James Schoonmaker

PSCI 0471

U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World

February 3, 1999

Russian Regionalism and its

Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy

The Cold War has ended. The West has won. The Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall have fallen, and the West, for the first time in decades, has been afforded a clear view of the workings of the East. What we saw was a house divided upon itself, which could not stand. Our nemesis, our adversary during the Cold War, was disintegrating before our very eyes and we rejoiced. Those same forces which toppled the Soviet Union now threaten the very fabric of the Russian state, however, and should give us pause, not cause for celebration. The most likely trend in Russia today is for power to devolve to the provinces, creating a political vacuum and a crisis for U.S. foreign policy.

Russia As a Pre-Revolutionary State

Russia today exhibits many of the characteristics of a pre-revolutionary state. As Joseph Heilbrunn states, "Russia is not in crisis. It is in dissolution."⁽¹⁾ James C. Davies hypothesized the J-curve as a model for determining the likelihood of a revolution,⁽²⁾ and this is the model which will be used in this paper. The J-curve is simply a model which posits two separate trends-- the people's capabilities and expectations. Usually, the two parallel each other, rising (and occasionally falling) with each other. As capabilities rise, so do the people's expectations about the future. As a state becomes richer, they expect it to continue to do so. As a people gain more freedoms, they expect this trend to continue, or at least to retain the freedoms they already have. The time when a state is most ripe for a revolution is when these two trends diverge; i.e., when expectations greatly outstrip the people's ability to realize them. This leaves people disillusioned and looking for a cause, which they usually find in the central government. Usually, the trends diverge when the state has been on an upward path-- growing wealthier, granting more freedoms, and allowing more participation in government. However, the people experience a sudden downturn in their capabilities, losing political or normative power, or simply losing their income, while their expectations continue to rise. They look around for what has foiled them from meeting their expectations, and their eyes usually fall on the government.

This is exactly what is happening in Russia. First, it is in the midst of an economic crisis, despite an economy which is capable of massive production. Historically, "the years preceding the outbreak of revolution witnessed unusually serious economic, or at least financial, difficulties of a special kind."⁽³⁾ No matter what measures the Russian government takes to control the crumbling economy, these financial difficulties are likely to continue. As Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes explain in their article "Russia's Virtual Economy," the creation of capital declined last year for the seventh year in a row and continues to decline this year.⁽⁴⁾ In addition, the recent decline in world oil prices and the onset of the "Asian Flu" threaten to continue to propel the Russian economy on a downward grade no matter what policymakers decide.

Tellingly, it is the government which most lacks the money to finance its activities. In most revolutionary states, the government is experiencing an economic crisis.⁽⁵⁾ It is true that Russia is not, relatively speaking, a poor country. Compared to most of the world, Russia is prosperous and productive, despite its current problems. Its production capacity, compared to world averages, is very high. It is, however, precisely this pattern-- a prosperous country which experiences a sudden economic downturn-- which is likely to spark a revolution.⁽⁶⁾ Citizens are likely to become discontent precisely because of this. The situation engenders a feeling that Russia could be prosperous and happy-- if not for the current government. Hence, revolutionary feeling.

Ironically, there is a class of elites in Russia which have a large sum of money-- the oligarches. It would seem that these men, who have all prospered under the current government, would have a stake in preserving it. However, this is not the case. The oligarches have made no real effort to preserve the government except so far as it aided them economically. Nor should we expect them to. These economic disparities have existed before. The French Revolution is one such example, and "it was precisely these prosperous people who in the 1780's were loudest against the government, most reluctant to save it by paying taxes or lending it money."⁽⁷⁾ In Russia, the oligarches refuse to pay their taxes or financially aid the government. This only aggravates the Russian financial crisis.

Many members of the common class are highly-educated, often in Western schools, where they are confronted with liberal ideas and the relative economic prosperity of the West. Access to this sort of information was tightly controlled under the old Soviet system. In addition, the common Russian now has access to the West through telecommunications technology, including television, e-mail and access to the World Wide Web. These factors of exposure to the West will help lead to a classic J-curve of relative deprivation. This happens because citizens are exposed to what "could be." When seeing the relatively prosperous and free people in the West, citizens begin to question why their country cannot be that way. The answer that they usually come to is that it could be-- if not for the current government.

Russian political, economic, and social expectations rose following the fall of the Soviet Union. Now these hopes have not only been dashed by the government's failure to capitalize on its opportunities, ordinary Russians have actually been set back by the current economic crisis, and political opportunities for average Russians are limited due to the oligarches' control of the political system. This is likely to cause widespread discontent among Russians of all classes, but particularly among the upper class and elites; i.e., those who would be in the best position to benefit if the Russian government were to change.

The Russian Army is in disgrace following the debacle in Chechnya and the Soviet Union's inability to prevent its own disintegration. The mere fact that Lebed had to point out that their "rockets may be rusty, but they still work," is telling. The Russian military is in no position to enforce order or hold the country together. The inability to use force effectively is one of the prime characteristics of a disintegrating regime.⁽⁸⁾

Joseph Heilbrunn suggests that it may be "oxymoronic to even speak of a Russian army,"⁽⁹⁾ stating that although Afghanistan was demoralizing to the Russian Army, the inability to operate effectively within its own borders signaled the inability to use force effectively. In addition, Russia withdrew from a Latvian radar station in September 1998, reducing their ability to detect ballistic missile attacks and forcing them to rely upon the United States to warn them of one.⁽¹⁰⁾ The regions no longer fear Russian military power. This is exactly the pattern which preceded the fall of the Soviet Union. Lithuania broke away because they no longer feared the Russian military, and the other republics followed her lead. Today, other regions are likely to follow Chechnya's lead.

The last key factor in pre-revolutionary states involves reform. Although myth holds that states experience revolution because they refuse to grant reforms, this is not true. In fact, attempted reforms tend to speed revolution, as those reforms are usually half-hearted, inefficient, and ineffectual. In fact, de Tocqueville claims that "experience teaches us that usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempts to reform itself."⁽¹¹⁾ This is what triggered the downfall of the Soviet Union: its attempted reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev. The reforms enacted in Russia today are more likely to spur regions to greater claims of autonomy than to rein them in.

In addition, the regions no longer have an outlet to express their concerns. This sometimes acts as an escape valve to release pressure, and has been cited for the stability of the American government. Through voting and political participation, citizens have methods other than the actual seizure of power to voice their concerns. However, this no longer exists in Russia. When the Communist Party began to fall apart in the early 1990's, the most important regional and urban committees were dissolved. In fact,

the evaporation of the power of the party . . . meant the disappearance of the official and informal linkages of coordination, the structure for incorporating regional representatives and the procedures for aggregating and integrating regional demands.⁽¹²⁾

Devolution of Power

A change in the power structure in Russia seems inevitable today. Russia displays all of the signs of a classic pre-revolutionary state. An economic crisis is gripping the country, and especially the government. The Russian government has lost the ability to use force effectively, and everyone knows it. Russian citizens have had access to the West, and have seen what "could be" if the Russian government is replaced. This does not, however, answer one important question: What will replace the current Russian government? The most likely answer is that the regions will continue to take power over the events in their own territory, ignoring mandates from the central government.

This is not to say that no one will attempt either to revitalize the current government, or to impose another strong national government, either through legal elections or through a full revolution. Indeed, the conditions are ripe for a revolution, as shown before. This, however, is more likely to speed the devolution of power to the regions. Power is already devolving, and any attempt to revitalize a strong central government is likely to cause the regions to take greater steps to consolidate their own power. Moreover, if the current situation results in an unlawful seizure of power, the regions are likely to simply ignore any dictates coming from Moscow. Russia is simply too widespread, without enough concentrated power, to be governed effectively for the near future.

Strong nationalist or fascist governments have been predicted. The so-called "Red-Brown coalition" of old communists and newer nationalists are usually sited as the potential source of this type of government. However, it must be pointed out that "Fascists were not simply nationalists; they were primarily and essentially statists."⁽¹³⁾ In other words, they propose a strong central government. However, Russian voters are unlikely to vote in a strong national or communist government in 2000, because they value the freedoms which came with liberalization, despite the economic hardship that accompanied it. Russians have been surprisingly resilient to the current economic crisis. Strong fascist, communist, or nationalist regimes are unlikely to come to power through unlawful means, because power is already devolving to the provinces, and Russia is so large and diverse that, without a strong infrastructure in military already in place, no one faction is likely to hold power.

Several factors lessen the possibility of the liberal regime now ruling being replaced by a strong national regime, however. One of the most prominent trends in Russia today is of ethnic autonomy or even separatism, as seen in Chechnya. Daniel Treisman contends that "since 1990 Russia has experienced an unexpected 'ethnic revival.' From Sakha in Eastern Siberia to Adygeia on the slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, many of the country's more than one hundred minority nationalities have asserted claims for greater rights, privileges, and constitutional recognition."⁽¹⁴⁾

Regionalism is a growing trend, and not only in Russia: the way that information control is handled, business trends, and the structure of capitalism encourage regionalism. Central governments tend to miss community bonds and small-scale social organization which occurs at the local level. These bonds, paradoxically, often stretch across state borders. It has been stated that

city-regional meso- (intermediate) level governments, of which the Siberian Agreement has been a prototype for Russia, have become key agencies of political organization in the capitalist democracies and form a constellation of economic linkages with transnational companies in the pursuit of 'competitive advantage.'⁽¹⁵⁾

In other words, the Siberian Agreement forms a model of regional government which the other regions will follow. As Russia continues down the path to capitalism and a market economy, the regions will necessarily gain more power and independence.

Moscow has made plans to curb regionalism, "capture the local elites and solve the 'regionalism problem' in Russia for good."⁽¹⁶⁾ Yeltsin has announced the dissolution of regional councils as a preliminary measure. This, however, is not a workable proposal. An attempt to dissolve local government institutions could cause bloodshed in St. Petersburg and other regions, such as Karelia, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan. Even if Moscow could dissolve local institutions without active resistance, Moscow needs the local elites to keep factories running and basic services fulfilled, because local elites are "intertwined with those of factory directors, administrators, and local councils."⁽¹⁷⁾ It will be difficult for Moscow to recapture the power which the regions have now claimed, and will only become more difficult as time goes on, or the central government is rocked by change or paralysis. Regionalism is caused by "increasing insecurity of regional elites under the combined pressures of the disintegration of the country, the economy, the command-administrative system and its hub, the Communist Party."⁽¹⁸⁾ As we see again, as the center falls apart, the regions grasp more power to insure their own security. Disturbances in Moscow, such as an attempted coup, will only heighten the fears of regional governors and fuel the trend of regionalism.

Regional governors are already beginning to take more power into their own hands. According to Jacob Heilbrunn, "De facto independence already exists. Regional governors and legislative assemblies have begun to gain mandates through democratic, direct elections and to ignore the central government's decrees."⁽¹⁹⁾ Moscow simply no longer has the ability to control the regions.

Provinces have begun refusing to send taxes to Moscow (ostensibly for fear they will be squandered). Even Kaliningrad, an enclave which depends upon the beneficence of Moscow for its survival, has halted payments to the federal government.⁽²⁰⁾ This is not only a signal of the regions' rebellion against the central government, but will deepen the central government's economic crisis.

Other regions in Russia have begun acting independently of Moscow as well. Most of these efforts have involved attempts to curb the economic crisis and its impact on individuals, something the central government has failed to do. Murmansk, for example, has independently appealed to Norway, Sweden, and Finland for humanitarian aid. Novgorod has created a commodity bank, trading staples in a barter fashion. In addition, Alexander Lebed, the governor of Krasnoyarsk, has introduced price controls in order to stave off inflation.⁽²¹⁾

Perhaps the greatest single catalyst of regionalism in Russia was the Chechen war of independence. This war proved the weakness of the Russian Army, lessened fears in other regions of Russian power, and provided them an example to follow. Tatarstan, for example, no longer fearing Russian retaliation, sent humanitarian aid to Chechnya during their war.⁽²²⁾ The war also had other, indirect consequences, such as the Dagestanis' loss of road, rail, and phone links with Russia.⁽²³⁾ This merely reinforced their earlier perceptions of isolation and independence from Russia, and strengthened their belief that they would have to rely on their own means for survival.

Regional independence has shown itself in other ways as well. Dagestan, the most multi-ethnic and poorest of Russia's constituent republics, is on the brink of civil war, with Muslim fundamentalists calling for secession from Russia. Fully one-third of the Russian army in Dagestan are Dagestanis, and many analysts believe that in the event of a rebellion, Moscow would order its troops to disengage.⁽²⁴⁾

Other signs of independence are beginning to emerge as well. Tatarstan has recently negotiated an agreement with Moscow guaranteeing it greater autonomy,⁽²⁵⁾ merely one of many to do so. The governor of Sverdlovsk has gone so far as to proclaim the existence of a "Urals Republic,"⁽²⁶⁾ a move which has drawn no real reaction from Moscow, presumably because they have their hands full with other matters.

Foreign Policy Implications

Henry Kissinger tells us that "Russia will always be essential to world order and . . . a potential menace to it."⁽²⁷⁾ The loss of central power is likely to be disastrous for U.S. foreign policy as well as for peace and stability on the Eurasian landmass and beyond. Jacob Heilbrunn disagrees, however, arguing that "Russia's collapse could prove a blessing in disguise."⁽²⁸⁾ To support this argument, Heilbrunn draws an analogy between Russia's current state to that of the crumbling Soviet empire in the early 1990's, stating that there were no negative consequences to the downfall of the Soviet Union. However, the collapse of Russia will have negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy.

The loss of central power in Russia is likely to have several consequences of note. First, the Caucasus will lose what has been, if not a friendly force, at least a stabilizing one. The resulting power vacuum will be very dangerous, as China, Iran, and Turkey vie for influence in the region, and the various ethnic and religious conflicts in the area flare up. The states of this region have their own interests as well.

Second, China will gain proportionally more influence in East and Southeast Asia, moderated only by the United States and Japan, which is militarily weak, politically constrained by not being a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and economically crippled by the "Asian Flu" and their current bank crisis.

Third, the Indian subcontinent will have to revise its balance of power equation as one of the main suppressive forces is lessened. Without a strong Russia, China will be freer to express their power and pursue their objectives, as discussed. China is an historic enemy of India, and China's new-found freedom will create new pressures for India. This has already begun to occur, as the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests show. This nuclear arms race is likely to continue until both are satisfied that their security is guaranteed and that they are unable to gain an advantage over the other.

Fourth, and perhaps most troubling, is the potential increase in nuclear smuggling, as central control is loosened, and regional blocs gain physical possession of nuclear material, but not the ability to use it. Associated problems include the selling or smuggling of nuclear technology or essential equipment, as well as the emigration of those scientists with knowledge of Russian nuclear technology.

There is no easy answer or "magic bullet" to solve these dilemmas. Many of these factors will have consequences which the United States will simply have to accept. The most important thing, however, is for the United States to be aware of the consequences of the devolution of central power and Russia, and therefore less likely to be paralyzed by developments. Luckily, provisions for most of these consequences already exist, and reaction to the devolution of power should simply be to strengthen or implement them.

The Caucuses present a special problem for U.S. foreign policy. This region is vital to the future of the United States, not least because of the energy potential of the Caspian Sea basin. It is necessary to ensure that the United States plays a role in the development of this energy., and it will be necessary to take more forceful and determined actions to ensure American participation, especially since the balancing factor of Russian interest and participation has been removed. In effect, Russian power devolution creates a power vacuum in this region, one which will be repeated around the globe.

The United States needs to be aware of the effect of Russian dissolution on China, for China will surely be aware of its implications. China will surely be eager to explore its newfound influence and freedom, and if the United States fails to take into account the lack of restraining influence, we are likely to miscalculate and find ourselves glaring at China on the opposite side of a crisis we cannot win. More than ever, a policy of containment will bring a hostile response from China, since they will now have a greater ability to express this sentiment.

The Indian subcontinent is a troubling region. The rivalry between India and Pakistan has existed since the birth of independence on the subcontinent in 1947, and has resulted in three wars between the two countries. Two of these three wars were over Kashmir, a region existing between the two countries, and controlled by neither of them. This issue has not abated. In addition, tensions are permanently high in this local, bipolar system, and such a large, outside force as a China freer to deal with India is likely to have strong destabilizing ramifications. The nuclear capabilities of neither India nor Pakistan can be denied. Now what remains is to bring the two countries into the so-called "nuclear club," before the disastrous combination of failing to do so and the pressure of an outside force combust.

The close alliance that the United States and Western Europe have shared, as well as the closeness within Western Europe, will begin to fragment. Simply stated, the glue which bound the alliance will have dissolved. This alliance is like Humpty Dumpty: all the king's horses and all the king's men will not be able to put the alliance back together again. Once more, no panacea exists. It is simply necessary to recognize that other states have other interests, and avoid being blind-sided when they unexpectedly balk at American goals. It will become necessary to deal with them as we would any other independent states with interests which sometimes differ.

As far as international criminal organizations are concerned, this is a problem which already exists, and thus, plans and organizations already exist to combat it. What the United States should do is simply respond to developments in international crime do: as crime grows, so should efforts to strengthen international cooperation concerning crime, as well as strengthening organizations to deal with it. In addition, the United States and Europe can provide knowledge and advisors to Russia, such as exists, to help combat it.

One of the most important questions, however, is in determining what the U.S. response to the newly-autonomous regions in Russia should be. This is also the area where the United States has the most ability to have an effect. Most importantly, the United States should not deny the possibility of recognizing their independence altogether.

Neither, however, should the United States automatically recognize any region which declares its independence from Russia. As stated before, these regions may have a significant amount of power in their own local areas, perhaps more than Russia itself, and many of the foreign policy issues raised by the loss of Russian power can be influenced by the regions. Control of nuclear weapons, weapons-grade material, and knowledge are excellent examples of this. Recognition of regions should be linked to foreign policy objectives. Simply put, this is a bargaining situation: we have something they want (recognition by the strongest power in the world; a very large chip), and they have something they want. Everything has its price, and it may well be worth it to the United States to grant recognition to these statelets in exchange for assistance in meeting U.S. foreign policy goals.

Many fear the revival of a strong central state in Russia, often envisioning an empire hungry for expansion and a renewal of the Cold War. Such a state, theorists claim, would consolidate and wield power ruthlessly, forming a renewed threat to stability and security in Europe and elsewhere.

This is not likely to be the case, however. Russia is ripe for revolution. The current economic crisis shows no signs of abating, nor should we expect it to. There is a high level of discontent among citizens in Russia, and particularly among the elites. Russian capabilities have been steadily rising, and analysts in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere predicted that they would continue to rise, fueling Russian expectations. Those expectations have been dashed, shaking what little confidence there was in the central government. Although the oligarches could, perhaps, aid the government financially, or at least pay their taxes, there is no reason to expect them to. And the military, the last line of defense in a pre-revolutionary state, is in a state of disgrace. Following the Chechen War, no one fears the mighty Russian army.

Power is already devolving to the regions. Regions have stopped sending taxes to the central government, have begun assuming powers previously reserved for the central government, or have even declared their independence. This trend will likely continue, and perhaps accelerate.

The most important question is what effect the trend toward regionalism will have on U.S. foreign policy. It is difficult to overstate the effect that the loss of central power in Russia will have on the world. The Soviet Union was a world superpower, with interests spanning the globe. Now that their influence has lessened, and will continue to lessen, forces previously unseen or unexpected will be released. China, for example, will have a freer hand in East Asia and elsewhere. The Caspian Sea will be up for grabs. Nuclear smuggling, as well as the spread of knowledge of nuclear weapons, will probably increase. In general, there is little that the United States can do about these problems that is not already being done. It is important that the United States be aware of these effects, however, so that we are not caught unaware.

One area where the United States may gain an advantage is in the recognition of regions. It is imperative that we do not fritter away this advantage by prematurely recognizing the regions, or by making clear that we will not recognize them. Recognition is the only ace we hold.

1. Jacob Heilbrunn, "Clean Break ," New Republic, 28 September 1998, 6-7.

2. Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990): 140-141.

3. Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 29.

4. Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998): 54.

5. Brinton, 29.

6. Greene, 140.

7. Brinton, 30-31.

8. Brinton, 86.

9. Heilbrunn, 6-7.

10. Ibid.

11. Greene, 145-146.

12. James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies 46 (November 1994): 1134.

13. A. James Gregor, Fascism and The New Russian Nationalism, 6.

14. Daniel S. Treisman, "Russia's 'Ethnic Revival'," 212.

15. Hughes, 1133.

16. Vladimir Todres, "Still Restless in The Regions," 19.

17. Ibid.

18. Hughes, 1334.

19. Heilbrunn, 6-7.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Caryl, 42-43.

23. Losing Control? 45-46.

24. Economist, Losing Control? 45-46.

25. Christian Caryl, Islam's Hotbed of Stability, 42-43.

26. Heilbrunn, 6-7.

27. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone Books, 1994): 25.

28. Heilbrunn, 6-7.

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