Relativity in Ethics
A pair of men walk down the street. They see a third man. He stops walking, looking down at his feet, and picks up a wallet that has been dropped there by a fourth man. The wallet-finding man opens the wallet, takes out all of the bills and drops the wallet back onto the ground. One of the two men watching this is rather taken aback.
Mr. Objective: I don't believe what I just saw. That man behaved
abominably. He found a wallet, which most likely had all sorts of
identification in it, and rather than even look to see whose it
was, that he might return it, he merely rifled it for the cash
value and left the rest.
Mr. Relative: What is abominable about his behaviour? In all
likelihiood he sees nothing wrong with the way he acted. He
probably believes in the old adage, "Finders Keepers."
To him it might be the worse move to have access to all that
cash, which might make his life a little better, and not take it.
Mr. Objective: So what you are saying, that whether or not one
does the right thing, is relative to what one believes? Surely
there is a right and a wrong.
Mr. Relative: Not necessarily. I believe I can convince you that
ethical beliefs or systems are ultimately a matter of personal
taste and preferences. Or, if they fail to be merely personal
they are at most merely socially approved norms, and neither
have, nor need to be, more reliable or non-arbitrarily binding.
Take a simple look around, both here before us and in your mind's
eye, at the world about us. The existence now, and in the past,
of many, many ethical systems, large numbers of which were
prosperous for extended periods of time must be a strong
argument.
Mr. Objective: Not necessarily. It could easily be the case that
only one of those systems was actually right, was actually what
we might call Ethics, with a capital 'E'.
Mr. Relative: But surely, if I were to follow a Social Ethic,
with a capital 'S' and a capital 'E', that we agreed differed
from Ethics, but the outcome of all my decisions was the same as
if I were Ethical, then I am essentially Ethical?
Mr. Objective: No, not in an Ethical sense. Ends do not justify
means when one is Ethical. Similar outcomes do not equate Ethical
and unEthical acts. Nor do they validate an unEthical system by
their similarity.
Mr. Relative: Well, what if I hold a certain ethic, and I find
that people where I live do not hold the same views? I decide to
move elsewhere, and I find a place where people hold similar
views to mine. There, I am not only more comfortable, but I, and
everyone else, function very well, very successfully, despite not
having Ethics as our cornerstone.
Mr. Objective: Well, empirical functionality is not a measure of
the truth of your statement, either. If your community lived
under a system different from Ethics, then you would all merely
be unEthical together. The number of people living under a system
is not its truth determinant.
Mr. Relative: Oh, but there we disagree. I believe that empirical
functionality is all that matters. "Does it work down here
in the trenches, here in the real world?" is the question I
ask. What good would it do to argue the unEthical nature of
murder to a man who kills you merely to shut you up?
Mr. Objective: Well, if there is no basis for these beliefs
outside of an abstract invention, then what would be the point in
following them? They lack any truth, in a larger sense.
Mr. Relative: Well, what could be more important than the fact
that they work? What truth more than the reality of everyday life
would you need?
Mr. Objective: Well, to use your observational stance, I know
that everyone doesn't have a different ethical belief system. And
if they did, how would anyone communicate if they didn't value
certain things in the same way?
Mr. Relative: First, everyone does not have to have a different
ethical system. Now I don't happen to believe that there are only
two, but surely it would require only two systems of belief for
there to be relativity in ethics. Then, of course, you would have
one system that is different, relative to another. And people can
communicate without identical ethical systems. Ethics is named by
and described by our language, it is not language itself. Plus,
even if ethics were a kind of language, we could come to
understand the ethical language of others just as we do their
spoken words, and make a little progress from there. And,
continuing the analogy even further, we could decide to agree on
certain points, to manufacture arbitrary points of reference to
allow for communication.
And finally, why do different systems of ethics have to be
completely exclusionary? Surely it would be possible to disagree
on some ethical questions whilst agreeing on others.
Mr. Objective: Well, what about interchangeability? If what that
man did is as correct as anything else, then you and your
community could just pick any ethic, which would be as good as
the one you're currently working under.
Mr. Relative: No, that's not true. Relative ethics would still be
subject to ethical ideals like "the greater good for the
greater number of people". To arbitrarily change ethics
would be stupid behaviour, to begin with. We are not idiots in
this relative society! But the ethic of the community can change,
sensibly, as the conditions of the community change throughout
time, or with the physical aspects of the surroundings. Or, the
ethic of the community could even change in order for the
community to make the best of a situation brought on through
contact with a second society, with its own ethic.
Mr. Objective: Perhaps you have fallen for the Naturalistic
Fallacy, believing that your community's ethic is correct based
on who uses it.
Mr. Relative: No, because the reputation, stature and identity of
whosoever believes any ethic is not a validating property. For
any ethic to be valid it merely needs to be the ethic under which
a person operates.
Mr. Objective: Well, what about the Genetic Fallacy? Perhaps you
believe your ethic right based on its origins.
Mr. Relative: No, I do not fall into that trap, either, and
here's why. I did gain a basic knowledge of ethics from people
like my parents. I was lectured and taught in ethical behaviour
by such representatives of my society. But as I aged I began to
see that sometimes I no longer agreed, or never did agree with
the views and stances of my teachers. I developed my own ethical
outlook on some points. But that didn't mean that my teachers and
parents had failed, that they had misunderstood ethics. It merely
meant that I had a different view, relative to them.
Mr. Objective: Perhaps you operate under the basic tolerance of
others' views, respecting their right to hold an opinion
different from yours, which is an Ethical stance.
Mr. Relative: In a way, yes. I tolerate others' views because it
is part of my ethical system to do so. There are other societies
that do not do such things, both now and in history. Those
societies have also evolved, either due to the expulsion or
flight of those that the societies considered unethical. But
neither the departed nor the society that did not want them are
more right, they merely differ.
Mr. Objective: So, one could arbitrarily decide to operate under
an ethic that said-
Mr. Relative: No, don't even say it. I anticipate your suggestion
of something silly, like the ethical system where everyone
worships Beavis and Butt-Head. To that I say these things.
An ethical system need be no more, and is no less for any man
than that system of ethics under which he operates. It need be
anchored to no fact, need be validated in no fashion other than
its success. If I pick a system as my ethic, and I gain a life of
good things, and am happy and content, then the validity of the
system I have chosen is proven.
If, by comparison, my system is similar to or even the same as
another man's, then perhaps we have a Social Ethic, and perhaps
it will turn out to be a society of more than two people. But
rest assured that eventually a person, or group of persons, will
be encountered who do not like our system, or do not understand
it, or simply because of their own differences in ethical belief,
be they large or small, feel themselves not of our Social Ethic.
Then, either on a personal or a societal level, we will have
different ethics, relative to one another.
Mr. Objective: But is that not just differences in personal
taste, there and then, at the moment?
Mr. Relative: Yes, it is. But it need be no more than that, a
personal difference.
Mr. Objective: Well, if ethical beliefs are fit to and decided on
by individuals, or even groups of some kind, surely they cannot
be considered objectively valid or generalisable. And surely they
could not be used as a reliable, non-arbitrary and neutral basis
for greater ethical agreement or cooperation. And wouldn't that
handicap defeat the purpose of greater good?
Mr. Relative: Well, I agree with the thought that ethical
systems, when relative, are arbitrary to those that do not hold
them. But I don't think they need be less arbitrary than being
'something that works'. But to say that there is no basis for
agreement or cooperation in untrue. There are areas of overlap
between the systems.
Mr. Objective: Then in those areas there would be value, similar
value, that is objectively held by both sides.
Mr. Relative: Between those two, yes, but a third, fourth or even
a fifth party may well not agree with the first two. And, what if
we later change our minds on that point, as we are allowed,
because that stance no longer furthers the greater good for our
society's greater numbers?
Mr. Objective: Well, wouldn't the whole idea of change defeat
your argument in this fashion: if you must change, then your
original ethic was wrong, and your new ethic, functioning for you
in a better way, must be closer to a true Ethic.
Mr. Relative: No, untrue. Time passes, and physical surroundings
change, technology changes, tastes, styles and other things
change. Our Social Ethic changes with these things because at
this time in this society in this place under these circumstances
our society benefits from this new ethic, and takes greater
benefits from it.
Look at Social Ethics through this analogy. There is a big,
stretchable sack, full of happy little puppies. The sack has
holes in it so the puppies can breathe. The volume and shape of
boundary of the sack define the Social Ethic. The puppies,
representing all the factors of our society, are constantly
playing around, moving around, and changing the shape and
effective volume of the sack. In this fashion does the Social
Ethic change.
Mr. Objective: But surely there is some goal, some aim, for your
society.
Mr. Relative: Certainly, the welfare and well-being of our
members, and the furtherance and prosperity of our society.
Mr. Objective: And there are concepts, such as the education of
the young, healing of the sick, training for national defense,
welfare for the unfortunate, that are concepts of benevolence and
sharing, that exist in your society and others. And, these have
existed for long periods of time. Surely these are necessary to
social function. They must therefore have a value, objective and
separate from opinion, in a greater sense. Many of these things
develop in societies that have never had contact with one
another.
Mr. Relative: Independent verification is an empirical tool, but
no method is necessarily the best merely because two strangers
devised it, or it uses the least fuel, or works the quickest. In
fact, your analogy supports relativity in ethics. If two
different societies discover a means of behaviour, independent of
one another, and adopt it because it is for the best, then they
have changed their ethic, it is different relative to the one
they had before. If that system no longer serves at some later
date, for either one or both, and a reversion to the earlier
system takes place, relativity in ethics is indicated again.
Also, imagine this. Let us say that two societies, Society One
and Society Two, have different ethical systems. But there is
commerce between them. There is tourism and travel, there is
intermingling, socialisation and intermarriage. Neither society
believes the other to be as advanced or as civilised as it, but
neither can either find a way to usurp or conquer the position of
the other without serious harm to itself.
What need has either society for broader ethical agreement or
cooperation in this case?
Mr. Objective: Together they will be able to solve societal or
ethical problems still common to them both. The greater size of
the combined society will provide for greater resources and
contribution.
Mr. Relative: I see, much in the way that Yugoslavia, as a
greater whole, was able to solve the problems between the
different ethical societies of the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs,
Macedonians and Bosnians? Much as Russians, Azerbaijanis,
Kazakhstanis, Uzbekistanis, Ukrainians, Georgians, Moldovans and
others managed to solve greater problems as a part of the Soviet
Union. Homogenisation is no guarantor of solution.
It is proven in the real and practical world every day that
competition, in nature and society, between different physical or
mental systems is the greater problem solver. Isn't it just as
likely that two competing societies, each suffering Problem A,
may struggle with it until it is solved by one of their methods,
and the other then adopts that solution on inspection?
Mr. Objective: But then that solution has an objective value, and
the two societies move toward homogenisation because they adopt
the same method.
Mr. Relative: Temporarily, perhaps. But the only known solution
is not necessarily the best, or the best for the two societies.
It is, at this point, merely the only known solution.
I don't disagree that different Societal Ethics can prevent a
productive union for larger ethical problems. I simply argue that
competition can solve at least as well as cooperation. The
implication of your original point was that without such
cooperation Social Ethics were doomed to being unable to find
certain solutions, that Homogenised Ethics was therefore better
because of this. But competition is always a better method for
solution determination, while cooperation is perhaps better for
implementation.
Mr. Objective: So you would disagree with the idea that ethical
beliefs come from common sources, that factual observations, good
solid reasons and well-grounded logical assumptions are the bases
for deriving belief systems?
Mr. Relative: Yes, I would. A simple overview would appear to
make these things true, because they seem to appeal to common
sense. Vast numbers of people may agree on a stance or position,
but it only takes one person to value it differently.
Mr. Objective: So you say there are no factual or objective
observations. What about the fact that one kilogramme of stone
weighs one kiligramme?
Mr. Relative: To some it doesn't, it weighs 2.2 pounds.
Mr. Objective: But one kg is 2.2 pounds.
Mr. Relative: Well, first, kilogrammes are mass, and pounds are
weight. But then to some people abortion or a nice hamburger are
murder. Besides which, physical properties are not Ethics.
Mr. Objective: But many things are based on good reasons or
well-grounded logical assumptions.
Mr. Relative: That doesn't make them valid or objective. The good
reasons and well-grounded logical assumptions are made by people,
who have tailored them by their own perceptions.
Take, for example, the New Jersey Devils' victory over the
Detroit Red Wings in the 1995 Stanley Cup. The Devils won by four
games to none.
Mr. Objective: True.
Mr. Relative: This is agreed, 4-0, because after each sixty
minute game the Devils had more goals. But what of the nature of
the victory? The Red Wings fans say that their team played
poorly, or that the Devils' victory was tainted by the trap
system they used.
Devils fans, however, say that they used legal, proper tactics,
and that their team played superbly well, well enough to beat the
Red Wings even at their best.
Mr. Objective: You prove my point. Each team's play had a
quality, a measure to it, and the increase or decrease of that
measurable quality affects the outcome.
Mr. Relative: If there were a concrete point to which you could
anchor the quality of play. I reiterate the point that it is a
relative thing. Agreement with a fact, the Devils' victory,
doesn't allow for agreement with even the origin of that fact,
the quality of play. If the origin of a fact is so ethereal, how
can one extrapolate the future from it, and therefore, what value
can you assign to an assumption based on it? What you can do,
instead, is go out and act in the world, see what works, and
change to that method.
I agree that within a Social Ethic certain things have an
apparent concrete value. Newtonian Physics has value on large
scales at slow speeds. But on a quantum level, or at 90% of the
speed of light, one needs Quantum Statistical Theory, or
Relativity. And for a combination of all these one needs the
Grand Unified Theory.
In Ethics the Grand Unified Theory is that all Ethics are
relative.
Mr. Objective: Surely, though, while there are relative
differences in some ethical views, there are overarching portions
of all beliefs that have an objective validity, or can be
generalised in a reliable way.
Mr. Relative: True, as far as societies choose to place a
temporary, arbitrary value on those things.
Mr. Objective: Surely all it takes is for one thing to have that
value.
Mr. Relative: Okay, what one thing.
Mr. Objective: Gold.
Mr. Relative: Gold's price changes. We, as a society, make an
effort, and it is a complicated one, to put a value on it so that
we can trade by means of it. But the value of gold changes from
day to day. And what value has a mound of gold to a man stranded
with no food, and no hot dog vendor with whom to trade?
Mr. Objective: Love, then, all men value that.
Mr. Relative: But what about polygamists, or divorced people. The
first believes that love is different for men and women, in the
Mormon manner, that he can have many wives, but that no wife may
have more than one husband. Love's value there is relative.
Divorced people change their level of love, or their valuation of
the love they receive changes. It no longer has its original
value to them.
Mr. Objective: But divorce and polygamy are manifestations of
law, and its effect on people.
Mr. Relative: But the passage and enactment of laws is an action
of people, directing their ethical beliefs on people who might
behave differently, who might have different ethical views.
Mr. Objective: What about the value of life?
Mr. Relative: What about the Croats, Bosnians and Serbs. They do
not value one another's lives as much, do they? And what about
Nations that hold Capital Punishment legal, whilst others do not?
Or that some areas of those Nations hold it ethical whilst others
do not?
Mr. Objective: Well, what about things like lying and killing?
These are universally frowned-upon. They are reliably generalised
in that way.
Mr. Relative: Reliable to what degree? White lies are apparently
acceptable. Mercy-killing, revenge killing, crimes of passion,
self-defense. These are acceptable methods of killing in some
societies, whose Social Ethic allows for them. And we
differentiate between planned homicide and manslaughter, do we
not?
Different cultures have different moral codes, so no ethic is
objectively solid.
Mr. Objective: That is an unsound argument.
Mr. Relative: Okay. Not every culture or person in that culture
will make the same ethical decision. Therefore, there are at
least as many ethical codes as there are decisions and consequent
acts that people will make.
Mr. Objective: Then Hitler's Holocaust wasn't evil. Because in
Nazi circles of ethics it was acceptable?
Mr. Relative: In Nazi circles, yes, it was ethical.
Unfortunately, the society to whom this was evil, the Jews, was
powerless to enforce its ethic. The winning societies of World
War II found it evil, relative to their Social Ethics, and
punished the Nazis subject to their laws.
Mr. Objective: Then how can Cultural Relativism function if all
people have diferent ethics?
Mr. Relative: Because part of ethics is furtherance of that
ethic, and sometimes that involves recognising the benefit of
taking part in society, or groups of societies, like WWII. The
decision can be made at any time to leave.
Mr. Objective: But, surely, some of the relative aspects of
ethics actually support the need for non-relativism, providing
the very groundwork for it?
Mr. Relative: Not true. Non relativity in ethics implies that
ethics are therefore the same to all, and this is simply not
true.
Mr. Objective: But if your society has an ethic, there must be
things constant to you all as a basis for that ethic.
Mr. Relative: No, there must not. We all realise the benefit of
acting under a Social Ethic, and we therefore make concessions to
socially accepted or arbitrarily drawn valules for the duration
of our use of the social system.
Mr. Objective: But, once again, consider that certain behaviours
are common to all societies, or at least to those that promote
and achieve greater good for greater numbers. I remain
unconvinced of your arguments on this point. There are too many
similarities among these systems. These replicated values and
mores must indicate ethical validity, and objective value for
those ethics.
Mr. Relative: Supposing what you say is true. Let's begin with
something seemingly common to all: killing is wrong, because all
life has value. So what? All life has value, let's take a look at
that.
First, if all life has value, ethics are not objective and valid
because of that. Rather, they are relative because of it. If all
life has value, surely all lives are equally valuable. If all
lives are not equally valuable then some lives, ethically, are
worth relatively more or less, and the value of life, the very
basis of this theory, is a relative concept. So, all lives must
have the same value.
Under the ethic that all life has value, and it is the same value
for all lives, then when two men sacrifice their lives to save a
third, a drowning child, perhaps, they have acted unethically.
They have discarded two lives in order to keep one. They have
reduced the number of valued lives, which is what a killer does,
does he not, when he kills?
Under this ethic, whereby all lives are equally valulable, it
would be unethical not to weep for the death of any person as
much as for a loved one, for the same value of life has passed
on.
And consider this, if every life has the same value, then which
way is it: has each life an equal share of the total Life Value,
or has each life Value, as in Value = some amount?
If it is the first case, then having children is unethical. Each
child would demand a share of the Life Value, and would require
that some be taken from all others to make that share. Having
children, therefore, decreases the worth of every other person
alive.
If the second is true, then not having children is unethical. To
make a concious desision to prevent Life from increasing in value
is to choose to keep the level of greater good, measured in life,
artificially low.
Mr. Objective: But that refers to life. Our point was 'killing is
wrong'.
Mr. Relative: Killing is wrong is not a point that we can argue
relativity over on a strategic scope. Although I think you'd
agree that it would be amended to 'killing is wrong unless...'
where unless is the prevention of further killing. So 'killing is
wrong' is only true in some circumstances, relative to others!
Let me make a sweeping argument, here.
As long as there are at least two ethical systems, then Ethics is
a relative concept. In order for Ethics to be non-relative it
must be Universal, i.e. there is One Ethic. There can be only
one. This one Ethic applies to all, and by its function, the
greater good for the greater number is achieved. The needs of the
many outweigh the needs of the one, if you will.
But everyday life proves the existence of multiple ethics. One
Ethic would require the same resultant decision from all people
in the same ethical dilemma. But people in the same ethical
dilemma do not make the same decisions.
This raises the question of unethical behaviour. If there is one
Ethic, and more than one behaviour, at least all-but-one of those
behaviours must be unethical, because they are not the Ethically
dictated act.
This is not correct. If people can act outside the prescribed
Ethical area, then Ethics must be relative. The moment someone
acts in an unEthical manner they have created an ethic that is
different in relation to Ethics.
It is the purpose of Ethics to function as a Universal Truth, a
concept of view, action, treatment and behaviour that generates a
quality of Good. It is the purpose of Ethics to operate for all
people. But Ethics is no longer true the moment one of its
constituents acts outside it, or the moment it no longer serves
all its constituents. Ethics is in error if it claims to be one
thing for all. The greater good for some is not the greater good
for all, and those that differ in their greater good at one point
will agree on it at another. The only way to reconcile this is to
agree that Ethics is relative, from the individual upward.
Data originally transmitted: 9711.26
Pages provided by Geocities