is very strong language that makes quite clear that the five nuclear powers--the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council--have made very clear what our goals are. They are a unified voice. There clearly is more work to be done. I pointed out that this is not just--I suppose this is not a great word to use, a "one-shot process"--this is not just something that we have paid attention to here in Geneva today. We are at the beginning of a process that is going to work to try to bring them back from the brink.

The question over here was a legitimate question. We had thought that having so many countries sign these agreements would be enough warning. Obviously we have to look at other methods. This is what this meeting was about, and other meetings are going to be about: the ability to try to show them the error of their ways. Also, as I have said, we are not going to try to turn these two countries into pariahs -- we are going to engage with them and try to figure out ways to solidify our message and point out to them that they have earned nothing, zero, zilch, by what they have done. They have only earned themselves the opprobrium of the international community across the board, and have made their people less secure--not to speak of poorer--and not to speak also of having lost the respect that the international community for their role, and for their ability, frankly, to live even with difficulty, side by side in the subcontinent. So they have gained nothing. The international community, to use the normal UN words, is "seized of the issue." But more so, it is actively involved in looking for ways to bring them back from the brink. And as I said, nobody's promising that this particular communique is going to resolve the problem. But I hope you don't underestimate the importance of having had the P-5 meet in this kind of setting, be able to rapidly put together a clear statement of objectives, and then be prepared to follow through on further ways of dealing with the problem. Thank you.


 

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