Is There a Seat for Japan at the Head Table?

The Security Council is very important in the post-Cold War world: it is the only body that can enact binding resolutions on United Nations members, and serves as the most important decision-making body in the United Nations. Today five permanent members with veto power sit on the Security Council-- the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and China-- and ten rotating seats exist, with members elected to two-year terms. The General Assembly votes on five seats each year. These nonpermanent seats do not have a veto over U.N. actions. To be elected to a rotating seat, a state must receive a two-thirds majority of all voting members. In the last election, Costa Rica, Japan, Kenya, Portugal, and Sweden were elected to a term lasting from January 1, 1997 to January 1, 1999.⁽¹⁾ Competition for these seats is intense, reflecting the value of these seats despite their lack of veto power.

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, many believe the United Nations will be a more effective organization. During the Cold War, two of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States and the Soviet Union, often paralyzed the Security Council by using their veto powers. However, some see the Gulf War and several successful peacekeeping operations as a blueprint for how the United Nations should operate. The Security Council now relies upon consensual decisions, and, in contrast to the Cold War, often attains them.⁽²⁾

The United Nations faces a crisis in legitimacy, however, and that is one driving force behind the calls for reform. Although the General Assembly has grown from 51 members at the birth of the U.N. to 185 today, the five same states hold permanent seats on the Security Council, and enjoy the use of the veto power. These five powers were the victors of the Second World War.⁽³⁾ The last expansion of the Security Council was in 1965, when they increased the number of nonpermanent seats from six to ten.⁽⁴⁾

The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Bill Richardson, presented a proposal for a revision of the Security Council to more fully represent today's political reality at the 52^nd annual session of the United Nations.⁽⁵⁾ Although many people have proposed plans for restructuring the United Nations, including the Security Council, Japan's best bet to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council is probably through the success of the United States' plan.

This plan calls for the creation of five new permanent seats, bringing the total number of Security Council members to twenty. This plan would make Japan and Germany permanent members, with a seat each for Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The plan leaves vague whether a single country would receive these seats or whether they would rotate, and the United States' position is that the constituencies of these seats should decide.⁽⁶⁾ Although not specified in the original proposal, the United States has since taken the stand that the new members should not have veto power,⁽⁷⁾ a decision which will make the proposal more palatable to Security Council members and nonmembers alike. This plan is a change of a five-year-old United States plan to only give seats to Japan and Germany,⁽⁸⁾ which the United States has belatedly realized would not pass a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, since Third-World or developing countries dominate this body. Any plan would need to include these countries to have a chance at approval.

The United States' proposal has a lot going for it. First, the proposal more closely represents political reality today.⁽⁹⁾ Japan and Germany are both stable, prosperous democracies, and the addition of the three seats for developing countries reflects their rise both in membership in the General Assembly and their prominence in world affairs.

Second, both Japan and Germany are economic and political powers. Japan's financial commitment to the United Nations for 1997 constituted 16.75 percent of the United Nations' operating budget, more than any country besides the United States. Japan's contribution is larger than the combined contributions of the four non-U.S. permanent Security Council members. In addition, Japan is the largest donor in the world in Official Development Assistance (ODA).⁽¹⁰⁾

Japanese and German participation in the Security Council would also help alleviate the United Nations' financial woes. The United States' account is in arrears, and American contributions make up 25 percent of the United Nations' budget. The United Nations is badly in need of money, and that fact is driving Secretary-General Kofi Annan's management reform proposals. However, Japan and Germany have both publicly stated that they would be willing to pay more in dues as Security Council members than they do currently. This would also aid the United States, which has stated that it wants to reduce the US contribution of the United Nations operating budget from 25 to 20 percent.⁽¹¹⁾

Japan and Germany are also beginning to take a more active role politically, and a seat on the Security Council would encourage them to continue this. Japan designed the Kyoto Global Warming Conference, held from December first through tenth, 1997, to show Japanese political leadership. Despite dissension from the United States, the conference held together and produced what may turn out to be a viable global warming treaty.⁽¹²⁾

Germany and Japan also both participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Japan's first mission began on February 12, 1996, when 45 armed Japanese troops joined the United Nations troops in the Golan Heights. ⁽¹³⁾

Japan's bid for a Security Council seat enjoys political support from a variety of sources. Great Britain is a strong supporter, as is Australia and of course Germany. Japan also has support from an unlikely source, however: South Korea, a nation which has suffered under Japanese aggression for centuries. South Korea has been vocal in supporting Japan's bid, although they feel that the United Nations should not give Japan veto power.⁽¹⁴⁾

However, the United States' plan to expand the Security Council faces serious, if perhaps surmountable, obstacles. One of the most prominent, ironically, deals with Japan and Germany's peacekeeping contingents: neither is willing to commit troops to combat under United Nations peacekeeping missions.⁽¹⁵⁾ For Japan's part, this stems particularly from a domestic constituency that is still strongly isolationist and pacifistic.⁽¹⁶⁾

Another problem is the belief that any expansion of the Security Council would render it infeasible. Senator Jesse Helms, Chair of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that "expanding their number would remake it in the image of the General Assembly, which is to say, a do-nothing debating society."⁽¹⁷⁾ This fear has led him to promise to kill any changes in the United Nations Charter which expands the Security Council. This is a very real threat-- the United States Senate must ratify any changes to a treaty to which the United States is a signatory.

Some critics, ironically, criticize the United States' plan for the opposite reason: it does not, in their view, include enough participants. These critics claim that numbers alone would not necessarily make the Security Council unworkable. Masayuki Tadokoro explains that "the critical question is not the number of the members but whether major powers such as the United States are prepared to invest as much political capital as is necessary for timely action."⁽¹⁸⁾ Tadokoro and others point to the Intermonetary Fund as an example of a large, yet functional, governing board.

Another factor which will weaken the United States' proposal is its timing: with its account heavily in arrears and the United States Senate threatening to reduce or even eliminate American contributions to the United Nations, the United States does not exactly find a receptive audience for its reform proposals. Although the threat of financial crisis might drive some to accept any plan which would alleviate the crunch, it also alienates many friends and allies of the United States.

Many United Nations members are upset at the U.S. proposal for other reasons as well. Foremost in this category are those who have been left out of the proposal. The states of the Middle East, who would not receive a seat under the U.S. plan, are upset. Most vocal, however, is Italy.

Italy stands as the United Nations' fifth-largest donor,⁽¹⁹⁾ making it an important player in the United Nations. China, a permanent Security Council member with veto power, by contrast, donates the same amount as Mali.⁽²⁰⁾ In addition, Italy has the world's fifth-largest economy, making it a world player in the economic sphere.

Besides its economic clout, Italy is an important player in peacekeeping and peacemaking missions, which many see as the future role of the United Nations. Italy has contributed troops to United Nations missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Mozambique, and the Persian Gulf, and led a United Nations peacekeeping mission to Albania when the Albanian economy collapsed.⁽²¹⁾

The Italian Foreign Ministry recently claimed that the U.S. proposal "privileged certain countries to the damage of Italy."⁽²²⁾ Francesco Paulo Fulchi, the Italian ambassador to the United States, went even further, claiming that Germany wants a seat on the Security Council as part of a plot to politically isolate Italy and remove her from any significant role in world affairs.⁽²³⁾ Although the Italian foreign minister quickly distanced himself from the ambassador's remarks, they still reflect Italian anger at the plan.

Italy's exclusion from the Security Council has also angered Italians and Italian-Americans in the United States. Three umbrella groups, the National Ethnic Coalition of Organizations, the Coalition of Italo-American Associations, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Italian Organizations, which claim to represent 22 million Italian-Americans, are petitioning against the U.S. plan. Besides their anger at Italy's exclusion in the rush for new seats on the Security Council, they raise three potential problems: lack of Third World countries support for any plan which does not grant them a permanent seat, a lack of consensus in the General Assembly on whether the new members should have veto power, and intense rivalries which will likely emerge for the three open seats.⁽²⁴⁾

The United States has not been deaf to Italian complaints. During a recent trip to Rome, Bill Richardson stated that the plan "should not become a litmus test of our enormous friendship."⁽²⁵⁾ Italy will see this as a test of U.S.-Italian friendship, however, with some justification. By passing Italy over in favor of Japan and Germany, the United States makes clear how it views the relative significance of the three countries. To date, the United States has made no moves to mollify Italy or gain its support beyond verbal acknowledgment, either.

The biggest threat to the ratification and successful application of the United States' reform plan, however, may be China. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China can veto any action taken by the United Nations. This means that China must support any reform proposals. Japan and China have an historic animosity, and China views Japan as a future rival second only to the United States. China would most likely oppose any reform proposal that would grant Japan a seat on the Security Council.

China is afraid that the United States and Japan are ganging up on China to "narrow China's range of options,"⁽²⁶⁾ especially on the issue of Taiwan. One key Chinese boogeyman is Japanese remilitarization: China remembers only too well Japan's depredations during the Second World War. Many believe that Japan's pacifist stance makes it an unviable choice for a Security Council member, but Japanese remilitarization could lead to an Asian arms race. The two participants, moreover, have enough money to make for an explosive situation. Throw in China's nuclear weapons and Japan's extensive scientific and technological base, and you have the basis for a crisis of worldwide proportions.

Jiang Zemin, in a speech preceding a visit to the United States, proclaimed that

since the end of World War Two, there has not been a very thorough examination of the lessons that people should learn from Japanese militarism. We have always proposed that the Chinese and Japanese peoples maintain their friendship from generation to generation. But we hope that Japan will never forget its history of invading China and waging war against it, which brought great suffering to the Chinese people and also made the Japanese people victims.⁽²⁷⁾

In response to this and other fears, a senior Japanese official explained that "Japan would be entitled to say yes or no in the even America asks for assistance in a crisis over Taiwan. We have explained this to China. It's not automatic."⁽²⁸⁾ Still, many both within and without China see a closer U.S.-Japanese alliance as a threat to Chinese interests. Because of China's position on the Security Council and its fears of Japanese aggression, two things must be done for China to accept the U.S. plan: first, Japan and the United States must convince China, through treaties or promises, that Japan's ascension to the Security Council will not harm its vital interests; second, either Japan or the United States must compensate China enough for China to see this plan as beneficial rather than harmful. One possible first step would be a formal apology by the Japanese Prime Minister to China for atrocities committed during World War Two. This, however, would only be a first step. In light of Japan and China's historic and current relationship, and China's position on the Security Council, securing China's blessing for this plan may be the most significant stumbling block the United States' proposal faces.

Others have also proposed plans for reforming the Security Council. Perhaps the most important of these is the plan proposed by a United Nations Working Group on Security Council Reform. Chaired by Razali Ismail of Malaysia, the President of the General Assembly, this working group is open-ended, meaning that delegates from any interested member state may participate.⁽²⁹⁾ This format encourages wide participation, particularly from developing states.

The Working Group presented their plan to the United Nations General Assembly on March 21, 1997. This plan proposed expanding the Security Council to 24 members. Under this plan, they would introduce five new permanent members without veto power, as well as four new rotating seats with two-year terms. Two of the permanent seats would be from the "industrialized" world, with Japan and Germany the most likely candidates. Of the three remaining permanent seats, one would go to Asia, another to Latin America, and the last to Africa. Of the rotating seats, one would go to each of the following: Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.⁽³⁰⁾

This plan would serve Japan nearly as well as the United States' plan. Although the General Assembly has not discussed this plan as thoroughly as it has the United States' plan, the plan is likely to become at least as prominent, due both to its creation by a United Nations working group and the prominence of its chair, Razali Ismail. Its concessions to the developing world further aids this plan-- with three permanent seats on the Security Council and all four rotating seats going to developing regions, this plan is likely to gain the support of the majority of the General Assembly. Its proposal by the President of the General Assembly aids its legitimacy with the General Assembly as well. However, this proposal is extremely vulnerable to the criticism leveled against all proposals to expand the Security Council: many say that a 24-member Security Council would be too unwieldy to be effective.

Italy has also put forth a proposal, in which they would retain the current permanent members of the Security Council, and ten nonpermanent members would be added. Three states would rotate through each of these new seats.⁽³¹⁾ At current, no one is seriously considering Italy's proposal, but it does draw attention away from the U.S. and working group proposals and focus it on Italy's complaints.

Timothy J. Penny, a senior fellow at the University of Minnesota and former member of Congress, and Mark J. Mullenbach, a doctoral student at the University of Arizona, have proposed another formula. Under this plan, they would preserve the permanent members with veto power. They would create five rotating seats with two-year terms, and Japan, Germany, Italy, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, and the Ukraine would rotate through them. Their plan would create ten nonpermanent seats with two-year terms as well.⁽³²⁾

Although this plan has not received any attention within United Nations circles, a plan of this sort would probably not encounter stiff resistance from existing Security Council members, as it does not endanger the powers of the existing Security Council members. In addition, a similar plan would satisfy the ambitions and concerns of regional and rising powers such as Italy. The size of the Security Council under this plan is no larger than under any of the other proposed plans. However, a plan of this type does little to satisfy Japan and Germany, who might become frustrated and not pay the level of dues that they would with a permanent seat, nor play as constructive a role in providing political leadership as they might otherwise.

One style of proposal that will likely not see any serious discussion within the Security Council involves radical changes to the powers of the existing permanent members of the Security Council. Masayuki Tadokoro has proposed expanding the role of the Security Council to include social and economic matters, and expanding the number of members to 20 to 25 members, including Japan, Germany, and several developing states. Unique to this type of proposal, however, is the introduction of a weighted voting system to replace the current veto power held by the permanent members.⁽³³⁾ Proponents of a weighted voting system for the Security Council claim that they could distribute the weights of the respective members' votes to virtually protect the veto power currently held; however, having a heavy weight in voting does not ensure the ability to kill a measure, and assigning a heavy enough weight to ensure that they could kill a measure would defeat the purpose of the proposed reform.

A proposal which threatens the powers of the current permanent members of the Security Council is not likely to receive serious attention at any rate. The irony of the situation is that the current permanent members could use their veto power to defeat the very measure which threatens to take it away. Britain and France have already declared their intention of vetoing any proposal which threatens their current powers. ⁽³⁴⁾

Considerable support already exists within the General Assembly for a revision of the Security Council, and a two-thirds majority is almost certain so long as whatever proposal put forth gives seats to developing countries, which dominate the General Assembly. Under virtually every plan proposed, and all of the plans being taken seriously, Japan would be given a permanent seat, without veto power, on the U.N. Security Council. Although Newt Gingrich has promised to defeat any revision to the United Nations Charter which enlarges the Security Council, the President can perhaps nullify his active opposition through careful politicking. In the world of U.S. domestic politics, nothing is so important to a politician as the prosperity of their constituency, and politicians can often alleviate differences over matters of foreign policy.

The most serious obstacle to Japan gaining a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council is opposition from China. To gain China's support, Japan must make major concessions and take measures to alleviate China's fear about a resurgent Japan. However, even China's current opposition is not an insurmountable barrier. Japan will most likely gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council without veto, although it may be several years before this occurs.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

"A Larger Security Council." New York Times (August 15, 1997): A30.

Anderson, John. "Jiang: 'The Supreme Interest of China is Peace and Nation-Building.'" Washington Post (October 19, 1997): A22.

"Best We Can Do." Washington Post (August 11, 1997): A16.

Crossette, Barbara. "5 Seated in Security Council After Intensive Maneuvering." New York Times (October 27, 1996): A5.

Crossette, Barbara. "U.S., Bending a Bit, Will Offer Wider Role for 3^rd World at U.N." New York Times (July 17, 1997): A14.

Goshko, John. "Italian American Groups Seeking Permanent Seat for Italy on U.N. Security Council." Washington Post (September 17, 1997): A22.

"Japanese Troops in Golan." New York Times (February 13, 1996): A7.

Kristof, Nicholas. "Japan's Goal of Leading on Climate is in Doubt." New York Times (October 5, 1997): Sec. 1, p. 13.

Lewis, Paul. "U.N. Panel Proposes Expanding Security Council to 24 Members." New York Times (March 21, 1997): A13.

Perry, Timothy, and Mark Mullenbach. "UN's Chosen Few-- A Tricky Feat." Christian Science Monitor (September 24, 1997).

Plate, Tom. "A Terribly Lopsided Summit Table: The Addition of Russia to the Former G-7 Talks Made Japan's Role as the Only Asian Nation Even More Untenable." Los Angeles Times (June 24, 1997): B7.

Tadokoro, Masayuki. "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council." In The Once and Future Security Council, ed. Bruce Russett. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

United Nations. "Working Group on Security Council Reform." Available on-line at .

"UNreform." Wall Street Journal (October 21, 1997): A22.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "Fact Sheet: Japan's Official Development Assistance." Available on-line at .

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. "U.S.-Japan Relations." Available on-line at .

1. Barbara Crossette, "5 Seated in Security Council After Intensive Maneuvering," New York Times, 27 October 1996, A5.

2. "A Larger Security Council," New York Times, 15 August 1997, A30.

3. Ibid.

4. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Panel Proposes Expanding Security Council to 24 Members," New York Times, 21 March 1997, A13.

5. "UNreform," Wall Street Journal, 21 October 1997, A22.

6. Ibid.

7. "'Best We Can Do,'" Washington Post, 11 August 1997, A16.

8. Barbara Crossette, "U.S., Bending a Bit, Will Offer Wider Role for 3^rd World at U.N.," New York Times, 17 July 1997, A14.

9. "Best We Can Do," Washington Post, 11 August 1997, A16.

10. Masayuki Tadokoro, "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council," in The Once and Future Security Council, ed. Bruce Russett. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 129.

11. "UNreform."

12. Nicholas Kristof, "Japan's Goal of Leading on Climate is in Doubt," New York Times, 5 October 1997, sec. 1, p. 13.

13. "Japanese Troops in Golan," New York Times, 13 February 1996, A7.

14. Tadokoro, "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council," 129-133.

15. "UNreform."

16. Tadokoro, "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council," 130.

17. "UNreform."

18. Tadokoro, "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council," 125-126.

19. "UNreform."

20. Ibid.

21. Timothy Penny and Mark Mullenbach, "UN's Chosen Few-- A Tricky Feat," Christian Science Monitor, 24 September 1997.

22. Ibid.

23. John Goshko, "Italian American Groups Seeking Permanent Seat for Italy on U.N. Security Council," Washington Post, 17 September 1997, A22.

24. Ibid.

25. "UN's Chosen Few-- A Tricky Feat."

26. Tom Plate, "A Terribly Lopsided Summit Table: The Addition of Russia to the Former G-7 Talks Made Japan's Role as the Only Asian Nation Even More Untenable," Los Angeles Times, 24 June 1997, B7.

27. John Anderson, "Jiang: 'The Supreme Interest of China is Peace and Nation-Building,'" Washington Post, 19 October 1997, A22.

28. Tom Plate, "A Terribly Lopsided Summit Table."

29. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Panel Proposes Expanding Security Council to 24 Members," New York Times, 21 March 1997, A13.

30. Ibid.

31. "A Larger Security Council," New York Times, 15 August 1997, A30.

32. Timothy Perry and Mark Mullenbach, "UN's Chosen Few-- A Tricky Feat."

33. Tadokoro, "A Japanese View on Restructuring the Security Council," 120.

34. "A Larger Security Council," New York Times, 15 August 1997, A30