An American Kissinger Diktat:

A Bismarckian Model for U.S. Grand Strategy

"All politics," Otto von Bismarck once told the Russian ambassador to Berlin, "can be reduced to this formula: Try to be in a threesome as long as the world is governed by the precarious equilibrium of five great powers. That is the true protection against coalitions."⁽¹⁾ This fear of an anti-German coalition is what drove Bismarck's diplomacy from the moment of Germany's birth in 1871 until his resignation in 1890. The United States is in a similar position today: the greatest threat to U.S. interests today is the formation of a hostile coalition, just as it was to Germany. Therefore, the United States should adopt Bismarck's Kissinger Diktat, his plan for avoiding an anti-German coalition, as the U.S. grand strategy for the post-Cold War world, and adapt it to American circumstances.

Upon its birth in 1871, Germany instantly vaulted into the position as the most powerful state in Europe. No other state could hope to defeat her alone. Benjamin Disraeli, the British statesman, stated that "you have a new world. The balance of power has been entirely destroyed."⁽²⁾ By this, he meant that Germany had shattered the delicate balance that kept any one state from becoming dangerously powerful. Far from being assured of safety by virtue of her strength, Germany was in deadly peril of all of Europe aligning against her out of fear.

According to traditional balance-of-power theory, lesser powers will "gang up" against a hegemonic power. The French in the Thirty Years War eventually defeated the Hapsburg Empire of Charles V of Austria, after the Bohemians, the Danes, and the Swedes opposed him in turn. In the late 17^th century, France threatened to conquer all of Europe but lost in the War of the League of Augsburg, in which England, Spain and Holland joined forces against Louis XIV. A coalition again defeated Louis in the War of Spanish Succession. Denmark, Poland and Russia defeated Sweden, under Charles XII, one of the greatest generals of the age, in the Great Northern War.

Despite the pressures of the international system, however, history does not show a hostile coalition forming against Germany until 1914, when Kaiser Wilhelm II and others in the German government provided the rest of Europe with the means and the reason to unite against her. How, then, did Germany manage to survive peacefully from its birth in 1871 until the beginning of the Great War, although she was capable of handily defeating any of her neighbors? Why did they not turn against her?

The secret lies in Bismarck's system of alliances. The famous Kissinger Diktat, penned at Bismarck's summer retreat at Bad Kissingen, stresses the creation of a "universal political situation in which all the powers except France need us and, by dint of their mutual relations, are kept as much as is possible from forming coalitions against us." France, Germany's mortal enemy, would be diplomatically isolated, and all other potential enemies of Germany would be bound in treaty to her. At the center of Bismarck's web of treaties would be Berlin, and all would be beholden to her.

The United States today is in a position very similar to that of Germany in 1871.⁽³⁾ Unlike Britain in the age of the European balance-of-power, the United States cannot remain isolated from the rest of the world; our interests reach into every corner of the globe. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has become the preeminent power in the world. However, like Germany, we are not powerful enough to take on all comers if they decide to unite against us. Implicit, then, in the maintenance of American preeminence in the world, is the acquiescence of other powerful states. In the words of Josef Joffe, "a power like the United States faces only one choice: keep everybody from uniting against it."⁽⁴⁾ We must make ourselves indispensable to other states.

A model for determining and analyzing grand strategies would be useful here, consisting of four stages: determination, diagnosis, formulation, and ascertainment. The first step is to determine American interests; second, diagnose possible threats to those interests; third, formulate a strategy to counter those threats; and fourth, ascertain what resources would be necessary to execute this strategy.⁽⁵⁾

The determination of American vital interests has always been a contentious issue, and the elimination of the Soviet Union as a direct threat to the survival of the United States has only increased the difficulty of determining American vital interests. However, the United States is currently the most powerful state on Earth; maintaining the current world status of the United States is the best way to protect such explicitly vital interests as protecting the American homeland and territories from attack and ensuring the economic prosperity of Americans. Thus, maintaining the current world status of the United States is the most vital interest to the United States.

The only feasible threat to American vital interests as defined here, i.e., maintenance of American primacy, is the same as that of Germany in 1871: the formation of a hostile coalition. Just as for Germany, no other power can oppose us alone and hope to succeed. However, a coalition of opponents to American primacy would defeat us. Thus, the formation of a hostile coalition is the greatest threat to American vital interests. As Joffe says, "nations occupying a precarious perch-- though America's is the highest and sturdiest since Rome's-- have one interest above all: to secure it against rivals both real and potential, arriving singly or in combination."⁽⁶⁾

The best strategy for the prevention of hostile coalitions is a modification of Otto Von Bismarck's Kissinger Diktat. According to Robert Lieber, "states are particularly motivated to cooperate to balance a powerful threat, rather than merely to do so in response to power per se."⁽⁷⁾ In other words, it is the perception of a threat to their interests that cause the formation of a coalition, not just the accumulation of power by a state (although many often perceive that as a threat). Joseph Joffe makes this point clearly:

For the balance-of-power machinery to crank up, it makes a difference whether the rest of the world faces a huge but usually placid elephant or a carnivorous Tyrannosaurus Rex. Those who coerce or subjugate others are far more likely to inspire hostile alliances than nations that contain themselves, as it were.⁽⁸⁾

Ensuring that other power centers do not see American power as a threat is important, therefore, or at least to make sure that the majority do not. This can be done through four instruments. The first is a bilateral defensive or nonthreatening agreement. It is vital that they be defensive or nonthreatening; otherwise, you secure an enemy while you secure an ally. This is the tool preferred by Bismarck, as it was one of the premier tools of statecraft at the time. Bilateral agreements are still useful today; indeed, they form the basis for our involvement in East Asia. However, we have a variety of other tools to work with as well.

The second are multilateral institutions or agreements in which the United States is a decisive or vital part. Again, it is vital that all not privy to the agreement see it as nonthreatening. An example of this sort of institution would be NATO, so long as they take care that Russia does not come to see it as a threat to her vital interests.

A third option, one which was not available to Bismarck, is to what some have termed "collective goods," such as security. The United States is already the ultimate guarantor of security over much of the globe. Many states know that, should someone attack them, the United States will defend them, and thus avoid costly and inflammatory arms buildups. The United States currently keeps Germany and Japan, two potential military powers, under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," averting the potentially explosive situation of a nuclear-armed Japan or Germany.

The United States provides collective goods in other ways as well. Although the United States keeps some tariffs and other protective trade barriers in place, ours are among the lowest in the world. The United States is vocal in its role as the foremost proponent of an open and free trading system, and was vital in the creation of the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). We have helped create a stable monetary system, and our unending efforts to promote peace and oppose regional hegemony in the Middle East have helped to stabilize energy prices across the globe.

In addition, the United States is very active in promoting peace and stability in troubled regions around the world. The United States is an active participant in United Nations peacekeeping missions across the globe, and nearly every major peace initiative in the Middle East or Northern Ireland bears the stamp of the United States.

The last tool which the United States possesses is what Joseph S. Nye has termed "soft power." As Joseph Joffe describes it,

Soft power is cultural and economic power, and very different from its military kin . . . On that table, China, Russia, Japan, and even Western Europe cannot hope to match the pile of chips the United States holds. People are risking death on the high seas to get into the United States, not China. There are not too many who want to go for an M.B.A. at Moscow University, or dress and dance like the Japanese. Sadly, fewer and fewer students want to learn French or German. English, the American-accented version, has become the world's language.⁽⁹⁾

Proper application is crucial. For this strategy to be successful, it is important that the United States maintain better relations with the powerful states of the region than they do with each other. Luckily, the United States is in an excellent position to do so. Many regions have poor interstate relations. Many states look to the United States as the ultimate guarantor of security, and naturally see the United States as an important ally against their enemies.

Some states will not be willing to play the American game. This, however, will not prove a problem, so long as the United States succeeds in gaining at least the tacit support of most players. Just as France was unwilling to play the German game in 1871, others will be unwilling to cooperate with the United States today. States which refuse to accept international norms must be balanced against, using their natural regional enemies as a counterweight.

However, this is not to say that the United States should promote conflict and division. Regional conflict in the twentieth century has proven very difficult to manage; failing to defuse conflict, the United States would be forced to choose sides, which would alienate a potential ally, or surrender any influence in the region. This is, arguably, what has occurred in the Middle East: the United States has failed to solve the admittedly complicated frictions which exist in the region, and thus has lost much of the influence that it once wielded. Instead, the United States has become identified, rightly or wrongly, with Israel, lessening its influence in mediating the various conflicts. What we see now is other states, particularly European Union states, stepping in to fill the political vacuum left by the failure of the United States.

A grand strategy of adapting Bismarck's Kissinger Diktat to the U.S. position today may be compared to other grand strategies. Proponents of primacy would agree with the basic goal of maintaining the American position of primus inter pares. Primacy advocates also have a similar view of the greatest threat to the American position; that is, opposition from other states. However, the grand strategy of primacy differs in that in a primacy strategy, a single, powerful state which would rival the United States for power is the greatest threat. In actuality, the American position as the most powerful political, economic, military, and cultural power is not in immediate danger. There exist few states with even the potential to rival the United States, the most likely being China and Russia. However, both face serious internal crises which will slow their ascension; even if they put their own houses in order, there is no guarantee that either can actualize its potential. A Bismarckian view, however, holds that the greatest threat to American primacy is the rise of a coalition of states hostile to American leadership. This, unlike the rise of China or Russia, is an immediate threat. The solution of primacy, suppressing any rising powers, would foster this hostile coalition. A strategy of fostering interdependence and a reliance on American domination, however, alleviates this danger.

Applying the Kissinger Diktat to the U.S. position today would require much less in the way of military equipment and preparedness than would a strategy of primacy. Although it would remain necessary to be the pre-eminent military power in the world, by engaging regional powers in alliance with the United States, the United States would not need the capacity to defeat several regional powers unilaterally and simultaneously. Rather, the United States would bring as many as possible into alliance with the United States, and align with their natural enemies against those who refuse to play the American game. This, of course, means that the United States must take pains not to isolate or alienate all of the major powers in a region. For example, the United States needs to draw either Iraq or Iran into the American orbit. This would require ending the policy of Dual Containment, a position which will be explored later in this paper.

The critiques of a strategy of primacy are also germane to the Kissinger Diktat.⁽¹⁰⁾ First, due to the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities, other states will have the resources to become significant players. The Kissinger Diktat recognizes this, and therefore gaining the support of these states is vital. Second, other states will have an interest in dethroning the United States. We must, therefore, do everything possible to make it in their interest to keep the United States as primus inter pares, through the instruments discussed above. Those who refuse to support the United States must be balanced against-- by co-opting their natural enemies, they can be politically isolated, as France was in the late 19^th century, and the threat nullified. Third, American hegemony would undermine the effectiveness of any multilateral organizations the United States might wish to employ against possible competitors. However, by creating regional alliances with the United States as a vital member, we co-opt or automatically balance against possible competitors, rendering multilateral institutions unnecessary. Fourth, the United States must be willing to wage a preventive war to prevent the rise of a competitor, and the American public may not support this. However, by working in a framework of alliances, the United States has a built-in excuse for war, and this will help as well with explaining our actions on the international scene. Fifth, primacy risks imperial overstretch. However, the Kissinger Diktat does not risk this to the same degree that primacy does. Few resources would be committed except if a competitor attempted to break the web of alliances that the United States had constructed, a web which would bind superior resources against anyone who would attempt to challenge it. The Kissinger Diktat has the advantage of employing the resources of allies and our own. The United States must maintain the capability to be the most powerful player, but must not necessarily be so powerful as to cow all others into submission unilaterally. This would, in fact, be counterproductive.

The Kissinger Diktat is also similar in many respects to the strategy of selective engagement.⁽¹¹⁾ Like selective engagement, a Bismarckian grand strategy asserts that Eurasia is the home of most of the power in the world, and therefore it is there that U.S. grand strategy must focus. Like selective engagement, a Bismarckian grand strategy recognizes that American resources are finite, and we must therefore apply them to those states which pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. As such, the criticisms leveled at this strategy are particularly relevant: first, since it is concerned only with world and regional powers, the United States would necessarily have to ignore much of the violence and strife in the world. This could harm U.S. prestige, a vital key in a Bismarckian grand strategy, and gaining the support of the U.S. public is unlikely. However, it may be possible to mute this criticism by successfully and preemptively presenting the case to the American public for staying out of small, regional conflicts with no real power implications. After all, American resources are finite. Second, the strategy does not provide much guidance as such on which conflicts to get involved in. Germany in 1891 was blessed with Bismarck's expert understanding of what did and did not affect German interests. However, despite the difficulties in applying this strategy, it should be possible so long as policymakers focus on maintaining key alliances in each region and balancing against those powers which refuse to play by the new rules of the game, such as China and Iraq. Fourth, this strategy is not as "selective" as the name implies; Eurasia is a large place, home to the vast majority of the world's population and capital, and contains a large portion of the world's land mass and natural resources. This applies to the Kissinger Diktat as well. It must be kept in mind, however, that although the geographic region which would be under consideration with this grand strategy is vast, the focus would be on only a few powerful players, of which only a handful exist in any given region. Even Western Europe is only home to half-a-dozen or less powerful states.

Neo-isolationist arguments have perhaps the least relevance of all of the grand strategies being proposed today.⁽¹²⁾ The goals and interests assumed under this strategy are in direct opposition to a Bismarckian grand strategy. Although it is true that the American homeland is not under a direct threat, the United States has greater interests than simply protecting U.S. territory and citizens. Our interests are so interwoven that a neo-isolationist strategy is simply not a viable option. The United States depends on the rest of the world for its economic welfare, as well as for the technological innovation of our trading partners. Our vitality depends upon our remaining engaged with the rest of the world. The critiques that neo-isolationists level at other strategies are relevant, however. One such criticism is that American capabilities and involvement may cause resentment and even attacks. This is a relevant criticism; however, it is a price we must pay for our integration with the rest of the world. We can utilize closer ties with major powers to guard against attacks on U.S. citizens and property. Our only other option is to sever all ties with the outside world and rely on a strategy of partial autarky, which has been a failure whenever it has been employed. Also, the absence of the U.S. presence would create a vacuum, which would tempt those powers we are attempting to balance against to fill it.

On first inspection, a Bismarckian grand strategy seems to have little in common with collective security, the one grand strategy based on liberalism rather than realism.⁽¹³⁾ The Kissinger Diktat is assuredly a realist strategy, based less on what is good for the world than on what is best for the United States. Less emphasis is placed on humanitarian concerns. However, there are some similarities as well. Under the Kissinger Diktat, the United States would not act unilaterally; rather, we would use regional allies in keeping stability. Also, some tools employed would be similar, because the United States would employ collective goods as incentives for others to allow the United States to remain as primus inter pares. A Kissinger Diktat for the United States, however, would not be vulnerable to the critiques of collective security, which focus mainly on its idealistic vision.

The most telling criticism, however, is one leveled against all realist strategies: they are unlikely to capture the hearts and minds of the American people. A lack of public support is perhaps the biggest threat that the Kissinger Diktat faces. A pro-active public relations campaign can alleviate this, by explaining to the American public why continued humanitarian missions are not feasible. In this, several recent failures in peacemaking missions help administrations. The methods employed by the Kissinger Diktat should be palatable to the American people, however, and a clever administration can probably rally significant public support.

One of the regions which is vital to the employment of a Bismarckian grand strategy is Europe. Europe has the single greatest concentration of power states in the world. France, Germany, and Britain are all global players, and the other states in Western Europe are all power players to one degree or another. Maintaining good relations with Western Europe, and promoting an American presence in European affairs, is perhaps the single most important goal for the United States. This should not, however, be a difficult task: Europe is bound to the United States by culture, tradition and treaty. Given the failures of the past, Europe is clearly not very skilled at providing such common goods as collective security. Within the last century, Western Europe has been home to the two largest wars the world has ever seen, and required explicit American aid, in political, economic, and military form, to avoid being overrun by the Soviet Union.

We should note that France has already stated that it opposes American leadership in Europe. Our primary goal should be to develop greater ties with Germany, both to prevent Germany from developing ties with Russia to control the Eurasian landmass, as well as to deny a Franco-German axis. This should not be difficult We have much more to offer Germany as an ally than France does, and we must stress this to them. However, we must not assume enemies where none exist. It must be made clear to France that we would make a much better friend than adversary, even in European matters.

It is also important to note that the United States should not promote regional alliances that do not involve the United States, either implicitly or explicitly. The development of these regional groupings would encourage independent political development, and allow ties which would otherwise serve American interests to be developed with other regional powers. One such example is a powerful, independent European Union. In his book The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that a strong European Union is in the best interests of the United States.⁽¹⁴⁾ It is not. A unified Europe would have two nuclear powers, a larger economy than the United States, a larger landmass, a larger population, and a louder voice in world political affairs than the United States. Although Europe is, as Brzezinski states, "America's natural ally,"⁽¹⁵⁾ Europe's alignment with the United States is not assured today. Already, Europe is showing serious signs of independent political maneuvering, as shown by French dissent during the recent U.N. inspection crisis with Iraq. Of course, France has long sought to assert an independent foreign policy, but the end of the Cold War has given them unprecedented freedom to do so, and other European states are beginning to show signs of opposition as well. A unified Europe, centered around a renewed Franco-German alliance, would not need American support, politically, economically, or even militarily, given the fall of the Soviet Union. Although Brzezinski raises the specter of a Russo-German alliance,⁽¹⁶⁾ Russia can offer Germany few of the incentives for alliance that the United States can. Therefore, it is in the interests of the United States to see Europe filled with strong yet independent states, rather than as a single, monolithic entity, which would soon become a major competitor in the political, economic, and cultural spheres.

Russia is a major player as well, in Europe as well as in Asia. Russia has for centuries been a major player in European affairs, and will continue to be one for the foreseeable future, despite its current weakness. Of major interest to Russia is the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO best serves U.S. interests in its current form, although developing new missions for it to preserve its usefulness will probably be necessary. Most defensive alliances do not survive the death of the threat their signatories created them to defend against, and there is no reason to believe that NATO would be an exception. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the original purpose of NATO dissolved as well. However, critics have suggested a variety of new missions, ranging from peacekeeping operations to the promotion of democracy.

Although there is no reason for Russia to see NATO expansion as a direct threat to its security, Russia clearly still has interests in Eastern Europe, and expanding NATO to engulf the states of this region thwarts the desires of many within Russia. The danger is not of Russia overreacting to the threat posed to NATO states on its border; rather, the danger is of a thwarted Russia, feeling isolated from the West, turning to a new coalition partner to balance against the United States. China is the most likely option. Evidence already exists of this occurring. In April of 1997, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin met in Moscow and devised a "strategic partnership" against those who would "push the world toward a unipolar order."⁽¹⁷⁾ Furthermore, pressing NATO forward to the Russian border will weaken the position of the currently-ruling moderates in Russia and strengthen the so-called "Red-Brown Coalition." What is left of Boris Yeltsin's power and influence is slipping as the communist-nationalist coalition gains sway.

Therefore, American promotion of NATO expansion was a mistake. Although not expanding NATO could be seen as a failure, as it leaves vulnerable the fledgling states of Eastern Europe, it would actually be a victory. In the political calculus of the twentieth century, sacrificing the new states of Eastern Europe, if this is even what would occur, is a small price to pay for securing the support of what is still the largest country in the world in terms of landmass, and one which still has a mighty nuclear arsenal, a large population, and a large, if disrupted, economy. Russia stretches from Europe to East Asia, and has long been a major player in both realms. By securing Russia, the United States gains a major lever to move either China, or in the event of its emergence, a recalcitrant European power such as Germany or France.

However, the United States has staked its credibility on NATO expansion. To abandon this cause now would do irreparable harm to American political prestige around the world. We would lose not only the trust and support of the states of Eastern Europe, but we would show ourselves to be weak and indecisive to all of the major players in the world, particularly Russia. Since so much depends on the assumption of American political leadership, backing away from NATO expansion at this point would be catastrophic. We must not allow the opportunity to engage Russia slip away, however. Russia has natural geopolitical enemies as well, most notably China and Germany, and is unable to deal with them in its current weakened state. The United States can offer Russia its services in restraining Germany and in providing security against China in exchange for Russian support. In fact, the best way to protect Russia against German maneuvering is for Russia to allow itself to be bound by the United States in alliance, which would pacify German fears of its larger neighbor.

In East Asia, the most important players are China and Japan, with South Korea, Russia, and Taiwan as secondary players, and a whole host of lesser states on the periphery. The United States is in a strong position here, as we have better relations with these states than they do with each other. China is most unlikely to accede to American dominance in East Asia, and will likely make a bid for regional hegemony. However, China has many regional enemies, including Japan and South Korea, who would be more than willing to allow benevolent American guidance in East Asia to prevent China from dominating them. Chinese regional hegemony is not in America's interest, as our interests diverge from those of China, and China has already proved itself unwilling to abide by international norms. We must make clear to China that we will oppose China's rise if they refuse to fully comply with international norms. The divisive history and diffuse power structure of the region will give us a wealth of allies so long as we can make a credible promise of American support. Japan, already bound to the United States through a defensive treaty, is one we must keep bound as tightly to us as possible. Russia, though weak, can still be a player in the region if it can reorganize its own house, and thus we must cultivate good relations with Russia as best as possible without compromising our own interests. Although no other major powers exist in the region, a coalition of the smaller states in the region would also provide a significant counterweight to China.

South Korea is another important ally. South Korea naturally balances against its neighbor to its north, and can serve as an important ally against China as well. South Korea has a large and vibrant economy, although it is currently undergoing serious strains. To a lesser degree, the rest of Southeast Asia should be considered important to American interests. Most of the states of the region have rapidly growing economies, and the historical animosities of the region have kept them from coalescing into a single political unit. With China looming over them and being unable to unite against it, the region is ripe for American leadership.

The Middle East is a region whose fate will always be of interest to the United States. The region around the Persian Gulf contains the world's largest developed oil reserves, which automatically makes it of prime concern to every industrialized state in the world. This, in turn, has led to another factor which makes the Middle East important: it is perhaps the most militarized region in the world, yet the states which contain these militaries are incredibly unstable. This is due, in large part, to great power intervention, both during the age of colonization and during the Cold War. With its inherent instability, its natural resources, and its location on the European hindquarters, the Middle East is a region which has always been, and will always be, vital to the United States. Major regional players fill the Middle East: Iraq, Iran, Israel and Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Turkey does not play a major role because of its ethnic differences, its location on the far western edge of the Middle East, and its history of conquest over the Middle East. It is, nonetheless, an important player.

Two of the keys to the Middle East are Iraq and Iran, arguably the two most powerful states in the Middle East, and natural enemies for many reasons. Iran is one of the world's only theocracies (Vatican City being the other), while Iraq is a determinedly secular autocracy, no matter what Saddam Hussein may have declared during the Gulf War. Shiites dominate Iran, and though Iraq has a slight Shia majority, Sunnis control the government.

Iraq has often proven itself to be unwilling to play according to generally accepted rules. Repeatedly, Iraq has made and broken agreements, violated widely accepted human rights and engaged in unjust war. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly compared himself to Gamel Abdul Nasir, the pan-Arab Egyptian leader, and makes no secret of the fact that he intends to dominate the region.

However, Iran, Iraq's natural enemy, naturally balances Iraq. It is for this reason that the American policy of "Dual Containment" is unworkable and must be done away with. Attempting it to diplomatically isolate what are arguably the two most powerful states in the region is untenable. The United States and others have criticized Iran for its human rights record, its support of terrorism, its opposition to the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, Iran has several legitimate grievances against the United States as well, their principal ones being that the United States tried to overturn the results of the Iranian Revolution and supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.

However, Iran has made several gestures that suggest that it is willing to work with the United States. Most telling, perhaps, is the election of Mohammad Khatami, a moderate cleric, to the presidency. Khatami won the election, against the wishes of the ruling party, with 70 percent of the vote. Iran has served as a mediator in Central Asia, particularly in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. Iran has also signed the Chemical Warfare Convention, which it shows every sign of abiding by. Recently, the U.S. State Department and the Iranian Foreign Ministry have begun a series of small diplomatic steps toward better relations, as well.

Because Iran has shown itself to be willing to work with the United States, the United States should abandon its policy of "Dual Containment." Rather than isolating two "rogue regimes," this policy forces two unlikely partners closer together-- and closer to other "rogue regimes." The United States should bring Iran back into the international system, and accept Iran's help in containing Saddam Hussein.

Israel is another of the major players in the Middle East, and one whose support has been, and will continue to be, important to American interests. However, with warming relations with other states in the region, Israel is not as important as it once was, and Israel is not as important to American interests per se as is the peace process, upon which the United States has staked its credibility in the region, and which would promote better relations with the states in the region. Therefore, pushing Israel to make a serious commitment to the peace process is important, even if it means a diminished friendship with Israel.

Turkey, despite its relatively remote location and its history of animosity toward most states in the region, or perhaps even because of it, is a useful ally of the United States. Turkey has a powerful and stable military, which has proven itself repeatedly to be the staunch defender of Turkish democracy. Removed from most of the conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey may prove to be an ally of last resort when issues in the region are too delicate to appear allied with any side.

Another region where we may promote American interests is in the Caspian Sea region. This region, particularly Azerbaijan, is rich in oil. In addition, the states fear each other and particularly their large neighbor to the north, Russia. Most are very interested in having American influence in the region. American interests lay most simply in securing access to the tremendous oil reserves of the region, and allowing U.S. businesses the opportunity to extract the oil. By offering to act as a security guarantor, the United States can develop better relations with these states, and give them the knowledge and capital to extract their oil.

By utilizing Bismarck's grand strategy for Germany in 1891, the United States can prevent the formation of a hostile coalition, which stands as the greatest threat to American interests today. To do so, we must make it in the interests of the major powers to allow us to stay in our position of primus inter pares, and we can do this by offering our power as a tool to others. Only in this way can we remain "first among equals."

Selected Bibliography

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Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives. New York: BasicBooks, 1997.

Hoffmann, Stanley. "The United States and Western Europe." In Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, ed. Robert J. Lieber, 178-192. New York: Longman, 1997.

Joffe, Josef. "How America Does It." Foreign Affairs Volume 76 No. 5 (September/October 1997): 12-27.

_____. "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity." In America's Strategic Choices, ed. Michael E. Brown et al., 99-122. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.

Lieber, Robert J. "Eagle Without a Cause: Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat." In Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, ed. Robert J. Lieber, 3-25. New York: Longman, 1997.

Mastanduno, Michael. "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War." In America's Strategic Choices, ed. Michael E. Brown et al., 123-162. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.

Pollack, Jonathan D. "Pacific Insecurity: Emerging Threats to Stability in East Asia." In Japan and the Pacific Rim, 4^th ed. Global Studies, ed. Dr. Dean W. Collinwood, 120-123. Guilford: McGraw-Hill, 1997.

Posen, Barry R., and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." In America's Strategic Choices, ed. Michael E. Brown et al., 1-49. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.

Rothchild, Donald, and Timothy Sisk. "U.S.-Africa Policy: Promoting Conflict Management in Uncertain Times." In Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, ed. Robert J. Lieber, 271-294. New York: Longman, 1997.

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1. Joseph Joffe, "How America Does It," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997): 20.

2. Ibid., 19.

3. For a more thorough comparison of the United State's position to that of Germany in 1871, see Joseph Joffe, "How America Does It" or "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity".

4. Joffe, "How America Does It," 16.

5. modified from Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense," In America's Strategic Choices (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 52-53.

6. Joseph Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity," in America's Strategic Choices, ed. Michael Brown, et al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997): 106.

7. Robert J. Lieber, "Making Foreign Policy Without the Soviet Threat," in Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997): 9.

8. Joffe, "How America Does It," 16.

9. Joseph Joffe, "How America Does It," p. 24.

10. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," in America's Strategic Choices, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997): 38-39.

11. Ibid., p. 13-19.

12. Ibid., p. 5-12.

13. Ibid., p. 19-27.

14. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: BasicBooks, 1997), 57-86.

15. Ibid., 57.

16. Ibid., 73-75.

17. Joseph Joffe, How America Does It, 15.